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INTERNATIONAL

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OCTOBER, 1903.

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THE SPECIAL MORAL TRAINING OF GIRLS.

In an article from the pen of the Rev. the Hon. E. Lyttelton, published in this Journal some time ago, he dealt with the difficult subject of the instruction of the young in relation to sex in a way which must make every thoughtful woman who has read his words grateful to him for the courage, delicacy and purity with which he has treated his theme. Since its original appearance Canon Lyttelton has enlarged the article and published it in book form, and in what I have to say it is to the book that I shall refer.

In several places the writer makes allusion to such teaching as it affects girls, but he candidly confesses that he prefers to leave all details as to girls' needs in the hands of those who have had the opportunity of gaining information at first hand as he himself has been necessarily debarred from doing. This is practically an appeal to women for their views, for their co-operation in a great work; and in the absence of any one older, wiser and of wider experience taking up the challenge I venture to do so.

Before dealing at all and even very briefly with the form which such teaching should take where girls are concerned, I should like to clear the ground by questioning some of the tacit assumptions which seem to underlie nearly all masculine writing on sex subjects, and which Canon Lyttelton consciously or unconsciously shares with many other wise and

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noble men. These are, the comparatively slight risks that girls run as compared with boys, if allowed to pass through the shoals of adolescence untaught and unwarned of its dangers, and of the practical non-existence of passion as a factor in the life of a good woman.

Many writers and thinkers who concede the need for giving direct instruction to boys shrink from what appears to them meddling with girlish innocence. Even Miss Ellice Hopkins, the great apostle of purity, confesses that the subject of the teaching of girls has caused her far greater perplexity than how to deal with boys. I hope I shall not be misunderstood. I do not underestimate the huge temptations that surround the growing youth, the vice that flaunts before him in the street, the vile talk, the vicious example of many of his comrades and companions, the low tone of public opinion shared even by women who make such large allowance for loose and immoral conduct on the part of young men as can have but a most deteriorating effect on those unwisely excused from parental disapproval or wholesome social ostracism. It is surely the greatest wrong that women do to men that they expect so little from men, the consciences and moral standards of all of us being to so large an extent built up out of the opinions, the approvals and disapprovals prevailing among our little surrounding public. In this particular point women are indeed better protected. Society, at any rate in its upper layers, holds out to them a far stricter code of morality and visits upon its detected infringers such cruel social banishment, that there is no doubt that these conditions combined do act as a powerful agent in favor of at least external morality and probably even of a higher standard of purity. But if fear of social disgrace is a potent deterrent from wrongdoing, and no one who faces facts can deny it its due, there may be other motives and impulses left—some common to both sexes, some more apparent in women—which tell in quite the contrary direction.

That girls under present circumstances must be but very imperfectly safeguarded is evidenced by two facts alone. That a large number of young women in every rank of life are seduced, far larger than the indirect evidence of the Registrar-

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General's birth returns would lead us to suppose, for nearly all murdered babies are illegitimate children and first children and numbers of other such infants (at least in America and Australia, I cannot speak as to Great Britain), perish unborn by the hands of the abortionist, man or woman. The second consideration which gives away completely the case for non-interference is the prevalence, far greater than is commonly dreamt of, of habits of solitary vice among young girls. This is less easy of proof. The existence of feminine immorality in this form is burked by respectable society, ignored by respectable literature such as Mothers' Guides and manuals for the training of girls, but admitted by any medical woman or by any medical man whose practice lies mainly among women. Because solitary vice is less frequent than among boys and it is said less dangerous in its immediate physical results, it is customary to deny its habitual occurrence among girls, but that view will by no means bear inspection. Personally I have known of many instances. I have before my eyes one pretty young woman, now the inmate of an English lunatic asylum, who confessed, and as far as could be gathered with truth, that she had no recollection of a time when she had been free from the habit. This is doubtless an extreme case, so abnormal that one is inclined to raise the supposition whether the degrading practice may not have been partly at least a result rather than a cause of the nervous and mental unsoundness. But from the greater we may infer the less. Besides, even if on the whole the physical results be less baneful, there can be no distinction at all as between boy and girl as to the lowering moral effects of such a habit if persisted in.

I trust then that I have made so much clear, that as things are, many girls, girls too out of good homes, become demoralized by one or other form of vice. Further, that as no human being sins or errs untempted it follows therefore that girls, like boys, must be open to temptation on the sexual side of their nature. The next step is to examine somewhat more in detail the conditions surrounding the immature woman, for modified by these conditions the dangers to which she is exposed take on a different and in some ways it may be a far more

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subtle guise than the cruder, frankly admitted temptations that lie in wait for the boy. It appears to me that it is principally because of these modifications that the very real risks to which girls are exposed are so commonly overlooked by parents, guardians and teachers.

In the first place while I admit that masculine passion is often excited and masculine self-control often overcome by sensual solicitation from the other sex, it must be borne in mind that temptation is never most dangerous and beguiling when open and direct. Advances made by women to men, whether in the street or in the drawing-room are always of that definite and unmistakeable character. A man or a boy may but lightly esteem his own chastity, but all the while he knows when he is invited to be unchaste. It is not so with the respectably brought up average girl. The man's advances may appear to her perfectly legitimate. She may not recognize them for what they are nor guess the meaning of his carefully administered flattery and his partiality for her society. She may indeed suppose that all this points the way to engagement and marriage or she may see in it nothing save the expression of an exceedingly pleasant, exciting and novel sort of friendship; her inclination may be won, her ideas fascinated, and then the yielding of her will-power to fraud and deception readily follows. The path of many a girl, good but untaught and unwarned, is like a railroad where the engine-driver sees not the signals, or sees them only to misread them.

Race inheritance, the established conditions of society as well as the training of the individual girl, all tend to make her much more yielding than the boy. Not half often enough is she taught the duty of saying no, nor impressed with the frequency with which that duty in connection with many different subjects may arise in her own life. The love of approbation, the desire to please is habitually strong in the growing young woman. It is instilled into girls from their childhood that she must make herself agreeable, and particularly so to the opposite sex. Through that avenue everything comes to her. By what legal and social disabilities has she not been prevented from earning her living except by making herself

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sufficiently pleasing to some man to induce him to support her? If man's favor is accepted as woman's proper objective, is it wonderful, taught as she is always to be yielding, rarely reminded of the duty of resisting selfishness in others, if she now and then learns her lesson somewhat too thoroughly? While it is naturally difficult to obtain any approach to exact knowledge on this matter, my own observations lead me to the conclusion that in a certain proportion of cases of seduction among respectable working and middle class girls the fatal step has been taken merely through this too easy yielding to the will of another, without anything like physical passion of either a high or a low type—sex as a moral force and therefore in its highest development the protective shield of chastity being dormant. To this I shall return later. It may seem paradoxical and inconsistent with this view that woman's physical maturity advances more rapidly than that of man. I admit the paradox and until a scientific or generalized explanation is forthcoming can only remind inquirers that analogous inequalities in physical development are not unknown elsewhere in the animal kingdom.

But there may be weightier motives still for teaching a girl early the reasons for self-control. In the hour of trial it may happen that all ordinary considerations of prudence and duty are powerless against the rising storm of sexual feeling in the girl herself, for passion in the girl as in the boy may be normal or abnormal, naturally developed or precocious in its growth. Society never reasons before pouring its ruthless condemnation on a girl who falls. If it did society would remember that these girls all had fathers and that in many cases the daughter's exaggerated sexual impulses and want of self-restraint can be distinctly traced to the father's self-indulgence within or without the pale of marriage.

Curiosity, the desire to know and inquire into the unknown, is not a motive confined to one sex. Mothers do not notice that their girl-children show a less eager interest in their surroundings than boys. Everyone accustomed to the ways of children knows that little girls are always asking why the clock strikes, what is the name of a flower or bird new to them, and just as

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often from their lips as from those of boys comes the testing question, the question that more than any other tries a parent's courage and truth, "Mother, where did the baby come from?" Girls, as a rule, have fewer opportunities than boys of partly solving their difficulties through observing the ways of animals, and if a mother does not think it right to gratify her young daughter's innocent desire for knowledge on sex subjects natural curiosity often grows into an unhealthy acquisitiveness, the whole matter assumes an undesirable importance instead of being relegated to its subordinate place in the child's thoughts, and the atmosphere of unwholesome mysteriousness with which it is surrounded becomes later a powerful allurement to the needless or untimely gratification of the awakening impulses of sex.

Lastly in respect to muscular exercise girls stand at a great disadvantage. All who have studied the subject of physical culture recognize the bracing effect on boys' moral nature of gymnastics, field-sports, and other forms of open-air exercise. Very rarely is this aspect of the matter taken into consideration when plans for girls' training are under discussion. Healthy animal spirits which ought to find an outlet in vigorous physical exertion are repressed with danger to health and certain encouragement of unhealthy sentimentality and precocious sexual feeling. Something it is true has been done already in connection with large girls' schools, but much more remains to be accomplished. Energies spent in this way would leave less time and inclination for excessive and indiscriminate novel reading, a pursuit that tends still further to prematurely develop the emotional side of the nature.

If we analyze the causes that lead to youthful immorality of the more patent sort among girls, it is clear either that the girl must have yielded to her own ill-regulated passions, or if the victim of a sensual man that she has paid the penalty of sheer ignorance. But under either supposition her fall is still largely due to ignorance and might have been prevented by that timely knowledge which would have given her the ability to protect herself from herself and from the thoughtless or sel-

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fish advances of another. Here is where the injustice comes in. Society accords to the modern girl a great deal of liberty and denies her the light wherewith she could walk safely in that liberty. Society punishes the girl who yields credulously to an admirer but neither as society nor as individuals do we concern ourselves in the beginning to see that she was ever taught what risks lay in front of her or that she was ever instructed to recognize the first symptoms of danger, the vague theory being that an innocent girl's unspoiled instincts were guide enough and protection enough and that anything so commonplace as definite formulated information was at any rate superfluous and probably demoralizing. The theory of maidenhood guarded by relatives and teachers in an innocence devoid of evil because no knowledge of evil was suffered to enter from without, of the daughter watched in her parents' castle till she was handed over to the husband chosen for her, may once have been logically defensible. It is so no longer, among English-speaking races at least, so that all the means that Canon Lyttelton recommends for preserving pure the thoughts of the growing boy and for finding for his developing energies due exercise as well as his appeal for direct instruction and delicately worded warning, all apply, *mutatis mutandis* to the girl. In reality the question is now not so much one of acquiring knowledge, but rather of who shall impart it, how it shall be imparted and when. Every woman who grows up to maturity gains such knowledge somehow and somewhen. But does society or do mothers take any pains to assure themselves that girls receive such information in time to be of any use to them, in time to tide them over the dangerous years under twenty which are responsible for by far the largest number of lives wrecked by this particular disaster?

In the late Mr. Alexander Sutherland's "Growth and Development of the Moral Instinct," occurs an instructive passage, casting as it does a side-light upon the commonly accepted view of what is implied in womanly purity, the view held by so many male thinkers. In the ninth chapter, after tracing the gradual bringing of the sexual instinct in the race under the control of moral principle he goes on, "Moreover,

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there is ample reason to believe that educated women now largely enter upon marriage out of purely sympathetic considerations in which sex counts for something but with all its grosser aspects gone," and concludes by quoting Dr. H. Campbell as saying in his "Difference in the Nervous Organization of Men and Women," p. 200: " 'It may be taken for certain that sex desire enters not at all into the minds of a very large proportion of women when contemplating matrimony.' " I am not in a position to controvert either of these statements, nor do I wish to do so. Wherein I cannot agree with the distinguished writers is in the inference they draw that the extinction of the sex-attraction of the man for the woman is a good or a desirable thing, or even that such extinction is on the lines of the trend of woman's future development. I freely admit that there has been in the past and that there still exists among women a vast amount of what may be termed this sexless attitude in regard to marriage and as a result a vast amount of what may be termed the passive sort of marriage. In our present economic condition the most common factor, the one that weighs, perhaps unconsciously beyond all others, is the need of a home and a supporter, and if the average woman can gain the provider of the home in a man who is not distasteful to her so much the better. The desire to please, gratified vanity, and ungratified physical passion are the other motives that single and combined lead the bulk of women to say "Yes" when the momentous question is put to them. But woman as we see her developing is becoming more and more an economically independent being. She will not in the future need to marry for a livelihood as we in the past have had to do. Whether this come about as the result of the crude compulsory plans of some German socialists or on the lines suggested by Mrs. Stetson Gilman in her study of the growth of the home on the principle of the division of labor and the specialization of workers,[1] or on some better plan than either, lies outside the present argument. The meaner motives, vanity and love of conquest which now run riot in the hearts of idle girls

[1] "Women and Economics."

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are likely then to be less unwholesomely active and will besides, in a less constricted life, find freer scope to spend themselves in more harmless fashion in work or study or play rather than those extremely risky subjects, possible human mates.

I lay particular stress upon passion as existent in woman, even as part of the rightful equipment of every healthy woman, because I think that in the future it is an element of character which is likely to be more and not less fully developed and must therefore be reckoned with. Woman has been regarded as the passive instrument of man's desires and she has moulded herself to his ideals, has come to consider feminine passion as something disgraceful. It has suited masculine wishes and reasoning to embody in her the ascetic ideal that man has been so far from realizing in his own person and as a consequence woman's morality has become a collection of inconsistencies. She has been taught to believe that she should ever make allowances for and (within the marriage bond) yield to masculine impulses and self-indulgent demands, while denying even to herself the existence in herself, in her fellow-women or in her own daughter of the potentialities of physical love that are inseparably bound up with the finest, richest and most perfect vitality. There are men and they are either men of a low type of mind or they have had the clearness of their perceptions blunted by familiarity with the coarser aspects of life and by association with a low stamp of woman who go quite to the other extreme and habitually think, speak and write of women as if they were but bundles of hot desires meeting with and appealing to man on the ground of the merest animal passion, unconsecrated and unspiritualized by the faintest intellectual stimulus or moral sympathy. I am not at present addressing myself to these, but both schools of male thinkers, wide apart as the poles in all else, yet have this one ground in common. Both take man as the imaginary centre of their universe of thought. His needs and career having been first investigated and decided upon they then proceed to deduce woman's needs and woman's life from his. It is done by the one school with brutal indifference, by the other kindly and with the best intentions, but it is done and from such premises the resultant

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must inevitably be that woman's development is regarded as subsidiary to man's.

A tacit proof of the prepotence of this masculine element in the popular philosophy of life is to be noted in one quite neutral branch of literature. Almost every book of travels contains a chapter headed "Women and Marriage." (Think you that if the positions among ourselves had been reversed that same chapter would not still have been there, but under the style of "Men and Marriage"?) All this is very natural in our stage of thought, probably inevitable, but it is the best of men who will be the first to acknowledge the desirability for the blended human race that the woman's voice be heard while the future in which the children of both men and women have to live is in the making in the minds of thinkers.

If we recognize, as did Thring, as did Elizabeth Blackwell[2] before Thring, the unspeakable sacredness and delicate mystery that belongs to human birth and the launching on the sea of life of a new human being with all the potentialities bound up in that being's existence it will be seen that if we would have clear, definite and even practically useful ideas on the subject of sex it will be necessary for us to entirely re-arrange our modes of thinking. Our present collections of beliefs are marked by some inconsistencies in detail but there exists a certain rude congruity among them, based upon the idea that there is something inherently unclean about the idea of sex, that the impulses of that side of our nature are to be indulged as a necessary but regrettable concession to the flesh, mostly to masculine flesh, and the less woman is actively inspired by such impulses the better for her own self-respect and for her elevating and purifying influence upon man. On the basal assumption that sex and the indulgence of sex-passion involves evil rests the second already touched upon that in woman in so far as she approaches man's highest ideal passion as an active force does not exist. With the fall of the first assumption goes the second. Deal with sex as with something pure and holy and the feeling that a woman's purity is smirched if she ex-

[2] "The Human Element in Sex."

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periences, aye, and owns to passional attraction passes too. It will be seen then that the truly indelicate position is not that a woman should know the promptings of passion but that it should be for a moment possible for her to contemplate marriage with any man for whom she does not feel physical attraction. One to whom I once expressed these thoughts was acquiescent but inclined to ask, *"Cui bono?"* For two practical reasons besides the interest of pure ethics should the question be discussed. First because it is certainly only those who admit the existence of passion in the normal woman who have any logical basis for a single standard of morality for both sexes. Others may indeed press it as a counsel of perfection, but it is always open to those who hold the conventional view to urge in defense the irresistible force of temptation in any particular man's case, whereas if it be conceded that women too are open to temptation on that side then there is some prospect of an idea something like this gaining entrance to a young man's mind: "If the women of my acquaintance are of like passions to myself and tempted even as I am and yet lead lives of self-restraint and continence and are on the whole healthy, active, contented and happy in so doing then there does not seem to be much reason why we young men cannot be as pure as they."

The other reason is even more weighty and is far less understood. This is that the force of passion in woman long unnaturally repressed or equally unnaturally undeveloped is likely in the immediate future to be a growing force, possibly for a while even a growing danger. Woman's standard of physical vitality and strength is rising, her independence of thought, feeling and action is increasing with a less cramped environment and a freer life. There is every reason to believe, judging from all analogy, that the intensity of feminine sexual passion is likely to keep step with these. Canon Lyttelton remarks truly that in all probability both the parents and the young people of to-day are faced with greater difficulties, have to bear heavier responsibilities in this particular field than fell to the lot of their ancestors. I would vary and extend the scope of this saying and add that if the girl of to-day needs help

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and direct instruction (and she does), the girl of the future will need it more. The prospect is not one to be faced with fear and trembling, neither are its increasing difficulties to be ignored. In the strivings of such passion I trace an active force on the side of goodness and purity, and equally so whether gratified and sanctified in adoring yet mutually respecting love or whether restrained yet still sanctified by unselfish consideration for the rights, the claims, and the happiness of others. The old cavalier's song is ever the hymn of fidelity and loyalty, fidelity to the individual and loyalty to an ideal,

> "I could not love thee, dear, so much,
> Loved I not honor more."

Yet I do not therefore shut my eyes to the inevitable converse, that all women will not be found worthy, that the revulsion from the morality of convention to the immorality of license will not be unknown, that feminine vice will take on new forms, that some women with stronger passions and hampered by less external restraint will make the more conservative feel woman's emancipation to be a not unmixed good. But this effect I anticipate in faults and vices not specially sexual. It is only too probable that we and our immediate successors will witness an increase in feminine drunkenness and drug habits and in feminine crime. If you place woman in conditions analogous to those which in men have produced certain results it is only reasonable to look for analogous effects. But there is no harking back. We shall have to take this coming woman, this freer, stronger creature and using her very virtues to counteract her vices adapt our training and teaching to make of her a being noble, passionate and pure.

To return to where I started from. If my reading of my own sex and of the growing tendencies of my own sex be correct the inference is a simple one. Give to girls practically the same instruction that Canon Lyttelton would impart to boys. The difficulties of conveying such information are lessened by the fact that there should be no hesitance as to who should be the instructor throughout, for the same mother who first opens the eyes of her little daughter to the beautiful wonderment of birth and growth can gently lead the older girl to look

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deeper into these same mysteries. Very simple rules may always guide the giving of such teaching to boy or girl alike. One, and this is the keynote to perfect simplicity and the completest confidence between mother and child, that the mother should begin to touch the baby mind *before* the barrier of conscious sex shall have risen up to build a wall invisible, but oh how often impassable between mother and child, a barrier as real between mother and daughter as between mother and son. It is to the sexless mind of the child that the mother can most easily and naturally address herself when she first unfolds the mysteries of sex. The next sound principle to bear in mind and this applies rather to older children, when the parent is faced with the difficulty of deciding how much to tell and where to stop is that teaching should be mainly positive and dwell upon the wholesome, beautiful and natural aspects of sex, generation and birth. On these lines there is practically nothing that you can tell that can harm the most innocent child. It is otherwise with what may be called the pathological side of the sex question in its painful, loathsome and not elevating details, though as both boys and girls go on into their teens the dangers have indeed to be indicated and the needs, temptations and risks of every individual child to be fairly estimated and weighed. In the case of young girls no warning could possibly be too strong or too explicit which should place a girl on her guard against the wiles, the flatteries and the deceitfulness of immoral men. Nor can any mother lay to her soul the flattering unction that no such danger can come nigh to her beloved, well-guarded daughter. The most terrible, the most unaccountable cases of seduction are perhaps those in which some old family friend has abused trust, the trust of the parents and the uninformed trust of the child. Where her daughter's virtue, honor and future are at stake a mother should take no risks, leave nothing for granted. But as Dr. Milner Fothergill acutely remarks, let her teaching take the form rather of a lesson on purity than a mere lecture on prudence. Again a mother may be parted from her daughter by the hand of death; she may leave her girl as she thinks under the safe oversight of some aunt or intimate friend. But there is one condition

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she cannot ensure and that is the transfer all at once to another of the confidence and trust which has been growing between mother and daughter since babyhood.

I have lately come across a sheaf of leaflets and booklets to aid mothers and teachers in dealing with this branch of the moral training of the young, beginning with the young child of either sex and ending with the growing girl and the big boy. Two are in the form of half-penny tracts published by the Woman's Temperance Publishing Association, Chicago. The first, called "Motherhood," is signed M. A. L. and deals most beautifully and tenderly with the ideas that can be conveyed to a very little child. It purports to be a talk between a mother and her boy and is, we are told, the substance of a conversation actually held between the writer and her nephew of seven. It began over the child's breakfast egg and he is gradually led on to discover for himself, by the heuristic method as it were, the points of resemblance between the development of the chicken from the egg, the birth of the kitten and the coming into the world of the baby brother or sister whom his mother is just then caring for as the hen cares for her eggs. Dr. Mary Wood-Allen, of Ann Arbor, in a more recent series has dealt with the difficulties of every age. Where the teaching comes to be specialized for girls I do not find in her books as in so many otherwise excellent attempts to solve the problem for parents anything of the *pour pis aller* tone. She gives to the girl as she gives to the boy of her best and ripest thought. She deals with the one as frankly as with the other.

In view of the fact that there are still so many parents who fail to recognize the need for such instruction for the young of both sexes, who either shrink from giving it or are unfitted to do so, the question deserves the serious consideration of those who as teachers or managers are responsible for the administration of national and state systems of education. The *raison d'etre* of all compulsory education is that the training of the young citizen is of such paramount national importance that it cannot safely be entrusted to parental care or to parental neglect. The state must see and know for itself that its future citizens are growing up an advantage and not a menace to their

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country and to their fellow citizens. Wherever a national system of education exists I hold that the state is shirking its duty which does not provide for the teaching to the young of truths of the deepest import in their bearing on the race. The Lady Teachers' Association of the State of Victoria, Australia, recently laid before the Minister of Education in Melbourne the very practical suggestion that lessons in this branch of special physiology should be given to the upper classes, by a medical man to the boys, by a medical woman to the girls. So far, however, the proposal has fallen flat, but it deserves passing mention as a sign of the recognition by teachers of our government schools of one point in which the most advanced curricula fail grievously. Something was hoped by reformers when the teaching of physiology became general, some twenty years ago, but although some great scientific writers assisted in preparing textbooks it was soon found that it was quite possible to teach an emasculated physiology, and ignore even in plates and handbooks the very organs of the transmission of life and all that hangs on a right understanding of their functions.

When fathers and mothers, teachers who assist fathers and mothers and the State who represents fathers and mothers, all do their duty we shall no longer be tempted to echo Ennis Richmond's half despairing cry for "a neutral sex to teach our children the ethics of purity."

ALICE HENRY.

WRITERS' CLUB, MELBOURNE, AUSTRALIA.

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THE RIGHT OF FREE THOUGHT IN MATTERS OF RELIGION.

IT is sometimes thought that the study of philosophy can be carried on in complete seclusion, and that the thinker is trespassing upon foreign territory when he interferes in the world of practice. This is a prejudice which it is to the interest of many people to cultivate. It is inconvenient to the partisans of the established order of things, when their pretensions are compared with their real motives. It is not less embarrassing for the reformer when he too is called upon to show that the new order which he would introduce, promises a genuine satisfaction to the demands of a disinterested spirit. And the particular demand which is voiced by thinkers as a class, is the demand for freedom in the formation of opinion. Other human needs may count upon a certain and clear expression. The very structure of social and commercial institutions embodies the main human appetites and cravings. But it is only incidentally that they subserve the free movement of thought. Each party in opposition is for the time being an advocate of toleration, but when it gains power, it tends to replace an old despotism by a new one. It is, therefore, the perpetual office of philosophy to stand aloof from these more immediate practical interests and to champion the loftier and therefore more remote interests when they are threatened or obscured. And in particular it seems to me at this moment to be necessary once more to raise an old question, in order that it may be answered in the light of new circumstances. *How far is conformity to be exacted in matters of religion?* And the class of persons upon whom this question is pressing at this time with special urgency, and who will furnish me with a text for some general considerations, is the whole body of the teaching profession. Now this is a matter upon which it is the duty of all serious students of ethics to make up their minds, and having made up their minds to give expression to their opinion in the most effective way. It may be that even the majority of the readers of this JOURNAL are anxious to impose tests of orthodoxy of some kind or other

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upon those persons who undertake the training of the young. But whether this be so or not, at any rate it is better that the imposition of religious tests upon the teacher should be maintained or even extended after a free discussion, than that the present state of things should be regarded as unalterable and beyond dispute. Nor is the fate of the teacher indifferent to the student of philosophy. As things go at present, teachers form a large proportion of the thinking class, and if they are muzzled, philosophical studies will lose some of their already limited vogue.

I.

The present controversy in England about the Education Act makes the imposition of religious tests upon teachers a matter of more pressing interest to the English reader than to the American reader, but the problem is one that in the nature of things must recur from time to time, and is capable, I hope, of being treated in such a way as to admit of a general answer.

It is noteworthy that the dispute has been carried on as though all persons were satisfied about the main doctrines of the Christian religion, and as though the controversy lay between the Anglican Church on the one hand, and the Trinitarian non-conformists on the other. Now to any one who realizes the actual condition of educated opinion upon these matters, this is simply a ludicrous misapprehension. So far is it from being the case that in England—and it is best for me to speak in this definite way; an American reader can make his own corrections—that I know very few thinking men whose attitude towards the traditional forms of religion is as conservative as my own. And what is more, the class of persons from which teachers are drawn, whether in elementary or secondary schools, is permeated by the same revolutionary spirit in matters of religious opinion, as that which I seem to trace among my own circle of acquaintances. Now for such men there is no relief in replacing one form of orthodoxy by another. There is the same reluctance in both of the conflicting parties to recognize the growing authority of the scientific method and, in particular, its application to the study of the biblical histories. And

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this reluctance is a symptom of positive hostility to that temper of mind by which alone scientific and moral progress is made possible; the temper which learns by experiment, by boldly marching forth into the unknown. And so the young teacher is led on by every other study, be it scientific, historical, literary, to cultivate a free and impartial judgment. (I am speaking of the most advanced methods of teaching, of course.) But when he passes from these other subjects of instruction, and attempts to apply the modes of thought which he has learned there, to the traditional setting of religious truth, he is met by arbitrary restrictions. He is told by his religious guide, for example, that the demonology which has been expelled from medicine and the statute book, is still to be accepted in the pages of the "New Testament," and that the miracles which in Roman and Greek history, are a certain token of the fabulous, are to be regarded as the proper evidence of Jesus' divine mission. Now this state of things cannot, or at least ought not, to go on much longer. It is impossible to teach with two voices. "The voice is Jacob's voice, but the hands are the hands of Esau." The teacher who has been inspired all week by the promises of scientific discovery and mechanical invention, cannot for a select hour fall back into the pre-scientific temper of the Syrian writers of the New Testament. In fact religious teaching must make terms with scientific method. Until that is done, the teacher is made the whipping boy of an unconscious hypocrisy. The other alternative is to banish religion from the school time-table. But before that is done, we ought to be quite certain that it is impossible to reconcile the two conflicting parties. I do not think it is. I believe that it is possible to safeguard the personal honor of the teacher and at the same time to satisfy the permissible demands of positive religious teaching.

II.

This reconciliation is only possible if we can succeed in marking off the scope and method of scientific teaching on the one hand, and of religious teaching on the other, and this in such a way that there remains no necessary contradiction between

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the two. Nor must this reconciliation be brought about by any undue depreciation of either party. We must show on the one hand that the scientific method has a moral authority which religious teaching is bound to recognize, and on the other hand that the religious experience is part of that actual and objective content which science must interpret and organize. And first as to the moral authority of the scientific method.

An incident which came under my notice a short time since so impressed itself upon my mind that it forced me to reconsider many notions which I have taken rather too much for granted. A little child was placed under the care of a Roman Catholic nurse. The child was docile but restless and somewhat excitable. Although she was timid as perhaps all children are, she was not afraid to go into a room in the dark and alone. After the nurse had gone, it was found that she had been in the habit of frightening the child in order to keep it quiet. The child would no longer go into a dark room alone for fear that some one—some imp or black man, as she had been told—would fetch her or hurt her. In all my experience I have not known any one gain as much from the traditional consolations of religion as this little child has lost for the time being from the superstition of the nurse. And this actual occurrence has served me for a parable by which to measure the services of the scientific method in freeing man from fears of his own creation. In the sublime words of Lucretius: "Even as children are flurried and dread all things in the thick darkness, thus we in the daylight fear at times things not a whit more to be dreaded than those which children shudder at in the dark and fancy sure to be. This terror therefore and darkness of the mind must be dispelled, not by the rays of the sun and glittering shafts of day, but by the aspect and law of nature." So far as scientific method frees man from groundless anticipations, it makes possible that attitude of calm confidence in the order of nature which is also an ingredient of religious faith. The preaching of hell-fire which formed a leading element in the religion of the earlier part of the nineteenth century, is like the manufactured alarm of the ignorant nurse, and, I fear, darkened the lives of many timid and childlike persons.

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The demonology, therefore, which forms a salient portion of the "New Testament," must be removed from religious instruction, especially when it is given to imaginative children. And what child is not imaginative? I shudder as there passes before my eyes the mournful procession of helpless children spiritually tortured and deformed by superstition; the perpetual massacre of the innocents. No apology is needed for the science which makes these crimes less frequent. Similar reasons lead me to put on one side with distaste and, indeed loathing, the morbid fancies of the spiritualist. There are some exceptions to the maxim that I will venture to lay down. But it is my own experience and that of many persons with whom I have conversed, that the attitude of mind which spiritualism involves, introduces a certain disorder into the mind, and clouds over the serene apprehension of truth which is the crown and joy of the scientific temper.

Not only is science the highway to serene confidence in the course of nature, it fulfills another office which religion claims for its own. Through medicine in particular and the arts of life in general, it relieves pain and increases human happiness to an extent of which religious tradition fails to take account. And while according to some the benefits of religious belief are confined to the possessor, the benefits of science are indifferent to the distinctions of creed. The anæsthetic relieves the agony of the atheist as well as of the believer. No faith in God or bargain with the Almighty is the condition of these miracles. The antiseptic and the knife cannot indeed raise from the dead, but they can save from dying. Human science on the one hand, and human suffering on the other, offer as majestic spectacles to the seeing eye as the marvels of the Evangelists. The founder of the Christian religion promised that greater wonders should be seen than those which he himself performed. And his prophecy is daily realized in the hospitals of the sick, and the prolonged and more abundant life of mankind at large.

But the science which frees from empty fear, and the science which ministers to pain, is also something more. It is a sublime revelation, and one which unlike some other revelations, does not contradict itself. As each page unfolds itself, it is

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found inscribed in characters which are indelible. And we can peruse them without any after-thoughts. Hence the mind feels beneath itself the certainty which theologians of a more ancient day have vainly sought in revealed truth. The nebular theory, for example, is enacted before the eyes of astronomers. Worlds flash into being and worlds decay. There is therefore the less need of a local apocalypse which, like the "Book of Revelation," is the passing dream of a Jewish enthusiast, or of prophets who, like the sons of Zebedee, call down fire upon a world which goes its way and regards them not. The astronomer may learn something from the apostle, but he can also teach him something.

III.

This same triumphant spirit which is conquering the rest of the universe, cannot be prevented from investigating the credentials of religion. Obscurantism is like a horse in blinkers, which does not see the rider upon its back. The critical method which is making possible the scientific understanding and, as we shall see in a moment the scientific use of the biblical books, is no invention of self-willed heretics. It consists largely in the application of two canons which Leibnitz traced as follows: "The future can be read in the past, the distant can be read in what is near." It is in the light of these principles that modern historical methods have reinterpreted the whole of man's past. As applied to the books of the "Old Testament," these canons exclude first all particular prophecies; I say particular prophecies because there is no doubt that the general tendency of Jewish aspiration was itself prophetic of the later and more spiritual forms of Jewish religion. But with this qualification, we may accept the critical rule formulated by Martineau ("Seat of Authority in Religion," p. 577): whenever any person in the narrative is made to speak in language or to refer to events which had their origin at a later date, the report is incredible as an anachronism. Now it is the application of this rule that has been the main clue in disentangling the successive strata of tradition upon which the Jewish religion is based. And the results vindicate the method. The de-

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velopment of the idea of God in ancient Israel is the supreme type of spiritual progress and cannot be neglected with impunity by any system of liberal education. But this standpoint is so far from involving any acceptance of the miraculous parts of the Jewish tradition that, by an almost universal consent, they are now explained away or neglected as meaningless. It is found that the nearer the historian stands to the events with which he is concerned, the less does he diverge from the ordinary canons of probability. But this transformation of the popular idea of the "Old Testament" under the influence of the scientific spirit, has resulted in a positive gain to the teacher who surveys his various duties as a whole. He can pass without a break from the institutions of Rome and the arts of Greece to the religion of Israel.

Now this revolution in opinion is almost completed and enables us to anticipate the effect of a corresponding revolution which is taking place almost as rapidly with regard to the "New Testament." The publication of the "Encyclopedia Biblica" has been an advertisement to the world that miracle in the accepted sense is no longer an integral element in the belief of Christendom. A very striking example of this change of opinion came under my notice the other day. An able writer in the *Christian World* was discussing the narratives of the resurrection. He took the experiences of St. Paul as a clue to the nature of the other recorded appearances of Jesus, and thus was led to regard them as entirely subjective and therefore to be understood in the light of similar experiences. Now if the resurrection of Jesus is removed in this way from the category of miracle to the region of faith, it is unlikely that the other miraculous narratives in the "New Testament" will be accepted much longer in their literal intention. And the books of the "New Testament" will be read with the same sense of what is probable and what is not, as the books of the "Old Testament."

Here again the reformation produced by the scientific method will subserve the true ends of religion. The teacher will have to dwell more upon the spiritual originality of Jesus and to say less about the external trappings of miracle which Christianity

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shares with Buddhism and Islam. "The man," says Lotze, "who, laying aside prejudice allows the teaching and life of Christ to work upon his spirit without analyzing this impression, may be convinced that here an infinitely valuable and unique event has happened for the salvation of mankind." Now the scientific impulse which has led to this change in religious opinion, is not opposed to, but is curiously parallel with the method of dogma. The impulse which led Greek fathers to reconcile the gospels with Greek logic, ethics and metaphysics, is the same with the modern impulse which, as we have seen, would make terms between the gospels and scientific method. Dogma, in its origin, sprang from the impulse to think clearly about the historical setting of the Christian religion; contemporary criticism seeks the same end. Once more therefore the western world has accomplished a synthesis of the whole body of its knowledge, and awaits a second Thomas Aquinas to formulate a new *"Summa."* And it is because the historical criticism of the Bible has so far accomplished its work that the thoughtful teacher may undertake the duty of religious instruction hand in hand with the best text-books. This may seem a rash and indeed almost a fanciful statement when we look out upon the turmoil of the present religious conflict. But as we have seen the work of the critics upon the "Old Testament" is done in the main and no one makes any scruple of recognizing this fact to some degree at least. The teacher who is patient will, in the course of a very few years, find that he can proceed as freely to the scientific exposition of the "New Testament."

IV.

But we have not grappled with the most urgent part of our problem; we have only set the problem itself in a clearer light. What is to be the relation of the teacher to the various religious bodies who are contending together? Is he under any obligation to conform publicly to any of them? The question is indignantly put by Nonconformists whether they are to be excluded from teaching in any of the schools which are supported by the national exchequer. This is but part of a still wider

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question. Is any man to be excluded from the teaching profession because he does not hold any of the creeds? Why should not a professed atheist or agnostic be a teacher? As a matter of fact such men are teachers of special subjects; for indeed it is comparatively rare among the leaders of scientific thought in England to find men who *ex animo* profess the beliefs usually accounted as orthodox. It seems reasonable that the liberty of opinion which is actually accorded to the men who determine opinion at its sources, should also be extended to the rank and file of the teaching profession. That is to say, the teacher is under no moral obligation to belong to any religious body whatsoever, and it is unjust that any compulsion even of an indirect kind should be exercised upon him. It is specially unjust because the professed adherents of the various religious sects do not amount to a majority of the whole population. I make this statement upon the authority of the religious census which is now being taken in London by the *Daily News.*

The statesmen of Elizabeth's reign indulged the hope that it was possible to comprehend the whole range of religious belief within the limits of the establishment. And as a matter of fact there is a wider diversity of theological belief and therefore greater freedom of opinion in the Anglican Church than in any other religious body. It enumerates within its membership men who at the one extreme are but one remove from Roman Catholics, and, at the other, but one remove from Agnosticism. Yet in practice even so comprehensive a scheme as this fails to satisfy everybody. Now where the Elizabethan settlement has failed, it is unlikely that any fresh scheme of comprehension will succeed. The critics of the Establishment, however, have attempted to find a fresh formula with the name of undenominational Christianity, and under cover of this they seek to exclude from the teaching profession all those numerous persons who are not only outside the Anglican Church, but also outside the sphere of Trinitarian belief. This will not satisfy the claims of those for whom I am arguing. These claims will only be satisfied by the removal of all religious tests of every kind whatsoever: Anglican, Trinitarian and Theistic.

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In order to illustrate the bearing of this, I will take a definite instance, if I may be pardoned for the personal reference which is involved. No public man is more generally respected in England for his sincerity than Mr. John Morley. Now in the present condition of public opinion a man who held Mr. Morley's views would be debarred from the teacher's office. And in order to show that the case we are considering is not an imaginary one, I will recall an incident in Mr. Morley's political career which is not generally known. When in 1880 he formed the purpose of entering the House of Commons his name was brought before the Liberals of Nottingham as a parliamentary candidate. But the leaders of the local religious bodies refused to support Mr. Morley because of his religious opinions, and Mr. Morley went elsewhere. In this way Nottingham missed the opportunity of having for her representative a man who unites moral enthusiasm with the insight of a scholar, and those who inflicted this loss upon the city, failed to see that they were enforcing religious tests in a manner repugnant to their own professed principles of tolerance.

It thus appears that the only alternative to the establishment of religion by the state, is the entire abolition of religious tests of any and every kind. But, it will be objected, how can religious instruction be given except by a teacher whose thoughts are in harmony with the subject which he is dealing with? In the first place, the very methods of criticism which have brought the biblical history into relation with scientific thought, make it possible to unfold this history in an objective way *sine ira et studio;* without the militant spirit of a professed enemy or the partisanship of the devotee. An agnostic friend of mine is at the same time one of the most enthusiastic and thoroughgoing students of the "Old Testament" who are known to me. And it is not necessary to belong to any of the two hundred and seventy religious societies which are enumerated in "Whittaker's Almanac," in order to trace the human figure of Jesus as it disengages itself from the mist of legend.

In the next place, by removing the penalties of free thought, you also take away the glories of martyrdom, and so remove a motive to exaggerated expressions of opinion. The religious

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sentiment needs no adventitious aids, for it is safe here to trust the unbiased instincts of mankind. So far as prophecy can reach, it seems certain that man will always worship, and that the symbols of the Christian tradition will afford the ultimate vehicle of his devotion. There is the less need therefore to use compulsion upon the minority, in whom the instinct of worship is weak. It is the same with religion as with music. To some persons music makes no appeal. Yet no one proposes to exclude such individuals from teaching, nor indeed from teaching the rudimentary parts of musical theory. On the other hand it is not the business of the teacher to trespass on the functions of the pulpit. The school-room is not the place for religious propaganda. In fact the professed atheist is not a more dangerous enemy to religious feeling than the mawkish advocate. It thus appears that the argument for religious tests in the teaching profession breaks down even when it is regarded, not from the standpoint of abstract freedom, but from the standpoint of religious feeling itself.

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WERE THE CHURCH FATHERS COMMUNISTS?

THE assertion is frequently made that several of the most distinguished of the Fathers of the Church were communists, in the sense that they believed private property to be wrong. This contention seems to have originated with Barbeyrac, a prominent ethical writer of the early Eighteenth century.[1] At present it is most commonly voiced by the socialists although it is also to be found in writers like Nitti,[2] and de Laveleye.[3] The Fathers most commonly cited in this connection are Clement, Chrysostom, Augustine, Basil, Ambrose, and Jerome. The first three of these need not detain us; for the passage in which

[1] See his "Traite de la morale des Pères," p. 144.
[2] "Catholic Socialism," pp. 64-70.
[3] "Le Socialisme Contemporain," p. ix.

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St. Clement is made to declare for common ownership is now recognized as spurious; the declarations of St. Chrysostom are merely fervid denunciations of the rich men of his time, while St. Augustine, in the passage that is usually quoted, is speaking of the *legal* title, not the moral right of ownership. With regard to Basil, Ambrose and Jerome, it must be admitted that some of their utterances are, on the surface, capable of an interpretation that seems to be out of harmony with the doctrine of private property. Let us see whether this interpretation is legitimate. We begin with St. Basil.

In order to estimate fairly the denunciations of wealth which are found in the pages of this writer, we must bear in mind that they were spoken in sermons addressed to rich men of his time, and that he was himself an ascetic, a monk, the founder, in fact, of monasticism in Asia Minor. He lived on the poorest fare, wore haircloth, and in general, to use his own words, "treated his body as an angry owner treats a runaway slave." To him the proper use of wealth was more important than a precise definition of its rights; hence in his sermons we find little concerning rights, but much concerning obligations. He seems to regard the possession of great wealth as a curse, and the possessors thereof as utterly heartless. A fair sample of his opinion of the rich of his time is seen in the following words addressed to usurers: "You make a profit out of misfortune; you levy a tax upon tears; you strangle the naked; you heap blows upon the starving." This, it is obvious, is not the language of a scientific treatise, but of a fervent condemnation of a social wrong. And it is in this light that all of St. Basil's strictures on wealth must be judged.

The passage which follows is the severest arraignment of private ownership, or rather, of the private owners whom he knew, that is to be found in all of St. Basil's writings. From it the socialist writers have drawn the saying of which they have made so much, namely, "the rich man is a thief." Other statements of his views will be found in his Homilies: "To the Rich;" "On Psalm XIV;" "On Avarice."

"'Upon whom,' he (the private proprietor) says, 'do I inflict any injury in retaining and conserving that which is mine?' What things, tell me, are

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yours? Whence did you bring them into the world? You rich act like a man who, being the first to enter a theatre, would keep all others out, regarding as his own that which was intended for the common use of all. For you appropriate to yourselves the common heritage, simply because you were the first occupants. Whereas, if every man took only what was sufficient for his needs, leaving the rest to those in want, there would be no rich and no poor. Naked you came from the womb; naked you shall return to earth. Whence your present possessions? If you say, 'from fate,' you are impious, since you do not recognize the Creator nor render thanks to the Giver; if you answer, 'from God,' then tell me why you have received them. Is God so unjust as to distribute the necessaries of life inequitably? Why are you rich and your neighbor poor? Is it not to enable you to receive the reward of benevolence and upright stewardship, while he obtains the crown merited by patience? Yet you fancy that you do no injustice when you gather all things into the fathomless recesses of your greed. Who is the avaricious man? The man who is not satisfied with enough. Are not you, then, avaricious? Are you not a despoiler? For you have made your own that which you have received to distribute. Is he not called a thief who strips a man of his clothes? And he who will not clothe the naked when he can,—is he deserving of a different appellation? The bread that you keep in your possession belongs to the hungry; the cloak in your closet, to the naked; the shoes that you allow to rot, to the barefooted, and your hoarded silver, to the indigent. Hence you have done injustice to as many as you have failed to help."[4]

A careful and unprejudiced reading of this passage will show that it does not bear out the claims of those who use it to prove that Basil denied the right of private ownership. Not the right itself, but an exaggerated interpretation of it, is condemned. The rich man is represented as claiming the right to do what he pleases with his goods. St. Basil tells him that he has no such right, that what he calls his own was given to him by God, and that God wishes him to distribute so much of it as he does not himself require to the needy. First occupancy of property does not confer the right to exclude everyone else. Consequently the rich proprietor wrongs as many as he could have helped but did not.

Only through a radical misconception of the nature and limitations of private ownership could this teaching be called communistic. To be sure, if the right of private property is made to include the right to use one's property as one pleases—the

[4] "Hom. in Luc." xii, 18, "Destruam," No. 7, Migne, "Patrologia Graeca," vol. 31, col. 276.

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"jus utendi et abutendi" of Roman Law, which is substantially the interpretation put upon it by most of the legal codes of to-day,—then St. Basil must be regarded as an opponent of private ownership. But this is not and has never been the Christian conception. According to Christian teaching, man's right to property is an endowment of his personality; it springs from his innate right to subsist on the bounty of the earth. This right is common to all, and equal in all. And it is the *primary* and original right of ownership. The right of any individual to acquire, use, and dispose of a particular portion of the earth or its resources, is *secondary,* and subordinate to this common and primary right. Consequently, all private rights of property must be defined and exercised in such a way as not to prevent any person from enjoying his innate right to live upon the bounty of nature. Nitti asserts that it was only after the Church became wealthy that ecclesiastical writers began to repudiate the teaching of the Fathers on property, and to defend private ownership. Among the prominent advocates of the new doctrine he mentions St. Thomas of Aquin. Well, the fact is that this writer's doctrine, while expressed in colder and more scientific language, is precisely the same as Basil's. Private ownership is right, he says, if the goods be justly acquired and justly used.[5] The first condition, then, is that the private owner must get possession of his property without violating the rights of others. He may not deprive his fellows of goods that they have justly acquired, nor appropriate so much of the unclaimed heritage of nature as to make it unreasonably difficult for other men to exercise their innate rights of use and ownership. Therefore, when Henry George, who, by the way, makes use of the theatre illustration employed by St. Basil, denounces private property in land for the reason that it would enable a few men to monopolize the entire habitable globe, he has in mind a false and unchristian conception of private rights. In the second place, even when a man has gotten possession of his property lawfully he may not use it according to his own sweet will. He sins grievously, says Aquinas, if he does not

[5] "Contra Gentes," lib. iii, cap. 127.

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distribute some of it to the indigent. Furthermore, the same writer maintains that a man who is in extreme need may, if no other means of relief be available, seize some of his neighbor's goods, and that this will not be theft or robbery, because the man's needs entitle him to call what he takes his own.[6] Here we have the doctrine that human needs constitute a right of ownership which is superior to any private right. It is the correlative equivalent of St. Basil's assertion that the superfluous bread, and clothing, and shoes in the rich man's possession belonged of right to his hungry and naked neighbors. Allowing for differences of language, circumstances, and temperament, the limitations to the right of private property laid down by St. Thomas are fully as "communistic" as anything to be found in the writings of St. Basil. And I may add that his teaching on the subject is to this day the accepted Catholic doctrine.

The claim that St. Basil was not a communist does not, however, rest on this merely negative basis. Positive proofs of his belief in private ownership are not wanting whether in his words or in his conduct. "Do not," he says to the rich man, "give up your soul to wealth, loving and admiring it as the one good thing in life, but take the opportunity to use it as an instrument of service."[7] Instead of asserting that the possession of wealth is in itself unlawful, he maintains that it is good, since it may be made to serve good ends. This, indeed, is the central thought in all his utterances on wealth—that it should be rightly *used*.

In another place he declares that money is called the "mammon of iniquity" because, "some of the predecessors of the present holders may have obtained it unlawfully," thus assuming that it is possible to acquire property lawfully. Otherwise he would not need to go back to former proprietors to find a reason for calling the private ownership in question "iniquitous."

Again, he frequently advises men to sell their goods and give the proceeds to the poor, which he could not conscien-

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[6] "Summa," 2a 2ae, q. 66, a. 7.

[7] "In Psal. lxi," No. 198, Migne.

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tiously do if he believed all private property to be wrong. This would be to command men to sell what they did not own, and thus to attempt to convey to others a title that they did not themselves possess. If he did not admit the justice of private ownership he should have said nothing about buying and selling, but should have bade the owners to distribute their goods to the poor directly.

As to St. Basil's conduct, we find that, while he renounced his property in a general way in his early youth, he never separated himself from it completely. A certain portion of it he leased to a foster brother on condition that he should himself be supported out of its revenues. He also retained some interest in its management, as we learn from two letters written to a certain tax official.[8] In one of these he asks that the estate be rated at its former assessment, and in the other he explains the conditions on which his foster brother took charge of the property. "At the same time, this was not to be regarded as an absolute gift; he was merely to have the use of the property during his lifetime, with the proviso that if any serious inconvenience befel him in managing it, he was at liberty to give it back into my charge. In that case I should be responsible in the matter of rates and collectors." St. Basil, therefore, acted to a certain extent as landlord, received profit from his estates, and stood ready to reassume active direction of them. Now his character and life completely refute the assumption that he could have acted thus had he believed private ownership to be unjust.

To resume in one sentence the results of our inquiry: the passages cited to show that St. Basil denied the right of private ownership merely prove that he set limits to it, and insisted very strongly on the corresponding obligations; while other passages, and especially his conduct in connection with his own estates, furnish positive evidence that he saw in the institution nothing inherently wrong.

The views of St. Ambrose are substantially the same as those of St. Basil. He declares over and over again that riches are

[8] "Epistolae," 36 and 37.

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a hindrance rather than a help to salvation, that the pursuit of them is the highest folly, that they are unnecessary and altogether to be despised. To those who will not make a proper use of their goods he promises the severest punishment. I quote three of the strongest denunciations of wealth that I have been able to find in his writings.

"You are not giving to the poor man anything that is yours, but are rather restoring something that is his. For you have appropriated to yourself goods that were intended for the common use of all. The earth is for all, not merely for the rich; yet the number of those who possess merely their own is smaller than the number of those who enjoy more than their proper share. You are but paying a debt, not giving alms."[9]

"The Lord, our God, desired the earth to be the common possession of all men, that its fruits might sustain all, but avarice has made a distribution of the titles (jura) of possession. Hence if you claim private ownership of any of that which was given to the whole human race—nay, to all living things—in common, it is but just that you should give something therefrom to the poor, and not deny sustenance to those with whom you ought to be a fellow sharer."[10]

Here we have, not communism, which would order the rich to turn their goods over to the community, but the Christian principle that the earth was intended by the Creator for the benefit of all His children, and consequently that when some men are prevented from enjoying their share through the greed of others, the latter are guilty of injustice and are bound to make reparation. Hence St. Ambrose tells the wealthy usurpers of his time that what they are urged to give to the poor is not an alms, but the payment of a debt. They have accumulated so much as to deprive other men of their birthright. And anyone who will read the history of the oppression of the poor in Italy in the Fourth century will concede that Ambrose spoke the simple truth when he accused the wealthy proprietors of robbery. What he condemned was not private property in itself, but the unjust extension of it, and the disregard of the duties attaching to proprietorship. This is evident especially in his statement that if the private owner wishes to claim exclusive control over any of the common bounty of earth he ought in justice to give a portion of it to the needy. *"Justum est, igitur,*

[9] "De Nabuthe Jezraelita," cap. xii, No. 53, Migne.
[10] "In Psal. 118," No. 1064, Migne.

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ut si aliquid tibi privatum vindicas, saltem aliquid inde pauperibus aspergas."

"Hence they (the Romans) regarded it as the office of justice that men should hold what is common, that is, what is public, as public property; and what is private as their own. This is not, indeed, according to nature; for nature has poured forth her bounty as the common gift of all. Thus, God decreed that goods should be created in such a way that there would be a common sustenance for all. Nature, therefore, is the mother of common right appropriation (usurpatio) of private right."[11]

The expressions in these passages which have been interpreted favorably to the communistic view are: "This (division of goods) is not according to nature" (*"secundam naturam"*); and, "appropriation has produced private right" (*"usurpatio jus fecit privatum"*). Taken by itself, the first of these statements may, indeed, be understood as asserting that a division of the bounty of the earth—any division—is *against* nature, and consequently in conflict with the Natural Law. On the other hand, it may without any violence to language, be taken to mean that the actually existing division has not been the work of nature. In this interpretation, nature would be regarded as permitting, or even as authorizing, the institution of private property, while leaving the creation and form of it to social action. In other words, nature sanctions but does not perform the work of allotting portions of the common heritage to particular individuals. St. Thomas puts the distinction clearly: "Common property is natural, not in the sense that the Natural Law directs all things to be possessed in common and nothing privately, but in the sense that human convention rather than Natural Law brings about a division of property." [12] A strong presumption that this is the meaning of the sentence in question arises from the fact that the passage from which it is taken is little more than a paraphrase of a paragraph in Cicero's *"de Officiis."* In this place the Roman orator declares that by nature all things are common, but that private ownership has come into existence through various kinds of human action.[13]

[11] "De Officiis," lib. i, No. 35, Migne.
[12] "Summa," 2a, 2ae, q. 66, a. 2.
[13] L. I., Cap. VII.

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The second sentence noted above—*"usurpatio jus fecit privatum"*—is the one usually cited to show that St. Ambrose denied the right of private property. This interpretation turns on the meaning of *"usurpatio."* In the footnote to page 297 of *"Die Frau,"* Bebel translates it into *"ungerechte Anmassung;"* yet he encloses it in parentheses, thus showing that he is not certain that his rendition is correct. *"Usurpatio"* did, indeed, take on the meaning of "usurpation" in post-classical times, but in the classical era it signified simply "use," "acquisition," "appropriation." In the context that we are considering, "appropriation" would seem to be the proper rendering for the following reasons: First, St. Ambrose, being a brilliant classical scholar, would probably use the word in its primitive and classical sense; secondly, "appropriation" expresses the thought of Cicero upon which St. Ambrose is commenting, and with which he seems to agree; and thirdly, to translate *"usurpatio"* by "usurpation" would be to make St. Ambrose contradict his own conduct and his own positive statements in favor of the right of private ownership. The following are some of the statements referred to:

"Wealth is not prejudicial to faith if we but know how to use it."[14]

"As in the wicked riches are a hindrance, so in the good they are an aid to virtue."[15]

"Not those that have riches but those that do not know how to use them, are condemned."[16]

"Riches are not in themselves blamable. . . . . And even in riches there is opportunity for virtue."[17]

Ambrose declares that the direction given by Christ to the rich young man to sell his goods and give the price to the poor was not a precept, but a counsel which the young man was free to accept or reject.[18]

Thus St. Ambrose asserts in unequivocal language that pri-

[14] "In Psal. 40," No. 880, Migne.
[15] "In Luc. ix," No. 1493, Migne.
[16] "In Luc. ix," No. 1371, Migne.
[17] "Epis." Clas. I, No. 1064, Migne.
[18] "De Viduis," cap. xii.

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vate property is licit if only it be properly used. Moreover, his treatment of his own goods clearly supposes the same views. Like St. Basil he gave up his property at the beginning of his ecclesiastical career, but with certain restrictions. His gold and silver he handed over to the Church, but he committed his estates, with the exception of a life interest for his sister, to the management of his brother, Satyrus. Thus he saw fit to safeguard the property rights of his brother and sister, and to retain for himself the legal title to the greater part of his landed possessions.

Of St. Ambrose, therefore, as of St. Basil, it may be said that when he is most severe on wealth he attacks not the institution of private property but the abuse of it, and that his conduct and explicit statements show that he believed it to be in itself just.

Now as to St. Jerome. "Opulence is always the result of theft, committed, if not by the actual possessor, then by his predecessors." This saying is attributed to St. Jerome by Nitti in his "Catholic Socialism" (p. 69). While no reference accompanies the quotation, we are safe in concluding that it is a free rendering of a maxim which seems to have been frequently heard in St. Jerome's time, and which occurs in the three following passages of his works.

In the "Commentary on Jeremiah" he explains the Prophet's condemnation of the "wicked men who have become great and rich through deceit," in these words:

"And they fill their houses through the plunder and losses of others, so that the saying of the philosophers may be fulfilled, 'every rich man is unjust or the heir of an unjust one.'" ("Omnis dives aut iniquis aut iniqui haeres."[19])

Thus he makes the words of Jeremiah confirm the "opinion of the philosophers."

In the "Commentary on Habacuc" he declares that, "those who work for honors or riches in this world become the tabernacles of demons, which is strikingly shown by the single word iniquity (*iniquitatis*); for 'every rich man is either unjust or the heir of an unjust one.'" [20]

[19]Book I, chap. V, verse 26.
[20]Book II, chap iii, verse 7.

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The proverb occurs again in the "Epistle to Hedibia." A widow in Gaul had written to Jerome to know how she was to follow the way of perfection, and how to interpret certain passages of the Scriptures. In answer to her first question he refers to the parable of the Unjust Steward, and draws therefrom this inference:

"And you, therefore, since you have few children, make to yourself many friends of the mammon of iniquity who may receive you into everlasting dwellings. 'Of iniquity' was beautifully said; for all riches come from iniquity, and unless one were to lose, another could not gain. Hence the common adage seems to me to be very true: 'The rich man is unjust or the heir of an unjust one.' "[21]

Continuing on the same topic, he says that for a rich man to enter heaven is not so much a difficulty as an impossibility. In fact, the whole context is most severe upon riches and the rich.

It will be observed that the saying in question is given in one passage as "the opinion of the philosophers," in another, without any reference to its origin, and finally, as a "common expression." The important consideration is that Jerome makes it his own, quoting it with distinct approval. He, therefore, subscribes to the opinion that every *rich* man (not every man of property, for *"dives"* always means a man having much property) was an unjust man. Elsewhere he denounces riches in equally strong language. In the "Commentary on Micheas," we find the following: "Now, however, the rich abound not so much in wealth as in injustice; for all riches being a spoliation of others are born of injustice." [22] In the "Commentary on Isaiah," we are told that, "one man does not accumulate money except through the loss and injury suffered by another." [23] Again we are exhorted to beware, "lest in accepting gifts of the earth from men who have gathered them through plunder and the tears of the wretched, we become, not so much thieves ourselves, as the companions of thieves." [24]

These declarations show that St. Jerome believed in a gen-

[21] "Epistle" 120.
[22] Book II, chap. vi, verse 3.
[23] Book II, chap 33, verse 13.
[24] Ibid, book I, chap. 1, verse 23.

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eral way that the great fortunes of his time were dishonestly acquired. Now this is a question of fact, not of abstract right. The legitimate inquiry, therefore is, Did St. Jerome correctly interpret the facts of his time? Speaking generally, it would seem that he did. When he wrote the yeomanry of Italy, the men who cultivated their own land, had long since disappeared through impoverishment or violence. To them had succeeded the holders of the *"Latifundia,"* and the hordes of dependent tillers. Already in Pliny's time, these immense estates were, in the words of the writer, causing the ruin of Italy, while half the Province of Africa was in the hands of six owners. The evils of this institution had undoubtedly become so great by St. Jerome's time as to constitute an outrage on the Christian sense of justice. Moreover, he did but repeat a maxim which the opinion of philosophers and the common belief of his time had made a *"vulgata sententia."* Nor is his language by any means unique. Of the *present* titles to landed property the following words were written by Herbert Spencer: "It can never be pretended that the existing titles to such property are legitimate. . . . . Violence, fraud, the prerogative of force, the claims of superior cunning—these are the sources to which these titles may be traced." These extracts are from the first edition of his "Social Statics." "I say," writes W. S. Lilly in "Right and Wrong," "that to much modern property the saying of Proudhon is strictly applicable." If these two men can write thus of present-day fortunes, is it any wonder that St. Jerome, ascetic as he was and fervid of temperament, used harsh language concerning the spoilations practiced in his time?

At any rate, Jerome nowhere declares that private property is always or necessarily wrong. Indeed, the very wording of the phrase which he quotes approvingly,—"every rich man is either unjust or the heir of an unjust one"—shows a belief that some of the wealthy proprietors referred to were guilty of no personal injustice. They were merely the inheritors of wrong dealing. Now if all private property were in Jerome's view contrary to the moral law it would not have been necessary for him to go back to the misdeeds of former owners in order to

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justify his condemnation of existing titles. The fact is that it was the manner of acquiring these great fortunes, and not the simple ownership of them that he found blameworthy. Again, it must be remembered that he speaks only of *rich* owners, not of all proprietors. Finally, he frequently gives explicit and general assent to the doctrine that private ownership is lawful in due conditions. Thus in the "Commentary on Ecclesiastes," he declares that it is better to be wise and rich than to be merely wise, because of the possibilities of doing good which are afforded by riches.[25] In his "Epistle to Salvinia," he says that wealth is not a hindrance to the rich man if it be wisely used, and calls attention to the fact that Abraham was a friend of God in the midst of riches. In the same "Epistle to Hedibia" in which he denounced the rich, he wrote as follows: "Ananias and Saphira deserved the condemnation of the Apostle because they secretly kept back their property. 'Must he therefore be punished,' you will say, 'who will not give away his own'? By no means. They were punished because they were willing to lie to the Holy Ghost and sought vain glory by pretending they had renounced all things, while retaining the requisites of sustenance. In general (*alioquin*) one is free to give or not give." These extracts and others that might be adduced, show that St. Jerome believed in the right to hold and regard some property as one's own. Like St. Basil and St. Ambrose, he condemned the abuses, not the institution.

In conclusion it must be admitted that many of the Fathers seem to have looked upon the ideal of a Christian community of ownership with a fondness and wistful hope that have not been shared by any considerable number of the great Christian teachers that have lived since their time. They were not far removed, either in time or viewpoint, from those early believers of Jerusalem who had "but one heart and one soul," and they probably regarded that example of Christian communism as not altogether impossible of imitation. They were perhaps not so thoroughly convinced as we of to-day that such an ideal is realizable only by the select few. Hence isolated expressions

[25] Chap. vii, verse 12.

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of theirs have been used in favor of the contention that they rejected the doctrine of private ownership. But when these passages are considered as the utterances of fervid preachers and teachers whose immediate purpose was to correct the flagrant injustices of their time, they easily become capable of a different explanation. And when they are interpreted in the light of the clear and explicit declarations of their authors in favor of the principle of individual property rights, the explanation that has been offered in this paper is seen to be the only reasonable one, namely, that the Fathers condemned not the institution but the abuse and exaggerations of private ownership.

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BYRON AND MORALS.

THE relation of Byron to morals is not a simple inquiry in personal biography, nor a question merely of judgment or justice towards an individual man, but involves some very vital points both of ethics and the philosophy of fine art. In discussing, therefore, the morals of Byron and his poetry, it is not necessary to follow in the tracks of the Caroline Lambs, the Beecher-Stowes, and the proper public generally in onslaught, nor of the Moores, the Austins, or even the Castelars at defence, but is possible to raise the subject onto more universal grounds, and to look to its more universal interest. Frankly, it is the intention, in the following pages, to combat the conventional verdict which says, "it is to be deplored that scarcely any moral good is derivable from the splendid poetry of Byron," and even Scott's amiable epitome of "that mighty genius, which walked amongst us as something superior to mortality, and whose powers were beheld with wonder, and something approaching to terror, as if we knew not whether they were of good or evil." But it is not intended to proceed by the method of palliation. I have no purpose—though something of this is being done these very days more effectively than ever,—

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of trying, by further bringing forward of evidence or by elucidations of fated temperament and circumstance, to extenuate Byron's indisputable deep taint of egoism, affectation, vulgarity, violence, and sensual looseness. Much less is it my object to endeavor to get around Byron's sceptical defiance and revolutionary radicalism. And yet, paradoxically, the aim here is to maintain that the essential, final influence of Byron is a powerfully moral one, springing from soundness of ethical content, and therefore in its very nature abiding, and justifying the expectation for Byron of a lasting place in the history of European literature and the evolution of the higher life of the Western peoples.

I do not mean, of course, that the safe passages in Byron outnumber or excel by count of lines the risky ones, that he abounds in wonderful descriptions unmarred by indelicacy or misanthropy, or even that he wrote the Hebrew Melodies. None of this touches the vital point. The desire underlying this paper is to find the vindication of Byron's essential morality just there where most respectable Anglo-Saxons have been wont to see the root or rankest growth itself of the evil in him; namely, in the boundless Byronic despair, and in his holding aloft the uncompromising and universal standard of revolt. Truly, if the chief virtue of poetry be to conform, to sustain established institutions,—the actual State and church, and the accepted norms of life and conduct—standing at most for moderate reform and optimistic progress,—then there is no case for Byron: like Satan, he stands hopelessly condemned, the bright patches on him being but the heightening attributes of a baneful fascination. If, however, the conservation of the public order, howsoever desirable this may otherwise be, is properly no part of the business of poetry; but, on the other hand, integrity, authenticity is its first obligation, and freedom therein its unconditional prerogative, and this truth and freedom together its very breath of life; and if indeed in these things, rather than in conformity of any sort, consists likewise the central essence of morality,—then we may hold that Byron, even as compared with the most praised of his contemporaries, is entitled, both as poet and man, to a distinguished renown.

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I will allow myself once more to say that I am intending no apology for the things that Byron said and did merely to produce an effect, or that sprang merely from the low or unhealthy side of his nature. Neither have I any wish to magnify what Matthew Arnold might have called the mere intrepid barbarian in him. I can best make clear where it seems to me the justification and the merit of Byron lie, by drawing, at some length, a contrast between him and the one among his fellow-poets, whom, for a long time, it has been customary, in England, to hold up against him, as at the very least his equal in poetry, while as a man he affords the ideal exactly suited to bring into relief Byron's lamentable short-comings.

It is necessary now to beg not to be misunderstood in another way. I am sure I am a reverent lover of Wordsworth. So long as mankind are willing to hear a message of hope, a poetry at once so joyous and so profound as Wordsworth's at its best is, cannot but be cherished wherever it is understood; while so long as democracy, philanthropy, and science continue to make us appreciative of the worth, rights and wealth of content of common existence, a poetry

"Of joy in widest commonalty spread"

cannot but win eager attention and sympathy. Nay, if we must be more personal, I also can confess that I have known at least somewhat of the Wordsworthian "cure," and of its virtues. I have reason, then, to love Wordsworth's poetry. But I likewise find very much to honor in him as a man. He is entitled to reverence for his high and serious faith in the poet's vocation; for the sturdy courage that sustained him through long years when his verses brought him abundant ridicule with small renown, and not money enough "to pay for his shoe-strings;" for the noble simplicity of his way of life; and for the purity of that life—the example of a poet able to understand the responsibility of his conduct to the canons and work-a-day order of the society about him. Accordingly, if what is now here said of Wordsworth shall be mainly in an unfavorable vein, it will be only because, to the purpose in hand, this is the more relevant side of him.

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Having thus made previous deduction and explanation, I may venture straightway to acknowledge that, for one, I have never been able to rid myself of the feeling that underlying the reproaches of apostasy directed against Wordsworth by Byron, Shelley, and the author of "The Lost Leader," there is an element of grave justice. Put crudely as a "selling out for a price," these charges against Wordsworth and the companions of his position, Coleridge, Southey, and DeQuincey (and, in a way, Burke too might be classed here), have not troubled me very much; but I have not been able to escape the conviction that—to keep to him alone—both in Wordsworth the poet and Wordsworth the man, there was a failure which can rightly be set down as moral; and that, moreover, this failure was one from which Byron, for all his heavy account on other scores, was noteworthily free.

What I have in mind is this: Wordsworth deliberately does *not,* whereas Byron *does,* refuse comfortable illusion and comfortable acquiescence; whereby Wordsworth forfeits, to this extent, and Byron preserves, freedom and wholeness of mind. Let us explain; and first as to comfortable illusion. What is Wordsworth's mental history as he himself recounts it to us in the "Prelude" and reveals it in the "Excursion"? In the life of nearly every young person of spiritual depth and promise, there comes, we know, a season of break-up, when, under advancing experience and reflection, the pleasant high imaginings and easy ideals of youth dissolve away, and in their place appear disbelief, confusion, and thorough mental misery. Such a time of disenchantment and pain—a crisis, as he himself truly called it, since it is, for every man, the confronting of him with the genuine problem of his salvation—the disappointing course of the revolution in France precipitated with exceptional severity in Wordsworth. How did Wordsworth meet this crisis; and in what manner ought it to be met? The beginnings of reflection for mankind as a whole, in olden Greece, were in disappointment; yet this first reflection did not bring restoration, but only completer overturnings of faith and dream, and so merely deeper trouble. Exactly so it was with Wordsworth. The aroused spirit of criticism drove him

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steadily farther into a disbelief which attacked and reduced to emptiness every object that before had seemed to possess anything of worth or substance, till in truth despair overcast his whole mind and he found himself a sick soul. Now the experience of humankind from the days of the Sophist down, teaches that if from this disease of thought there is to be any secure escape, it must be by one way alone, namely, not by cutting off thought, nor by any turnings either to the right or left, whether into faith, or vision, or sentiment, but only by thinking to the bitter end. Not that necessarily faith and vision shall have no portion in the clarification of souls; not at all; but simply that vision and faith must come back from their flights, and face unflichingly the remorseless challenge, not indeed of an airy, flippant dialectic, but of thorough-going, grim reason. In our romantic age, we may refuse to reason the primacy given it by eighteenth century rationalism; it is possible that it may not be the business of abstract reason to pioneer the way and discover the light; none the less its function of evaluating and verifying remains untouched, at all events up to the point where it can be shown that reason absolutely is unable to follow. Even here, though, vision and faith still dare not blink fact, must not, in any particular, be merely gratuitous, but must, in spite of every contradiction, be demanded by reason itself as requisite to its own completion; in short, they must be rational. To be sure, comparatively few men have the virtue or strength of will, the perseverance, and the pure passion for truth, to labor in this way to fulfil thought: Spinoza has said it for us,—"All illustrious things are as difficult as they are rare." Nevertheless, the ideal and the obligation still remain—certainly for him who, like Wordsworth, does not humbly acknowledge weakness and borrow his faith from a stronger, but himself claims the seat of prophecy. Wordsworth, however, did not abide in reason to the uttermost. He did instead the thing we have complained of.

Yet we must go slowly at this point. It may at once be objected that what Wordsworth turned his back on was not reason, the faculty of apprehending principles, which fundamentally is one with the power of genius, but only barren, logic-

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chopping understanding. We may accept the correction of terms, for we were not speaking technically. Notwithstanding, we must contend, with Hegel, that for the modern man—for whom common-sense is inseparable from a large ingredient of reflective criticism, that is, understanding—the divorce of genius and reason from understanding is not genius and reason liberated, but genius and reason rendered just so far perverse or null. Moreover, was a simple leaving behind him of logic-chopping understanding what Wordsworth really did? Precisely what was the course of his mental crisis?

When he found dissection grown an all-subversive habit, morbidly poisoning all the fountains of his joy of life, he concluded that the necessity of escape from a dreadful malady of mind was urgent for him. Accordingly the uppermost anxiety of his thought became cure, restoration. Following his natural bent, Wordsworth in fact found a cure,—in Nature, and in that gospel of "joy in widest commonalty." Here, undeniably, was the right place for him to look; because here was the region of his freshest and strongest enthusiasms, just as, for all men, it is the region freest from torturing obtrusive questionings about motives and morals. And yet, are Nature and the contemplation of common things altogether suited to the alleviation of minds distract with unbelief? Are there here no unlovely, tragic aspects? As I have just said, escape was easiest in this direction for Wordsworth, because he had an extraordinary genius for the serener phases of the Universe and of ordinary life; and this genius made him a great poet, in spite of all drawbacks. Still, Wordsworth had learned to reflect; therefore, if he would surmount those entanglements and uncertainties which analytic reflection will enforce on the attention in every region alike, he either must think and suffer on, until, peradventure, reason and light shall have dawned into his world, or else he must—not simply turn his back on and forget reflection but—make a virtue, an ever-alert and rigorous principle, of hostility to reflection. Wordsworth made his choice. Henceforth understanding becomes everywhere, for him, "syllogistic words," "barren intermeddling subtleties,"

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"presumption," "love of sitting in judgment," etc., etc.; and at every turn we have passages like,—

> "(Nature) provokes to no turns
> Of self-applauding intellect; but trains
> To meekness, and exalts by faith;"

or,—

> "What wonder, then, if to a mind so far
> Perverted, even the visible Universe
> Fell under the dominion of a taste
> Less spiritual, with microscopic view
> Was scanned, as I had scanned the moral world?"

And Wordsworth exultantly exclaims,—

> "I shook the habit off
> Entirely and forever."

He had, that is, made his choice.

What I am trying to work back to here, is not a foolish denial that unrelieved submersion in understanding and the analytic habit is not abnormal, and is not suffocative of the higher capacities of the mind; neither am I crudely requiring of Wordsworth that he renounce his poet's instinct and imagination and turn philosopher. My contention is only that self-deception is not necessary even to poetic salvation; that in poetry as elsewhere we must be candid with ourselves; that we must not refuse to let the understanding go as far as it is able and asks to go; and, above all, that running away from the understanding is not the best way to escape it. For is not the latter case simply that of the rabbit in his celebrated race with the hedgehog,—no matter how far he left the hedgehog in the rear, and he might run till his ears flopped off, yet he always found a hedgehog waiting for him at the goal? To be a naive, unreflecting child dwelling in the concrete perceptions, and to try, by taking thought, to become such a child again, are two different things. Even disdain of your maturity will not relieve you of it; as Kant or Hegel would phrase the situation, you have eaten of the tree of knowledge, and consciousness of self, reflection, understanding are with you to the ends of your world. You cannot, by turning your back on an uncomfortable understanding, simply have done with it: there is a nemesis in the matter. Instead of restoration of unconscious innocency, you

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have only a conscious ignoring of various inconvenient facts, together with an anxious, highly conscious insistence on sundry other more convenient facts and arrangings of facts; hence only a back-door tyranny—and this time hopeless—of the same old understanding. For just what is understanding? In the usage of the German philosophers, now more or less popularized, and which, of course, is the sense we are considering, the term means precisely a self-conscious taking-hold of things, together with a restricted and biased interest in them. Its self-consciousness is primarily what distinguishes it, along with reason in its self-conscious philosophical form, as *thought,* from the "unconscious" processes of *perception* and *intuition;* while its partial character of its views—the tendency to tarry with special parts and features—differentiates it, again, from philosophic reason, by which is understood the attempt to regard anything and all things in the entirety of their nature and relationships—the endeavor at total, and therefore, ultimate, views. But be it noted now, these two—philosophic reason and understanding—are not separate faculties, moving in quite unconnected spheres, but only two tendencies of the one common activity of thought. Both alike are engaged at what philosophers agree is the appropriate business of thought, namely, the establishing of connections and separations among the objects of our knowledge. Reason (I mean here again the theorizing reason, which lays claim to the character of philosophy) is merely the understanding lifted to a universal outlook—the understanding fulfilled,—whilst understanding is but the long indispensable preliminary labor of reason—the labor without which, as the history of speculation shows well enough, reason stands unjustified or empty. On the one hand, then, reason and philsopohy can be born only out of the travail of the understanding—(that was a hard saying for the transcendentalists, but not less a true one, that of Hegel's, declaring that whereas Understanding without reason is still something, reason without Understanding is nothing at all)—and, on the other hand, clearly, *the normal understanding cannot, if the challenge be made, refuse to undertake, unreservedly and with utter even-handedness in every quarter, the task that alone makes sound*

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reason possible. In the latter sort of courageous straightforwardness is found the peculiarly modern factor in intellectual integrity. Still, it is undeniable that this unrestrained delving of the understanding into the perplexities of detail, signifies a ceaseless introduction of new data and troublesome complications into the efforts of reason toward its final synthesis; so that of course, clipping the understanding means simplification and, so far, freer, airier soaring for reason. Unfortunately, though, this business of getting rid of an impertinent understanding, itself implies a watchful, carefully discriminative self-consciousness; that is, understanding, only this time not a free and open understanding, but an understanding maimed and perverse, impressing, in the servile, alien interest of subjective comfort, bounds against the supposed liberty of reason itself. We have here the case at once of *comfortable illusion and illusory comfort!* For the only escape out of the unhappy understanding is the perfect understanding. Only they become little children again, who *have* entered the kingdom of heaven. We that are on the outside, must labor and wait; though might not this itself, perchance, be already the advent of the kingdom? However, to refrain from parable and the apocalyptic vein, what of the poet's mode of vision, and its connection with reason and understanding? Poetic vision is only reason bodied forth in sensuous and emotive shapes; yet these shapes, in their completion, are not a product of bare sense-perception, but even abstract thought, including mere understanding, operates constituitively into them. As the psychologists would tell us, thought literally and bodily modifies the very objects of eye and ear; it is one of their commonplaces to point out how little of distance, shape, or size the eye would see, without the help of thought. The poet, to attain the truth of reason, is not obliged to turn philosopher, yet neither dare he cut off from such philosophy—nor such reflections at the humble level of ordinary science and understanding—as pertains inevitably to his estate as man and as child of his time. If he does, what befalls him? Doubtless, as with the pure thinker in like case, inspired insight becomes facile; but what of the wholeness and truth of the pictures? And what has happened to his artist's-

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freedom? Has not he, like the understanding-spurning philosopher, in this very anxiety to be free, hedged his freedom about, shutting himself within those identical limits that he raised to keep the understanding out? For he has grown sophisticated, and openness—the healthy free organic circulation in the mind, and of every faculty into every other,—nature, unconsciousness, innocency are impaired. How, then, should he end but by disciplining the naive, frank intimations of his genius, not simply into a negative respect for conventions and proprieties, but into positive crass service to regularity and dogma—to become himself the veriest Philistine and *Verstandsmensch?* In art as in thought and in conduct, the only unconditioned salvation is in perfect integrity.

So after all, it is not mere monstrous injury to accuse Wordsworth of having sold his birthright for a mess of pottage; because, in his solicitude to alleviate his mind, he traded away its singleness and unobstructed motion. If there exists such a fact as duty, then self-evidently not consolation, nor happiness, is the enjoined concern whether of conduct or poetry, but the finding and living-out of reality,—the frank, thorough, unmitigated reality which is the only truth we have. To repeat the ethical commonplace, easement and happiness may come of themselves at the end, but the quest is reality. But Wordsworth abjured reality for comfortable illusion; for be my scheme of things otherwise as solid as it may, so long as for me its strength is only that of emphasis, or, if you choose, ecstasy in it, and I am impatient and afraid of cross-questionings,—so far is it mere illusion. In the interest of a view of the world which, when not required to pose as more than an aspect, is as full of intimations of truth as it is beautiful, but which, when insisted on as the exclusive fact, is mere illusion,—Wordsworth suppressed his critical faculty, reprobated his sense of humor, and put in strait jacket his genius, till at last it atrophied and died. (Strange that the psychological history of genius turned conformist and renouncing spontaneity and growth has not been more looked into!) I do not say that in his acceptance of what I have been calling by the extreme designation of "comfortable illusion," Wordsworth was insincere in any worse

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fashion than are the general throng who work for themselves a confused way into placid orthodoxies of every sort; nor do I ignore how far the Wordsworthian deficiency of critical power and humor and a certain—I hardly know what to call it but—bluntness were original components in the Wordsworthian temperament, so that bias and early exhaustion of power were fated to it. But this affects only our judgments of subjective moral responsibility; it does not reverse our estimates of objective moral quality and objective moral influence: In fact, even subjectively we have to speak of the trouble as a defect of ethical instinct. It may be, too, that Wordsworth's surrender and renouncing of strife saved us the poet in him; but there is a greater thing even than becoming a poet. And is it not possible—if there is any justifying of even a remnant of optimistic faith in the scheme of things,—that through Wordsworth's giving in there was lost to us, not alone a leader of men—a grander personality—but a leader too of poets?—that on the other side of conflict well sustained there might have emerged to us a seer of much larger and deeper penetration? It becomes clear that, take it as we will, there shows in Wordsworth a failure right where it is customary to esteem him least assailable. Wordsworth falls short not alone of the supreme intellectual power, but of the last height of ethical heroism and perception. And Wordsworth paid the penalty in his limitations as a man; just as he has been paying and still more will pay the penalty in the discounts on his fame as a poet. For the content of poetry is ultimately inseparable from the personality that brought it forth, and likewise ethical truth is inseparable from either rational or artistic truth. Wordsworth, *by a fault whose import and influence are moral,* falls into the second grade of men and artists.

And now as to Byron? Simply once more that he did not accept comfortable illusion. Byron " 'filed his mind" with vulgar profligacy and coarseness generally, and permitted flippancy, histrionicism, and self-consciousness to distort his vision; and he too paid and pays the penalty as man and poet. Yet Byron did not quite enthrone vileness as a virtue in his eyes, nor erect the insincerity of pose into a firm principle and merit

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of thought and action: he knew better, and in his inspired hours was free and able to do better. Accordingly, when he too found the anguish of the world-doubt full upon him (for it is rank nonsense to speak, after a later fashion, of Byron's sorrows, which shook the hearts of millions of his contemporaries, as chiefly unreal; or to think we have disposed of them by saying that they sprang from his own character: this last may have been, with him as more or less it is with the rest of us, what brought his problem vividly home to him, but was it not itself a legitimate and urgent part of that problem?) when, I say, Byron found the world-problem fully upon him, his genius' extraordinary dower of fundamental sincerity combined with strength, made possible to him the maintenance of integrity and freedom of mind even in the extreme of hopelessness and black stress. "The imperishable excellence of sincerity and strength,"—this truly is Byron's. This it is that, in the interest of verity and freedom, braces him to dare and to endure to the uttermost, and to deny to the uttermost. This it is that makes unthinkable in him Wordsworth's sin of compounding with consolation and illusion. This is his salvation alike as man and writer.

This integrity, this candor, this fierce intrepid scorn of compromise and comfort, is what gives its terrible significance to the Byronic despair. Byron's faults of character, the limitations of his sympathies and insight, and the weakness of his reflective capacity (*"sobald er reflectirt ist er ein Kind"*),—all this—fortunately—robs his despondency of an unescapable convincingness. It is not what the settled dejection of a Shakespere or a Dante would be. Had he been a man of a complete sensibility and perfect appreciations, then might well Carlyle call on Goethe to come to our help when we had turned the last page of Byron. Luckily, though, our heaven-stormer was lame, and palsied in the right hand. Yet for all this, Byron remains the greatest poet of the negative that the world has seen. And this pre-eminence he owes to a *moral* greatness; for such as, good or ill, he is, being able to discover an unequivocal way only into doubt, denial, and despair; he has, though shaken like Man-

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fred in the hall of Arimanes, "the imperishable excellence of sincerity and strength" to abide in what he sees.

Before confronting the point whether really, however, negation affords a basis for eminence either in art or morals, let us go, briefly, to the second item, mentioned at the outset, in our contrast between Byron and Wordsworth,—the question of "comfortable acquiescence." Wordsworth, having renounced understanding and criticism, naturally took the next step in comfortable logic, turning defender of tradition and the old arrangements, and passing into the phase of poet of reaction.[1] Even on this ungrateful soil (has it not been said that poetry, by nature, belongs to the opposition?), his genius managed to find some nourishment, but the end was, for the man, ease, for the poet, famishment. Byron, on the other hand, in his unflinching (if not always wise or profound) perseverance in the cause of reason, in his utter rejection of truce with make-believe, did not cease, to the end, to be at least what he still continues to be,—the delight of all fighters of venerable formulas, triteness, and sham; an exemplar to the whole tribe of Mazzinis, Castelars, and chiefs of the revolt, whether in the empire of mind within, or the realm of society and politics outside; as, to the leaders of forlorn hopes and lost causes, and men resolved on resistance to the bottom of the last trench, a glorious fellow-Titan and inspired voice. The virtue of sincerity and strength made him a leader, after their kind, both of men and of poets. But what of the kind?

First, is a genuine moral superiority possible in the extreme attitude of negation and revolt? Or is not rather acquiescence of the very innermost secret of morality? To pass by the habitual speech of our funeral-discourses, in which men are praised for having "abode in the simple faith of their fathers," does not so great a philosopher as Hegel counsel us, as the sum-

[1] I do not, of course, say that this last transition of Wordsworth's was wholly without spontaneity or perverse; but I do hold that it was very largely moralistically motivated, and moralism is always bad art, as well as dubious morality,—even when it brings conventional happiness and a sense of virtue.

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mit of ethical clarification, to rest in the substance (*i. e.,* the point of view and the standards) of the society in which our life-lot falls? In the choice master-spirits like Goethe and Shakespere, is not the crown, the very aureole of their wisdom and goodness, a serene acquiescence? Fortunately, to meet these considerations, we are not obliged to go deeply into metaphysics. We need, in the first place, only to ask a question in turn. If there is any obligation higher than integrity—oneness and wholeness of self in judgment and act; if there is any measure of truth, any standard of conduct, apart from and neglectful of this harmony of self,—what is it? In the second place, of course, the talk now is not of Byron's fooleries or effective stage-sorrows; nor is it pretended that Byron is not inclined to give the benefit of the doubt to the pessimistic aspect of things: he lacks the self-containedness and ability to wait that belong to the very highest grade of souls. Yet, is it, lastly, true that Shakespere and Goethe end in acquiescence? If by acquiescence is understood checking the wild, self-consuming heat of the earlier protest, and taking instead the position of refraining from headlong onslaught where onslaught is plainly futile, and from impetuous attempts at final judgment where final judgment is impossible,—then, Yes. And this sort of acquiescence Byron too began to learn before the end, as witness the raillery and by no means always desperate jests of "Juan," in contrast with the passion of "Childe Harold." He did not, it is true, arrive at the grand simple tolerance and sweet indulgence of the last years of Shakespere; but it must not be forgotten that, in part, this is because his problem is of a somewhat different nature than Shakespere's or Goethe's either. Both these writers are predominantly interested in Man and human nature *as such,* so that the concern of reconciliation to mankind lay closer at hand for them than it did for Byron, whose eye kept always running to that wider universe, in which mere man seems but an incident, even as alongside the seas and the mountains. And is it altogether absurd to say, further, that Byron's perplexity was much more directly about God than either Shakespere's or Goethe's, so that the uncertainty of the writer of "Cain" was a more hopelessly complicat-

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ed one than that either of the poet of "Timon" or of "Faust"? Granted, however, that Byron falls short here; yet does this reconciliation we are speaking of embrace also coming to terms in that quarter where Byron absolutely declined to make his peace? Does acquiescence include conformity? Wordsworth conformed, undeniably, and Englishmen usually praise him for it. What, though, is conformity? It consists, briefly, in giving in your quiet adhesion to what happens to be. The thing, no doubt, is useful, to the peace alike of the individual and the world; and, to be sure, it involves some logic; but it involves much more avoidance of logic. Where is the evidence that Shakespere or Goethe conformed? Where have they consented to call the indifferent good, and the bad passable, or mummery truth? They may have ceased objurgation, but they did not go over to make-believe—certainly not as a matter of virtuous habit and principle. Byron neither went over to make-believe, nor ceased denouncing. Even in the lassitude of the last cantos of "Don Juan," he pours out his raillery, and flings thick the biting darts of ridicule as proof, on this score at least, that this mind is still clear, free and honest. And, amid the slip-shod complaisant millions of us, the meed of praise be his for it!

In conclusion, now, the query,—can negation and revolt furnish the substance of a great poetry? Let us put it in the extreme terms: can there be a poetry of blank pessimism? In this radical form, the question is not strictly pertinent to Byron; for pessimism means negation gone over into its contrary of assertion, dogma. Byron, however, is no dogmatist, but a sceptic. His denials are rather the grief and distraction of a soul that sees but cannot believe its sight. Glorified visions of faith, love, humanity, and the universe are ever trembling above the horizon of his spirit and taking him captive, so that his poetry is not poor but rich in bodyings forth even of positive ideality; nevertheless, since he only beholds to doubt, negation and despair are after all his underlying strains, and we may properly demand, whether a poetry of unconciliated negation is capable of ultimate beauty, of really being, at bottom, poetry at all? The query is one that has scarcely received an unbi-

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ased attention in æsthetics, and might well engage a whole paper or even book in itself. We must let it pass with a single observation. We have insisted that the business of poetry is not consolation, but truth; though we have not yet explained what kind of truth. Suppose that now we could sucessfully demonstrate, that this truth is not necessarily a blessed truth; in other words, that not necessarily and without further proof is the end of poetry a making-for-life (as even a critic like Arnold is very prone to take for granted); much less pleasure—except the pleasure of the satisfied yearning for insight, even for insight into the impossibility of insight;—but that, instead, the simple business of poetry is authenticity and concrete presentment of essential *real* truth. What then would be the objection—I mean the artistically disqualifying objection—to a negative poetry? Until we have clearly settled this point, let us not be in a hurry to discard Byron on the strength of an unexamined formula to the effect that all art must be optimistic or narcotic. I hope, rather, that we may—so long as this more radical test remains pending—have helped to show, right there where criticism against him is most usually directed, in the ethical heart of him, a merit not so common but that, in the mere moral interest, men should be unwilling to let pass the example and inspiration to it, even when obscured in much unloveliness; while as regards æsthetic considerations, we have already said, and not many will deny, that at last—the appropriate outer form not failing—the ethical *centre and substance* of art is one with the artistic.

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ART AND MORALITY.

It goes without saying, that it is impossible within the limits of an article, to deal exhaustively with the relations of Ethic and Aesthetic. An entirely adequate discussion of the subject could be accomplished only by a thorough examination of the question as to whether there be an essential connection between the human instinct that finds expression in strictly moral phenomena, and that which reflects itself in the forms of Art. We should, of course, have to examine and settle the difficult problem as to the precise sphere of Aesthetic properly so called, and to say whether and how far Art, by its nature, is essentially a mode for the manifestation of moral ideas and aspirations; we should have to decide whether there be a Good outside of the Beautiful, or a Beautiful outside of the Good.

But approaching the subject from a somewhat popular standpoint and making the very simple assumption that Aesthetic and Moral or Social phenomena are essentially modes of spiritual manifestation, one may endeavor to show that the Art impulse, when it has issued in Creation, as opposed to mere Imitation, has been, in one or two strongly marked phases of social development, a correct and accurate exponent of the moral movement of the period to which it belongs.

Spirit, from time to time in human history, has set its seal upon Nature in the form of Art. How far has the impress been morally significant?

Want of definiteness is the characteristic of all primitive forms of spiritual expression. Necessarily it is in the domain of Art that the earliest record of this want is left for posterity to read. Long ere poetry, politics, religion, have found adequate media, through which the thought they contain may live as history, the creative instinct has found means to imprint upon the world imperishable traces of the results of its activity. Through these, and often through these alone, can future ages guess at the poetic, the social, the political and the religious ideas that moulded and mastered the development of prehistoric man.

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Here, it is in architecture, that we find the most characteristic attempts of the aesthetic impulse to express itself. Barbaric Art, in the distinctive features of it, must be studied through the religious monuments of races whom Herodotus would have named civilized Barbarians. In ancient Babylonia and India, but most of all in ancient Egypt, the creative instinct wrote itself in larger symbols than are to be found among any other scenes of primitive human activity. What little we can learn of the ethical ideas of such a dim antiquity, we can guess at only by attempting to spell out the religious conceptions of ancient peoples from the stone symbols in which they strove to give them sensuous form. Strove, for everywhere are the marks not only of struggle but of failure. In the vastness and gloom of huge temples, in the bewildering size of stupendous pyramids, in the giddy loftiness of tower and obelisk, in costly sculpturing and rich arabesque,—in all these are the records of a painful strife, in which the human spirit was ever vainly endeavoring to find articulate expression for ideas which, with all its labor, it could not reduce to form. They tell the story of peoples in whose life dwelt the veritable creative force, a force that could find no articulate voice, a force that issued in monstrous births, that spent itself in vain quantitative and iterative effort, striving to subdue nature and speak through it, but evermore itself subdued to what it worked in, struggling to make matter luminous with the light of mind, but evermore itself cast down in darkness and buried under the pyramid which it raised.

Whatever be the historical or mythological significance of the story of the Tower of Babel, there is nothing, from the aesthetic standpoint, more infinitely pathetic than the idea which that story involves. To make dead matter the ladder of sublime aspiration by mere aggregation and repetition, this is the fate and the tragedy of early Art, before the spirit of Beauty has learned to clothe itself in a material form worthy of itself and adequate to the expression of it.

Of the moral ideas that influenced the lives of these early artists in stone and brick, it is more than difficult to form other than a theoretic estimate. If we may judge from the

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ethical phenomena manifested by the history of their descendants, as that history is reflected for example in such a writer as Herodotus, we find that Art, however inarticulate, was a very fair reflection of such moral instincts as were yet awake. Lofty enough conceptions of the value and dignity of law and order, of reverence for authority human and Divine, for age and wisdom and genius, of submission to fate, of the need for propitiating offended deities by sacrifice and ritual, sometimes an exaggerated humaneness, sometimes a superstitious recognition of the sanctity of human life,—all this often consisting with the most chaotic disregard of individual moral relations, the most monstrous sexuality and the most revolting cruelty. Morality like Art is here purposeless, inarticulate. It is impossible to deny the existence of an ethical consciousness, but the half articulate voice of moral obligation is drowned in the clash of the cymbals that accompanies a mere quantitative atonement for moral failures, just as the bright grace of the Spirit of Beauty is quenched amid the awful gloom of the Temple, or killed by the ugly mass of the pyramid.

In one aspect of ancient Art, however, there is both ethical and artistic possibility. In the idea of the Sphinx, the spirit of the ancient world found a partial articulation. Here the struggle with nature is most manifest, here where victory and defeat so strangely mingle. The divine womanhood of the head and bust, the contemplative power of the broad massive brow, the soul of eternity that sleeps in the calm wakefulness of the eyes, the depth of emotion wedded to indomitable will in the full firm lips, and below all this, and supporting it, and linked with it as indissoluble part of one organism, the lion's body with its virile force of muscle in shoulder and thigh and haunch,—such are the elements in this, the most marvelous aesthetic conception of the genius of antiquity.

What need is there to point out the ethical import of such a conception or to show that here a moral consciousness struggles, not altogether in vain, to give birth to the very deepest of moral ideas?

It is the dualism of Nature and Spirit, the eternal war of the actual and the ideal of the moral life. To a later age of Art

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was left the task of disclosing the inherent inadequacy of the half beast, half human creation, to express, with a clear articulateness, the conflict of matter and mind; an age which, in the complete human form, should find the balance of the antithesis, and in finding it should lose it and itself be lost in the growing light of its own thought, no less than in the darkness of its extinction by a world conquering alien. In Barbaric Art and in Barbaric Ethics, Spirit was inarticulate because it could not find in matter an adequate medium for its expression. It is to the sculpture of Greece and to the thought and life of Athens in the age of Pericles that we must go for the records of a race who gloried in finding such a medium, and who paid the penalty of believing that its adequacy was permanent.

In Athenian Art and in Athenian Society and Politics, we find an atmosphere illumined by the light of self-conscious definiteness. Freedom in order, liberty under law, thought clothing itself infinite embodiment and for the time unconscious of its limitation, finding indeed in the idea of limit the fullest expression of its highest aims and aspirations,—such were some of the characteristic springs of the Greek life at its loftiest reach of achievement. Spirit seemed to have lost, in the pliancy of matter, the sense of Infinitude; matter seemed to have become instinct with all spiritual possibility. Did intelligence ever conceive of any form in which more truly and simply dwells the soul of an Infinite Beauty than in the rhythmic curves of the Theseus? Before the most time mutilated remains of that age, we breathe the air not of the studio but of the shrine: any sense of admiration at the rare possibilities of skill of hand and brain is instinctively checked as a profaneness, and we all but believe that a marble bosom did heave into glowing life beneath the last loving touches of Pygmalion's chisel.

Turn where you will amid the surviving fragments of the creative energy of the Greek imagination, you find the same marvelous idealization of matter, the same conviction that the hard rind of Nature has for once been broken through, that Nature has given up its foreignness and willingly yielded to the interpretative insight of Art; that man has risen clear of the brute; that the human form is, even to the eye of sense, divine.

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The ideas thus reflected in this golden age of plastic Art were precisely the ideas that moulded the social life of Athens. To make the life of its citizens free, happy, beautiful, purposeful, naturally artistic, as well as artistically natural, was the aim of the lofty leading spirits whom the genius of the Greek life inspired. The actual of that life came so near to the ideal, that that aim was all but realized. The self-consciousness of that realization constituted at once the serene sunlight of the Attic Spirit and the darkness of the Fate in which ere long it was swallowed up.

The artistic and the ethical ideals were, as if for a moment, one. Art reflected life and educated it; the moral impulse found in Art its truest and fullest expression, until the idea of "Art for Art" became an ethical as well as an aesthetic aspiration, destroying the deepest life of the former, and depriving Art of its moral significance. Why, it has often been asked, did Greek Morality degenerate most, precisely at the moment when Greek Art achieved its noblest triumphs? The question has been variously answered; doubtless there must be various elements in the answer. When Socrates says that Ethics, to be truly such, must be purposeful, self-conscious, he indicates the source of the moral weakness of the spirit of his time.

So long as the ideal of the State was a vital thing for the individual citizen, so long as the Athenian cultivated his body and exercised his intelligence in the service of the Genius of his City, he escaped the worst consequences of that exclusiveness which the Society of the City enforced. Till then he could be socially self-denying, publicly brave and privately honorable and virtuous, according to his ideas of honor and virtue. But, with the dawn of the ambition, begotten of the age of Pericles, to make the individual life under the strong underlying aesthetic impulse of the Athenian spirit, a work of art, came the end of the Greek Ethics and the degradation of the Greek Art. To aim at the acquirement of beauty, physical and moral, with a view not to the service of Athene but to individual self-complacence and individual blessedness, to strive after a statuesque completeness in the individual life, with only the vaguest reference to a correspondingly increased value in the aggregate of

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social relations, this was the fatal moral mistake of the philosophically grounded life of the most perfect of ancient communities. In the course of the development of such a mistake, it was but natural that the State, less and less an object of devotion, should lose its cohesiveness and cease to be. In the sphere of Art, the like degeneracy was not less real because it is more difficult to trace. It is true that public spirit, patriotism, glad, or at the lowest ungrudging self-sacrifice to duty, clearness of moral discernment, the fidelity of friendship, the sanctity of domestic relations, that these had vanished as facts of political and social life, long ere the bloom was shed or even the fair bud had fully unfolded itself in the flower of Greek creative Art. That flower derived its quality from a root and soil to which the glorious past of Athens had most largely contributed. The growth of the Greek idea, especially in its degeneracy, was characterized by a rapidity unexampled in history. Hence the Art of its last days, that is the noblest forms of that Art did not strictly belong to the short and fleeting epoch in which it appeared, save perhaps in a certain self-conscious pride of technique, which is not altogether undiscernible even in the very purest of its creations. Whatever exception we must here allow to the general principle that the results of the creative impulse correctly reflect the ethical life of the time, must be grounded upon the unique swiftness of the Athenian social development, upon the wide application of the words, "*Ars longa vita brevis*" and upon the fact proved by all history that the highest products of thought and imagination are often reaped in periods of incipient national and social decay. Yet speaking broadly, the defects of the ethical conceptions of Greece were essentially the defects of her Art. The Greek State, like the Greek religion of which its Art was the nominal exponent, was based upon a doctrine of natural selection. It rested upon the belief, practical at once and theoretic, that the choice specimens of mankind alone should inherit the earth. It lifted some human qualities into the Divine, but not humanity as such. It found no place or voice for the infinite pathos that gives to modern Morality and Art of the highest types whatever of value or permanence or beauty they possess. It

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found no expression for the wail of the slave or the claim to compassion of the physically, morally, or intellectually weak. It cast out from it all shapes of deformity, or misery, or misfortune, as an ugliness, which its refined ethical and artistic taste could neither use nor tolerate. Hence, beyond all the sunlight of an ideal life of healthy practical energy and contemplative thought, there loomed ever the shadow of that fate, which, in the natural and necessary philanthropic reaction that preceded the assault of Rome upon its effete political life, wrapped Athens in the gloom in which so soon its exclusive freedom and its creative power were lost. The idea "Art for Art" consoling motto of the Greeks, who, when their country was enslaved, set up their studios in the Imperial City and amid the luxury of the voluptuous towns of the Campanian Coast, was neither new nor strange. We have said that it is difficult to connect the moral degeneracy of the most splendid phase of Athenian life with the noblest creative achievements which were contemporary with that degeneracy. It is not so difficult on a wide familiarity with some even of the most exquisite productions of Athenian Art. One of the most renowned works of the chisel of Praxiteles is the Aphrodite of Cnidos. No goddess more truly influenced the society of Athens in her hour of most unquestioned supremacy. No altar was more duly honored by public offering or by private rite. No deity was ever more really worshipped in spirit and in truth. And, as he bowed before the shrine, the Athenian devotee paid his vows and presented his gifts, and poured out his prayers, to the idealized image of the most noted beauty and the most notorious profligate of the age. Phyrne, the courtesan for whose bought smile and favors the young noblesse of the city contended, had served as model to Praxiteles, mightiest master of Athenian Sculpture at its best.

It was the belief in the ideal of the State as conceived by the Greek mind and all but realized in the Greek life, that destroyed the moral possibilities of Greece; it was the aesthetic faith that found in the sensuous perfectness of the human form an adequate medium for spiritual expression, that killed Athenian Art.

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Space does not permit us to follow through decadence to death the future progress of either. The spiritual atmosphere of earlier imperial Rome is not healthy either for the student of Ethics or the student of Art; an atmosphere of more than half insane sensuality and cruelty. The grossness of morals and the prostitution of Art are reflected with a fearful clearness in those sculptures and sketches from Pompeii, collected in a museum at Naples, which women are not allowed to enter.

In Rome the Greek Art found its grave; but in Rome also the Art spirit had its resurrection as reflector at once and teacher of a new ethic and a new life.

Amid the vilest travesties of the speculative Greek Morality in its epicurean phase, there lived and grew the stoic ideal, which, with all its narrowness of conception, still contained the germ of an infinite Ethical possibility. To the latter it was given to speak the last word of the old world both for Art and Ethics, and unconsciously to announce the advent of a new era for both.

The moral ideal of the earlier Roman Stoics revolted from Art. It wanted the touch of emotion to make it a religion, whose universal aspiration should recognize and include universal needs. It was doubtless a preparation for Christian Art and Morality, but it is difficult to see how these could ever have been evolved from it. It felt the pathos of human life, but in its essential and practical pessimism it contained no idea of an optimism on the basis of pessimism, such as constituted the very deepest truth of Christianity. Its highest outlook was towards the dim suggestion of a life beyond the grave, "where," says Seneca, "there will be union with God and then shall we behold that beauty which cannot be expressed to men."

Yet, underneath the splendors of the upper world of Rome, underneath the streets where rattled and glittered the chariots of voluptuous patrician epicureanism, covering with dust or mud the self-contained Stoic with his solemn stately tread, there lived, amid the dim vistas of the catacombs, a world of possibility both for Ethics and for Art. There, amid graves and darkness, was growing a society which, in its social anti-

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theses and its play of passion, was to combine the universalistic ideal of the Stoic with a purified enthusiasm for that beauty which the Stoic despised.

Passing over the attractive field of inquiry, that would invite to an attempt to trace the development of the new birth of Art and Morals which belongs to the early Christian centuries, the emergence above ground from the catacombs of the Christian Spirit and its evolution as manifested in the Roman, the Byzantine, the Lombard, and the Gothic Architecture and Sculpture, let it suffice to glance at that form of Art which most distinctively belongs to Christianity—Painting, and at the moral life which corresponded with it. In Christianity Spirit never found its adequate expression in Art; even from the first the moral ideal transcended full infinite manifestation; it could be no longer expressed through matter: Barbaric inarticulateness and Classic balance alike lay behind it; it did indeed take up into self the artistic impulse, in so far as form and color were concerned, and use it for its own high ends, but in so doing it glorified, exalted, transfigured, satisfied, it until, like the Greek Morality, it lost it, though unlike the Greek Morality it survived the loss.

In the perfection of pictorial Art under the Christian impulse, we have, of course, the reflection of some of the deepest ethical truths of which Christianity was the source. Under our present limits a glance at one or two outstanding features must suffice.

One of the central ideas of this Age of Art was the Madonna. This was perhaps the greatest ethical, as it was the greatest esthetic conception of the Middle Ages. In Classical Art it has no counterpart. *Δεινον το τίκτειν εστιν*, says Sophocles, but the idea is a mere casual reflection. The divinity of Motherhood simply did not influence practically the Athenian life or the Athenian Art.

In the moral culture, the moral regeneration of Christendom, what force has played a more resultful part? In the Magdalene, the divinity of Repentance found its earliest utterance, a conception which was or would have been most assuredly "foolishness" to the Greek philosophic mind, even

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under its deepest and truest moral mood. To trace the power of these two artistic, as well as religious creations, to the universal popularity of female deities in every age, as shown in the worship of Diana, Astarte, or Isis, is not only to rationalize Christianity; it is to miss the ethical import of the most essential of its ideas. In the Christ of Mediæval Painting, the divinity of Sorrow and the worth of Man as Man give the fullest expression to the spirit of Stoicism, while they add to that spirit the element of passion, without which abstract self-renunciation, no less than abstract universalism, could never fascinate or renovate mankind. It was not the Greek idea of God in the image of man, it was no apotheosis of the rarest intellectual and physical human beauty; no artificial divine humanity formed by the palaestra and the School, with eyes that had looked on no ugliness and ears which discordance had never entered. It was a figure whose humanity had been worn and spent in service, and whose divinity had become perfect through suffering.

The forms of an Art like this, so long as it was true to itself, were never self-consciously adequate to the ideas that inspired it. It was an Aesthetic Age, in which "Art for Art" was never a motive; whose half unconscious motto was "Art for Religion," when Religion and Morality were one. In its noblest remains we are invariably struck by the mighty force of one idea; there is no slovenly slurring of details, yet there is no self-complacent pride of technique; while, from the ethical point of view, we are taught without being lectured, and our aesthetic enjoyment is seldom if ever less, because it is the vehicle of moral teaching. The greatest religious painters, perhaps, never painted in order to teach, yet the essence of the purest Ethics of their time was most unquestionably very largely inspired by their work. Paradoxical though at first sight it seems, it is just as unquestionable that, in the decadence of the sixteenth century, the dawn of the idea of "Art for Art" was precisely the point at which Art and Morals ceased to have an essential connection.

The growth of Pictorial Art in the service of the Church corresponded with a broadening ethical outlook. More than

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any other agent it unfolded to the world the universalism which only half consciously inspired it. The abstract form in Sculpture tended to stereotype the ideas it expressed. In Painting, the principles of shadow and perspective formed the elements of an infinite progress, while they interpreted the pathos and the universality of the Christian conceptions of Humanity and of Moral relation. The inadequacy of Painting, even for tentative spiritual expression, disclosed itself just before the Reformation. Art lost its simplicity, its subordination of detail, its independence of technique, its reverence, its spirituality of conception, its purity of execution. Hence, it gave up Creation for imitation, loving interpretation for sensuous idolatry, spirit for sense and freedom for license. It ceased to lend itself to the display of religious facts, and then and thereafter, as Ruskin says, "religious facts were employed for the display of Art," and by a gradual process Art degenerated, through the sensuousness of realistic flesh color, until it came to revel at last in the clever realism of technique displayed by the still life and domesticity of the Dutch School. "Ye have made the Virgin," says Savonarola to the painters of Florence, "Ye have made the Virgin to appear like a prostitute." What wonder that the Church of the Reformation disdained the Sisterhood of Art? The Reformation could not come while a genuine artistic impulse promoted a pure worship and a lofty morality. It had to come when sensuousness took the place of aspiration, and spiritual adoration was exchanged for idolatry. The success of Mediæval Art was unquestionably owing to the fact that genius was nourished in the atmosphere of a passionate social purity. When that atmosphere became contaminated, scenic Art could be no longer the essential handmaid of religion.

It is unnecessary, perhaps, to discuss at length the relation of Art and Ethics after the Renaissance and the Reformation, for it is in Music and in Poetry, rather than in the Plastic or Pictorial spheres of Art, that that relation is most clearly seen. The moral movement of post-Reformation society is, of course, from age to age, reflected in the portrait and the landscape, as well as in the spirit of the periodic modernizing

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or imitation of pagan Models; yet these are but accidental reflections; they are not the creative impress of an ethical impulse.

One instance of such an impress under such an impulse, we select in closing from the history of four centuries: one of the most obvious and one of the most suggestive. The social earthquake of the French Revolution had no concomitant and no result more significant for the Aesthetic or the Moral interests of mankind than the rise of that movement of thought of which Goethe and Wordsworth were the most outstanding exponents. In wide diversity of manner and form, yet with a perfect oneness in spirit and in originality, they expressed an idea which all the glory of Mediæval Art at its highest point failed to reach. For the noblest thought of Leonardo, of Perugino, of Raphael, was the mystic union of Earth and Heaven; to the poetic spirit of the nineteenth century it was given to grasp and realize the deeper conception of the Eternal and Essential unity of the Human and the Divine.

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RELIGION AS AN IDEA.[1]

Recent philosophical literature presents, among other noteworthy features, a peculiar handling of the subject of religion. This peculiarity in treatment may be described as a more or less conscious commingling, even confusion, of elements. On the one hand, writers are concerned to make plain the biological and sociological function of religion and they give definitions accordingly:

"Religion is a substitute in the rational world for instinct in the sub-rational world."[2]

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[1] The writer of this paper wishes to call attention to the fact that he is not concerned to establish any form of faith but simply to inquire whether the term "religion" does not demand a more exact connotation than is given it in recent discussions.

[2] Lester F. Ward: Article. "Essential Nature of Religion."

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"Religion is a suppression of our fallible wills to what we conceive of as a higher will, the restraint of individualistic impulses to racial ones. This restraint seems to me to be of the very essence of religion." [3]

"Religion is the effective desire to be in right relations to the power manifesting itself in the universe." [4]

These definitions, exhibiting, as I have said, the functional value of religion, rest on the experienced fact of a reality, not ourselves, which is practically omnipotent. On the other hand there are definitions which seem to find in religion a fact having other value than that of restraint.

"Religion is an excitement of the cheerful, expansive, dynamogenic order. Religion cannot be a mere anachronism and survival, but must exert a permanent function whether she be with or without intellectual content and whether, if she have any, it be true or false." [5]

We are prepared by these words, for the more formal definition of religion as "the total reaction of the individual in the presence of that which is primary and enveloping. Religion adds a new dimension to life and spreads out a new reach of freedom making easy and felicitous what in any case is necessary."

We may place in this second class of definitions, Arnold's conception of a power that makes for righteousness, also Fiske's quasi-psychical energy, and last of all the recent expression of Professor Royce before the Amrican Philosophical Association [6] where he says: "Religion, in its higher sense, is the consciousness of practical relations to a real but unseen spiritual order whose authority, as furnishing the rule for conduct, is conceived as absolute and whose worth and dignity are recognized as supreme." This Professor Royce pronounces the most important business of the human being.

It is plain that these definitions, while differing in the general conception as above indicated, agree in failing to discriminate between what religion is as a given, present reality in the evolution of thought and belief, and what religion is as rep-

[3] Henry Rutgers Marshall: "Instinct and Reason."
[4] Ira W. Howerth: INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS, January, 1903.
[5] James: "Varieties of Religious Experience."
[6] Published in this JOURNAL April, 1903.

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resenting the highest conception of which the human mind is capable. We are concerned to know not only what religion is here and there and elsewhere, but what religion ought to be if the most fully developed man is to profess religion.

Among the quotations cited above, the utterance of Professor Royce comes nearest to our present thought. He declares religion to be the consciousness of practical relations to a real but unseen spiritual order. Here, as he tells us, we have a rule of conduct that is absolute and of a supreme worth and dignity.

There is noticeable in all this handling of religion, not excepting the last, a desire to get on without what is known in orthodox parlance, as a personal God. Professor Royce relates us to an unseen *spiritual order.* The writer must not, for one moment, be taken to imply that this rejection of the orthodox teaching is due to prejudice or narrowness. The fact is exactly the contrary. Such views as those of Professors Royce and James are the result of a conviction that we must have a higher, larger, and in every way diviner conception of religion than the creed of orthodoxy provides.

The gross anthropomorphism of all religions has inevitably brought it about that religion now attempts to get itself expressed without any anthropomorphism whatsoever. Doubtless there is below this still a further consideration, viz. the conviction that the existence of a personal God cannot be accepted by enlightened reason.

Now it is the purpose of the present paper to insist that whether you can or cannot believe in a personal God is a matter totally distinct from the question as to whether such belief is essential for the highest religious conception. A man may be alike justified and constrained to say: "Religion for me means belief in a personal God; if I cannot secure such a belief, I shall not profess religion. 'An unseen spiritual order' must be an order of unseen spirits, or spirit if it is to determine my conduct or character."

Since on all hands definitions of religion are put forward, and since nearly all of these are in terms of the vaguest generality, the writer submits one from the concrete approach:

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Religion is the binding of human personality to a supreme personality. The differencing marks of this definition are clear. First, religion is a binding—there is in it a consciousness of obligation. Second, this obligation is to make oneself like the supreme self. Third, this supremacy is due to and grounded in a transcendent *excellence of character* and nothing else. As the Best Being, and for no other reason, has God a right to me. Underneath the entire definition is the idea of personality. What does personality mean? It means self-conscious intelligence. It is no objection to say that self-conscious intelligence cannot be defined—for this is the ultimate and *no ultimate* can be defined.

The question before us is whether philosophy can furnish a higher definition of religion. There is no need in this paper to enter into historical considerations or to attempt to show, by distinguished examples, that wherever religion has been most powerful and comforting, it has exhibited faith in a Living God. We are concerned wholly with the idea and with the question as to whether the human mind is capable of any higher idea. It is safe to say that all will agree to set apart the word God to stand for the highest conception of which we are capable.

Have we anything higher or can we create anything higher than the conception of a Supreme Self-Conscious Intelligence? It is interesting to note that men as far removed from orthodoxy as Mr. Spencer, distinctly assert that we are not capable of any higher conception. It is interesting further to observe that in the same breath with which he says this, he adds: "That is no reason for not believing in such an existence." "How do we know," he asks, "that there may not be a being as far removed from the limited intelligence of man as man is from the intelligence of the brute?" Here, as the writer believes, we meet a most diffusively pernicious fallacy in all reasoning on this subject. We do not know how much greater realities there may be than those we do know and must know, therefore let us not believe as we know and must know but exactly as we do not know and cannot know.

There is scarcely anything more astonishing among the dis-

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plays of human reason than Mr. Spencer's attempt, made many years since, to reconcile science and religion. Tracing the conceptions of science and religion to their irresolvable remainders, he found these to be the same for each, viz. an unknowable. The only characteristic of this reality is *existence —weiter nichts*—as though there could be for any consciousness a "somewhat" which was not a "somehow."

Consider the religion of it. Science and faith on their knees before an existence of which not the slightest state of consciousness is to be had! All determination is negation, therefore if you speak of God, He is no longer God. Here we are reminded of Mr. Bradley's caustic footnote, "Appearance and Reality" page 128: "I do not wish to be irreverent, but Mr. Spencer's attitude towards his Unknowable strikes me as a pleasantry, the point of which lies in its unconsciousness. It seems a proposal to take something for a God simply and solely because we do not know what the devil it can be. But I am far from attributing to Mr. Spencer any one consistent view."

The fact of the matter seems to be that our refined culture is so shocked by the least anthropomorphism in approaching God that no God whatsoever is left to approach. We all know the favorite argument here and upon what assumption it is based. The finite cannot conceive the infinite,—because the infinite is exactly that which is beyond the finite. How shall anyone grasp that which he cannot grasp? Nothing seems more cogent than this—and nothing is more genuine nonsense. The nonsense is the necessary outcome of man's determination to give objective reality to the creation of his own mind. The distinction between noumenon and phenomenon—infinite and finite—is in itself, *i. e.,* as representing the state of the case beyond man's consciousness, an utter figment. The finite means nothing but our present relations with the infinite. We touch the infinite on every side, are parts of it, ourselves declare its nature. To say therefore that we cannot have a solitary state of consciousness about it is the extreme of folly. Whenever, by permission of Mr. Spencer, we know the pitiable phenomenal we know the infinite.

It is to be hoped that this old "inconceivability" argument

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will play no farther part in discussions about matters of fact or about inferences from fact. The only inconceivability worth talking of in an infinite universe, is that which is displayed by the incongruent elements of a conception—such as a round square or a double unit.

When we pass from form to matter nothing is to be ruled out as impossible because, up to date, our experience is lacking in a given direction. Not long since it would have been pronounced as impossible as it was inconceivable, that we could look through nine inches of solid oak. Yet many of us have done this, and should one come forward saying "I can project my thought by a wordless, wireless telegraphy, through miles of space," a fitting modesty would bid him do so and show the doing to others. Let us then say the phenomenon is the noumenon appearing; in knowing phenomenon, we know noumenon.

We return to the definition of religion as a binding of our personality to a supreme personality, and assert that, as an idea, a conception, this is higher than the vague presentations found in current literature on the subject.

Test the definition from the side of the intellect and from the side of the emotions. Intellect assures us that self-conscious intelligence is a fact—also that it is a fact of very high rank. No distinction is more evident than that between the thing and the thought of the thing. The thing knows not that it is a thing; the thought knows and knows that it knows. Now this fact, which none can dispute, must be taken at its full value and the only way to do this is to realize that the fact came by way of the universe itself. The universe has produced a self-conscious individual who is aware of the universe and of himself as aware. This transcendent fact should give a new meaning to reality, should illuminate it from every side, showing that the universe is in no sense static, also that self-conscious intelligence may be in no sense static.

Because self-conscious intelligence is, within our experience, exhibited through the limited centers of individuals, does it in any sense follow that no unlimited self-conscious intelligence is possible? Consider the highest expression of human intel-

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lect as such—taking as a type, Aristotle the "Master of them that know." Here the relation of finite to infinite is of the limited and serial order, but evidences of something else are also present. The unrivaled dialectic is simply a direct and *relatively complete* contact of consciousness with its subject matter. In like manner the painstaking accumulation of facts and the grasp of the subjects through their history is the relatively complete adjustment of consciousness to a world-process. What then compels us to maintain that the idea of an intelligence exceeding that of Aristotle as his exceeds the intelligence of the oyster is contradictory? Contradictory to what? Not to experience for experience points in that direction. To the necessities of thought? Not at all, if once we banish the figment of our own devising that the infinite is whatever the finite is not.

A supreme self-conscious intelligence then is our highest God-concept. We demand that the power that makes for righteousness shall *know* that it is making for righteousness, that the quasi-psychical energy shall be so far and so distinctively psychical as to know what it is about, that the "unseen spiritual order" shall be somewise approachable, that it shall mean something more than is embodied by the negative term invisibility.

Spinoza's God-idea, like all his ideas, is crystal clear and exhibits our present thought in masterly statement—"God is a being, each of whose attributes exhibits an infinite and eternal nature." This Spinoza rightly assures us means that each attribute is *absolutely* infinite, not infinite *suo genere* only. The entire being of God is in each—in the attribute mercy in the attribute power, in the attribute omniscience. God is absolutely just in His mercy and absolutely merciful in His justice—so through all attributes. It does not dispose of our thought to say that such a God is the noblest work of man, for in saying this the entire position of the paper is granted. We seek to know exactly what God must mean *for us,* the term God being used for our highest conception.

Our contention then is with those who, claiming to have the most advanced God-idea, speak to us in abstractions of the

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"presence of that which is primary and enveloping," and tell us that religion means "an excitement of the cheerful, expansive, dynamogenic order." It really seems that we need not, as we certainly cannot, concern ourselves much about that which is "primary and enveloping." We certainly need some way of getting an authority which, as Professor Royce says, will furnish a rule for conduct whose worth and dignity will be recognized as supreme. There is no consciousness so intellectual that it can divest itself of such need, for the need is grounded in the very essence of intellect. To intelligize is to perceive. To perceive is to perceive somewhat. Thus in our most abstract generalizations are we tethered to facts—concrete, individual objects and persons.

From the point of view of intellect, consciousness of self is the highest reality attainable. Kant's transcendental self, in the unity of apperception, makes experience possible—and Hegel's reflective self, as the last, highest, stage in the evolution of reason, thinks reality as a union of contradictories.

Now comes the distinctive doctrine of our day, scientific evolution, and shows a process in which the simple has become the complex, the homogeneous the heterogeneous, and, last of all, shall we say, comes the growing appreciation of this doctrine as an exposition of the nature of being, of the universe. Most interesting is it to observe that this appreciation carries us back to Kant and to Hegel. My meaning is that a newer emphasis has been put upon self-consciousness as a reality this universe was at work at—was determined to exhibit. A newer meaning is put upon struggle, contest, as the only way to character, self-determined excellence, moral worth. "The far-off event" has drawn so near as to suggest the meaning of it all—this stormy, struggling, developing life of ours.

It remains to consider the God-idea from that other side of human nature, the side of the emotions. Long ago Mr. Bain thought to tell us the truth about religion when he said: "Religion, being primarily an affair of the emotions, means must be sought for heightening these." Man not only reasons, he feels. About this there can be no question. All ethical judg-

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ment-standards class themselves under reason or feeling as the ultimate source of appeal.

With regard to feeling, two facts are of fundamental import. These facts are clearly and forcibly stated by Hegel.[7]

"Feeling is the immediate and, as it were, the closest contact in which the thinking subject can stand to a given subject." "Trained and sterling feeling is the feeling of an educated mind—and it is with such a mind that the rectified material enters into its feeling and receives form." "If any man on any topic appeals not to the nature and notion of the thing, or at least to reasons, but to his feeling, the only thing to do is to let him alone, because, by his behavior he refuses to have lot or part in common rationality, but shuts himself up in his private and particular self."

The first of these facts will doubtless be universally admitted. There is nothing so essentially, peculiarly, our own as our feelings. We can in a sense envisage, put out of ourselves, our thoughts; this we can in no sense do with our feelings. Yet the first fact has more in it than this truth. "Feeling is the *closest contact* in which as *thinkers,*" we can stand to a given subject. This means that thinking *alone* will not and cannot relate us as closely to a given subject as we are capable of being related. The subject is not ours until we have felt it; if we are unmoved by the truth we are not in possession of the truth.

One of the most radical defects in modern education, and a defect for which no provision seems anywhere contemplated in our reconstruction of curricula and our fads, is met exactly in our overestimation of the intellectual and underestimation of the emotional. In our reaction from sentimentality and gush we have attained that rarified extreme where feeling is "bad form" and we all know that when anything is "bad form" it is at its worst. As illustration the writer has in mind a "reader" for a large eastern publishing house who gave as his chief ground for rejecting a manuscript, the fact that it irritated him by surprising him every little while into states of feeling. This critic's horror of melodrama as "bad form" had robbed him of the divinest reality belonging to human nature, viz. its right to feel.

Many educators would admit that to establish a pupil in

[7] "Philosophy of Mind." I quote from Wallace's translation, pages 68-69.

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pure tastes and likings is to come very near saving him in his earthly career. This admission is the admission of feeling as the fundamental reality of character. No reformation in education could compare in beneficence with that which would develop within the pupils the feeling side of the truths they learn. This brings us to our second fact of fundamental importance.

Feeling should be a trained feeling, *i. e.,* the feeling of an educated mind and this because "it is with such a mind that the rectified material enters into its feeling and receives form." This thought is to be considered from two sides. Feeling depends upon fact for its right to exist. Secondly, all fact as such is capable of producing feeling.

Consider the first statement. Feeling has its source in fact. This justifies feeling, saves it from sentimentality and gush. Recall, in this connection, the statement of Professor James. "Religion must exert a permanent function whether she be with or without intellectual content and whether, if she have any, it be true or false." This appears to tell us that religion will continue to serve us in the expansive way before mentioned, whether she have any substance or not, or whether the claimed substance be true or false.

How much can religion expand us if we do not know that it means anything at all, or, if it does, that its meaning is true? We should be unwilling to credit Professor James with such a position were it not for other statements in the Gifford Lectures and for his argument, in the "Will to Believe," to show that argument is unnecessary. His teaching there is that by wanting a fact very much we create the fact—as where a young man creates love in a young woman by refusing to accept her "no" and by insisting that she must love him. It seems strange that Professor James did not reflect upon another alternative, viz. that the young man's intense desire may have made a different young man of him—brought out nobler traits, kinder thoughts and acts, so giving to the young woman the facts which won her affection.

Whether, psychologically speaking, the James-Lange theory of emotion be accepted or decidedly modified as now seems

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probable, the reality of trained feeling cannot be questioned or the philosophical significance of such feeling disputed. The active temperament when possessed by a strong conviction brings things to pass and this conviction, be it distinctly observed, means that certain things are true and certain conclusions justified. Now persuade such a temperament that nothing can ever be learned as to the truth or falsity of certain doctrines, and all feeling with regard to the doctrines, except possibly regret, will cease.

We deal here, as is plain to all, with a question of method, and it seems most essential that two very distinct matters be recognized as distinct and, if settled at all, be settled separately. Examine the definitions of "pragmatism" and "pragmatic method" given by C. A. Pierce and Professor James. Says Mr. Pierce: "Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have, then our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object." Says Professor James: "The doctrine that the whole meaning of a conception expresses itself in practical consequences, consequences either in the shape of conduct to be recommended or in that of experience to be expected, if the conception be true is pragmatism."

These statements agree in setting forth pragmatism as a method for *clarifying a conception.* That method is the analysis of the conception, its resolution into the *consequences* involved in it, consequences in the shape of conduct to be recommended or of experience to be expected.

Now it may be admitted that, for such clarifying result, the method is most admirable. We can thus determine the meaning of the conception for us in our present attitude toward a subject under investigation. It is a totally different thing however to interpret being, reality, after such a manner. When we come to metaphysics for an account of existence, we want to know what the *whole affair* means, why these things work out such results. It surely is no answer to show that conceptions are "workable" and bring certain consequences.

The definition of Professor James contains ethical and theoretical factors—the former where the conception involves

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conduct to be recommended, the latter as it involves consequences to be expected. Here something more appears to be contained than the mere determination of consequences. The method itself is determined outside itself. *Why* shall we recommend certain conduct seen to be involved in our conception? This question brings up again for settlement all the disputed topics concerned with ethical standards.

In like manner from the theoretical side the method requires *verification by experience* and so shares the strength and weakness of the inductive procedure. The application of this method is given by Professor James himself in his article, "The Will to Believe"—and the method here deals with the fundamentals of religious faith and avowedly claims to be a "defence of our right to adopt a believing attitude in religious matters in spite of the fact that our merely logical intellect may not have been coerced."

That we have a right to believe in spite of our reason no one will question, for what can "right" mean here except legal ability? That we *can* thus believe is not at all established by the author of the defense. His reference to the fact that men are much more under the influence of their feelings in all matters of faith, than of their reason, does not at all justify them in such surrender to feeling; neither does it, in the slightest degree, prove that they get on without reason when they yield to feeling.

The influence of feeling simply leads to the over-estimate of certain facts and the disregard of others and so to a wrong conclusion—but in no sense to a conclusion professedly at variance with the facts. Men have still a strong sense of shame in attempting to believe the absurd, and it is important to consider that there is no such thing as the "coercion of a logical intellect." The "logical intellect" rejoices in being itself, seeks no other freedom, has no sense of coercion in following the cogent, because logical, process of an argument or a demonstration. We seem then constrained, in the name of reason, to reject the method of saving faith urged by Professor James and to abide by the old attempt to give a reason for the faith that is in us.

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Have we reason to believe in the existence of a supreme personality whose nature is the ground of our sense of religious obligation? The answer to this question must be gathered from the facts of experience—our individual experience—and surely, on Professor James' own showing, no harm will result if the question be answered in the affirmative.

"But," some one may ask, "what if it be answered in the negative and there should, after all, be a God? Well, if He be a God worthy of the name He will respect and honor the sincerity of the unbelief and no harm will come to the unbeliever who erred through ignorance.

It is plain then that the inductive method which has served so well in the discovery of physical laws, may admit of application and be of service in determining our conclusions in matters of religion. There has been, and is, as much disagreement in science as in theology. The history of the inductive sciences presents a series of errors so extended and thorough-going as to parallel any contradictory dogmas and abandoned positions in the history of religious and psychological speculation. We have advanced in science by the use of experimental method and there is no reason whatsoever why this method should not be taken, in its broadest sense, as the method of fact-handling. The scientist is now well assured that there are facts as fact-like as anything he can perceive under his microscope or resolve by his chemicals. We have a right in the name of science to demand for these facts full recognition and a just estimate. A universe that produces consciousness, conscience, and reverence, must be interpreted in the light of these facts, as the acorn must be interpreted by the oak, and not by chemical analysis. The later stages of a process are as real as the earlier—more than this, they *alone expound the process.*

The realities that are found in the fully developed man whose body, mind and feelings are at their highest, are worth more to solve the mystery of the universe than any conceivable application of the genetic method.

We reach the final topic of our paper, which is the relation of religion to the emotional life of man. Having said that feel-

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ing is man's innermost possession, that the deepest, purest feelings are those springing from the loftiest religious conceptions, having insisted also that such feelings must be nourished by a rational belief in the existence of a reality capable of calling them forth and giving them nourishment, let us consider the fitness of our concrete definition of religion to supply this need.

The religious man is convinced that he is bound by a supreme personality—that is a supreme self-conscious intelligence. This binding is due to the excellence of a being between whom and himself there is kindredness of nature. Man believes, to use Fiske's words, that "he is not without kith and kin in all this universe."

Let it be granted that our loftiest emotions are love, reverence, worship, sympathy, and that we are at our best when these are most intense and abiding. It seems to follow that Kant's assertion about reverence holds with regard to all the emotions named. "Reverence," Kant tells us, "can be felt only for persons, never for things." Love, worship, sympathy, these in like manner can be experienced only for persons, never for things. If we are without a personal God in the world we shall necessarily be without the truest reverence, affection, and sympathy. There is something pathetic in the attempt of spiritually minded thinkers to ignore this fact and to advance in their spiritual life by generalities and abstractions. The most singular exhibition of this pathetic situation is shown by those who try to content themselves with the impersonal immortality of being known by posterity—known in their poems, their statues, their books, their legislation, while they, "the feeling, thinking, acting, men shall sleep in their urns."

Meanwhile signs are becoming more and more abundant that the individual man is asserting himself, and that he refuses to cry quits with the universe because posterity will know of his present doings when he has parted with all consciousness forevermore. The outcry of Nietzsche is the outcry of the individual, an outcry of protest against absorption in the mass—whether country or church. The longing to know

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whether, if a man die, shall *he* live again, was never more intense than at this very hour.

Our feeling is to be a trained feeling and we shall do well to consider that all-fact is capable of producing such feeling. Nothing could be more disastrous, alike for the individual and for the society where his influence is exerted than untrained emotion. Life cannot advance by disordered, *unreflected* impulses. Our impulses must somewise lead out of beyond themselves and this they can do only when an *ideal,* a *meaning* is found in them, by means of them. They must contain more than mere emotion; a fact must be their cause and an end their goal.

When we consider the world-view of to-day as an intellectual result constructed for us by modern science, we cannot refuse to acknowledge a body of fact every way qualified to develop, strengthen and guide our emotions. We have right to feel in view of what we know, and, were this knowledge set forth as it should be in our schools, colleges and universities, strong characters as active centres for good would result.

Idealism has come again, come with renewed power, and this is due to an acceptance of *all* facts with at the same time, a clear discernment of a meaning, a purpose, wrapped up in these facts. It is surely in place to ask what have the facts to offer as warrant for belief in God and for religious feeling as a binding of ourselves to Him.

W. R. Benedict.

University of Cincinnati.

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THREE STAGES IN INDIVIDUAL DEVELOPMENT.

THE word individual is the Latin equivalent of the word atom which means an indivisible unit. The monocellular animal is the simplest example of a living individual. Although endowed with a spontaneous activity of its own, its lack of organization, its simple, unitary character causes it to respond immediately to every stimulus from without. Because of this lack of coördination within itself, the sphere of its individual actions is, so to speak, limited to a mere point—its immediate sentiency. Its form of response therefore to the external world is mere irritability, its own inner activity, simple spontaneity. Such an individual, although it fulfils perfectly the logical definition of an individual, is in the sphere of reality a being reduced to a mere point, both in existence and in meaning.

An animal with a complex nervous system reveals a type of individual very different from that offered by the monocellular type. For an organization means the subordination of all that concerns the organism to the unity of the whole. Such an organized system therefore is not called upon to act as a whole in immediate response to every external stimulus. And this inner unity and stability is increased with the complexity of the organization. When system is within system the smaller systems or reflexes are fitted to respond of themselves to certain sets of stimuli. The life of the whole therefore is less at the mercy of particular external circumstances. Action of this organized type may be either instinctive or reflex, according as the organism acts as a whole or as some one of its many subordinate systems acts independently of the whole, through its own mechanism. It is evident that such an organic form of life belongs to a higher type than the monocellular, simple individual. "Every being who is not monocellular," says Guyau,[1] "is sure to have something good in him because he is a society in embryo." Spinoza speaks of "an in-

[1] "Education and Heredity," p. 33.

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dividual as composed of bodies only distinguished the one from the other in respect of motion and rest, speed and slowness; that is, of bodies of the most simple character." He then continues: "If, however, we now conceive another individual composed of several individuals of diverse natures, we shall find that the number of ways in which it can be affected, without losing its nature, will be greatly multiplied. . . . If we further conceive a third kind of individuals composed of individuals of this second kind, we shall find that they may be affected in a still greater number of ways without changing their actuality." [2]

A still higher type of individual is revealed when the organization of system within system, just referred to, is under the control of one definite central system—the brain. The human individual is the embodiment of this type. It is the true type of individuality. The reflex and instinctive life, no matter how complex, is, in itself and apart from any higher centre, the life rather of the race than of the individual. But through the brain as a controlling organ the entire content of the life mediated through any organism is handed over to one central consciousness. Here we see the most definite type of an individual—the human individual. The activity of such an individual is not merely the spontaneity, the inwardly pre-determined tendency of the monocellular being, nor the suppressing or emphasizing, the accepting or rejecting of sensations from external stimuli, as in complex organisms. Through a central system consciousness turns, as it were, upon itself, acquires self-consciousness and through its own capacity of inner reflection its inner impulsive tendency to activity is transformed into the self-conscious expression which we experience as volition or will. In addition therefore to the instinctive and reflex life there is the unique individual—etymologically indivisible or atomic—experience which is indescribable save in terms of itself. Human individuality therefore, although presupposing all these ascending grades of complex organization, still retains the original, inherent essence of the idea of in-

[2] "The Ethics," Part II, Prop. XIII, note.

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dividuality—the fact that it is not an exchangeable quantum but a unique, indivisible reality, which in this higher form is a living experience.

The human individual therefore has two widely different aspects: it is unique, indivisible, incommunicable, and it is also an organization within itself, "a society in embryo." The tendency of religion has been to regard only the former aspect while that of science has been to regard only the latter. The failure to deal with both these aspects must lead necessarily either to a chaotic individualism or to a deadening sense of unity in religious, philosophical and sociological thought. Whoever regards the individual as merely a part of a larger whole, in any department of life whatever, fails to see the very meaning of individuality itself. Whoever, on the other hand, recognizes in the individual only the exclusive, the unique, the incommunicable, fails to see that in addition to this fact the individual is also a highly complex organization, which sustains relationships to all the orders of life below him, to the complex social world about him and to the ideal world before him. The definition of the human individual therefore implies infinitely more than the atomic, the indivisible. He is "a society in embryo." When the unsharable character of volition and individual choice leads to isolation or to opposition the unity of life makes short work of such one-sided individuality. "The reign of morality," to quote Guyau again—and by this term he means harmony between the individual and the unity of life—"is more or less partially established within us as soon as we are able to establish any authority within ourselves." [3] It is not sheer nonsense even from a biological standpoint to say with Hegel that a definition of the human individual implies infinitely more than what we ordinarily mean by individuality.

These two aspects of the individual, that of uniqueness and that of organization, lead in the world of society respectively to individualism on the one hand and to socialism on the other. According to socialism the State is the unit of society,

[3] "Education and Heredity," p. 292.

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and individuals are regarded as products of this social life. The individual is the result of the social life regarded as a whole. Individualism on the other hand regards the State simply as the machinery of social life which individuals choose to hold in common. The individual wills are the source of all the authority of the State. The law of the State is the resultant of the action of these individual wills. Each of these two diverse tendencies in sociological theory is simply the over-emphasis of one of these two aspects of the individual which we have pointed out. The great swing in population from the country to the towns, the corresponding specialization of modern industry, and the growth of a new corporate life have added to the theoretical basis of socialism the massive weight of facts. It is seen that the social side of the individual life is no mere accident. At the same time it is impossible for democracy to over-ride the cardinal doctrine of individualism, that the authority of any State is in the will of its individual members. Each of these views is founded on one aspect of the individual's life. Neither takes into account the life of the individual in his entirety. We are to-day in about the same condition in which the Greeks were in the time of Socrates and Plato. Merely national, purely blood ties have broken down. Society has come to individual self-reflection. And so we have our sophists, men of individual rights and opinion. On the other hand there abound schemes of socialistic reform. But loose individualism can accomplish nothing because it means isolation and chaos. And socialism will not avail because the individuals are themselves the centres of social life and authority. They cannot be reduced to mere parts of any unity which does not centre in their own will. Individuals are ends in themselves, although these ends may be worked out in common with other individuals.

These conflicting views can be reconciled not in the sacrifice of the social side of the individual nor in the sacrifice of the individual himself but in a larger conception of the individual, which shall enable us to see that he is not only a self-determining individual but that he is an organization himself, and that his nature therefore so far from militating against

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organization and unity with other individuals really implies such organization and unity. The uniqueness of the individual has as its proper function not the negative performance of withdrawing into itself—the unity of nature has no place for such individuals—but such a direction of its own internal organization as shall best bring it into unity with the world of other men. The unity of a common ancestral blood is fast becoming a matter of the past. Let us hope the same for the world-old unity of militarism. But the deeper problem of a unity of will and intelligence, to take the place of the old, still remains. Such a unity between individual and individual is necessary because it is implied in the very structure of the individual himself. But it must be worked out by the individuals themselves, working together in common industries, common interests, common life. The greater the unity between the individual and his world the greater the individual. But this unity must be brought about if not by, at least through, his own will. The advance, the progress must come from the side of the individual himself as he learns to work and live in a larger, increasingly complex, social world. "He is the best who is most conscious of his solidarity with other beings and the universe." [4] This third stage in the development of the individual is the ideal type of human individuality.

Corresponding to the three stages which we have noted in the development of the individual—that of organization, that of a negative, exclusive self-consciousness, and that of reorganization between its growing sense of self and its deeper life—there are three similar stages in the development of the life of society. There is the racial life, the period of custom and blood-unity, followed by the stage of individualism, and then the swing of the pendulum through a period of reconstruction between the individual and society. We shall notice this three-fold movement in Israel, in Greece, and in modern life. First let us turn to Israel.

Tradition regards Abraham as the pre-historic head of the race. Later in the thirteenth century this patriarchal and clan

[4] Guyau, "Education and Heredity," p. 33.

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life was unified in a strong national unity through the work of Moses. This unification was carried further under David. Jehovah was the God of the nation. The government was a theocracy. The standard of righteousness was that of national prosperity. The nation was the unit, not the individual. With Amos, however, in the eighth century there came in a new world. The old national standard gave way to a moral standard. But this was a matter which had to be worked out through the individual. Finally, this individualistic point of view was clearly stated in Jeremiah's conception of the Law as written not on tablets of stone to be obeyed as external authority, but as written in the heart of the individual himself. It was not an accident that his contemporaries called Jeremiah unpatriotic. The pendulum had swung from the national to the individualistic extreme. A reorganization was necessary; and an age of reconstruction set in. Ezekiel, the father of Jewish ecclesiasticism, inaugurated this reorganization. He drew up a Code for the restored nation. Later on under Ezra a new Law-Code was given.

The same three-fold movement of social life is evident in the history of Greece. In the early age Homer was their teacher and the gods their protectors. But a later reflective age of which Socrates was the great spokesman did away with the now shadowy gods on Olympus and substituted the unseen spirit within the breast of the individual. The sculpture, dramas and philosophy of this period are still classic models for us moderns. It was an age of boundless individual growth. But the old authority of the State had crumbled, and Socrates was made to drink hemlock for corrupting the youth and for introducing strange gods. The unseen spirit which he found within his own breast was an unknown deity to the masses and a poor substitute for the older authority. In vain did Socrates attempt to show his countrymen that the reason to which he appealed did not belong to the individual merely but was the common property of all who were rational enough to seek her. He was ranked with the sophists. The counter-movement, a socialistic one, was mapped out by the author of the great socialistic Republic. But it was only an

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ideal scheme. Plato himself recognized it as such in his later years. The Greek spirit of unbridled individualism went on unchecked. Endless division, disintegrating strife, internal wars sent to destruction the most brilliant and most gifted of the ancient races of men.

Finally, modern life presents the same three stages of social life. There was the age of the divine right of kings, defended in Hobbes's Leviathan. But the individualistic movement inevitably set in. Rousseau was its great mouthpiece. The American and French revolutions were its immediate expressions. Since then has followed the period of reconstruction between an awakened sense of individual sovereignty and the demands of a larger social world. And the end is not yet.

Our dream of what we think of as simple individual lives is an illusion. "The savage," says Brinton,[5] "is not the type of a free man, although in popular estimation he is generally so considered. He is, in fact, tyrannically fettered by traditional laws and tribal customs. He is merged in his clan or gens, against whose rules, often most painful and arbitrary, he dares take no step. As an individual he cannot escape from their invisible chains." And when the individual does come to stand forth as a self-centered life, this very withdrawal from the larger life of the world is destructive to society and therefore to the social side of the individual himself. Shylock is a case of a highly accentuated individual consciousness: "He hath disgraced me, and hindered me half a million; laughed at my losses, mocked at my gains, scorned my nation, thwarted my bargains, cooled my friends, heated mine enemies; and what's his reason? I am a Jew." Here the individual, like a wounded serpent, recoils upon himself. He is destructive and even devilish: "I will have the heart of him, if he forfeit; for, were he out of Venice, I can make what merchandise I will." And yet this isolated soul, recoiling upon itself has something within him of more than individual interest; "I am a Jew. . . . . If you prick us, do we not bleed? . . . . And if you wrong us shall we not re-

[5] "Religions of Primitive Peoples," p. 244.

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venge?" Selfish and destructive he is yet social in his interests, and includes within the scope of his fiendish purpose that which belongs to the Jew. We are therefore forced to a newer and larger conception of the individual which shall enable us to see that his individual will finds its true sphere not in submerging itself in, nor yet in withdrawing itself from, the life of the world, but in so directing its own organized life as to form a unity between itself and the larger life of the world.

There are three distinguishable periods in the history of the individual in his relation to organized religion. There is the stage in which the individual does not stand out in distinction from the race. Then there is the period of individualism and revolt. Finally there comes the stage of reconstruction, readjustment between the individual and the larger life of organized religion. This is seen in the history of India, in that of Israel and in the history of the Christian church.

In India the first period with which we are acquainted, that of the Vedas, the gods were simply those of nature, the gods of the sun, the thunderstorm, fire, the light. But later on all these gods were seen to be manifestations of one underlying life. In this period of reflection—say, from 800-500 B. C.—the individual self stood forth as the greatest of problems; for it was not so easy to identify this individual self with the deeper unity of things. The individual stood forth in bold contrast with the now hazy deities of the earlier period. This is the period in which began the development of the great systems of Indian thought. The result was a variety of attempts to deal with this problem of the individual self. And through them all the aim was to show some underlying basis of unity between it and the deeper life of the world.

In the history of Israel the same movement is clearly seen. There is first the period in which the unity of religion is one of blood and race. This holds true of the times of Abraham, Moses, David. But with growing reflection the national basis of religious unity was outgrown and there followed the unity of morality and righteousness based on the teaching of the eighth century prophets. The most individualistic expression

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was reached in Jeremiah whose conception of the law is a rule of action within the individual life. Finally, there is the third stage of development, that of the teaching of Jesus, in which the individual finds his own life only in the life which he lives in common with his fellows and with God.

This same order of development is seen in the history of the Christian church. In the pre-reformation period the church with its established ritual and universal language was an institution whose authority rested in itself, not in the individual. The Bible was a constitution of religion all of whose parts were on one dead level. Christ was an ecclesiastical figurehead, or impersonal medium of salvation who through the sacraments substituted his own righteousness for the sin of the individual believer. But the reformation ushered in a period of individualism. The one holy church was split in twain, and thereby lost its old claim to authority. As for the Bible, Luther himself called the Epistle of James an epistle of straw. To-day its study is conducted as any other study in the great literatures of the world.

But the individual who rebels against, or withdraws from, the organized life of the world is cutting off the connection between himself and the life upon which he depends. The unity of organized life is absolutely necessary to the life of the individual himself. On the other hand the individual can never surrender his own individual will, his own selfhood. Here is the problem. And its solution is to be found in the fact that the individual can not be himself apart from this larger life, from which, in the period of alienation and estrangement, he has separated himself. On this basis the church is seen to be not an institution which already exists without the individual, to which he simply gives allegiance. It is simply the religious life which he has in common with others expressed in an organized form. Likewise, on this larger view of himself, the Bible is regarded no longer as a mysterious, inexplicable revelation. When it is seen to be, as it is to-day, the spiritual history of the Jewish people in that development which was completed in the teaching of Jesus, the Bible can no longer be regarded as foreign to the real life of the in-

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dividual. Indeed, this same development which is revealed in this literature is also seen in the development of the individual himself. He who sees this will understand that the Bible is not something simply to be accepted; it is to be digested, spiritually possessed—to be made a part of the individual himself. Finally, Jesus is no longer an impersonal, ecclesiastical, sacramental medium of institutional salvation. He is a teacher, a revealer of one's own real individual nature. As the revelation and realization of the unity between the human and the divine he is to be understood, appreciated and individually followed. He is, as Paul says, the completion of our individual life. He who as far as possible expresses in himself this deeper unity of things will understand the teaching of Jesus that the individual is really himself only in so far as he takes up into himself this underlying unity.

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DISCUSSION.

EMPIRICAL DATA ON IMMORTALITY.*

A Discussion of Professor Hyslop's Report on Seventeen Sittings with Mrs Piper.

For the first time in the history of man personal immortality has become, during the past fifteen years, the subject of what may rightly be called scientific investigation with the result that the beliefs in one Personal God and in an Impersonal Absolute—the orthodox beliefs in the Religious and in the Philosophical sphere respectively,—are giving place here and there to a new polytheism.[1] The tentative conclusions, favorable to Spiritism, of several of the more prominent investigators of the Society for Psychic

*"A Further Record of Observations of Certain Trance Phenomena," by James H. Hyslop, Ph. D., Professor of Logic and Ethics in Columbia University, New York. Published as part XLI of the "Proceedings of the Society for Psychic Research."

[1]See the *Conclusion* and *Postscript* of Professor William James' book, *"The Varieties of Religious Experience;"* and Meyer's "Human Personality."

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Research have moreover been reinforced by speculative arguments set forth in high philosophical quarters. The spiritistic hypothesis can no more be dismissed with a shrug of the shoulder.

Professor Hyslop's book of 649 pages is the most extensive and thorough of the many reports we have had on Mrs. Piper's trance utterances.[2] No pains have been spared to avoid error and to ascribe to every item of evidence its proper weight. Professor Hyslop deserves gratitude for his painstaking work and admiration, rather than taunts, for the courage with which he has announced his adoption of an unpopular belief. There is truth in his opinion that "it is the hard sacrifice of human pride and vanity that stand more in the way of a scientific and respectful consideration of these phenomena than anything else" (p. 290). These seventeen sittings, together with evidences from other quarters, have led him to the conclusion that spiritism is the preferable hypothesis. We shall see presently how far the Report substantiates this claim.

It is often remarked by advocates of Spiritism that all, or nearly all, those who have been favored with a *series* of sittings with Mrs. Piper have come to the same conclusion: Mrs. Piper's utterances, they have said, point to, and come near proving, Spiritism. There is no need of being disturbed by this unanimity. It is more to the point to look upon it as due to a natural selection of the ready-to-be-convinced and to the illegitimate affective influence of the sittings. Those well disposed towards Spiritism are about the only one to enter into a protracted investigation. Once launched into the undertaking, it is practically impossible to remain unbiased, even though there had been no initial inclination. I know of no body of facts in which it is easier, for two men urged in different directions by their wishes, to reach the preferred conclusion, in spite of the most sincere efforts at impartiality. The nature of the evidence is such that at a dozen different turning points one may—nay, one *will*—incline either to the right or to the left, according to one's prepossession, just as certainly as the hand will move the planchette although the will to do it be absent.

The Report before us is a luminous instance of these unconscious influences on a person of transparent sincerity of purpose and no more gullible than the average man of his profession. The warmth of feeling which enlivens the volume shows how vitally

[2] See the Reports of Prof. Romaine Newbold and of Dr. Hodgson in the "Proc. of the Soc. Psy. Res."

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the author is concerned with the success of his investigation. Perhaps the most striking illustration of this biasing influence is his construction of the word *tokens* (pp. 397 and 411) as "little oblong metal pieces of a coin-like character used in the Associated Presbyterian Church to indicate the person's right to participate in the Communion service," when the obvious and, as it seems to me, the only meaning allowed by the context is that of token of friendship. Professor Hyslop's gratuitous interpretation makes of this a wonderful incident. When those who have sat with Mrs. Piper say, as they are wont to do, "Yes, of course, you cannot be convinced at the reading of the reports; it is something you have to witness to realize its full import," I cannot help believing that most—perhaps all—of this added persuasiveness is due to the emotional tone in which one naturally gets during the sittings, a mood which reinforces the more or less unconscious desires and thereby deflects the judgment. Where is the man who can escape the affective influence of an atmosphere of apparent wonder? Who can make a sincere effort to enter into communication with the spirit of his father or of his mother, hear them speak to him, and remain the cold, judicious observer he ought to be? There is but one alternative, either to break the spell by escaping into the open air, or remain and fall victim to the witchery of the feelings. Therefore I say, let us rather listen to the conclusion of those who have only read and not witnessed.

The reader of the Report must be cautioned against the *totally wrong impression* given by the first half of the volume,[3] *i. e.*, the general account of the facts, the commentaries upon them and the discussion of the hypotheses that might be offered in explanation of them. This is because in that part the writer of the Report goes over those incidents only which have, or might have, evidential value; the others, *i. e.*, the false and the irrelevant are passed over unmentioned. It is clear, for instance, that if the medium had thrown out the several relevant names given in the first seances without any addition of wrong or irrelevant ones, the performance would have been totally different from the actual one: the chance-hypothesis would have been eliminated. Of this Professor Hyslop is, of course, fully aware. The second part of the volume contains the full sittings. That is what ought to be read in order to form a correct judgment.

[3]Prof. Hyslop need not be blamed for this. It was too difficult to present the report otherwise.

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The seventeen sittings were held at intervals between December 23, 1898 and June 8, 1899. Dr. Richard Hodgson was present at all of them and arranged for them. At five of them he was alone and received communications in behalf of Professor Hyslop. These two men and the latter's wife were the only persons who knew in advance that the sittings were to take place. Mrs. Piper had met Professor Hyslop twice before, in 1892. He had had at that date part of a sitting under an assumed name but he was introduced to her by his own name after the trance. At the beginning of the present series of sittings he wore a cloth mask to make recognition impossible. He was introduced as Mr. Smith, bowed without uttering a sound and did not speak a word until after she had gone into the trance. At the beginning of the second sitting, a communicator, supposedly his father, calls him repeatedly by his first name, "James, James. Speak James."

During the trance Mrs. Piper's right cheek rests on two pillows placed on the table. Her eyes are closed. She writes the messages with her right hand. The manner of the communications has fine dramatic possibilities. She is, apparently, in control of several spirits whose self-appointed business is to act as intermediaries between the sitter and the would-be communicators. The more important of these controls have been named *Imperator* and *Rector*. The latter usually acts as amanuensis. They often give advice both to the sitter and to the spirits, who, it must be said, are in sad need of it. "Don't speak so rapidly," "He does not understand you," etc. The chief communicator in the seventeen sittings is Professor Hyslop's father, Robert Hyslop, who died in 1896.

It will be taking the bull by the horns to begin with the utterances of Mrs. Piper disclosing things the sitter claims never to have known.[4] The universal, unlimited, Telepathy which according to his interpretation of the facts, it would be necessary to admit if Spiritism were rejected, is an hypothesis bristling with the greatest difficulties and without scientific support, as he rightly urges. If, however, the narrow Telepathy, limited to intercourse between the Medium and the Sitter, was to be proven sufficient, Professor Hyslop would lose his chief reason for preferring the Spiritistic hypothesis. We shall have to proceed without attempting to answer the well-nigh unanswerable question, "What sort of things may a man be sure he never knew?"

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[4] A classification of the incidents is to be found on pp. 131, 132.

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A considerable proportion of the facts supposed unknown to the sitter are contained in two relatively short messages. They are instructive on many accounts and short enough to be given in full. The first is called "one of the finest set of pertinent and evidential incidents in the record." For my part, whatever its value, I do not think a better one exists in this record. The letter S means *Sitter, i. e.,* Professor Hyslop.

"I am here once more. I am James McLellan, if you wish to know and you are my namesake. (S.: Yes, I remember you and that I am your namesake.) Yes, all right. We cannot quarrel about that, can we, James, but I despised the name of Jim. (S.: Very well, I understand.) What is it you want to know about Frank, or was it John who wanted to know? (S.: There was some confusion when Frank was mentioned, and also when John was mentioned. Who is this cousin John that was mentioned before?) It was not cousin, that was a mistake. (S.: Yes. Is he in the body or is he in the spirit)? He is here, and [Hand dissents violently.] I intended to straighten this out, but the light went out and I could not remain there. He is a brother . . . . yes, all right . . . . and he will be here soon. But it is still not straight. Wait and I will explain. You remember brother John very well, you must if you are James. (S.: Yes, I remember him well.) He was the one who went to war. (S.: Very well. Go on.) Let me see. Well perhaps you remember father, do you not? (S.: Do you mean *your* father?) Yes. (S.: Is this my uncle James McClellan?) Yes. (S.: No, I do not remember your father.) Well, he was John. (S.: Very well.) John James McClellan. [James written first. John written in front of James, then McClellan written after.] (R. H.: James John McClellan?) No. John James McClellan. (S.: Very well. I understand, and shall inquire about it.) Well, go ahead and inquire. I think I know. (S.: Well, all right. Please tell me anything you wish to tell.) I wanted to tell you about his going to war, and about one of his fingers being gone before he came here. (S.: Very well, go on, please. I understand.) And he had a brother David, who had a S U N stroke. (S.: I understand. That is perfectly new to me. I never heard it before, and it pleases me very much to learn this fact.) Well, he never was well after he received it until he came here. Then one more I wanted to speak of was N A N C Y, but I cannot tell you any more now. (S.: Very good. Thank you very much. Rest now.) Be brave, upright, honourable, do the best you can and don't forget your uncle James Mc. Good-bye. (S.: Good-bye, uncle, for the present.) (pp. 470-472)."

Here is what Professor Hyslop ascertained as to the truth in these statements. Uncle James McLellan had already been spoken of in a preceding seance. Professor Hyslop informs us (p. 110) that he was in fact his uncle's namesake and that the said uncle despised the word *Jim.* But his father's name was John, not John James. He had also a brother by the name of John, well

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known to the sitter. He was living, ninety years old, and therefore soon to be on the "other side." Neither James McClellan's brother nor his father had been in any war. But another John McClellan was commissioned as an ensign in 1810. That John had lost a finger, probably in the War of 1812. The uncle had no brother David, but a brother-in-law David Elder, who had a slight sunstroke just after the Civil War. Nancy was the name of the sister of this David Elder and of the wife of old John McClellan.

Taken singly, any one of these statements would hardly arrest attention; grouped together, they acquire a certain impressiveness. Yet there is that in the passage which, on close examination, robs it of any serious force. Notice, for instance, the bungling, or angling, with the name John when the Communicator is informed that there has been confusion. Then there are the errors. That a certain John McClellan, other than the one mentioned and not a relative, went to war and lost a finger does not help matters much. One wonders why David is said to be a brother and not a brother-in-law and why we are not told who Nancy was. The sunstroke was slight and remembered only by one of his two living sons. It did not have the importance the communication seems to ascribe to it.

Since the chief alleged Communicator understands the purpose of the sittings and repeatedly claims to be anxious to do his best to prove his identity, why not a little more definiteness, just enough to decisively put out the chance-hypothesis? As it is, I admit that the passage is perplexing,—as much so if one accepts, as if one rejects, the Spiritistic hypothesis.

The second passage (pp. 377, 394) seems to me clearly within the possibilities of mere invention. Yet it is one of those called "remarkable." It is certainly as much so as any other, barring out the one just quoted. Any one wrongfully claiming to know a certain library and attempting to describe it might naturally enough mention a desk, pads, paper cutter, ink and mucilage bottles. So far he would stand little chance of going astray. But if he ventured into more significant particulars, errors would be expected to give him the lie. In a sitting with Dr. Hodgson alone, some one claiming to be Professor Hyslop's father mentions the sending of photographs of his library and then, with considerable hesitation, the word *Pad* is written. On being asked what a closed spectacle case contained the answers came:

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"This I think is the one I used to put my Pen ho [?] . . . . No not pen, Paper cutter . . . . P . . . . sounds like . . . . in . .

"Yes, I remember I used to have this little case on my desk a great deal. Yes. And I am sure I used to place my spectacles in it. Yes, and sometimes my paper-cutter."

The box contained at the time his spectacles as well as his pen. The latter had been in it ever since his death. Twelve days later, at another sitting of Dr. Hodgson, a metal box was pushed over the edge of the table by Mrs. Piper's hand—apparently unintentionally—revealing its contents, spectacles, pen and folded paper packet (p. 394). Thereupon the previous Communicator exclaims:

"Oh. I remember so well this pr. of spectacles, and the place in on [superposed on *in*] which it used to lie on my desk. I can see it all . . . . I also had near it a paper cutter, a writing pad, a number [of] rests . . . rests for this, and two glass bottles, yes, one square in shape and the other rather round."

As a matter of fact, Professor Hyslop's father had no library, and he never called the sitting room, which contained what books he owned, his library. Besides he never had photographs of it taken. He had a paper cutter, not for cutting the leaves of books, however, but for opening letters and he carried it in his vest pocket and, as far as living relatives knew, never in the box. They say that he did not keep his two spectacle cases on the desk and that he did not use very frequently the leather one. He used a paper pad. As to the two bottles no one excepting a brother of Professor Hyslop, Frank, remembered them. He affirmed that his father had on the desk beside his round ink bottle also a square mucilage bottle. We are not told whether or not, in the letter of inquiry Frank was told that the bottles were described one as round and the other as square. His memory may have been falsified by that information if it was given him. If the speaker had really been the owner of the desk and had been intent, as he repeatedly asserted during the sittings, upon proving his identity by a description of it, he would have taken, it seems, the slight trouble of adding to the bare name of objects in common use, just a word or two to single them out as his own property. Why not say, for instance, that the paper cutter was not used by him for cutting the leaves of books but to open letters, or add that the square bottle was a mucilage bottle? And how are we to explain the initial mistake concerning the existence of a library?

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In addition to the incidents contained in these two passages, there are, among those declared "unknown," several without any weight and the following ones which I would rank as the best single incidents of the whole Report. In the fourth sitting, we read (p. 336):

"Do you remember the little knife I used to pick out my nails with? (S.: "I am not sure, father.") "The little *brown handle* one. I had it in my vest pocket. You certainly must remember it."

Professor Hyslop had no knowledge of such a knife. He found on inquiry that his father did have a small brown-handled knife, but that he never carried it in his vest or coat pocket, but always in his trousers pocket. He used the knife for paring his nails and other ordinary purposes. Here we are told the size, the color, the use of the object and where carried. Everything is right excepting the last item. But brown-handle pocket knives are not rare and it is a common practice in people of the country and in others to use the pocket knife for paring the nails.

In the sixth sitting happened another interesting incident (p. 378):

"I also recall the disturbance and trouble I had with one of *my eyes, the left one.* Do you not remember this, and the little so-called . . . .What . . . . P . . . . A . . . . . yes, I hear. Pad. Pad. I had a peculiar mark, which you will recall, at the back of the ears [ear]?"

Here are Professor Hyslop's comments: "The allusion both to the difficulty with the left eye and to the *mark behind the ear* is, as far as I and my stepmother know, entirely false." Later on, when reading the sitting to his stepmother, she said, referring to the eye, "Well, I do not remember this, but it was true that he had some trouble with it. He used often to take off his spectacles and complain that there was something the matter with the left eye. He would rub it and complain that he could not see with it." And concerning the mark behind the ear, "she again said she did not know of it, but added spontaneously and without suggestion or further question, that her late husband had a mole on the left temple near the ear and in front of it." Why did the Communicator not get that mole in the right place! As to the eye, what man seventy-five years old has not had some little trouble with one or both of them? I recall my own father taking off his spectacles to rub his left eye,—at least, I think it was the left.

There is better than that however. In the sitting of May 30th,

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the Communicator, trying to recall the name of some one who had had his foot injured, says (p. 428):

"Was it George? [Wrong so far as I know.—F. H. H.] I have been trying to think . . . . think where is . . . and do you remember Peter who was . . . . or belonged to Nanie?"

Professor Hyslop could attach no meaning to these names in this connection. In the sitting of June 1st the Communicator while trying to recall the name of a sister-in-law breaks out with the question (p. 452), "What is meant by Peter? Was it the dog George had? Can't you ask him?" Professor Hyslop inquired. The name Nanie seemed irrelevant. George declared he never had had a dog called Peter. But his mother remembered that, when he was between two and four years old, he had a little dog named Peter.

In the tenth sitting after the mention of George's name we have (p. 423):

"Yes, and do you remember *Thom* . . . . Tom . . . . and what has he done with him? I feel quite . . . . yes . . . . Yes, all right . . . . I mean the horse?" (S.: "That's it. My conscience!")

"This reference to 'Tom, the horse,' writes Prof Hyslop, is profoundly interesting. As soon as I saw Tom written I thought of an old negro whom father often employed in the harvest field . . . . But I was completely surprised when the statement came, 'I mean the horse.' Tom was the off-horse of a favorite pair of father's who had served him so well that he would never part with them . . . .'" George Hyslop disposed of the horse when it died.

In the sixth sitting James McClellan who had a sister by the name of Mary Ann casually makes the remark, "My sister Ann is here with . . . . yes . . . ." Professor Hyslop while at college had known her under the name of Mrs. Mary Mitchell. If she was known as Mary, why did the father say Ann?

These last three incidents, whether known or unknown to the sitter, are remarkable. If to them we add the connection of the name Harper Crawford with the church organ (pp. 491, 492), the mention of Hyomei and portions of the Cooper incident (chiefly or exclusively the reference to the Cooper School) and possibly the mention of one or two other names, we have the most evidence—like utterances of Mrs. Piper in these seances.

Unfortunately, the few more or less definite and exact utterances are swallowed up in pages of stuff for all the world identical with the deliverances of the professional medium. Why, if we

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are dealing with spirit-communications, is there so much of the procedure and of the peculiar results of the trickster?[5] Here is one of the supposedly strongly evidential group of incidents. I give it as a typical illustration of Mrs. Piper's method. Some one, Professor Hyslop's father we are told, asks the sitter concerning brother George. "Are you troubled about him . . . . he is all right and will be James." For Professor Hyslop the Communicator's meaning is perfectly clear. His brother's neglect of business affairs put in his charge gave him frequent cause of complaint to their father. He answers, "Yes. All right." And when admonished not to worry says, "No: I will not worry," which implies that he has worried. Thereupon the clever, "But you do," and the sitter's explicit acknowledgment, "Yes, I have worried some, but I will not any more." Mrs. Piper is now certain that she has made a lucky hit and she is going to pursue her advantage. But how does she know that Professor Hyslop has a brother, George by name, still living? Had that triple information come out squarely, it would have been most remarkable. But she learned these three facts gradually in the first seance. Many names, relevant and irrelevant, had been mentioned. Then the *Sitter* asked, "Have you seen brother George?" (p. 307). No direct answer is given, but as an accordion is produced right after the query, she declares that it belonged to him. It was just the statement to risk. This time she happened to be wrong. A minute or two later she comes back to George, as indeed she ought to since it is, so far, one of the very few positive facts she has ascertained about Hyslop's relatives. She asks suddenly "Well, what did you mean by asking for George?" (p. 310) which being interpreted, means, "If that accordion you showed me when you inquired was not his, why did you inquire?" Then follows a dialogue settling what was yet uncertain, to-wit, whether George is still among the living.

"S.: I wanted to know if you remember George?"
"Yes, but George is here. I say George is not here."
"S.: Do you say George is *not* here?"
"I say no, he is not, and I could not understand why you asked me if he was here. Neither is he coming for a while yet. He is well and doing well and so be it."

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[5] I do not intend to impeach Mrs. Piper's good faith. It may be all the work of the irresponsible secondary personalities.

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Is this what one would expect on the Spiritistic hypothesis? On our hypothesis it is a little masterpiece. And now that these preliminary items of information have been obtained, she is going to make them fructify. In the second sitting she ventures the discreet query already quoted, evidently prompted by the sitter's inquiry. When she has discovered that he is worried (p. 317) she adds in the soothsayer's way, "Thank God. James, if you will only stick to this, you . . . . stick . . . . he [says?] stick to the promise not to worry, you will in time be contented and happy—while still in the body." Then she asks, "Can you not give me something belonging to him?" As the sitter is getting the accordion out of the parcel, the hand writes "He [Professor Hyslop's father] wants it so much, he used to play for you." The accordion did not belong to George, then most likely it belonged to the person with whom Professor Hyslop was endeavoring to establish communication, *i. e.*, his father. And this time her guess proved true.

In Dr. Hodgson's sittings (pp. 401, 402), several weeks later—there had been time for preparation—the Communicator abruptly says:

"I am trying to think of the principal of your school and what he said to me about George. I am still troubled about him, and if you can help me in any way to se . . . . by sending me anything encouraging about him, I shall feel better I know."

S.: "Yes, I will write this, of course, to James."

"This, James, is the one thing I wish to right if possible, and perhaps you will be able to help me."

S.: "Yes, I am sure that James will do all that is best about George. Don't worry about him."

Then, after saying again that he has been much troubled about him and requesting the prayerful help of the sitter, comes:

"You see, I left with this on my mind, and I cannot dispose of it until I have learned from James that he will not feel troubled in this regard. We had our own thoughts and anxieties together regarding this . . . . this . . . . this as I [?] and Aunt Nannie also."

S.: "Do you mean she was anxious with you?" [Assent] "He says yes."

Is this not simply irritating if it comes from Professor Hyslop's father and perfectly in place if from Mrs. Piper trying to be wise on the little store of knowledge she has so far acquired? Why does she not tell us something definite as to the cause of this trouble?

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In a later sitting with Professor Hyslop she comes back to George (p. 492).

"Tell me something more about George. He always did look out for number one."

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"And about the fence [fense] I am thinking about the tax I left."

S.: "The tax has been paid . . . . nearly all the debts have been cleared off . . . . "

"Oh what a relief to my *mind.* I have thought and thought and thought what would Frank and George do if they had a hand in it."

With this the "George" incident comes to a close. I have already reported Professor Hyslop's comment on the first statement. He finds the reference to the Principal of their school "particularly pertinent" (pp. 404, 405), as the father had an important interview with him about the advisability of sending George to college. The last dialogue appears to him "as pertinent and extraordinary conversation as could be imagined. There is not an irrelevance in it. Every statement is charged with meaning that the members of the family know too well." Professor Hyslop's brother Frank is an invalid and one of the executors of the father's will. Both Frank and Aunt Nannie had appeared in preceding sittings. One cannot deny that the pertinence of one or two of the statements is striking, but when one observes carefully what is said and not what Professor Hyslop *adds,* the whole passage remains possibly within the limits of shrewd and lucky guessing. At any rate, it will not be denied that the method of the clever two-dollars medium could not be better imitated. Equivocations, hesitations, lack of definiteness and error mar every page, and almost every incident of these seventeen sittings.

Professor Hyslop has a double answer ready to meet the difficulties we have pointed out:—(a) The Communicators are not in a normal condition. Their state borders, at times at least, on delirium. There are indications of automatic activities, of loss of memory. (b) There may be mechanical difficulties in the way of the communication. The instrument (Mrs. Piper) may not respond perfectly to the desire of the would-be Communicator. Unfortunately for the upholders of Spiritism it is true that something like this first damning supposition seems absolutely necessary. The second is inefficient, as it does not explain why the instrument should be able to transmit names and not add the relationship, why it should be able to remember the square and the round bottle and

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not say what was contained in them; neither does it account for the fishing so often in evidence.

Instead of the preceding illustrations we might have chosen the messages concerning the disease of which Professor Hyslop's father died, or his conversation with his son on Swedenborg, or the fire and the railway accidents and the outcome would have been still less favorable to Spiritism.

With this our review of the evidence comes to an end. We have yet to state Professor Hyslop's main arguments in support of his conclusion. The Report is not sent forth, as many have conceived, as a demonstration of Spiritism. His intention was to "test hypotheses which profess to have some empirical evidence in their favor" (see footnote p. 4, pp. 244-247, 290-291) and his conclusion is that the choice—if choice there be—is between Spiritism on one hand and Universal Telepathy combined with Multiple Personality on the other. He prefers the former: "I give my adhesion to the theory that there is a future life and persistence of personal identity," but he adds, "I am willing to make it provisional upon the establishment . . . . of sufficient telepathy, in combination with the other necessary processes, to account for the whole amazing result." (p. 290).

The main advantages he sees in the Spiritistic hypothesis are that it explains more readily and more satisfactorily (1) *the unity of consciousness* in the communications, (2) the dramatic play of personality.

By Unity of Consciousness is meant the fact that the Communicators, whenever they appear, are true to their own self as known to Professor Hyslop or to other persons. They give expression to their familiar ideas, use their accustomed phrases, evince the emotional tone that was theirs, etc. The dramatic play of personality is "that kind of action and change of content and characteristics . . . . which occurs naturally in ordinary conversation between two or more persons." The weight of these two arguments depends, of course, entirely (a) upon the significance of the facts held to indicate Unity of Consciousness, (b) upon the possibility of a like result being produced otherwise than by Spiritism. The reader is already aware that in our opinion the great weakness of the Report is the failure to make a very large share to utterances neither Telepathic nor Spiritistic. It appears to us surpassingly clear that, even if there be a residuum

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calling for these hypotheses, the bulk of the incidents are of more common origin.[6] If Professor Hyslop denies that the appearance of Unity of Consciousness my be quite satisfactorily referred to Mrs. Piper's subliminal activity, it is because of what amounts in his eye to a *quasi* demonstration of superhuman knowledge. To his mind, the personages produced are not only consistent personalities, but they are reproductions of persons once living and never known to the medium. But if it be admitted that this knowledge may be entirely imaginary, the Multiple Personality hypothesis becomes sufficient. Without appealing to the rare and wonderful cases on record in the pathological Archives, our daily dreams afford sufficient evidence that the human mind is able to create personalities and make them act consistently in very complicated and long drawn out intercourse and, moreover, to mistake them for objective realities. The logical consistency and subtlety with which the sleeping mind will at times construct its fictitious personages is amazing. There is no Unity of Consciousness and no play of personality in Mrs. Piper's trance-utterances equal in complexity and perfection to what takes place in some continued dreams.

The chief arguments against Telepathy are, according to Professor Hyslop, (1) That it does not account for the selectiveness of the process, (2) that, to be sufficient, it has to be extended to all living consciousness and memory, (3) that the inconsistency of the mistakes are incongruent with the assumption of its easy access to all living memories, (4) that the Communicator's clearness and definiteness vary greatly while the data in the sitter's mind (Professor Hyslop's) are the same for all.

The first of these arguments is out of place—as Professor Hyslop, of course knows—as soon as the *selectiveness* is looked upon not as the result of Telepathy but of that unconscious mental activity of the subject himself which produces, for instance, the dream-personages. The second, third and fourth arguments fall to the ground unless it be shown that the facts necessitate the extension of Telepathy to all living consciousness and memory. I

[6] "The phrases said to have been habitual with the communicators (See pp. 89, 430 and Note 4 on p. 348) and other peculiarities in which the writer of the Report sees strong spiritistic evidence, are in my opinion, exactly on a par, as to their origin, with the other incidents we have passed in review. Space limitations prevent entering into the discussion of this portion of the evidence.

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agree with Professor Hyslop in not being ready to accept, before we have further data, an hypothesis so stupendous as to involve "the power . . . . to select any absolutely unknown person necessary, anywhere in the world, and from his memory make the selection of pertinent facts to represent personal identity . . . ." (p. 139). But this hypothesis has not been shown to be unavoidable. On the contrary, the incidents which might seem to demand a universal Telepathy are so few and dubious, that it would be folly to embarrass ourselves with that bewildering supposition on a pretext as slender.

The five sittings held by Dr. Hodgson in the absence of Professor Hyslop, but in his behalf, repay scrutiny in a discussion of the wider Telepathy. They contain first and foremost false statements, and incidents too indefinite to have any weight. Beyond that there are the statements about Mr. Cooper (pp. 386 and 397)[7] and the reference to a black morning coat (p. 387), (neither of which, in view of the large number of wrong incidents, goes beyond what chance might be expected to produce) and, finally, the trouble with the left eye and the mark behind the ear already taken into account.

The only possibilities that need be considered are, in my estimation:—

1. A combination of Secondary Personality and of Spirit-communication through the secondary personalities. This is the hypothesis for which Professor William James has declared a preference in his remarkable work on "Varieties of Religious Experience."[8]

2. A combination of Secondary Personality and of Telepathy. Not the amazing, universal, Telepathy which gives Professor Hyslop occasion for an easy triumph, but the narrower Telepathy limited to communications between the Sitter and the Medium.

3. Secondary Personality alone. On this last view the slight bits of apparently superhuman knowledge are to be ascribed to clever and lucky guessing, to suggestion from the sitters, or to

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[7]The Cooper *School* is not mentioned in the writings at which Prof. Hyslop was present.

[8]Prof. James' "overbelief" is not exclusively, not even chiefly, determined by the class of facts dealt with in Prof. Hyslop's Report. It is the outcome of his understanding of the whole of human experience. In his view, if I understand him aright, the informing spirits need not be surviving human persons.

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information surreptitiously secured from the outside world. This last supposition I admit to be extremely improbable. The share of suggestion cannot be correctly estimated by one not present at the sittings, neither by those present as sitters. Until further data are produced and as far as the Reports on Mrs. Piper are concerned one may rest in an easy indecision between the last two hypotheses. Mr. Frank Padmore, one of the very few men thoroughly well informed on this subject, does not think that even the narrow Telepathy is needed.[9]

Professor Hyslop's careful investigation may have at least one good result: the moderation of the disturbing wish of a certain class of people for a future life. They may learn to face the actual present more resolutely and wisely. For, although its purpose was not to discover the condition of the "departed," what comes through is sufficiently significant to make the heart of the believer sink. Three score and ten will appear long enough to everyone for that kind of life. However that may be, Professor Hyslop is certainly right in his contention that the condition of life in the other world cannot be made an argument against its possibility. For the rest, if the worse comes to the worse, humanity will have a unique chance of showing its stoutness of heart in facing this hopeless, repulsive, metempsychosis. And as to the Christian Religion, forswearing its stupendous mistake regarding the future life it would, let us hope, have grace enough to turn around and, instead of leading men to immortality, endeavor to deliver them from it, even as Buddhism does.

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[9] See Chap. viii, Utterances of Mrs. Piper in his *"History of Modern Spiritualism."*

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BOOK REVIEWS.

LECTURES ON THE ETHICS OF T. H. GREEN, MR. HERBERT SPENCER, AND JAMES MARTINEAU. By Henry Sidgwick. London: Macmillan & Co., 1902. Pp. xli, 374.

It was Professor Sidgwick's custom, in recent years, in his ethical lectures in Cambridge, not to take his students over the ground already traversed in his larger works, but to engage in exposition and criticism of current influential types of ethical theory which were not dealt with at any length, or not dealt with at all, in the "Methods of Ethics." "It appeared to me," he says, "that having already expounded my own system in my book, what I could further do in the way of making it clear would be best done in the form of a criticism on the views of others."

The present volume contains three courses of Lectures, eight on Green (Pp. 1-131), ten on Spencer (Pp. 135-312), and four on Martineau (Pp. 315-374). They are printed substantially as they were delivered, and have been prepared for the press by Miss E. E. C. Jones of Girton College, who has also prepared an analytical Table of Contents. That the book deserves the careful attention of all students of ethics need hardly be said; and for those who personally attended these lectures, the volume will have a more special interest as recalling a privilege and intellectual delight which they will not soon forget.

Within the limits of this review we can only refer, with occasional comments, to some of the more significant points in the various lines of criticism which are here developed.

I.

The examination of Martineau's "Idiopsychological" theory of ethics is specially instructive as regards some of the peculiarities of Sidgwick's own view. The whole work ("Types of Ethical Theory") was rather severely reviewed by Sidgwick in the tenth volume of *Mind,* and the appearance of this review was followed by an interesting discussion between the two thinkers in the same journal; but in reality there is less fundamental divergence between Sidgwick and Martineau than between Sidgwick and Green or Spencer.

The real character of Martineau's and of every ethical theory

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comes to light when we consider its answer to the question, What is the Nature and Object of Moral Judgment? Martineau insists strongly that "what we judge is the inner spring of action as distinguished from its outward operation;" and by this principle he thinks that Utilitarianism,—or any theory whatever which seeks a standard in consequences, in the objective side of conduct,—is excluded as contrary to Common Sense and the Moral Consciousness. That this does not follow is evident when we notice that Martineau has omitted to make an important distinction. A spring of action may mean *(a)* the impulse to action, abstracted from all effects,—a blind propensity; (*b*) the desire for a certain result,—those effects *for which* the act is done; *(c)* the consciousness of the whole effects so far as the latter are foreseen,—and these may include some things *in spite of which* the act is done.

(a) As to the existence of these "blind" incentives, Sidgwick justly observes that though in the adult human being such spontaneities may occasionally operate, they cannot be at all intense or prolonged without calling up a representation of the consequences to which they prompt. They are residua or habits due to past fully conscious acts. Hence a comparison of such quasi-instinctive tendencies cannot be the normal form of the moral judgment.

(b) It may, however, be held that the normal object of the moral judgment is the desire which prompts the act,—the consciousness of the results for which it is done. Sidgwick recognizes the possibility of this view, and allows a limited validity to what he calls the standard of "Subjective Right;" but his view appears to be that this standard must be corrected and sometimes superseded by that of "Objective Right." He rejects the view (which we believe to be the true one) that when in moral judgment we deliberately go beyond the particular "desire for a certain result," it is not to consider further ranges of external results, but to consider the whole personal character out of which the desire arose. We hold that the desire must be judged as a fact of a personal character, and the effects which are desired must be judged as effects on other personal characters. Martineau makes the wholly unwarranted assumption—in which Sidgwick is of course at one with him—that the external effects, when morally judged, can be estimated only by their pleasure or pain value.

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(c) Sidgwick's position is that the moral judgment is in the end not on persons acting but on things done; for while he says that it is always the choice or intention that is approved or disapproved, he also says that "the differences of choice or intention on which the moral judgment turns can only be conceived as differences in the objects chosen" (p. 337), "different sets of foreseen external effects, all of which are conceived to be within the power of the agent" (p. 336). Surely the logical outcome of this view is the ethical paradox that moral judgment is not on persons but on things; for what is judged, in this conception, is a series of events in the external world, on the condition that the first term in the series is a human volition; beyond this, the so-called "Subjective Right" confessedly makes no difference.

Another subject of central importance for Martineau is the nature of Moral Authority, which he holds to be conceivable only as that of "another Person," the Deity. It is very curious that, when discussing (in Book II, Chapter I, Section 2, of his "Study of Religion") one of the chief arguments of Professor Royce's "Religious Aspect of Philosophy," Martineau attributes to Professor Royce (and rejects) a view respecting the intellectual consciousness which is precisely similar to his own view respecting the moral consciousness. "I cannot see," he says, in answer to what he supposes to be Professor Royce's contention, "how it follows that if I am conscious of ignorance, 'Some One Else' must have perfect knowledge." Yet in his ethical theory he argues that because I am conscious of moral imperfection and of an obligation to be better, there must be "another Person," perfectly Holy, the source of the obligation. Now in a striking observation which Sidgwick quotes, he says that "whatever be the 'authority' of Reason respecting the True, the same is the 'authority' of Conscience respecting the Right and Good." It follows, as Sidgwick says, that in neither case is there any logical road to infer the existence of "another Person," but in both cases there is implied "a Universal Reason which the judging individual shares so far as he judges truly." Sidgwick's view is that the authority of Conscience is the authority of Reason in relation to practice, and adds "the 'authority' would not exist for me—except so far as the prudential obligation of obeying superior power goes—unless this Reason was *mine*, though not *merely* mine" (p. 346). But this recognition of the "Universal Reason" appears to be an empty ac-

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knowledgement; for the only "Universality" recognized is that of the similarity of numerically distinct individuals to one another. "Apprehending their similarity . . . I cannot avoid concluding that each of them has an ultimate Good similar to mine, and as valuable from the point of view of Universal Reason" (p. 347). The result is thus an abstract conception of an aggregate of "ends-in-themselves" merely similar to one another. Martineau in his comment on Green ("Types," vol. ii, 2d ed., p. 106) suggests conformity to the type of Perfect Humanity as the ultimate end; but Sidgwick does not regard this conception as admissible in ethics, owing to his paradoxical view that Perfection cannot be interpreted so as to include Moral Perfection.

It must be added that there are lines of thought in Martineau's theory which if developed would lead to results more satisfactory than the extreme individualism of the "Idiopsychological ethics."

II.

The ten lectures on Mr. Spencer's ethical system are unique as a thoroughly searching and immanent criticism of one of the most influential theories of the nineteenth century. The purpose of Sidgwick's criticism is two-fold: to examine the extent to which Mr. Spencer accomplishes the end which he sets before himself, of establishing rules of conduct with certainty and exactness on a basis of physical science, and to examine whether the rules which he does establish can be known with a certainty unlike that which the Utilitarian can attain, who forms from experience his view of the "middle axioms" of morality. Sidgwick deals with the whole of Mr. Spencer's ethical system as expounded in its complete form in the "Principles of Ethics;" but the central portion of his discussion is in the first five lectures, which deal with the "Data of Ethics" (Part I of the "Principles of Ethics"), and the eighth and ninth, which deal with "Justice" (Part IV).

The troublesome preliminary question of the connection between "origin" and "validity" is not dealt with in a satisfactory manner either in this volume or in the "Methods of Ethics." In Bk. III, ch. 1, of the latter work, it is argued that the question of origin is entirely distinct from that of validity, where validity signifies intellectual truth or trustworthiness; and hence

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(Bk. III, ch. 13) that the ultimate ethical maxims, as conceived by Sidgwick, cannot be proved or disproved by theories of Evolution. Nevertheless on Sidgwick's own view the question of "origin and validity" in ethics is not to be settled in this simple manner; for in Bk. IV, ch. 4, it is argued that the theory of derivation does show the invalidity to some extent of the accepted rules of morality regarded as means to the attainment of the Utilitarian end. And in the present volume a more serious admission is made; the investigation of the ways in which the current ethical beliefs and sentiments have arisen does not necessarily tend to establish the authority of the morality of which it explains the existence—"indeed it has more often, I think, an effect of the opposite kind" (p. 137). It is further said that there is one result of Mr. Spencer's view concerning the "origin" of our present experience of ethical obligation, "of which he hardly sees the full gravity: a sentiment regarded as imported by association, and destined to disappear, cannot now coerce us much" (p. 174). [In this view Sidgwick agrees in the main with Green ("Prolegomena," section 8); see present volume, pp. 6, 7.] Obviously what is first of all required,—and rarely, if ever given,—is a criticism of the various possible meanings of the idea of Development or Evolution in Biology and Psychology (Individual and Social).

The reader will remember Mr. Spencer's general view that "scientific" consideration of conduct (1) shows us a supreme or ultimate end to the realization of which human actions are directed, and (2) enables us to determine the kind of conduct by which this end may be best attained. As regards the first point, Sidgwick observes that this view is doubly teleological: "We recognize that the external motions of living things are adjusted to a certain kind of end, viz.: life, the continuance of the adjustments themselves; and we find further that if we take a certain view of 'quantity of life,' if we estimate it not merely by duration, but consider quantity of change in a given time, this kind of end is more attained as evolution goes on: *i. e.*, the actions of the higher or later beings are more life-sustaining—provided we measure life in this way—than the actions of the lower" (p. 140). Sidgwick effectively contrasts this doubly teleological view with the forced avoidance of teleological implications in the "Principles of Biology," which was originally written before the publication of the Darwinian theory. The latter implied a new teleology of its own.

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Spencer's language in chapters 1 and 2 of the "Data" suggests that increase in quantity of life is to be taken as the supreme ethical end. It is by no means so evident that the acts of living beings are so much directed to increase in breadth of life as to its increase in length: some evolutional writers have taken length of life only as the end. We see further that Mr. Spencer does not consider the fundamental question, why—if Biology gives us a generalization as to the function of life—it follows that this is to be taken as the ethical end at all. But in ch. 3 he does not accept as final the view suggested in ch. 2; he points that it involves an assumption of great significance, that life brings a surplus of agreeable feeling. Thus the end seems to be quantity of agreeable feeling or pleasure. The transition is too easily made from the end as quantity of life, measured only in length and breadth, to the end as quantity of happiness. What Mr. Spencer is bound to show is the coincidence of the two ends, at least for practical purposes. Sidgwick's contention is, first, the general one that this coincidence cannot be scientifically proved; and also (as in the "Methods of Ethics," Bk. II, ch. 4) that no scientific theory of pleasure and pain, based on their connection in the course of evolution with actions preservative or destructive of the organism, is of any use for directing us how to act so as to obtain the greatest happiness. Hence Mr. Spencer's assertion of the superiority of his method to the uncertainties and difficulties of the Utilitarian "Induction" is groundless. The vagueness and inadequacy of the guidance afforded by his biological data are effectively shown. The "Sociological view" ("Data," ch. 8) does indeed supply certain rules which are permanent conditions of voluntary co-operation, but it is easy to see that they are not of a character to constitute "ethics as a science," in distinction from "empirical ethics."

Nevertheless Mr. Spencer's statement of the end becomes very suggestive if we abandon the conception of life as a mere set of physical or physiological functions, and regard it as *personal.* Then our end becomes the immanent increase and growth (in intensity and scope) of the functions constituting personality. This conception is of course altogether foreign to Sidgwick's point of view.

Mr. Spencer conceives the "origin" of our consciousness of obligation to result from a combination of earlier, not strictly moral, restraints with "that which is regarded as strictly moral."

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But the difference between the latter and the former is not to be found, as Spencer suggests, in a difference of directness and proximity; nor can we treat as fundamental his distinction between artificial or factitious and natural or necessary consequences ("Data," ch. 7, section 44). "The essential difference is that in truly moral feeling, in the main, it is evil to others, sympathetically apprehended, that is influential" (p. 177). This brings us to the question of Egoism versus Altruism ("Data," ch. 11-14). After pointing out Mr. Spencer's fundamental misconception of English Utilitarianism (especially in ch. 13), Sidgwick observes: "The fact that there must be compromise between Egoism and Altruism does not determine the principle on which compromise is to be planned; for any individual here and now, the occasions of life may present alternative compromises—the compromise in which he pursues the happiness of others so far as consistent with his own, and the compromise in which he pursues his own happiness so far as it is consistent with maximum happiness generally. Mr. Spencer does not affirm that the two always coincide. . . . And if he does not, all his exposition of the growing implication of the interests of each with the interests of others, and of the ultimate conciliation of the two, does not relieve him of the necessity of answering the question of the individual here and now: which of the two alternative compromises am I to take? It may be said to me: How do *you* deal with it? My answer is, that unless we assume or prove the moral order of the world, there is a conflict between rational convictions. Do I assume it? Yes, practically, as a man; provisionally, and with due recognition of the need of proof, as a philosopher. The assumption is normal to reflective man, and a postulate of Common Sense" (pp. 187-8). A most instructive passage as regards Sidgwick's own position.

With respect to the distinction of Absolute and Relative ethics—(What is right for an individual to do in an Ideal Society? What is right for an individual to do here and now?) Sidgwick holds that Mr. Spencer tends to "reduce paradoxically the possibility of giving a definite answer to the second question. Spencer here adopts the Utilitarian standard exclusively. The Ideal State is one where all conduct produces "pleasure unalloyed by pain anywhere." Sidgwick argues that Absolute ethics, if attainable, would be useless, as by definition the ideal state is utterly unlike all actual states, or so unlike that we could

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not argue from one to the other. But also, he adds, Absolute ethics cannot be considered possible, for we could not ascertain a priori the nature of the human beings composing such a society with sufficient definiteness and certainty to enable us to determine their code of conduct.

Granting the force of these criticisms, there is still in Spencer's argument the recognition of an important truth. Humanity is guided by an Ideal which is realizable and is being progressively realized. In the Ideal the Good of each becomes the Good of all. "Relative ethics" can *for us* be only a formulation in outline of that Ideal, based on the interpretation of the fundamental tendencies of the life that now is. And just because it is true that the Ideal is very partially and imperfectly realized, it is true that such ethical theory as we can now establish, appropriate to the present stage of moral evolution, must necessarily exhibit a lack of coherence and exactness.

Of the remaining lectures on the "Principles of Morality" we have left space only for a brief notice of the discussion of Mr. Spencer's formulæ of Justice (Lectures viii and ix). The main points are these. The preliminary investigation of "sub-human" Justice is held to be irrelevant and misleading. The formula of Justice afterwards adopted (that each individual must receive the benefits and evils of his own nature and consequent conduct) almost excludes family relations from the sphere of Justice. The effects of social life in modifying the operation of this law among human beings are seriously underestimated by Mr. Spencer. He assumes without proof that the necessity for subordinating the welfare of the individual to that of the species arises solely from War. He has no good ground on evolutionary principles for holding as he does that War must ultimately disappear. The formula is not "obviously that which recommends itself to the common apprehension as Just." When tracing the origin and growth of the sentiment and idea of Justice, Spencer gives what seems to be a definite statement of the principle which modifies the individualistic formula of Justice which he has previously stated. It assumes the form: "Every man is free to do what he wills, provided he infringe not the equal freedom of another man." From this formula he attempts to deduce various "rights." The vagueness of this conception of Justice is well illustrated in the manner in which it is applied to the question of the right of Property, and especially to the burning question of the right to the use of Land (pp. 282 ff).

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III.

The chief points dealt with in the criticism of Green are: Green's misrepresentation of Hume and his predecessors; his account (in the "Prolegomena") of Greek and particularly of Aristotelian Ethics; the metaphysical basis of his ethical theory, and his view of moral freedom; his criticism of Hedonism. What we miss—and this defect in Sidgwick's discussion seems to us to be a very serious one—is any appreciation of the merits or defects of Green's view of life as a whole.

Professor Sidgwick shows that Green does much less than justice to Hume; but Sidgwick himself certainly does much less than justice to Green's conception of the Aristotelian Ethics (Lecture vi). And that Green's criticism of Hedonism is inadequate may be fully admitted. As regards the remaining point, Sidgwick seems to us to show effectively that "assuming Green's metaphysical arguments valid, and his ethical view sound, there is a great logical gap to be filled up in passing from one to the other" (pp. 12-14). And this difficulty comes out not less in his account of freedom. The motive in human volition is what it is by the operation of a self-distinguishing consciousness which is not a part of Nature, and hence not a natural fact. But this is not sufficient to justify moral imputation and responsibility. The real question is, *why* does *A* make a virtuous choice, *B* a vicious choice? Granting that the adoption of the desired end is not a "natural" event; *A* and *B* make different adoptions of objects as their respective personal goods; *why* does this particularity occur? The character of depending on the Eternal Self-consciousness is common to all individuals alike, and even to inanimate Nature; hence in discussing the virtuousness or viciousness of this particular choice, we must treat it (the particular character of the choice) as due to a chain of natural causation. The "self-conscious, self-distinguishing agent" is present throughout and hence cannot make the vital ethical difference that is needed between human actions and natural events. We are led to a similar result when we consider the "Freedom of Man as Intelligence" of which Green speaks. The principle is that man is a "free cause" in so far as, in knowledge, his consciousness is identified with that of the Eternal. Granting that an act of human knowledge is not an event in time; it remains true that in human minds knowledge

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is partial and changing; these limitations and changes are "details of the world" which have to be explained. Hence the "freedom of intelligence" is of no practical application to man; since the particularity of intelligence—i.e., *why* any particular mind or society knows *this* rather than *that*, why *so much* and *no more*—is wholly caused by natural events. *That* it knows at all may be due to its sharing in the Eternal; but the amount, extent, and direction of its knowledge is completely conditioned by natural causes. On Green's view of existence there seems no other means of accounting for the particularity of anything than by reference to the necessity of natural causation.

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THE ORIGIN OF THE KNOWLEDGE OF RIGHT AND WRONG. By Franz Brentano. English translation by Cecil Hague, Formerly Lector at Prague University, with a Biographical Note. Westminster: Archibald Constable & Co., Ltd. 1902. Pp. xiv, 125.

This is a far better discussion of the most fundamental principles of Ethics than any others with which I am acquainted. Brentano himself is fully conscious that he has made a very great advance in the theory of Ethics. "No one," he says, "has determined the principles of ethics as, on the basis of new analysis, I have found it necessary to determine them" (p. viii); and his confidence both in the originality and in the value of his own work is completely justified. In almost all points in which he differs from any of the great historical systems, he is in the right; and he differs with regard to the most fundamental points of Moral Philosophy. Of all previous moralists, Sidgwick alone is in any respect superior to him; and Sidgwick was never clearly aware of the wide and important bearings of his discovery in this one respect. Brentano is both clearer and more profound; and he avoids Sidgwick's two fundamental errors. It would be difficult to exaggerate the importance of his work.

His main proposition is that what we know, when we know that a thing is good in itself, is that the feeling of *love towards* that thing (or *pleasure in* that thing) is *"right"* (*richtig*). Similarly, that a thing is bad, is merely another way of saying that *hatred of* that thing would be *"right."*

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The great merit of this view over all except Sidgwick's is its recognition that all truths of the form "This is good in itself" are logically independent of any truth about what exists. No ethical proposition of this form is such that, if a certain thing exists, it is true, whereas, if that thing does not exist, it is false. All such ethical truths are true, *whatever the nature of the world may be.* Hence, in particular, none of them are either identical with any *subjective* proposition (*e. g.* "So-and-so has this feeling or desire or cognition") or such that, if it be true, *any* subjective proposition whatever need be true. Thus Brentano recognizes fully the *objectivity* of this fundamental class of ethical judgments. "No one," he says, "[except Herbart] has so radically and completely broken with the subjective view of ethics" (p. ix).

Nevertheless Brentano is wrong in supposing that the conception "rightly loved" or "worthy of love" is the fundamental ethical concept which we mean by "good in itself." Sidgwick was right in holding that that concept is unanalyzable; and it is, in fact, the concept which Brentano denotes by the word "right," when he says that a thing is good in itself, if the love of it would be *right.* Brentano recognizes *two* very important concepts when he recognizes both the concept of what it is right to love and of the *rightness* which belongs to love of such things; and the question which of these is properly denoted by the words good in itself might seem to be merely a verbal question. But it is not a merely verbal question, if, as Brentano rightly does, we take what is good in itself in the highest possible degree to be that of which it is our *duty* to promote the existence. For whereas the degree in which a thing possesses the quality which he calls "right" must be taken into account in considering what is that greatest possible good which it is our duty to effect, the degree in which things are "worthy to be loved" is not a measure of our duty to effect their existence. It is certain that many things, *e. g.*, inanimate beautiful objects, possess the quality of being worthy to be loved, in a higher degree than they possess that of "rightness;" it may even be doubted whether they possess the latter at all. And it is our duty to effect that which is the most "right" possible, not that which is most worthy to be loved. Though therefore we can agree with Brentano that everything which is good in itself is worthy to be loved, we cannot agree that everything which is worthy to be loved is good.

Brentano makes a similar mistake with regard to the definition of

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"true" in the sense in which that word is applied to the *object* of a belief. He says that, just as an object is good, if it be rightly loved, so it is true if it be rightly believed. The definition of truth has the same rare merit as the definition of good, namely, that it is *objective*. But that it is false appears to be plain from the fact that we can raise the question whether it *is* "right" to believe everything that is true: that is to say, we are immediately aware that "true" and "rightly believed" are two distinct concepts, one of which, "true," is an unanalyzable property belonging to some objects of belief. But it is important to raise a second question with regard to this definition of "true." Is the "rightness" which Brentano attributes to belief in the true the *same* quality which he attributes to love of the good, or is it not? He speaks of "right" love as if it were merely *analogous* to "right" belief (p. 19); and this suggests that he thinks the "rightness" is *not* the same quality in the two cases. In that case he is calling two different unanalyzable qualities by the same name; and that he should not have expressly noticed whether he is doing so or not, illustrates the insufficient attention which he has given to the question what he means by *"rightly* loved"—a defect in his inquiry, which will be illustrated again later, and which will help to explain his failure to perceive that *this* quality which he denotes by "rightness," and *not* the "rightly loved," is the fundamental ethical concept properly denoted by "good in itself." In fact, I am unable to perceive that there is any unanalysable quality which we attribute to belief in the true except the very one which we attribute to love of what is worthy to be loved. In other words, Brentano's judgment that belief in the true is "right" *is* a judgment that belief in the true is always good in itself—a propostion which does not seem to be true. If it is not true, it follows not only that "true" does not mean "rightly believed," but also that just as what it is good to love is not always itself good, so, it is not always good to believe what is true. The incorrectness of this definition of "true" is further proved by the fact that, as will be shown, the quality meant by "rightness" has degrees, whereas, as Brentano himself rightly maintains, no one thing is *more* true than another (p. 23).

Another doctrine of Brentano's also illustrates the insufficient attention which he has paid to the nature of that "rightness" the reference to which constitutes the merit of his definitions of good and true. His belief in this doctrine seems indeed to be the main cause why he has given so little attention to the nature of this

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fundamental concept. It is the doctrine which explains why he has given to this inquiry the unfortunate title of an inquiry into "The *Origin* of the Knowledge of Right and Wrong." Brentano holds, namely, that (as Hume thought) all our conceptions are derived from "concrete impressions"—impressions, which, he says, are either "of physical" or "of psychical content" (p. 12). This doctrine may be perfectly true in one sense; but in the sense naturally conveyed by the words it includes a most important error. Obviously the conception of "good," as Brentano defines it, cannot be derived merely from the experience of *loving*, but only from that of *"right* loving"—from the perception of the *rightness* of a love: its *origin* cannot be merely the perception of a love which *is* right, but in which this quality is not perceived, it can only be a perception in which it is itself *contained.* But whereas the experience of loving *has* all the marks which are suggested by calling it a "concrete impression of psychical content," the "experience of right loving"—*i. e.*, the perception of the *rightness* of a love—has *not.* The quality of "rightness" is *not* a psychical content and the perception of it is *not* an impression in the ordinary sense of these words. A single mark is sufficient to distinguish it: by a "psychical content" we always mean at least *an existent,* and by "impression" the cognition of *an existent,* and "rightness" is not an existent. Brentano is certainly not sufficiently attentive to this distinction between the experience of loving and the experience of right loving. He says he belongs to the "empirical school" (p. 8); and he here shows himself to be under the influence of empiricism, in a sense in which empiricism is certainly erroneous.

The same inattention to the nature of the quality which he means by "rightness" is further shown in the account Brentano gives of our knowledge that one thing is *better* than another. His first suggestion is that since *"good"* means "worthy to be loved," *"better"* must mean "worthy of *more love*" (p. 21). It does not seem to have occurred to him that it must mean *"more worthy* of love," that is to say, his attention is directed only to that element of his definition, which is a "concrete psychical content," namely the love, *not* to the more important element "rightness," which is not. In asserting that a thing is rightly loved with a *greater love,* you do not assert that it posseses the quality of *being rightly loved* in any higher degree than what is rightly loved with a less love; and hence if good means rightly loved, you do not assert that it is

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better. In short, even on Brentano's definition, if anything is to be *better* than another, that can only be because the quality which he means by *"rightness"* has degrees—a point which he has entirely failed to observe, and which proves that "true" cannot mean "rightly believed." The supposition that, if "good" means "worthy of love," "better" means "worthy of more love," does in fact derive most of its plausibility from an ambiguity in the latter expression, in virtue of which it denotes not merely that a greater and a less love are each of them "right," but that each of them is *"more* right" than some other love. If we say that one thing is worthy of more love than another, these words naturally convey the meanings that to love these things with the different amounts of love in question is *"more* right" than to love them both with the same amount: we do not merely convey the assurance that to love each with the amount of love in question is "right," in a sense in which this assurance does not exclude the supposition that to love either of them with any other amount would also be equally "right." And that Brentano is actually using the expression "worthy of more love," in the sense in which to say that one thing is worthy of more love than another is to say that one love is more right than another, is shown by the reason he gives for denying that the better is worthy of more love (for, after all, he does deny it). His reason is (p. 22) that nothing which is really good can be loved too much. And this proposition obviously only implies that no one thing is worthy of less love than another, because it asserts that a greater love of a thing is in no case *less right* than a less love of the same thing. Accordingly, whether this proposition is true or false (and it seems to be false), it makes an assertion not only about degrees of love, but also about *degrees of rightness.*

But Brentano, we have said, rejects the view that "better" means "worthy of more love," except, he says, "in quite another sense" (p. 22). This "other sense" is that "better" means "object of a *right preference.*" But what is meant by a "right preference"? If, as is usual, we mean by "preference" a *feeling,* it is obviously a feeling *only* towards the thing preferred, *not* towards the thing which is not preferred. When we say that we prefer one thing to another we usually mean either (1) that we *like* the one *more* than we like the other, or (2) that we choose the one and do *not* choose the other: there is no such thing as a single feeling, called "preference," directed to *both* the things. But in case

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(1) to know that a thing is "rightly" preferred, is only to know that it is worthy of the greater love which it receives, *not that* the other thing is *only* worthy of less; and in case (2) to know that it is "rightly" chosen is again only to know that this choice is positively "right," *not* that the other choice is not also and equally "right:" in neither case does the "rightness" of the preference allow any inference as to the relative value of what is not preferred. Such an inference is only possible, if by saying that the preference is "right," we mean that the liking or choice of the thing preferred is "*more* right" than the alternative?

The above seem to be the most important points in Brentano's theory concerning the nature of intrinsic value and intrinsic superiority. As regards intrinsic value, his theory has the almost unique merit that it defines "good in itself," not only as an *objective* concept, but as containing that very concept which is in fact properly denoted by the words: but it is defective in that the complex property which he takes to be the required definition is not merely different from the simple property which is the true definition, but has not even the same extension; "worthiness to be loved" is not even a correct criterion of intrinsic value. As regards intrinsic *superiority* his theory has an additional defect: he does not clearly recognize that to know one thing to be *better* than another must be to know that it has in a higher degree the very property which we mean by "good in itself."

If now we pass to his views on the question, "What things are good in themselves, and in what degrees?" we find that they have corresponding merits and defects. He cannot be too highly praised for insisting that, not one thing only, but very many different things have intrinsic value; and, in particular, for emphasizing the value of the immense variety of different states which belong to the class "enjoyment of things worthy to be enjoyed" or "right loves." These constitute, in fact, by far the greater part of considerable goods: and Brentano does recognize that they are all good, and that, if they are so, mere pleasure or mere knowledge cannot be the sole goods. But his views have the serious defect that he ascribes value to two classes of things which have little or no value—to things which are, in both cases, necessary constituents of valuable wholes, but which seem nevertheless to have no value in themselves. The first class consists of things which his definition of "good" binds him to consider good—things which are really worthy of love: it is certainly good *to love* all such things, but

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only *some* of them are also good *themselves;* as an example of those which are not, I have already mentioned inanimate beautiful objects. As examples of the second class of things to which he certainly ascribes more value than they possess, we may take *pleasure* and *knowledge.* This error is even more grave than the last, since it compels him to ascribe value to things which are not merely indifferent but positively bad; and it follows not from his definition of "good" but from a principle which I have not yet mentioned. This principle is that no one thing is better than another, unless it contains a greater number of good or a less number of bad parts. In this book, indeed, Brentano is even inclined to maintain that all judgments of intrinsic superiority are purely *analytic*—that "better" merely *means* "having a greater number of good parts." But the translator tells us, in the Appendix, that he has now definitely abandoned this view: he now recognizes "that it is by no means evident from analysis that one good plus another is preferable to each of these goods taken singly" (p. 122, note). We are not told, however, that Brentano has also abandoned the views with which we are now concerned—the views that, *as a matter of fact,* not only are two good things always better than one of them, but also that no one thing is better than another *unless* it contains more good parts. From the second of these principles it would follow that all good things, which are not composed of good parts, are *equally good;* and also that any quantity of pleasure is one such good thing. For it is certainly true that a greater pleasure in a very beautiful thing is sometimes better than a less pleasure in the same; and, this being so, it follows from Brentano's principle, that what differentiates the former from the latter—namely the excess of pleasure—is good in itself. And similarly it is certain that one state may be better than another, where it only differs from that other in containing more knowledge; and hence it would also follow that *some* knowledge, at all events, was good in itself. But the principle from which these results follow is certainly false: that it is an error, and a grave one, may be shown by taking a case in which it would prove to be good what is in fact positively bad in a high degree. For Brentano is bound to hold that a very great pleasure in what is wholly bad, but not very bad, is not merely *better* than a less pleasure in the same, but positively good. He must even, if the bad thing be purely imaginary, pronounce it to be *better* than a less pleasure in an imaginary thing which is wholly good. In fact,

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however, a great pleasure in what is bad seems certainly to be *both* a great positive evil *and worse* than a less pleasure in the same. It follows that one thing may be better or worse than another, even though it does not contain more good or bad parts respectively; and hence that the facts admitted above give us no reason for pronouncing either pleasure or knowledge to be good in themselves. It does *not* follow, indeed, that pleasure is *not* good in itself; only, if it is good, we must also dispute the principle that two good things are always better than one of them—must deny, at least, that the value of the whole formed by them is always equal to the sum of the values of its parts.

The third great excellence in Brentano's Ethics is his clear recognition of the distinction between what is merely *a means* to good and what is good in itself, and of the fact that the one supreme rule of Practical Ethics is that we *ought* always *to do* that which will cause the whole state of the Universe to have as much *intrinsic* value as possible—that for an action to be "right" in the ordinary sense of the word, it is both sufficient and necessary that it should be *a means* to this result. He states the consequences of this principle very clearly in several points in which they are frequently overlooked. In particular, the text of the book, which consists of a lecture delivered before the Vienna Law Society in 1889, under the title "The Natural Sanction for Law and Morality," is arranged with a view to showing, as against the relativistic views of Ihering, that, although there is no "natural law," in the sense of laws of which the *knowledge* is either "innate" or universal, the above principle is a "*natural* moral law" in the sense that it is *universally valid;* and that all positive laws have "natural sanction" or are *truly binding,* if, and only if, their observance does have the best possible results.

The book consists of this lecture, together with a number of notes, of much greater bulk than the text, and two Appendices, one of a review of "Miklovich on Subjectless Propositions," which first appeared as a feuilleton in the *Vienna Evening Post,* and the other a brief account, by the translator, of Brentano's life and philosophical achievements. The longest note, which consists of a criticism on Sigwart's theory of judgment, is, like the Appendix on Miklovich and some other long notes, relevant to the subject of the lecture only in that it serves to confirm Brentano's theory of judgment and of the analogy between belief in the true and love of the good. Many notes, again, are directly historical. Never-

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theless, owing to Brentano's extraordinary clearness with regard to the precise relevance of all he says, the contents of the book are far more easy to grasp than is usual with books of the most regular form: there seems no reason to wish that he had arranged his matter differently.

The translation is not well done; and it should be noticed that the cross-references are often utterly wrong, *e. g.*, on p. 47, where we are referred to note 27, p. 83 sub., the reference should apparently be to p. 73 sub.; on p. 82, *for* note 26, p. 77 *read* p. 71; on p. 87, *for* note 43, p. 99 *read* note 44, p. 92; on p. 89, *for* note 31, p. 91 *read* note 32, p. 85; and in the notes (pp. 87-90), the notes numbered 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42 should be numbered respectively 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43.

G. E. Moore.

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A Study in the Psychology of Ethics. By David Irons, M. A. (St. Andrews), Ph. D. (Cornell), Associate Professor of Bryn Mawr College. Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood & Sons. 1903. Pp. xviii, 176.

This book has the merit of calling attention to two facts which are far too frequently neglected.

The first of these is the fact that emotions have to their objects a peculiar kind of relation which cannot be identified either with that of a cognition to its object, or with that of effect to cause. Fear of a lion is not identical with a cognition of the lion accompanied by a feeling of fear; for I am not afraid of everything which I cognise at any moment when I am afraid. And similarly when I think that I am angry with my brother, *what* I think of is plainly quite a different thing from that which I think of when I think that my brother, or the idea of him, causes my feeling of anger. Mr. Irons does well to point out that for this, as well as for other reasons, such a definition of emotion as Höffding's is ridiculous (pp. 9-10).

The second fact is that our emotions directly influence our actions. This fact has not, like the last, been almost universally neglected; but it directly contradicts the very common theory that pleasure and pain are the sole psychical causes of action—a theory which it is one of Mr. Iron's main objects to attack. It should be noted, however, that Mr. Irons is not careful to distinguish the two

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theories (a) that a present pleasure, and (b) that the idea of a future pleasure is the sole cause of action; or to distinguish the theory that pleasure or pain are, in one of these two senses, necessary conditions of all action, from the theory that they are its sole cause.

But unfortunately Mr. Irons seems to regard as standing or falling with these two facts, three other principles, which are in fact quite independent of them, and against which the strongest objections may be urged.

(1) He seems to regard the peculiar relation of an emotion to its object as identical with "*reaction* in reference to" that object (p. 7). He explains that he does not mean by this merely that the emotion is a joint product of the cognition of the object and of the previous state of "the psychical organism:" this, which is certainly true, he admits to be true of pleasure also; whereas he takes the fact that emotion is "subjectivity as *reaction*" to distinguish it from pleasure which is "subjectivity as *receptivity*." In what other sense then, is emotion a "reaction"? Having a thing is certainly not *identical* with acting upon it in any kind of way; and Mr. Irons even appears to admit this. But, if so, we must conclude that to call the relation of an emotion to its object, a relation of "reaction" is merely misleading.

(2) Mr. Irons is anxious to insist that emotion is an "ultimate aspect of mind," different in kind not only from cognition, but also from "pleasure-pain" and conation (p. xvii). He proposes to distinguish it from "pleasure-pain," as we have just seen, by maintaining that it has, and "pleasure-pain" has not, an "outward reference." By this "outward reference" is meant that peculiar relation of an emotion to its object, which as was pointed out above, is not identical with that of cognition to its object, but is also not, as Mr. Irons thinks, identical with "the outward direction which is characteristic of all reaction" (p. 10). But Mr. Irons fails, I think, to establish that emotion is distinguished from pleasure-pain by this "outward reference." It seems on the contrary: (a) That pleasure-pain *may* have precisely the same "outward reference;" when I am *pleased with* a person, it would seem that the relation of my feeling to him is exactly the same as when I am *angry with* him. (b) That emotion *may* exist *without* this "objective reference:" there is as much reason to think that we sometimes feel afraid without being afraid *of* anything, as to think that we are sometimes in pain without being pained *at* anything.

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Similarly Mr. Irons fails to show that the relation of conative states, *e. g.,* desire, to their object is not, as Brentano maintains, of precisely the same kind as that of an emotion to its object. Accordingly, if we are to define emotion, as Mr. Irons proposes, as "feeling-attitude," *i. e.,* by the fact that it sometimes has this peculiar "outward reference," it would appear that pleasure-pain and conation are to be classed as emotions. That emotions differ qualitatively both from one another, and from pleasure or pain or any form of "conation" Mr. Irons is, of course, quite right to insist; and even this elementary fact is, as he points out, constantly neglected. But it does not follow (as Mr. Irons might suggest, *e. g.,* pp. xvi, 39) that each qualitatively different emotion is "unanalyzable; and their qualitative difference would give to conation and pleasure-pain no more right to be considered different *"ultimate* aspects of mind," than the difference between fear and love gives to these emotions, or the difference between the cognition of red and the cognition of causality to these cognitions. In short, instead of *four* Mr. Irons has established but *two* "ultimate aspects of mind," namely the *relation* of cognition to its object, and the *relation* of emotion to its object.

(3) Mr. Irons holds that "every emotion presupposes a judgment by means of which the situation is brought under a general category" (p. xvi). He gives no conclusive evidence for this assumption; it seems to be contradicted by introspection; and, if it were true, it would probably follow that animals can have no emotions. But, moreover, when he proceeds to point out what are the judgments which he takes to be the necessary conditions of particular emotions, it seems plain that many of these supposed judgments themselves either are or include emotions. A man, he says, "is angry because he *objects to* being pained" (p. 78); and similarly "the necessary conditions of ill-feeling are present whenever the object is regarded as the source of effects which are *felt as objectionable"* (p. 88). It seems plain, that, in the cases here referred to, what is meant by "objecting to" a thing, or "feeling it as objectionable," is itself an emotion, and similarly any "sense of danger," which may be plausibly regarded as a necessary condition of fear (p. 15), would seem certainly to be itself an emotion. It is purely extravagant to maintain that a rabbit cannot be afraid until he has been conscious "that an evil is possible which possibly he cannot cope with" (p. 84). These instances certainly do not support Mr. Irons' contention that a judgment is a necessary condition of every emotion.

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To establish these principles with regard to the emotions seems to be the main object of Mr. Irons' first three chapters; of which Chap. I discusses "The Nature of Emotion," Chap. II criticises "Current Theories of Emotion," and Chap. III gives an account of the particular emotions. But these chapters also contain a great mass of detail, somewhat loosely put together, which is often interesting, but rarely convincing, and which does not generally seem to have any confirmatory bearing upon the above principles, even when Mr. Irons supposes it to have one.

But with Chapters IV and V we pass to what Mr. Irons describes as "The general problem which is the subject of this inquiry" (p. xviii)—the discovery, namely of "the primary tendencies of the psychical organism," "the primary principles of activity." With regard to these tendencies Mr. Irons' two main contentions are (1) that they are necessary conditions of emotion and (2) that they are *not* hedonic; so that our activities may be divided into three different classes (1) actions caused by emotion, (2) actions caused by "pleasure-pain," and (3) actions of which the principle is one of these "primary principles of activity."

These chapters are unsatisfactory chiefly because Mr. Irons has not been at pains to consider what he means by "tendencies to action," and in what relation they stand to the conceptions by which he classifies them. For instance, he tells us that one of our primary tendencies is "the impulse to self-preservation" (p. 132). Does he here mean by "impulse" *any* course of action which *results* in self-preservation, or does he only mean a *conscious* impulse—one in which there is present some cognition of an object towards which the impulse is directed? What he says about the influence of knowledge on action (pp. 138-145) strictly implies that no cognition is ever a constituent of a primary impulse: he does not appear to have realized that "striving after" a thing can only properly denote a mental attitude towards a cognized object. Yet if his "primary impulses" are all purely unconscious, it is plain that to establish their existence does not, as he thinks, contradict the theory that cognition of pleasure and pain are the only cognitions which do influence action. But if he does mean by "impulse" "conscious impulse," does he mean by "the impulse to self-preservation," only the single impulse defined as that in which the actual idea of self-preservation helps to cause action; or does he mean the immense variety of *different* impulses, in each of which some *different* cognition is the motive idea, and which

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have in common only the fact that they all *result* in self-preservation? If he means the former, then his "primary tendencies" certainly constitute only a *very* small part of our actual tendencies, and emotions can certainly arise before they exist; if he means the latter, then it is important to observe that what he calls a single tendency is in fact a vast number of different tendencies, and that to call them all by a single name, which is merely the name of a result which they generally produce, is more misleading than useful.

We may, then, agree with Mr. Irons that a vast number of ideas other than those of pleasure and pain are conditions of action—that we strive after a great many objects beside pleasure. But the relation of the activities thus caused to the emotions is not so clear. If, as we saw, Mr. Irons has failed to show that *any* judgment is a necessary condition of emotion, far less has he shown that "the consciousness of the relation in which objects stand to [some one] of [our] tendencies" (p. xvi) is such a necessary condition. The *"recognition"* that an object *"interests"* us (p. 109) is certainly not necessary to emotion. And to say that we do not feel emotion towards an object unless it *does* interest us may only mean either that we do not feel an emotion towards it unless we do feel an emotion towards it (for interest properly denotes an emotion), or that we do not feel an emotion towards it unless the idea of it often helps to cause some action. Both propositions are true, but neither of them establishes the proposition which is essential to Mr. Irons' point: namely, that it is only because some ideas help to cause action *without* exciting emotions, that we ever come to feel any emotions at all.

Mr. Irons' last chapter is on "The Ideal of Worth as Regulative Principle." He maintains that every man has an Ideal of Worth which does influence his actions; and so far, I think, we may follow him, at least as regards civilized men. But he also apparently intends to maintain that this Ideal *ought* to regulate *all* his actions; and that it consists in the "realization of his distinctive nature" (pp. 159, 171). Moreover he seems to think that these two propositions follow, in some way, from the first. It seemed only necessary to point out: (1) That a man may *have* an Ideal of Worth, which is very far from *being* an Ideal of Worth—in plain words, that he may *think* a thing good, which is very far from being so: and that, even where a man's ideas of what is good are not erroneous, it is often not possible, and, where possi-

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ble, often not desirable; that they should influence *all* his actions. (2) That different men have different ideals of worth, and even each man, in general, a great many different ideals. That the realization of all of these would in each case be identical with the "restoration of the individual's distinctive nature," certainly require more proof than Mr. Irons offers. (3) That, even if a man's ideal of worth were the "realization of his distinctive nature"—even if he did think this realization a good thing, he would be mistaken. For all men (I believe) have some "distinctive capacities" (p. 159) for evil; and all men certainly have some capacities which it is desirable they should not realize.

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The Origin and Propagation of Sin; being the Hulsean Lectures delivered before the University of Cambridge, in 1901-2, by F. R. Tennant, M. A. (Camb.), B. Sc. (Lond.), Student of Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge. Cambridge: The University Press. Pp. xv, 231.

This is a most interesting and valuable contribution towards that Metaphysics of Theology of which we want so much and get so little. The place of sin in the universe is important enough, and its place in Christian doctrine is perhaps even more prominent. Mr. Tennant could scarcely have taken a subject so much in need of intelligent treatment, and the result of his labors has justified his choice.

The first lecture deals with the views on the subject which have been held by professed theologians. Mr. Tennant begins by pointing out that the fact of the existence of sin—which cannot be denied—must not be confused with the truth of the theory of Original Sin—which is only one of various possible ways of accounting for the fact (p. 9). It is also to be noticed that, while the denial of the need of grace would involve disbelief in the Fall, yet disbelief in the Fall need not involve the denial of the need of grace. (p. 13). The difficulties involved in the conception of the Fall are then discussed, and the lecture concludes with an examination of the possibility of the transmission of corruption from Adam to his descendants. Then I am inclined to think the author goes too far in saying that heredity, in any strict sense, can only appertain to the rational side of our constitution—unless in-

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deed we fall into Traducianism (p. 34). If it were a law of the universe that the soul whose body was begotten by A.'s body should in certain respects resemble A.'s soul, should we not have strict spiritual heredity without Traducianism? This possibility might furnish no escape for the opponents against whom Mr. Tennant is here arguing, but it would invalidate his general proposition.

The subject next considered is the treatment of Sin in philosophical speculation. The account of the views of the pre-Kantian rationalists is clear and judicious. Kant is treated at greater length. "He feels profoundly what we have already seen to be the great *crux* of the problem of sin: the apparent antinomy, furnished by our experience, between the direct deliverance of conscience, on the one hand, behind which it is not possible to go, that we are chargeable for the guilt of sin, and the fact that, on the other hand, the bias to evil in us seems to be given to any conscious act and therefore born with us." (p. 50.)

In Mr. Tennant's exposition of Hegel he has done me the honor of adopting my own theory, (p. 63) and I must not presume to call him accurate. I think, however, that he goes rather too far when he says that, for Hegel, evil ceases to be real evil (p. 66). The reality of evil is of a very low degree, but it is scarcely to be called altogether absent. The discussion of this point, however, would carry me beyond the limits of a review.

Mr. Tennant appeals from my theory that "the harvest of virtue which sin inevitably yields is to be reaped in a future life" to "universal human experience, according to which sin, of itself, produces nothing but further sin, and makes amendment even less possible" (p. 203). But the road from sin to virtue is through retribution. Now, either there is something in man's nature with which sin conflicts or there is not. If there is not, he has not committed sin, for he is not a moral being at all. But if there is, must not every sin in the long run bring about or rather become—its own punishment?

The lecture ends with the systems of Lotze, Schleirmacher and Ritschl. The author is, I think, right in finding in Lotze (pp. 62, 67) the most Christian of the great philosophers. The serious difficulty would be, not in making some aspects of Lotze's theology agree with Christianity, but in making them consistent with other respects which appear to be not less fundamental for Lotze himself.

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In the third lecture Mr. Tennant develops his own theory of the origin of sin. "Can we find," he asks, "the ground of the possibility and occasion for sin in our actual constitution regarded as the properly moral result of a process of development through which the race has passed previously to the acquisition of full moral personality; and can we assign the rise of evil itself simply to the difficulty of the task which has to be encountered by every individual person alike, the task of enforcing his inherited organic nature to obey a moral law which he has only gradually been enabled to discern?" (p. 81).

In support of this view he quotes Archdeacon Wilson and Professor Pfleiderer, and supports it by considerations drawn from the lives of savages and of children. Sin comes into existence gradually, for it only arises when the gratification of certain impulses, which had originally been non-moral, and perhaps beneficial, is recognized to be bad, and yet is still continued. "The sinfulness of sin would gradually increase from zero; and the first sin, if the word have any meaning, instead of being the most heinous, and the most momentous in the race's history, would rather be the least significant of all" (p. 91).

The theory has a distinct resemblance to Hegel's, in making Sin a consequence of the advance from a non-moral state to the higher state of morality. But while "this account of sin sees in it something empirically inevitable for every man,—which of course accords with all experience,—it by no means implies that sin is theoretically, or on *à priori* grounds, an absolute necessity" (p. 110). There, no doubt, we have an important difference, and one which may very possibly be sufficient to save the theory from taking sin as happily (*sub specie aeternitatis*, a distinction to which Mr. Tennant scarcely does justice) as the true Hegelian must.

The fourth lecture discusses the compatibility of the existence of Sin with a morally perfect God. Mr. Tennant is inclined to take Sin as a necessary accompaniment of the Divine purpose rather than as part of the purpose (p. 124). He recognizes that this involves "very real limits to the action of Omnipotence." (p. 129). (Surely the retention of the word Omnipotence is merely confusing, if the power is limited.) These limits he thinks can be treated as only self-limitation (p. 130). And their existence need not shake our faith in "the ultimate Divine government and preservation of the world" (p. 137).

Much might be said on this subject, but it would scarcely be

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sufficiently relevant to the main subject of the lectures. If the author has succeeded no better than anyone else in solving the ultimate problem of Evil, he has thrown great light on the particulor form of Evil which we call Sin. The merits of his present work will leave his readers impatient for the historical study on "The Sources of the Doctrine of the Fall and Original Sin," which will be published shortly.

J. ELLIS MCTAGGART.

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PHILOSOPHY OF CONDUCT. A treatise of the Facts, Principles, and Ideals of Ethics. By George Trumbull Ladd, Professor of Philosophy in Yale University. London: Longmans, Green & Co. 1902.

Professor Ladd has the pen of a ready writer. The present volume, the text of which runs to 656 pages, follows hard on "Philosophy of Knowledge," 1897; "Philosophy of Mind," 1895; "Psychology, Descriptive and Explanatory," 1894, and "Introduction of Philosophy," 1890. Frequent references occur, moreover, to "A Theory of Reality," 1899; "Outlines of Psychology;" "Elements of Physiological Psychology," etc., by the same author. It is indeed one of the worrying elements in this book that extraordinarily frequent reference to fuller treatment in his other books, seems to Professor Ladd sufficient excuse for incomplete and unsatisfactory treatment of particular points, even when they are fundamental to his inquiry. The best things seem always to be in other books, either in those that have been written, or in those that are to be written by Professor Ladd. This is very irritating to any reader to whom time is an object, and it gives rise to an uncomfortable feeling that the writer is "dodging" his subject rather than grappling it in earnest. This is the more to be deplored, as an undoubted spirit of moral earnestness is apparent throughout the book. Indeed in his preface Professor Ladd somewhat disarms philosophic criticism by avowing his interest and aim to be practical. He wishes to further "the rational and practical betterment of the life of conduct." He does not anticipate philosophical criticism; but "opposition" from (1) "the current theory of biological evolution," (2) "the reigning spirit of commercialism," and (3) "the relatively low and nerveless condition of the current Christianity." It is not surprising therefore to find his book a popular discussion of popular "Ethical" problems, of-

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fered to a popular audience, rather than a serious attempt to carry philosophical inquiry further. But it is surprising to find Professor Ladd claiming for his work that it is "an analysis of man's ethical consciousness which is, so far as I am aware, at the same time more thorough and more modern than that attempted in any other similar treatise."

Professor Ladd's attitude towards his predecessors in the world of philosophy is somewhat startling to the European mind. He speaks (p. 135) of "the profound but perverse analysis of Kant," "the brilliant and subtle but fallacious dialectics of Dean Mansel or Mr. Bradley." He speaks of a certain "conclusion" of Aristotle (p. 36) as "hasty and ill-taken, and based upon insufficient grounds." He begins his chapter on "Ethical Judgment" by saying, "Since the time of Aristotle the relation in which man's intellectual equipment stands to his moral life has been quite customarily misunderstood by writers upon the philosophy of conduct. No such distinction," he continues, "as that advanced by Aristotle, although it has 'lasted ever since' can justify itself before the analysis of a thorough and consistent psychological ethics." Can American humor do nothing to help American modesty from so sad a plight as this?

Professor Ladd's plan is to analyze (1) the Moral Self; (2) The Virtuous Life; (3) The Nature of the Right. He is, roughly speaking, Idealistic: but it is perhaps the idealism of Emerson, rather than the idealism of Hegel or of Kant. He is supremely interested in the self. The moral self, its unity, its community, its characteristic activities, its relation to the absolute self—these are his constant theme. His feeling for the unity of the self is so strong that it leads him at times to find difficulty in holding asunder the elements or aspects of the self, even for purposes of analysis—as in his criticism of the Aristotelian judgment already cited. He is an ardent upholder of the "freedom of the Moral Self," and a scornful denouncer of Determinism, which he takes to be incompatible with moral freedom.

Here, as elsewhere, Professor Ladd is not so much logical as morally inspiring.

In his analysis of the nature of the Right Professor Ladd finds "the virtuous life *is* in itself good; it is *the* supreme moral good" (p. 637). "Man creates his own moral standards" (p. 612). "Nevertheless, the continuous illumination of the human race by the everywhere scattered lights of the Moral Law has its source

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in the Sun of Righteousness, the ideally holy and righteous Will of the World-ground" (p. 613).

The central ideas of the book—viz., the unity of the self, the evolution of the virtues, the spiritual nature of the universe—are not so much argued as reiterated. The treatment impresses a reviewer, sympathetic towards these ideas, as scrappy and unsatisfactory, the argument being nowhere maintained with consistency or completeness.

MARY GILLILAND HUSBAND.

LONDON.

THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE MORAL QUALITIES. An ethical treatise of the eleventh century by Solomon Ibn Gabirol, printed from an unique Arabic manuscript, together with a translation, and an essay on the place of Gabirol in the history of the development of Jewish Ethics. By Stephen S. Wise, Ph. D., New York: The Columbia University Press and Macmillan Co. 1901.

The Arabic text of Ibn Gabirol's treatise on Ethics is printed by Dr. Wise from a manuscript in the Bodleian Library, probably written at the end of the fourteenth century. The facsimile shows that it was written in Hebrew characters. But Arabic scholars will not find fault with the editor for printing the text in the *nashki* characters, though his statement that he "has allowed the peculiarities of the Judaeo-Arabic Script to remain unchanged" is a little puzzling. This manuscript, which seems to be the only extant copy of the original Arabic text, was brought to England by Bishop Huntington in 1682. Of the Hebrew translation there are several manuscripts and six printed editions. A new critical edition is projected by Dr. Wise.

The English version given by Dr. Wise is a faithful rendering of the original. Occasionally, however, the text itself is uncertain, and there are places where the sense is somewhat obscure. The introduction presents a good account of the life and writings of Ibn Gabirol. The bibliographical notices are ample and will be of value to the student of Ibn Gabirol's philosophy. In the matter of quotations the author's method reveals something of the awkwardness of the present transition to something better, from the stately system of full titles in the first place and subsequent *loco citato's* (with the inevitable difficulty and waste of time in finding

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the first place). If journals and general works of reference are referred to only by initials, it would seem proper to have a list of abbreviations at the beginning and not at the end of the book. It is a question whether a slight gain in ink and paper offsets the disadvantages of quotations that do not facilitate or encourage use of the works quoted.

As for Ibn Gabirol's Ethics, the work is already familiar to scholars through the Hebrew translation. But this English version will give a wider circle of readers an opportunity of becoming acquainted with his ingenious thought. The importance of his contributions to the science of ethics lies in his method rather than in his results. While it would be going too far to say that he made morality autonomous, he certainly discussed the problems of moral conduct without distinctly deriving its sanctions from a divine revelation. He seldom quoted the Scriptures, and still more rarely the Talmudic authorities. How far this resulted from the peculiar field of observations which he chose, and how far it may have implied a conscious break with external authority, is not easily determined. Dr. Wise thinks "he was shunned rather than despised" and refers to the attempt to "kill him by silence." It may be, however, that the rabbis failed to discern the importance of the work or found it as difficult as we do to discover the real attitude of the author to those authorities which they recognized. On the other hand, it is quite clear that Ibn Gabirol left the ground of accepted beliefs and common speculation when he began to investigate the possible connection between the five senses and certain groups of virtues and vices. True, he distinguishes sharply between physical senses and concealed senses such as perception and understanding. But in connecting all moral qualities with the physical senses and regarding them as manifestations of the animal soul, he entered as a pioneer the path followed centuries later by Locke. It is interesting to observe how he distributes the qualities of the soul among the different senses. Thus meekness and pride are connected with sight, love and hate with hearing, good-will and jealousy with smell, joy and grief, tranquility and penitence with taste, and liberality and courage, stinginess and cowardice with touch. It is impossible to avoid the impression of a certain artificiality in this system, and it is also clear that Biblical language has influenced him quite as much as direct observation. His purpose is to show how these moral qualities may be improved by being subjected to the control of the

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divine or rational soul. In this way the astral influences may be neutralized or modified. This young philosopher of the eleventh century, who died before he was thirty years of age, will be introduced to many modern students in an admirable manner by the present volume.

NATHANIEL SCHMIDT.

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BOOKS RECEIVED.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY: With Other Lectures and Essays. By Robert Adamson, M.A., LL.D., some time Professor of Logic and Rhetoric in the University of Glasgow. Edited by W. R. Sorley, M.A., LL.D., Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Cambridge. In Two Volumes. Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood & Sons, 1903. Pp. xlviii, 358; xv, 330.

LOGICAL CONDITIONS OF A SCIENTIFIC TREATMENT OF MORALITY. By John Dewey, Professor and Head of the Department of Philosophy. (The University of Chicago, The Decennial Publications. Printed from Vol. III.) Chicago: The University Press, 1903. Pp. 115-139.

AN INTRODUCTORY STUDY OF ETHICS. By Warner Fite. New York and London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1903. Pp. xi, 383.

AN INTRODUCTION TO SYSTEMATIC PHILOSOPHY. By Walter T. Marvin, Ph.D., Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Western Reserve University. New York: The Columbia University Press. London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1903. Pp. xiv, 572.

DISSERTATIONS ON LEADING PHILOSOPHICAL TOPICS. By Alexander Bain, LL. D., Emeritus Professor of Logic, University of Aberdeen. (Mainly Reprints from *Mind*.) London, New York, and Bombay: Longmans, Green & Co., 1903. Pp. vi, 277.

SCOTTISH PHILOSOPHY IN ITS NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT. By Henry Laurie, LL. D., Professor of Mental and Moral Philosophy in the University of Melbourne. Glasgow: James Maclehon & Sons, 1902. Pp. viii, 344.

THE STUDY OF MENTAL SCIENCE: Popular Lectures on the Uses and Characteristics of Logic and Psychology. By J. Brough, LL.D., Professor of Logic and Philosophy at the University College of Wales, Aberystwyth. London, New York, and Bombay: Longmans, Green & Co., 1903. Pp. vii, 129.

THE LAW OF LIKENESS. By David Bates. London, New York, and Bombay: Longmans, Green & Co., 1903. Pp. viii, 340.

WHY THE MIND HAS A BODY. By C. A. Strong, Professor of Psychology in Columbia University. New York: The Macmillan Co.; London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1903. Pp. x, 355.

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

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JANUARY, 1904.

THE TRUE DEMOCRATIC IDEAL.

The word democracy, which once aroused scorn, then homage, seems now to evoke despair. This is partly a matter of evolution; but partly also a matter of definition. No two generations, no two individuals, have meant quite the same thing by Democracy. I wish at present to ask what Democracy can be fairly taken to stand for in the world of the ideal? This is conceivably something other than the suffrage, than political institutions, economic fallacies; something other than motive, though perhaps involved in motive; something in part expressed by the changes of the last hundred years, in part resulting from them. Can it be defined?

A generation ago men would have answered the question by some glowing eulogy of Liberty. They might have vouched to warranty that great Hellenic philosopher who finds in Freedom at once the peril and chiefest glory of the democratic state. "Even the horses and asses have a way of marching along with all the rights and dignities of freemen; and they will run at anybody who comes in their way if he does not leave the road clear for them; and all things are just ready to burst with liberty."[1] We have changed all that. Liberty is neither the glory nor the peril of modern democracies. If anywhere, one would have looked to England for a fulfilment of Platonic prophecy. The Englishman is an individualist; his reserve,

[1] "The Republic." Translation by Jowett, p. 563.

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his sense of completeness unto himself, and his exceeding anxiety to do as he pleases, give distinction to his character. Yet in England to-day we find a growing distrust of Liberty and a multiplication of the rules which restrict it. "In our own day," writes Lecky, "no fact is more incontestable and conspicuous than the love of Democracy for authoritative regulation." [2] While some are proclaiming that the supreme blessing of freedom has been to teach us its limitations, others mourn that speech is no longer free and that men's hearts are no longer open to the appeal of oppressed nationalities. Others, again, profess the forms of freedom after the fashion of the man at an Australian bush inn who knocked down a comrade for suggesting that something might be said for the Boers, shook a first in his face, and then bade him thank God that he lived in a country where there was freedom of speech. "Sympathy, which a generation ago was taking the shape of justice," laments Herbert Spencer with perhaps exaggerated emphasis, "is relapsing into the shape of generosity; and the generosity is exercised by inflicting injustice. Daily legislation betrays little anxiety that a man shall have what belongs to him, but great anxiety that he shall have what belongs to somebody else." [3].

If indeed we except a few philosophers who are out of touch with social tendencies, and the individuals in whom the prejudices of self-interest beget an economic and political liberalism, the whole tendency of modern feeling is towards the conviction that the Liberty which our forefathers praised has done its chief work. Men no longer regard it with special affection, or hope for salvation from the free play of individual interests. They are far too impressed by the way in which facilities for amassing immense fortunes have outgrown the restrictions of democratic legislatures. They have little fear of the tyranny of their rulers, but great fear of the exploitation of the plutocrat; and they conceive of the pursuit of liberty as perhaps leading to nothing better than "the desolate freedom of the wild ass." I am not concerned with the truth of such views: I sim-

[2] "Democracy and Liberty," I. 213.
[3] "Ethics" II. 44.

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ply note them as material for the consideration of those who would understand the true nature of the ideal towards which democracies tend, working out their destiny not in Utopia but on earth, not in times simple and stationary but in times complex and progressive, not untrammelled and unperplexed but encumbered by the changing problems and difficulties of modern civilized life.

Does the rejection of Liberty imply the elevation of equality? Much contradiction exists on this point. While many speak of equality as the master passion of Democracy, others declare that in no other community is the desire for social stratification so universal or so strong. The facts of life in Australia tend to discountenance both of these views as extreme. Whilst on the one hand a few members of the Labor class advocate equality in all conceivable forms, and on the other hand certain members of the professional classes appear to be incapable of any other judgment of men than that which is based on their standing at Government House, the great mass of the population lie between these extremes. While making no fetish of equality in any sense, they show a disposition to assume *camaraderie* between class and class. A late Bishop of Melbourne was counselled on one occasion not to be shy of approaching a cricketer who was the most popular guest of the evening. "He won't mind. He's the right sort." The Bishop took his lesson, and acted upon it, conquered—doubtless—by a conviction of the gains of a social atmosphere where a man stands or falls by what he can do. No one can remain long in Australia without feeling that the Australian citizen is relatively free from those peculiar vices of manners, the insolence and servility, which result from class isolation.

One hears much in Europe of the pursuit of titles and decorations in America. The truth appears to be that, in so far as we must impute to this pursuit a desire for rank and social precedence, its extent is much exaggerated and its relation to the national life misunderstood. I have not, however, seen enough of America to speak on the point with confidence, and I content myself with quoting the word of a distinguished authority:—

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"The second charm of American Life," writes Bryce, "is one which some Europeans will smile at. It is social Equality. To many Europeans—to Germans, let us say, or Englishmen—the word has an odious sound. It suggests a dirty fellow in a blouse elbowing his betters in a crowd, or an ill-conditioned villager shaking his fist at the parson and the squire; or, at any rate, it suggests obtrusiveness and bad manners. The exact contrary is the truth. Equality improves manners, for it strengthens the basis of all good manners, respect for other men and women, simply as men and women, irrespective of their station in life. . . . People meet on a simple and natural footing, with more frankness and ease than is possible in countries where every one is either looking up or looking down. There is no servility on the part of the humbler, and if now and then a little of the 'I am as good as you' rudeness be perceptible, it is almost sure to proceed from a recent immigrant, to whom the attitude of simple Equality has not yet become familiar as the evidently proper attitude of one man to another. There is no condescension on the part of the more highly placed, nor is there even that sort of scrupulously polite coldness which one might think they would adopt in order to protect their dignity." [4]

In France, an enthusiasm for Equality exists, but it is more restrained by the power of the past. "The French lawyer," observes Bodley, "will challenge a Count without hesitation, while he will scorn to concede a rendezvous to a cabman." Of the Legion of Honor, he writes:

"From the egalitarian point of view, the disadvantage of the system is that it tends to make the French a nation of suppliants, each man soliciting to have confirmed his superiority over his neighbor. Twice annually, at the New Year, and on the day of the Fall of the Bastile, supreme festival of Equality, the new nominations and promotions are published, being the result of many months' importuning of ministers. So vast is the host of applicants that two other species of decorations have had to be developed or invented outside the national Order. . . . Thus, whenever the President of the Republic visits officially a provincial town, he goes with the definite mission of displaying that Equality is discountenanced by the State; for it is his practice to seize the occasion to distinguish local notables with invidious disparity. The worthiest in the eyes of the Government he invests with the Legion of Honor; while other inhabitants of mark he practically tells that they are of inferior condition, not good enough for the red ribbon, and only entitled to the modest violet of the Academy, or the rustic green of Agriculture." [5]

This appreciation of French life by an English author recalls the fact that quite recently a French publicist of repute has published a work on the Psychology of the Anglo-Saxon.

[4] "The American Commonwealth," II. 810.

[5] Bodley's "France," I. 164-5.

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"Inequalities are established in England," argues in effect Emile Boutmy, "as the result of the severity of the struggle for existence. Once established, the citizen regards them with complacency for several reasons. (1) Their existence does not prevent him from realizing his ruling ambition *to do something.* (2) He is too conservative in disposition and habits to desire much change in his social environment. (3) More disposed to act than to think or reflect, his analysis of the elements of the national life is arrested half way, so that Society appears to him nothing more than an aggregate of classes and corporations. His intellectual deficiencies prevent him from reaching a conception of society as made up of individuals between each of whom in the last analysis Equality must be assumed as a working basis."[6]

Most Englishmen will accept this judgment as sound in substance. Envy of all superiority is not unknown among us; but it is not common. Superiority and inferiority are rather accepted as more or less inscrutable facts. In new lands, free from the despotism of old institutions, the Englishman will accept and appreciate a large measure of equality in his social relations. At home, he does not appear to desire Equality in any form. To make of it the sole or paramount element in his social ideal would exact a generous allowance for its demerits. The Englishman will not do justice to its merits. Conscious that men are neither born equal nor by any legerdemain can be made equal, he accepts inequality in all its forms as a part of the order of Nature.

We have seen that Equality in certain special forms is sometimes accepted or sought after by modern democracies. But nowhere is it revered. One very patent reason for this may be found in the negative character of Equality. There is no special charm or advantage in having all men equal if it be an equality of badness—the equality of a lunatic asylum or a sea-sick crew. If, on the other hand, we are to suppose an equality of goodness, it is the goodness and not the Equality upon which moral enthusiasm must fasten; but as conditional to something beyond. Great national or political faiths are constructive. Equality, negative rather than positive, destructive rather than constructive, may pull down the wrong; it cannot uphold the right. It may lead battalions to victory; it cannot control what it wins. Its permanent influence must depend

[6] Boutmy "Psychologie politique du Peuple anglais," pp. 188-197, 268-270.

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upon its subordination to other enthusiasms. It is sure to find some place in the democratic policy; it cannot for long inspire the thought and activities of the democratic citizen.

If to-day men's hearts are not fired by the thought of Liberty or Equality, if these aspirations can no longer claim to express the genius and inspiration of the democratic ideal, whither does that ideal tend? Towards extinction? We cannot hope to answer this question unless we have the courage to free our minds from certain conventional misjudgments of Democracy which have had their origin in exaggerated expectation or partial analysis. We must avoid the excesses of those who are disappointed with Democracy because they have hoped too much of it, and of those who refuse to make allowance for the problems with which modern politics have had to cope.

In the first place, the common estimation of Democracy has suffered from a reaction against a too sanguine expectation. The apostles of modern Democracy, like the apostles of a former time, antedated the millenium. Democracy, defined as government by the people, was to have been realized by granting the suffrage. Opportunity was to inspire; exercise to perfect. But the dream has not been realized. Neither in Europe nor in America do the people rule. Neither in Europe nor in America have the people seriously endeavoured to answer to the demands which new institutions have made upon them. Opportunity to rule has not inspired an ambition to be worthy of rule; and the exercise of political control by the many has been capricious, intermittent, and ineffectual. Great commercial interests have thwarted political aspiration, and in the presence of a general inertia the enthusiasm of the democrat has yielded to the chill of despair. I wish to point out that such despair may be as little justified as the exaggerated expectations of democratic pioneers. If those expectations have been falsified, the fact affords no reason for rushing to an opposite extreme and condemning Democracy on the evidence of a generation. Human possibilities are not to be actualized in the course of a few decades; and it is now made abundantly clear that Democracy must continue to rest its hope on potentialities rather than actualities, building more upon the race than upon

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individuals or a generation of individuals, with respect to whom it must proclaim the need for an infinite patience which will sympathize with man's weak strivings and even with his failure to strive. The element in the democratic gospel is exacting; it cannot as yet be held ridiculous. Time alone can judge its truth.

In the second place, Democracy has been misjudged because we have not realized the extent of the difficulties which it has been called upon to overcome. Scientific and mechanical progress, by increasing the facilities for making great fortunes, has lured the souls of men in the pursuit of gain. The growing complexity of affairs, and the swift development of urban populations, have increased the number and difficulty of our political problems to an unprecedented extent. The competition of the nations for world dominion, due to the opening up of new continents, is imposing a great strain upon national finance, and threatening the world with some of the gravest moral evils of chronic militancy. Democratic progress is not responsible for these things; but democratic institutions have to cope with them.[7] We must remember this fact, if we would judge Democracy aright or discover the real character of its ideal.

The nature of that ideal must be sought in the achievements of Democracy rather than its mistakes, in what it has done rather than what it has failed to do. I fear that in the past most of us have been so disappointed with the failures of government *by* the people, that we have failed to be just to the progress which has been made in the direction of government *for* the people. While the capacity of the many for self-government still remains to be proved, the appreciation by all classes of the claims of the many as the proper object of government has grown stronger and stronger. To this fact must be added an undoubted progress in man's appreciation of Humanity. How else shall we explain the anomaly that the Age in which Christians have begun to doubt the eternal damnation of the heathen is also the Age of Foreign Missions? Whatever may happen to democratic institutions in the future,

[7] In my essay "The New Democracy," this subject is considered at some length in the chapter, "The Real Defects of Democracy."

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the results which have been achieved in these directions have permanently enriched the world. We may examine them a little more closely.

I speak of *a deeper appreciation of Humanity.* The idea of Humanity is no creation of Democracy. The origin of that idea takes us back to tribal times when Revenge was potent and mutual protection from foes was the great motive of social union. To trace the stages of its slow development, we need to review the rise and fall of Oriental despotisms, the social and religious systems of the East, and the culture of that Hellenic world where great philosophers extolled "the pure and heartfelt hatred of the foreigner" while developing an Art and Knowledge which was destined to unite humanity under the Empire of Ideas. From Greek culture we should have to pass to Roman Jurisprudence, the *Pax Romana,* and the organization of the Mediterranean world under the Empire of Law. When we had gone thus far, we should only be at the beginning of our work, for we should still have to regard the advent of the Teuton, the triumphs of Christianity, the mediaeval theory of a universal state, the decline of slavery, the stages of industrial progress, the intellectual renaissance of the fifteenth century, the spiritual renaissance of the sixteenth century, the struggles for liberty in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and the growth of federations and democracies in our own time. Even now, alas, the Idea of Humanity is but indifferently appreciated. Religion, Art, and Poetry may have inspired man. The voice of the great and good may have proclaimed the worth of man. But these influences have not always been in harmony with themselves or with one another, and the possibilities of the seed have been limited by deficiencies in the soil. Great barriers still divide men. Yet, much has been done; and to-day the barrier of caste is being undermined by the power of Democracy. Just as the struggles of the seventeenth and preceding centuries were engaged in winning back the old Teutonic freedom, reconciling it with higher social and political conditions, so in our time Democracy has sought to realize on a vast scale something of that spirit of mutual responsibility which marked the fellowship unit of

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tribal times. Democracy is indeed less than Humanity; but its face is towards Humanity; and its presence among us has broadened the common vision until the Idea of Humanity, once imputed with scorn to solitary dreamers, has become the possession of multitudes.

I speak also of *a broader conception of social justice.* Each age of moral progress has seen some advance in the intrusion of the domain of justice upon the domain of charity; has witnessed the recognition by the human conscience of obligations which before had been denied or admitted as merely supererogatory. Hence, by slow degrees, justice, which is declared to have originated in the impulse to give your enemy as severe a blow as he has given you, has been broadened until to-day it embraces within its wide domain the claims of poverty and weakness. Aforetime these appealed to our charity; they now appeal to our sense of justice. The relation of Democracy to this process is too apparent to call for emphasis. Democrats may quarrel about the consequences of the ethical principles which underlie the suffrage, or may differ as to the period for their practical application; but the general character of those principles is beyond the range of controversy. They may be stated as the right of every individual to self-realization and to a share in working out the national destiny; the right of every individual to count as one (no man counting as more than one) in all estimations of the common good; and, implied in these, transcending them in its supreme import, the duty of each to revere in others the claims which he makes for himself.

I said just now that we must examine the achievements of Democracy rather than its failures if we would learn its ideal. The conclusions which such an examination must suggest to us are confirmed by the teaching of those who have a special claim to represent the democratic movement. I speak not of demagogues who exploit that movement for their own purposes, seeking to gain a popular favor by the arts of flattery and intrigue, but of those who have loved Democracy, have served or died for it. The meaning of Democracy must be sought in the lives of its best men. And if we are to apply this test, surely no higher or better representative could be found

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than Mazzini. There is a remarkable passage in "Thoughts upon Democracy in Europe" which bears directly upon the subject of inquiry:

"The law of God has not two weights and two measures: Christ came for all: He spoke to all: He died for all. . . . We cannot wish the brow that is raised to Heaven to fall prostrate in the dust before any created being: the soul that should aspire to Heaven, to rot in ignorance of its rights, its powers, and its noble origin, while on earth. We cannot admit that instead of loving one another like brethren, men ought to be divided, hostile, selfish: jealous, city of city, nation of nation. We protest, then, against all inequality, against all oppression wheresoever it is practiced: for we acknowledge no foreigners: we recognize only the just and the unjust: the friends and the enemies of the law of God. This forms the essence of what men have agreed to call the *Democratic Movement;* and if anything ever profoundly surprised me, it is that so many persons have hitherto been blind to the eminently religious character of that movement, which is sooner or later destined to be recognized."

Mazzini prized Liberty; but he saw clearly that Democracy could not rest at that stage; that, transcending Liberty and Equality, it must pass on to something beyond, or perish miserably. That "something beyond" may seem to us visionary. But it can be recognized, without adulation or censure, as material for reflection. Its presence can be traced in much of the better art of our time. Witness, for an example, the art of Millet with its deep reverence for elemental human life and human toil. Witness, especially, his tragic picture called "The Man with the Hoe." The scene represents a man occupied in field work. The man pauses in his work, and looks into space with a wearied and vacant gaze. He has lived a life in which all the finer aspirations have been dwarfed by the struggle for existence.

"Bowed by the weight of centuries, he leans
Upon his hoe and gazes on the ground,
The emptiness of ages in his face,
And on his back the burden of the world.
Who made him dead to rapture and despair,
A thing that grieves not and that never hopes,
Solid and stunned, a brother to the ox?
Who loosened and let down this brutal jaw?
Whose was the hand that slanted back this brow?
Whose breath blew out the light within this brain?
Is this the thing the Lord God made, and gave,

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To have dominion over sea and land?
To trace the stars and search the heavens for power;
To feel the passion of eternity?
Is this the dream he dreamed who shaped the suns
And pillared the blue firmament with light?
Down all the stretch of hell to its last gulf
There is no shape more terrible than this—
More tongued with censure of the world's blind greed—
More filled with signs and portents for the soul—
More fraught with menace to the universe.
What gulf's between him and the seraphim?
Slave of the wheel of labor, what to him
Are Plato and the swing of Pleiades?
What are the long reaches of the peaks of song,
The rift of dawn, the reddening of the rose?
Through this dread shape the suffering ages look;
Time's tragedy is in that aching stoop;
Through this dread shape humanity, betrayed,
Cries protest to the judges of the world." [a]

The work of Millet gives expression to a spirit which slowly invades all branches of art. Even if our flights in literature never take us higher than the passing novel, we can hardly fail to be impressed by a real change in the artist's view of life. Gradually the people, the life they live, the thought that stirs within them, their hopes, joys, and sufferings are being deemed worthy subjects of highest art—no longer to receive the insincere treatment of the artist who selects and handles his materials with a constant regard to the fastidious sense, but to be welcomed as inherently noble to him who has the soul to interpret. The tendency is described with admirable force in J. A. Symonds' Essay on Walt Whitman.

"Heroism steps forth from the tent of Achilles; chivalry descends from the arm-gaunt charger of the knight; loyalty is seen to be no mere devotion to a dynasty. None of these high virtues are lost to us. On the contrary, we find them everywhere. They are brought within reach, instead of being relegated to some remote region in the past, or deemed the special property of privileged classes. The engine-driver steering his train at night over perilous viaducts, the life-boat man, the member of the fire-brigade assailing houses toppling to their ruin among flames; these are found to be no less heroic than Theseus grappling the Minotaur in Cretan labyrinths. And so it is with the chivalrous respect for womanhood and weakness, with loyal self-dedication to a principle or cause, with comrade-

[a] Edwin Markham.

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ship uniting men in brotherhood, with passion fit for tragedy, with beauty shedding light from heaven on human habitations. They were thought to dwell far off in antique fable or dim mediaeval legend. They appeared to our fancy clad in glittering armor, plumed, and spurred, surrounded with the aureole of noble birth. We now behold them at our house-doors, in the streets and fields around us. . . . This extended recognition of the noble and the lovely qualities in human life, the qualities upon which pure art must seize, is due partially to what we call Democracy. But it implies something more than that word is commonly supposed to denote—a new and more deeply religious way of looking at mankind, a gradual triumph after so many centuries of the spirit which is Christ's, an enlarged faculty for piercing below externals and appearances to the truth and essence of things. God, the divine, is recognized as immanent in nature, and in the soul and body of humanity; not external to these things, not conceived of as creative from outside, or as incarnated in any single personage, but all-pervasive, all-constitutive, everywhere and in all. That is the democratic philosophy."[9]

The true character of the democratic ideal is thus revealed. It once stood for Liberty or Equality. It now stands for what perhaps may be described as Brotherhood. Among all the strange contradictions of our day surely there is none more strange than this—that when Belief as a whole has seemed to wither, and life has become in many ways more materialized, there should have developed a new and very exalted social ideal. We may regard the presence of this ideal as the first sign of a new dawn that shall arise upon the mountains. We may regard it as the last brilliant reflections of a sun which has already set. We cannot contemplate it without some enthusiasm: we cannot help feeling that such enthusiasm might easily become irrational and extreme. The post of honor is the post of danger; the political institutions which aim the highest may fail the most miserably. The more we see of Democracy, the more closely we examine it, the more we must be impressed by the ancient declaration that Republics live by virtue. A modern State which voluntarily adopts Democracy, makes a declaration of resolve to live the higher life. If it fails to keep this resolve, the step forwards must lead to the rigors or Despotism, or the desolation of Anarchy. The Puritan fought to realize God's Kingdom on Earth. His creed was

[9] "Essays Speculative and Suggestive," pp. 263-4.

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narrow, but it was also high; "a rapture too severe for weak mortality"; and the nation rebelled against it, as much because it was high as because it was narrow. The puritan had undertaken too great a task. Has Democracy undertaken too great a task? Have we tried too early in the world's history to realize the political institution based on mutual forbearance and co-operation? If this be the case we may imagine some historian of a remote future concluding his account of the present age in the following mournful judgment: "In a word, the nineteenth and twentieth centuries witnessed the development of Democracy, but not the development of that moral atmosphere which could alone make Democracy a real and lasting triumph. At one time it seemed as if that moral atmosphere was almost within reach, but the evidences which suggested this hope were proved to be inadequate. Hence, Democracy, which had promised to inaugurate a new era in the history of man, an era of Brotherhood, became more and more discredited; and humanity started out once again on a cycle of experience, finding what strength it could in the hope that in some far future, man might reach the higher levels which as yet had been sought in vain."

Judicious observers are not wanting to-day who will tell us that the world's need is not Fraternity, but justice and discipline; that the operation of natural laws in their influences upon human progress will ensure the triumph of societies in which competition is most free and men are least fettered by the survival of the unfit. To such warnings must be added the sombre fact that an analysis of existing social life reveals a vast gulf to-day between aspiration and actuality. Clearly it is not the presence of an ideal in a nation that saves, but the fearless strong-hearted devotion to an ideal. Civilizations, says one, are destroyed by great ideas apprehended, but not lived up to. Rome, as we know, was passing slowly, surely, to its fall during the long period which was distinguished from its predecessors by an increased humanity. To-day we have ideals, but the common acceptation of them can only be made efficacious by embracing the call to labor and to suffer in a



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way that is seldom realized. We have chosen a God to worship without knowing how jealous He would be, or how exacting of the spirit which consecrates institutions to high purposes. Whether the ultimate results will be good or evil, the future alone can decide.

W. Jethro Brown.

University College, Aberystwyth.

RELATIVITY AND FINALITY IN ETHICS.

The moral teacher constantly faces a strong and persistent craving on the part of persons of all classes and of every range of intelligence for some final and absolute authority in the field of conduct. Even where in concrete cases such persons do not easily surrender their own judgments, yet in the abstract they demand the feeling that in the background there are sharply defined laws, and final and authoritative voices to insure them in time of need against errors and mistakes amidst the moral difficulties all vividly anticipate as our possible lot.

Nor is it a sufficient reason for this longing to emphasize the grave issues which are, no doubt, at stake. It is not simply as the sick man demands expert medical aid. What is demanded is not competent advice, but an abstract infallibility somewhere. The ethically confused man seeks advice, but advice is not what the average man longs for; he hungers for abstract infallibility behind the advice. The opportunity for medical quackery is small compared to the field for ethical quackery.

The sense that our moral decisions must be made rapidly, almost instinctively; that in many cases to hesitate is to be lost; may make the longing for a final and sure guide strong, but it does not explain the soul's demand for this abstract infallibility. We all at times become weary in the midst of the

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moral and intellectual struggle in which the world is engaged, and long for stronger ones to lean upon. This is part of our immaturity and weakness. The surprising fact is, however, that many who have contentedly accepted the doctrine of relativity in all other spheres of knowledge, even in that of religious knowledge, are still strongly insistent on the possibility of and necessity for an absolute and infallible guide in the field of conduct. When in the ranks of an immature Protestantism the question is raised as to the infallibility of organization, creed or book, it is the ethical losses that are most dreaded as a result of the dethronement of the infallible authority. Men who no longer need or defend an infallible theology still insist that in the region of morals we dare not trust to the living inspirations of each struggling generation, but that we imperatively need some outward and absolute authority to which in the last analysis we can successfully appeal.

The doctrine of relativity in morals is distasteful in quarters where one might least expect such hostility. The assurance that the human mind, if only it be sincere enough and earnest enough, can in all concrete cases easily discover the right course of action is widespread and deep-rooted. Yet in the personal experience of every honest student of his own moral life it only needs a moment's reflection to realize that this is not the case. In no field of human inquiry is the honest truth-seeker confronted by more complicated conditions. Nowhere is the relative character of our knowledge more pronounced than just in the sphere of conduct. Whether it will or no, each generation must re-enact its own ten commandments.

The philosophy of Kant is a splendid struggle with dogmatism and skepticism, but the weakness of the ethical contributions is the persistent attempt to escape from the inevitable logic of the system, and to find, in fact, some ground beyond the reach of criticism upon which to build an ethical concept of duty both absolute and unconditioned in its demands. It is just this hunger for a really abandoned Absolute in the sphere of conduct that makes Kant's ethics the most unsatisfactory part of his great work. Kant is himself respon-

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sible for the failure on the part of many of his followers to fully recognize the purely formal and empty character of the categorical imperative.

In the development of an empiric personal code of morals we may perhaps find the reason for the historical hunger for an outward and absolute finality in the guidance of conduct. Disclaiming at once any pretence that the theory of development gives us any light upon the origin of morality as an admitted variation, we yet see plainly that the moment a dim sense of "oughtness" is awakened in a group, such a variation from the unmoral must prove favorable and must persist. To call these arising senses of "oughtness" innate ideas no more explains them than the tracing them to the conflict of unmoral instincts. How out of the unmoral should arise the moral, we confess, remains an unsolved riddle. None of the catchwords of the biological laboratory have thrown as yet any light upon that question.

That, however, every empiric morality is a social product needs no argument. And in the family group there is forced upon the young a morality which the parents have more or less vaguely found efficient for their life purposes. In the lower ranges of lift, what we call instincts or inherited memories play the part of guarding the young life, and so far as we can know are unmoral, but as the situation becomes more and more complicated the young animal is relatively more helpless, and parental care, as John Fiske and others have pointed out, becomes more and more important. It is at this stage that the social usefulness of courses of conduct being forced upon the immature, not as "useful" or "agreeable," but as "right," becomes apparent. This must occur on the basis of the parental authority. And the parental authority is in the last analysis based upon the relative physical, intellectual and moral superiority of the adult over the young. This social usefulness consists not simply in the fact that those who honored father and mother lived long in the land, and those that did not were eaten by animals in whose way they wantonly wandered, but also in the fact that moral life was deepened and the basis broadened upon which ethical humanity was to build.

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The empiric morality of a child is forced upon it by the parental group from heterogeneous motives. For the most part the arguments are from expediency, so far as the empiric morality is rationalized at all. But the awakening moral sense distinguishes between courses of conduct that are "right" because commanded, and only so, and courses of conduct that are understood as agreeable or wise. Again the social usefulness of obedience on the part of the immature to categorical commands is obvious. A dozen times a foolish hen may call the chickens under her wing without good and sufficient reason, but if any chick in superior wisdom notes the uselessness of the call and systematically disobeys, it will probably be the hawk's first victim. For even the most foolish adult supervision of young life is more effective for its preservation than the inexperience of the young can be.

The child that is, therefore, being slowly moralized is constantly being drilled in obedience to unrationalized categorical imperatives on the basis of authority; and this must be the case even at the risk of some strange ethical confusions in the process. Hence at the very beginning of the moral process an authority, outward and visible, and in a sense quite absolute, is linked with the decisions of the gradually developing moral agent. There is, therefore, generally a distinct and dangerous shock where the boy or girl awakes to the fact that father and mother are not infallible, and long after the intellectual limitations may have been more or less consciously realized, the ethical absoluteness of the parental guidance may remain unshaken. Hence linked with the moral life and its needs remain for long after the memories of and longings for an authority practically final and infallible.

In the same way the social usefulness of a group morality leaving its impress upon every member of the group determines the life duration of the group. Favorable variations in a group morality are never at the beginning rationalized. They tend to prolong the group life and to strengthen the association, and hence the group insists upon stamping its morality on each member with all the force of an imperfectly rationalized categorical imperative. The unquestioning obedience of a war-

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like tribe to the chief, even if the leadership be inferior and unfortunate, may and likely will give the group great advantages over any less united group, however superior in other respects. The katabolic tendency of the rationalistic analysis is more or less distinctly understood by every leader in a group life. It in fact requires great faith to look beyond the temporary weaknesses of free discussion to the ultimate advantages of a more spontaneous and intelligent acquiescence. Again and again has a relatively stupid conservative reaction defeated intelligent radicalism because of the inherent weakness of a party of action that has all generals and no soldiers.

Here again all the social imperatives are in their genesis linked with an outward and a visible sign of social authority. The group in the way of being moralized becomes accustomed in that very process to leaning upon an ultimate and final authority. The strongest expression of this is in the phrase, "The king can do no wrong"; and the most recent expression is the proclamation of the infallibility of the Pope in the sphere of morals and religion when speaking in an official capacity. The very essence of primitive morality is this sense of being bound to sacred but entirely unrationalized obligations. The finality of duty's claim is linked with confidence in the infallibility of the decisions of some outward authority. Socially, in fact, the weakening by intellectual analysis of confidence in this infallibility has ever been one of the causes of political disruption. From the standpoint of the existing order, whether political or ecclesiastical, the very attitude of asking questions involving doubt about the existing authority is dangerous. The practical, cautious mind may court all suggestions with regard to "reform," but it feels "society must not be overthrown"; the same mind may welcome all suggestions for correcting ecclesiastical defects and failures, but certain undefined fundamentals "must not be touched." The social usefulness of these transcendental abstractions, "society" and "fundamentals," lies exactly in their vagueness. Not even the court-dazzled eyes of King Charles I's pulpit defenders could fail to see that the King was personally an unscrupulous and unclean liar. For them it was not the man Charles Stuart, but

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the royal abstraction, that could do no wrong. Just so no intelligent Roman Catholic maintains that the kindly but human Cardinal of Venice becomes personally infallible. The infallible Pope is a symbolic abstraction that corresponds to the categorical imperative, and is for practical purposes as formal and as empty, for in all concrete cases the *ex cathedra* utterances are and always can be explained away. But these abstractions hover as symbols over conduct, giving a measure of authority to each ethical demand.

The question is then at once raised whether any such abstraction is really necessary to enforce our moral obligations. May we not think of the rationalization of conduct proceeding to a point where not only all symbols, but all imperatives and all morality, as we now use the term, would cease. The prudence of Bentham, or a proper recognition of life's values, might then, supposedly, take the place of all moral imperatives as springs for conduct. In that case the idea of duty would give way to enlightened, rationalized self-interest or to an intelligent and far-seeing estimate of the world's real values. With any one who thinks thus, or thinks he thinks thus, no arguments will probably have any weight. It is, in fact, possible to theoretically construct a world thus managed, as it is possible to construct a world without any place for moral freedom. Whether such a world corresponds to the actual facts of our moral experiences is another question.

The really important point is, however, a practical one—does the variation which we describe by the "sense of oughtness," and which in other words we call duty, play now and is it destined to play indefinitely an important role in the uplift of human life? And if this is so, the present question is forced upon us—how shall we find amid our intellectual limitations a source, if not of absoluteness, yet at least for the individual of finality? The real emptiness of all formal and transcendental categorical imperatives and the unreality of all pretending infallibility are dawning on a slowly maturing race; and with exactly the same katabolic effect upon existing moralities that the youth's discovery of parental limitations signifies for his

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conduct. That the responsible leaders in church and state have reason for anxiety with regard to the effect of this moral shock it is folly to deny.

The present need for the sense of oughtness and the farther question whether that need will be permanent may seem capable of separation. It is possible to think of the sense of duty as being simply a useful, socially necessary illusion at least until intelligence takes the place of the illusion. But in point of fact the two questions cannot be separated. If the sense of duty is an illusion, the mask will be forced off by the picked few long before the intelligence required by Bentham or any estimate of values needed by a model society can fully operate. The leaders of thought and action in church and state who have any sense of responsibility for the future are bound to fearlessly face an existing situation.

That, however, a sense of "oughtness," an immediate and impelling sense of duty, must ever exercise its wholesome influence over the race seems implied in the very fact that the interests of the group and those of the individual never do and never can absolutely coincide. It is a useless assumption to say that the mother's ego is simply extended in the child, and that therefore self-interest will dictate care for the future race. On a certain plane of intelligence the unmoralized woman knows that the child is not and cannot be an extension of her pleasure-seeking ego; and she, from her standpoint rationally, refuses the obligations of motherhood. Nor can any presentation of more perfect values affect the situation. As between social and personal values she rationally chooses the personal. She will refuse in the interests of the preservation of such an abstraction as the group's future life to be dictated to by social illusions as to her personal values. She will rationally be guided by her own estimate of values. The future of the associated life can never rationally outweigh the immediate personal interests of a member of the group, particularly if those interests are indefinite and undefinable. At the same time where in some form the interests of the future group are not cared for, disaster is sure to follow.

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It is at this point that hitherto symbols of an abstract authority, infallible and final, have been socially useful. And now as these symbols fade there becomes more and more necessary the insistence on a sense of duty apart from all prudential personal considerations.

For any one who considers the group life of importance and who desires its prolongation and its development—again a purely personal judgment of value; it is open to any one to deny the importance of such prolongation—but granted such a desire, and it will have to be insisted upon that a main fact will be the cultivation for the group life of this sense of "oughtness." There is no use in counting upon fictions of infallible authorities giving much longer any support to the inspiration of duty, nor can we ever hope to rationalize completely these imperatives.

The social function of this sense of "oughtness" is not a matter of abstruse speculation, nor an ethical assumption; it is a matter of every-day observation. In a community where the moral sense is developed we find order and persistence, fullness of life and capacity for resisting destructive forces of every sort. Every historian notes the influence; and even the perils and evils attendant upon the fiction of an infallible authority have been outweighed by the temporary support such fictions have given to the imperfectly moralized community in its search after ideals.

The careful separation and the cultivation of a profound sense of duty, apart from all outward infallible authority, becomes one of the chief duties resting upon the moral educator. In answer to the inevitable question, what takes the place of the infallible authority, there can be but one reply. We are here, as everywhere else, entirely dependent upon our experience. The sense of "oughtness" gives us no light upon *what is our duty,* but only tells us that our duty *must be done.* To do our duty we must be at pains, with often sorrow and labor, to find it out. Nor can we confine ourselves to the sphere of rationalized experience. We are as thinking beings bound to rationalize our experience as far as it is possible, yet at the same time ethical development will often, if not

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generally, outpace our rationalizing process. John Stuart Mill was ethically at his best when he declared himself ready to forgo an eternity of happiness rather than betray his intellectual manhood. At the same time, from his own standpoint, such a course would be highly irrational.

So long as the group interests do not seem to the inidvidual to coincide with his and so long as in setting up a standard of values there is room for the conflict between social and individual standards, so long must profound but often unrationalized race impulses guide the really moral man. He feels himself impelled to do what "seems to him right," even though he may have to confess that intellectually he may of course be mistaken. Our rationalized moral experiences become often only our platform for farther advance along the lines of moral improvement. We are moved by profound sense of duty, even while freely confessing our limitations in discovering what duty is. Often we must depend on unreasoned but deep-seated impulses for our guidance, not that these impulses are by any means more trustworthy than our reasoned processes; they are often less so; but it is often perilous to our best and deepest self to be deaf to such voices.

Luther may have been irrational before the council of Charles V, and Calvin was, no doubt, mistaken in his course toward Servetus. But the race is probably ethically stronger to-day because those men were true at great cost to what rightly or wrongly they believed to be their higher manhood.

It has probably often been, and will often be again, of more importance to the group life that the sense of imperative obligation be cultivated in its members by obedience to its sternest commands, than even that these demands be in every case rationally defensible.

Not that a race coming slowly to intellectual maturity is not bound as far as is possible to rationalize its empiric morality. This is just the field for a really scientific ethics. Impulsive morality must become the morality of intelligent conviction, often passing out of the field of moral contest as it is thus rationalized. So fields that were once the battleground for the moral man's ethical struggles become the peaecful re-

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gions of an automatic obedience to the demands of the higher life. Indeed, the hope of the race is the fact that the ethical triumphs of one generation or of individuals in the past become the undisputed possession of succeeding generations.

Historically no force has been more efficient in impressing men with the tremendous value of this obedience to duty than that of religion, using the term as it is used by Höffding, and defining it as "faith in the permanence of the world's values." Nor will it probably ever cease to play this part. For this reason it is all the more unfortunate when dogmatic forms of religion substitute for this faith tentative and temporary formulations of those values, or stake themselves and their authority on the maintenance of alleged infallible authorities, however venerable or valuable. To the question, are we under moral obligation and have our ethical values any reality, religion in the broadest sense should always have an answer prompt and ready. To the question, what courses of conduct most conduce to the social and individual welfare, only a rationalized experience can give any lasting and communicable light. And the two questions are separate. It is one thing to ask what courses of conduct *are* socially useful, and another to ask, should I seek at personal expense the socially useful. The moralized man feels the finality of the answer to the last inquiry. He acknowledges himself bound by categorical imperatives "to do right," and the more earnestly and honestly he feels the force of the imperative, the more profoundly alive is he likely to be to the tremendous difficulty of the task set him in discovering just what the right course for him is. The shallow man may render "blind" obedience to external conventional forms; the lazy man may gladly accept a conventional morality on the basis of some alleged infallible authority; the earnest moral man feels he must fight for each new glimpse of moral obligation. Thus it comes about that forms of religion which arrest inquiry by substituting an alleged infallibility for personal effort act as ethical soporifics, and check the very moral enthusiasm and inquiry which it is their chief business to enkindle. The man who fondly dreams that in Pope or Church or Bible or creed he has an answer ready

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at hand to all ethical problems will be in grave danger of not taking much pains to discover just what those problems are. The moral conventions of his day he assumes have all the countenance of his infallibility, and he attributes to them the sacredness he connects with his infallible guide.

The only hope, therefore, for the ethical future of the race is the careful insistence, on the one hand, on the finality of our moral obligation, and on the other on the relativity of our ethical knowledge.

This finality is symbolized in nearly all political and ecclesiastical systems by some person, book or constitution, and in most systems of philosophy by some theory of authority resting upon "innate ideas" or a "categorical imperative." So long as the purely formal character of these symbols is recognized they do no harm. But the moment that the symbol is identified with an ethical content, so far as that identification is made effective, it must work injury.

One of the especial dangers it entails is the loss of all ethical perspective. Nothing is more obvious to the morally struggling man than that some decisions are made under a moral impulse that leaves no room for hesitation or doubt; while in other cases the gravest indecision is his painful experience. This struggle is one of the powerfully educating factors in our ethical advance. When, then, a pretended infallible authority is interposed, this struggle is too apt to be transformed into a mere casuistry, a simple intellectual determination of the letter of the authority. The whole educative significance of the ethical struggle is really endangered, and moral deterioration sets in. Our moral advancement, both personal and social, depends upon our honest struggle to solve the problems about us, and to do this under a high sense of the moral risks involved.

To the moral man, then, who stand firmly on the ground of our moral obligation, while at the same time freely recognizing the relativity of our ethical knowledge, there remains the duty of bringing these together in an ideal which is an advancing one, but for him embodies final obligation until

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a better ideal takes its place. The moral man rejoices to render implicit obedience to this ideal, and he recognizes that in it are included all his relations to life.

We sadly realize from year to year and from generation to generation how imperfect have been our ideals; at the same time it probably means more for the race that the moral agent should form his own imperfect ideals with the help of the past, and with toil and pain and tears, than that he should accept ready-made an ethical system, no matter how exalted, and obey it slavishly and mechanically.

Our moral life is thus a tremendous venture of faith in the ultimate outcome of obedience to ideals, confessedly imperfect; an emphatic insistence on the solemn and final character of the categorical imperatives of even the ill-informed conscience of the individual.

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THE TOLERATION OF ERROR.

Any one interested in watching the intellectual life of our day and in comparing it with that of the past, is likely to notice that a subtle but very real change has gradually taken place in the mental attitude of civilized and educated men toward such opinions and dogmas as they believe to be erroneous. This may in brief be said to consist in a readiness to give all ideas alike, good and bad, true and false, helpful and hurtful, as they may appear, a "fair chance," an opportunity to hold their own if they can in that struggle for existence which is as ceaseless among ideas as among animals and plants. Whether this broader toleration extended to error, real or supposed, is to be considered a wholesome sign of the times must depend on what such toleration means; if it is, as some earnest

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people suppose, merely a by-product of materialism—if it is due to indifference to truth—it is certainly no subject for congratulation; but it is the purpose of the present paper to indicate that it is susceptible of a more satisfactory interpretation, and that, while perhaps not unaccompanied by dangers, it indicates a real advance toward a higher and more adequate conception of the intellectual and moral interests of our race.

That there has been such a change needs little proof. In all past ages that were marked by sincerity and zeal, the leaders of thought were ardent in the work of making converts to their views. In proportion to the strength and vividness of their convictions, was the keeness with which they hunted down and strove to exterminate root and branch the doctrine opposed to them. In the fight between dogmas no quarter was offered or expected. If Agag himself was spared,—and we know how often zeal against heresy led to the destruction of the heretic,—at least the ideas for which he fought and which lent strength to his arm must be hewn in pieces before the Lord. It was held to be self-evident that the lover of truth was utterly abhorent of all opinions that he conceived to be erroneous. The Latitudinarian, the Mr. Facing-both-ways, might stop and hesitate, pointing out that as the shield had two sides one could not be sure at first sight whether it were all gold or not; but the straight-forward man having the courage of his convictions must stick to his party and offer no compromise to the enemy. Either this or that, either God or Baal, choose ye this day whom ye will serve. Hence all reformers had to be of the Luther or Loyola, rather than of the Erasmus or Montaigne, type of mind. To be intense was to be narrow, to see clearly the gaze must be kept fixed on a single point. But slowly and unconsciously yet with ever-increasing clearness, it has dawned upon the human mind that the connection between zeal for truth and intolerance of that which seemed to the thinker untrue, was not so close or so inevitable as had been assumed. In this case, as so frequently, an often repeated association between two ideas had come to be regarded as a rationally justifiable bond between them,—"constant conjunction," in Hume's phrase, being taken as a "necessary connection." The earnest

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man is apt to be narrow, but he is not forced to be so; and breadth of outlook is not incompatible with depth of thought. Moreover experience has shown how infinitely more useful are enthusiasm and openness of mind when conjoined than when separated. In the sphere of philosophy it is part of the debt which we owe to Hegel that by his strong and insistent protest against the finality of such judgments as rest on an "either—or," and by his thorough exposition of the nature of a truth as always transcending its direct dogmatic statement, we have learned to regard it as almost axiomatic in speculative thought that even the most self-evident or well-certified proposition implies within itself its *"Anders-Sein,"*—its negative and corrective, which must be evolved and apprehended if the full import of the proposition is to be rightly appreciated.

If we turn to the vast and widespread movements, social, economic and political, of the present day, we find a tendency to recognize as worthy of leadership, not those men whose circumstances, education or temperament lead them to an intense and exclusive partisanship, but rather those who to a vigor and steadfastness in the pursuit of their purposes add a breadth of view and something of a judicial grasp of mind. Not that the practical reformer can dispense with zeal and enthusiasm, without these the most philosophic temper will effect little; but for civilized communities the use of the fanatic is over. A "Mad Mullah" would gain no party among the progressive classes in Europe and America. The capacity to see that almost all the subjects which perplex and agitate modern society—the relations of labor and capital, monopolies of production, the limits of legislative control, the forms of political institutions, international rights and duties,—are most complex and many-sided, and that the problems they involve can seldom or never be settled by *a priori* methods, is recognized by most of us as an essential of true leadership. Enthusiasm and a readiness for self-sacrifice for a cause are as much needed now as ever, but we ask that the enthusiasm shall be clear-eyed, and that the cause shall make good its claim to reason as well as to sentiment.

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It is however with regard to the more intimate beliefs and aspirations of the individual in their relation to his conduct, that I propose to consider the tendency referred to,—the tendency to set up a spiritual ideal which shall include with earnestness of purpose and uncompromising sincerity the most liberal tolerance not only for opponents but for the opinions and conceptions they represent. Of course it would be impossible to maintain that such an ideal is even now universally recognized in theory, and still less can we claim that it is generally realized. But that it exists to some extent and has a widening circle of influence can hardly be denied. The spirits that animated Milton's "Areopagitica" was exceptional in his day—he himself was not always under its control,—but its dicta are common-places and truisms now. The new idea, clad in unfamiliar garb, is not necessarily for us the suspect it would have been for our fathers. An example of this greater tolerance may be found in the way the ethical and religious heresies of Nietzsche have been treated by thoughtful men all over Europe. The storm of reprobation which but half a century ago greeted Darwin's writings, though these were purely scientific in their subject-matter, and though their language was studiously moderate wherever theological or moral susceptibilities might be affected, was far stronger than the opposition offered a generation later to the violent invective directed against theistic doctrine and Christian ethics by the latest and most brilliant of pessimists. It is perhaps, in part owing to the indirect influence of the work of Darwin, himself the most tolerant and liberal of men, that later innovators are treated with more generosity than he was. Certainly in the case of Nietzsche we find that many even of those who regard his theories as seriously dangerous for his immediate disciples, and as deficient in elements of permanent worth, yet willingly admit that the eagerness with which they have been welcomed and the readiness with which they have been assimilated show they must contain some relative and partial truth, and possess at least a temporary value, if only by way of a reaction against the specious shams and shadowy unrealities hidden under the mask of our conventional morality. Nietzsche's philosophy

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as a whole may not be strong enough to stand the tests of criticism and experience, the charm of its clever paradoxes and the captivation of its daring originality may lead many minds away from sounder and saner teachings, yet its net results, if we consider it not in abstraction as though it were the only intellectual force in existence, but as a part of the whole stream of tendency of our day, may very well be for good rather than for evil. It is the consciousness of this possibility in all such cases that makes prudent men chary of boycotting any set of opinions, even when firmly convinced that they are erroneous, and, it may be, considered in themselves, obnoxious to morality. So inextricably interwoven are the outgrowths of the intellectual world, that wisdom requires us to let all new ideas have an opportunity of proving their worth, lest if we root out the tares we root out also the wheat with them.

Influenced, perhaps, to some extent by the increased interest in psychological and sociological analysis, but mainly by reason of the intense individualism which is such a marked characteristic of the spirit of our age, we have come to feel acutely the importance of the personal point of view. At the same time, conscious of the enormous and fast-increasing complexity of modern life, and of the boundless number of forces at work upon every civilized human being, we are learning to moderate and limit the intellecual claims and the spiritual duties of the individual. The whole in its full-orbed completeness is not to be apprehended by any single man, and he bests succeeds in gaining some clear and intelligible view of it who keeps faithful to that standpoint which circumstances, temperament and training have given him. The poet sees reality in another form than does the man of science, and his vision becomes obscured and his perspective distorted if he attempts to rationalize the revelation of imaginative insight. The mind of mystical tendency has its own outlook upon things, and the mind of logical and formal habit must see them differently. The legitimate and wholesome modification of individual opinion in every case, must come not from each inquirer trying to adopt his neighbor's point of view, but from each keeping in mind that his neighbor has his own point of view, and that this fact

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constitutes a part of the reality which both are striving to conceive adequately. We can thus see that the ideal catholicity which is to be aimed at is not that all shall come to think alike, nor yet that each mind shall be "broad" enough to entertain opinions that are really mutually contradictory, but rather that every man, while endeavoring to see clearly and to guard faithfully his own vision of truth, shall recognize that no exclusive inspiration is his, but that his fellow's intellectual and spiritual experience, be it what it may, has a proper place in the universe of things; and that, limitless as is reality, so are its aspects innumerable and infinitely various in their presentation to the minds of men.

It is especially in regard to religious dogma that this new toleration is most obviously extending its influence; and while it is in this sphere that it finds its fullest justification, yet it is here too that its ultimate results are most difficult to forecast. If we take America as typical in this instance, as in many others, of what is most characteristic in the modern spirit, we shall have little difficulty in seeing that the degree of importance attached to the holding and teaching of particular theological doctrines is very different now from what it was in even a comparatively recent past. I do not allude to a difference in the beliefs themselves, to the relaxing of Calvinism or to the spread of the extra-orthodox bodies; what concerns us here is that the majority of thoughtful and conscientious Americans, whatever their private beliefs may be, regard as of the very slightest importance the question whether a particular man holds a particular creed or not. Heresy-hunting is an out-of-fashion sport. It is only with extreme reluctance that ecclesiastical authorities interfere, even when the most heterodox opinions are uttered from the pulpit or the platform; while all that the layman asks of his spiritual pastor is that he shall have attached himself to some church, the standards of which are not in obvious and flagrant contradiction to his genuine convictions. The really important matter is felt to be the sincerity of the man himself, and his power to give moral uplifting and spiritual consolation to those for whom he labors; what is his doctrine is of trifling interest to the community compared with what his character

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and his work are. Dogma is indeed little heard from the pulpits of American churches, and there is often an almost apologetic air about a preacher who ventures to give arguments for or against some theological tenet. He knows that his congregation probably care very little as to what views he holds or why he holds them,—they do care for any fresh light he can give them on the social or moral problems of every day life, but even in regard to these they may disagree with the opinions he utters without in the least deprecating or regretting the utterance. For neither preacher nor people look for unanimity of thought in regard to such things. We give, indeed, often a ready welcome to what opposes itself at first sight to the views we have hitherto held, just because the novelty is an attraction and serves as a mental stimulus, and we have come to concede, as though it were a right, to every new idea, however slender its real claim to consideration, the "liberty of the floor."

If it is asked on what grounds this seeming indifference of serious minded people to the presentation and diffusion of their own religious beliefs can be defended, it may be answered that its justification rests on the existence of the feeling, more or less consciously recognized and avowed, that the conceptions a man forms in regard to things of the spirit are of a directly and intimately personal nature, and that therefore they cannot and ought not to be valued by others by reference to an impersonal and objective standard. Theology, if in any intelligible sense it can be called a science, is certainly at the furthest remove from the exact sciences. Neither Catholic nor Protestant, Unitarian nor Calvinist, Theist nor Pantheist, Supernaturalist nor Atheist, has ever been able to establish on rational grounds or by logical methods the certainty of the fundamental assumptions on which his faith or unfaith rests; though each can readily enough detect the inconclusiveness of the arguments for a rival creed. The spread of knowledge has made it almost impossible for any sensible man to claim that his own or his church's apprehension of things human and divine is "the truth" for every one. However tenacious his hold on those salient conceptions which seem to him all-important, and which for him may be all-important, yet he has found by ex-

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perience that his fellow-men have avenues of approach to the spiritual which are closed to him. This does not mean that truth is unattainable and the search for it a vain thing, but it does mean that it is no man's exclusive property, nor can one ever exhaust its concrete fullness of manifestation, since each man apprehends it only in its inevitable relation to the nature and development of his own soul.

From this admission of the subjective and individual point of view as determining the way in which the ultimate reality and man's connection with it are seen, it follows naturally and necessarily that the dogmas to which a person gives his assent get their value and significance mainly from their relation to himself,—they are the outcome of his character and react upon his character; necessarily, therefore, they will differ from those accepted by a man of another mental habit and disposition. Now no sensible man desires or expects that all human beings should be cast in the same mould; variety is essential to society, and it is to the tendency to vary that we look for the possibility of future progress. Monotony is the mark of the savage, differentiation comes with and from civilization. An unlikeness, then, in the way in which we envisage such conceptions as God, Nature, immortality, freedom, law, conscience, is in no way to be deprecated, it springs from and corresponds to the essential diversities of type which we find among men. The only legitimate convert I can make is he who finds in my doctrine the natural and appropriate sustenance for his inner life; if I succeed in winning over him to whom it is not suited, I only starve a soul. What we can rightly strive to do is to give the opportunity for a choice, and by education in its highest sense teach men to choose thoughtfully and with their eyes open, instead of accepting blindly whatever may be offered by tradition or authority. In short, what is of supreme importance is that a man's creed shall be verily and indeed his own,—not something accidentally or by the will of another imposed upon him from without, but the outcome of his thought, his life, his character,—the ripe fruit of his own growing. In past ages philosophers have wasted time and ingenuity in trying to prove that a belief in the existence of God was "necessary and universal"; this is

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false, but we have come at last to see that, were it true, then from the very fact of its universality and necessity such a belief would not be of any religious significance. For religion, the conception of the innermost reality of things, with the emotional accompaniment and practical results of such conception, is and must ever be qualified and determined by the personality of the religious man. The Kingdom of God is within you, is the profound utterance of spiritual wisdom. The dicta of religious experience are not, like mathematical or logical deductions, the common property of all. It is because we are becoming conscious of this—that the concrete individuality of each man lies at the root and determines the growth of his philosophy of life,—that we tend to deprecate more and more strongly all subscription, actual or implied, to ready-made formulæ; and it is for the same reason that we are unwilling to outlaw opinions, even such as are in open opposition to those conceptions which we hold most firmly and prize most highly.

But the question may be raised, Is not such readiness to emphasize the subjective and personal element in doctrine fraught with danger to the cause of truth? Such an attitude, it may be said, implies the virtual acceptance of the statement of the Greek Sophists, that there is no truth other than individual opinion. And can we even vigorously and sincerely hold our own opinion unless we recognize the existence of some independent standard, some objective reality, standing wholly apart from individual predilections and uneffected by special points of view? Anarchy might be even more fatal than tyranny in the realm of ideas. The objection is certainly worthy of consideration, but the real danger is not of too much toleration but of a toleration wrongly motived and based on an imperfect and inadequate understanding of our moral and intellectual needs. If we regard with complacency or indifference the views which we believe to be erroneous because we think it is of no consequence what a man thinks, we are ignoring some of the greatest forces at work upon the human soul, and overlooking one of the most significant symptoms of the state of the soul. It is impossible to doubt that a man is helped or hindered, raised or lowered, enlightened or blinded, by the conceptions he holds of

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life, of society, of nature, of God, of the moral law; these are to him of vital moment, since, in proportion to their strength and permanence, they help to determine his character and his conduct. But it is one thing to recognize the potent influence that ideas have, and another to desire or endeavor to determine for another what his ideas shall be. The proverb that "what is one man's meat is another man's poison" is true in this regard. Take for example such a doctrine as that of Calvinism: it has proved, as all admit, strong food and drink for the nourishment of upright, vigorous, virile characters; on it have been reared some whom the world could have ill spared when the work of the warrior and the pioneer was to be done; but how many sensitive, highly-strung natures has it brought to spiritual starvation and disease! What was a logical and rational world-system to Calvin's mind was a hideous nightmare to Shelley's. How obviously absurd were the assertion that it had been of no consequence whether the great theologian had held the doctrine of predestination, or the great poet had maintained his faith in a limitless humanitarianism! The only toleration which is psychologically and ethically justifiable is that which rests on the recognition on the one hand of the innumerable differences in human beings, involving corresponding innumerable needs and capacities, and on the other of the infinite complexity of the world of reality and the impossibility of its being ever fully compassed or completely analyzed by any finite understanding. To tolerate ideas on the supposition that an opinion, whatever its character, can be held without either good or evil resulting from it, is to found liberty of thought on a most untrustworthy basis. But impatience of, and hostility to, any view opposed to our own is not so much a tribute to the supreme claims of the truth as a practical assertion of our infallibility in comprehending or defining all that the truth includes.

The subject of the relativity of knowledge is too large to be more than alluded to here; but it is certainly necessary to guard against the misconception that toleration for error logically implies a denial of the reality, permanence, and value of truth itself. Truth is the apprehension of reality, the grasp of the mind

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upon fact. Those whose scepticism is so thorough that they can deny the existence of reality may refuse to believe in truth; but they who regard reality as infinite must expect that it will take on the most varied forms and appear under the most unlike conditioning circumstances. We are not bound to regard each man's view of the real as equally clear, or his grasp of it as equally strong. We can see in the relative adequacy of his philosophy of life, as it appears to us, a sign of the degree of the individual's mental vigor and moral soundness. We may, and in proportion to the strength of our critical faculty we must, judge systems of theological or anti-theological thought according as they do or do not satisfy our minds as being logically and ethically adequate. It is almost a truism to assert that with each stage in the growth and opening out of the intelligence the old conceptions of truth are found to need revision and enlargement, but this is not to say that those old conceptions were wrong and useless; they formed an early but perhaps a necessary step toward the farther goal. So when we meet in our fellow men with theological, speculative, or moral ideas, which from our point of view look like the rubbish and refuse of a creed outworn or the vagaries of a disorderly and uncontrolled imagination, we need not fear we are relapsing into indifference or cynical doubt because we allow free course to what for us is error. Darkness is only a less degree of light, and the darkness of ignorance will the sooner disappear if the windows of the human soul are opened wide to every quarter of the sky.

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PROVERBIAL MORALITY.

By proverbial morality I understand those maxims of conduct which have reached the dignity of expression in a popular phrase, and may thus be said to have become an integral part of the common thought and speech of men. While such maxims do not mark the first stage of the moral consciousness, they have some claim to be regarded as the earliest expression of reflective morality, constituting as they do a deliberate attempt to establish a standard by reference to which particular actions may be judged. These rules do not indeed admit of the universal application which is characteristic of a scientific law or a philosophical principle, but they do display the same measure and kind of generality as belongs to a typical instance or example, and they cast a similar light upon a definite portion of the field of experience. Like a picture or book or poem they set life in a special point of view and seek to adjust and estimate its details from some consciousness of the meaning of the whole.

Further, these moral rules not only indicate the beginning of ethical theory, they mark also the highest point which most men ever attain in the apprehension of moral principles. The ordinary consciousness in its judgments upon conduct seldom gets beyond an appeal to one of these popular saws. For while all men can appreciate and apply the truth embodied in such phrases as "Honesty is the best policy," "Pride goes before a fall," "Look before you leap," only a few minds can rise to the conception of a general principle as determining what should be virtuous and vicious. General conceptions of right and wrong, of good and evil exercise their sway over a comparatively narrow circle of persons and actions, but maxims of conduct have gained a recognition that is practically universal. For though few can think general ideas as to the nature of conduct in a concrete way, or understand the content and validity of particular duties better in and through these, practically all men do apply to their own and others' actions the rules which

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embody "the wisdom of all and the wit of one." Common consent and approval have thus lent sanction to their authority and weight to their counsels.

Proverbs also have proved themselves to possess a vitality and a permanence which belong only to that which ministers to a real need in man's life. In this respect they may be contrasted with so-called folk-lore which has been less successful in maintaining its hold over men's minds. The one has not become antiquated or obsolete, while the other has. In the one case the growth of knowledge has been fatal, while in the other it has been productive of strength and stimulus by forcing proverbial wisdom to adapt itself to changing conditions of life, and thus enabling it to lay firmer hold upon mens' thoughts and affections. Thus we cannot simply dismiss it as an early and temporary phase of human belief which is bound to disappear as science and philosophy extend their sway. On the contrary it would seem that the popular saws and maxims about conduct have to be reckoned with as a permanent form in which man's thought and endeavor express themselves. For this reason they deserve more consideration and study than they have yet received, and the aim of this paper is to call attention to some of the main features characteristic of them.

First of all, it may be noted that proverbial literature abounds in counsels of caution and restraint, and is much richer in warning and reproof than in inspiration or stimulus. One of its chief aims is to fence all the dangerous places where man's foot is apt to slip, and it does this most effectually by furnishing a vivid representation of the follies, vices, weaknesses and besetting sins of humanity. But with this its function begins and ends. It does not try to wean men from devotion to the less worthy objects of desire by setting before them the attractions of a more complete good. It is content to point out the risks which attach to certain courses of conduct, and to dwell on the dangers that attend all human existence and effort. The shortness and uncertainty of life, the inconstancy of fortune, the vanity and unprofitableness of much that man desires, the narrowness of his knowledge, the insta-

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bility of his will, the manifold causes of fear, unrest and disappointment which may play upon him, these are the main topics with which the ordinary moral maxims deal. If more positive counsels are not absent, it is the conditioned and relative nature of all that man attempts and accomplishes which forms the burden of its message to the world. "Never halloo till you are out of the wood." "Second thoughts are best." "One man's meat is another man's poison." "All is not gold that glitters." "Procrastination is the thief of time."

This sense of the limitations of human life, of the narrowness of the bounds within which safety lies, the manifoldness of the dangers which encompass all action, gives to much of our proverbial morality a tone of pessimism and even of cynicism. In this respect it stands supreme and unapproached. It has a cap for every fool, a wise saw for every imprudent action, a rod of correction for every sinner. At all points it is armed to match itself against whatever chances and mischances life may present. It has a kind of omniscience which prevents it ever being taken unawares, and a universal adaptability which enables it to meet every change of circumstances with a fresh front.

Moreover the fact that proverbial wisdom adopts in the main a negative role and is content to play the part of critic and judge, gives additional sanction and security to the exercise of its function. Since it is not called upon to be wise before the event, but only to enforce the issue which experience has already declared, it occupies the strong position of one who is ever on the winning side. No doubt even a negative and critical attitude does imply a positive and directing one. But if the former is always made explicit, and the latter constantly kept in the background, criticism seems able to use its weapons without apprehension of having them turned against itself. This is one reason why the wisdom of ordinary moral maxims appeals to us as so convincing after an action has been done, while yet it is of such a nature as to be quite unfitted for determining what should be done or for pointing out the best way of doing it. He who is content to prophesy only after the event, or to pass sentence only where judgment has gone before,

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or to point the moral which the tale has already established, enjoys a position of much security. And it is this position which most of our popular moral maxims do occupy. They reserve their strength for giving effect to conclusions which experience has first made sure, and so they escape the criticism which they themselves are ready to apply.

Further, proverbs are not general truths. They appear and seek to be so; but their form and their matter are inconsistent. The essence of a proverb is a concrete image suggestive of a general idea. It is an attempt to embody a universal truth in a particular case. And the image or metaphor is the only proof that is given of the general principle. This is at once the strength and the weakness of such maxims as guides of conduct. They are short, sharp appeals to experience. They offer no reasoned proof and suggest no doubts. Indeed they are successful in making good their place in the common consciousness of men precisely in proportion as they present themselves as self-complete and self-evidencing. Whenever they fail to produce an immediate conviction of their truth they have lost their virtue; for it is just the apparent identity between the general principle and the particular image which constitutes their peculiar value. Take, as an instance, the proverb "A chain is not stronger than its weakest link." No assertion could be less questionable, and no proof more conclusive. Whence comes its effectiveness? Simply from the success with which it gives to our thought the definite embodiment of a metaphor which not only seems adequate to the thought, but which also renders any other conclusion inconceivable. One cannot even suppose that a chain should be stronger than its weakest link. And the essential virtue of the proverb is that it has fused a general truth with a particular image so perfectly that this truth and this image appear not two but one. It is only reflection which enables us to dissolve the union, and to discern that the general and the particular are not perfectly at one. For the general principle, that the strength of a whole is no greater than the strength of its weakest part, no longer appears self-evident if we picture the whole not as a chain, but as a bundle of sticks, an army of soldiers, a river or a house. The bundle of faggots

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is stronger than its weakest part, stronger even than its strongest component; and under this change of metaphor we find it possible to apprehend that there may be another side to the truth, that "union may be strength," and that each constituent may find its particular stength multiplied indefinitely.

Proverbial maxims then give striking expression to some one aspect of life, and they achieve immortality just in proportion as they are able to wed form and matter in a way which makes these appear inseparable. Their excellence is not the breadth of outlook upon life which they furnish, but the vivid picture of a single aspect of it which each of them presents.

Yet in spite of the narrowness and partial nature of the views of conduct which proverbial morality expresses, it has succeeded in keeping its hold over men's minds. How has it been able to respond so well to the demands made upon it? The explanation seems to me to consist in its many-sidedness and catholicity on the one hand, and its unsystematic character on the other. Not only has it kept itself open to the teachings of experience, but its indifference to leading conceptions has allowed it to embrace the most diverse views without any feeling of inconsistency. In many respects this has been advantageous. It has rendered such literature all the more perfect as the mirror of life. It has helped to keep constantly before men's minds the wholeness and complexity of the problem to be solved, and it has prevented an easy and premature attempt to unify the varied phases of action, ere thought was able to embrace its manifoldness in a concrete way.

It might seem indeed that any reading of experience which involves the recognition of diverse principles and points of view must stand a self-confessed failure. Much more is this the case if the principles it admits are not only different, but opposed to, and inconsistent with, one another. For what claim to authority can belong to any court which is not at unity with itself? And the charge of being thus self-divided can, it seems to me, be both brought and maintained against proverbial morality. On almost any question it speaks with two voices, and is equally ready to recommend opposite courses of conduct.

Consider, for example, such a maxim as "Take care of the

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pence and the pounds will take care of themselves." The observance of this rule would involve that attention to the smaller duties and needs of life would necessarily bring about proper devotion to its larger ones. Yet suppose one did follow it, and, taking care of the pence, allowed the pounds to take care of themselves, the result would not be by any means admirable. And the fact that folly may lurk in this course no less than in the other is already recognized in the precisely opposite proverb which pillories those who have too great faith in this maxim as a rule of conduct, and are "penny wise, pound foolish."

Again, the proverb, "Seeing is believing," seems quite indisputable, and even all-sufficient in its guidance, until the truth that seeing is not always believing is brought before us in the contrary maxim "All is not gold that glitters." The confidence begotten of the conviction that "Well begun is half-ended" is tempered by the counsel "Never halloo till you are out of the wood." And the encouragement to industry which springs from the maxim "Procrastination is the thief of time" is qualified by the assurance that "Everything comes to him who waits." The comfort to be derived from the thought that "It is a long lane that has no turning" is rather damped by remembering that "It never rains but it pours." While the opposite assertions that "Out of sight is out of mind," and that "Absence makes the heart grow fonder" are well fitted to act as the correctives of a one-sided faith. "What's sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander" appears less conclusive when we remember that "One man's meat is another man's poison." And the belief that "Fortune favors the brave" has also to reconcile itself with the fact that "Fortune favors fools."

I hesitate to assert that every popular maxim can be thus met by an other and opposite one, but most of them, I believe, can be. What hides this fact from us is simply the difference of the images or metaphors through which the opposing aspects of the truth are expressed. Hence proverbial wisdom reflects not only the many-sidedness of human experience, but also the contradictions and perplexities which life presents, and it does this with all the greater fullness and impartiality that it is itself unaware of the antagonism of its parts.

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For this reason the disharmony between the various maxims of popular morality has not proved fatal to its usefulness. Self-consistency is not a *sine qua non* of all efficiency. Rules of conduct may be sound and suggestive though they are formally at variance with one another. In the case of a system of philosophy, no doubt, the conflict of the parts detracts sadly from the value of the whole; but when a collection of rules is in question, such a defect is much less serious. For the aim of such a collection is to enable us to give telling expression to the special aspect of conduct which is prominent or important at the moment rather than to co-ordinate and unify the manifold aspects which changing moods and circumstances may present. And the unsystematic character of proverbial literature, instead of proving fatal to its general acceptance, has frequently been its safeguard when more ambitious attempts to read the riddle of human life have proved wanting. For, by depicting with photographic accuracy the manifoldness and variety of the elements that enter into conduct, it has been able to keep before men in a permanent way the breadth and complexity of the moral problem to be solved.

Thus in spite of the somewhat prudential motives to which it appeals, and the self-conflicting nature of its various counsels, the maxims of proverbial morality have proved of great and essential service in human endeavor after better and more complete forms of existence. They have helped to maintain amid the fickleness of desire the balance and sanity of man's thought and volition, because they have been ready and able under all conditions to force to the front the aspects and elements of action that have been neglected or crowded out under the pressure of other interests. In this way they have done much to further the development of the moral consciousness, even while they have seemed to be fighting against its unity and harmony. For while they are themselves unprepared with any satisfactory reconciliation of the discordant features of moral experience, they can bring into play against every partial conception a very effective dialectic. And in thus quickening the pulse of ordinary thought, and saving it from the stagnation into which its own want of vigor is apt to betray it, they have

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performed a function of great value and interest. As a universal irritant they have prevented men finding rest in those half-truths, contentment with which is ever the worst of lies.

Thus if the ideal of conduct which most popular maxims present is not of a very high type, it is at least a many-sided and self-corrective one. It is at war with extremes, and has on the whole a healthy instinct for the middle way. Hence it supplies excellent foraging ground for any theory that would prove its adequacy to the needs and desires of humanity. For unless such a theory can embrace the varied aspects of good which popular moral maxims set forth so graphically, it cannot claim to present a higher truth than they do. From this point of view even the chastened sobriety of judgment which refuses to indulge in any large expectations, and is critical of all enthusiasms, is serviceable in securing the sterling worth of any doctrine which pretends to set up a higher ideal of life. For the practical good sense which can avoid extremes, and can discern that success in every field involves the recognition of limits, and can see what in each particular case is the nature of these limits of successful action, this good sense is not the enemy of ideal views of life, but the necessary condition of their conception and realization.

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CRIME IN ENGLAND.

For some years past it has been the habit of prison reformers to refer to England as the one country in which statistics show that crime is decreasing; and for more than ten years the barometer of criminality furnished by the prison population supported that conclusion. But statistics refuse to be always optimistic. The last British Blue Book on this subject, the report of the Commissioners of Prisons, of which Mr. J. Ruggles Brise is Chairman, is only a shade less blue on the inside than on the cover, and the reason is that the tide of statistics has at last turned and has risen so high as to awaken some concern. The report is pretty well up to date, for all its investigations and conclusions are based on facts and figures brought down to the thirty-first of March, 1903. The tables are arranged with great care and the analysis of statistics by the commissioners is made with impartiality and with the determination to face facts as they are. There are attempts to explain but not minify or to disguise the real meaning of the figures. And what do these figures tell us?

They show the total number of persons received each year on conviction from ordinary courts compared with the population of England and Wales for the corresponding year. They show that running back for twenty-two years the proportion of commitments to the population was highest in 1882 and 1883, when it was 621 to every 100,000 of the population. From that time it decreased steadily for ten years until in 1892 it was 473 to every 100,000 of the population. From 1892 it began to show much fluctuation, sometimes rising and then falling. Thus in 1894 it rose to 526 per 100,000. In 1896 it was 506, in 1897 482, in 1901 it dropped to 460, but in 1902 rose to 513, and in 1903 has reached 535. Making the comparison twenty-two years back to 1881, there has been a decrease of 45 per 100,000, but unfortunately there is an increase of 46 per 100,000 since 1891 and of 74 since 1900.

What is the cause of the great increase in commitments to

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prison since 1900? This increase is seen to be in both of the two most important categories of prisoners—those tried on indictment and supposed to represent the most serious offences, and those dealt with summarily, representing petty offences. The result of inquiry made in all the prisons bears out the opinion that it is impossible to assign any one cause for this rise, but brings to light certain incidental features and circumstances which, taken in the aggregate, indicate some causes contributing to a large number of convictions for petty offences. The special features brought to light are: 1. Increased activity of police. 2. Growth of vagrancy and of offences against workhouse regulations, through which men are transferred from workhouses to prisons. 3. Effect of the war in South Africa as to charges for drunkenness and assault. 4. The increase in the number of debtors.

With regard to the increased activity of the police, the larger prison population in some districts is due apparently to a more rigid enforcement of the law with regard to drunkenness and immorality; in another district to the enforcement of the law with reference to the neglect of children; in another to laws affecting vagrancy. Nothing affects more barometrically the rise and fall of prison population than fluctuations in police activity. It is as unsafe in this country as anywhere else to draw conclusions as to the prevalence of crime based simply upon the number of commitments. The very things upon which a community may pride itself, a higher standard of law and an increased vigilance in its enforcement, make it compare unfavorably as to prison population with places where looser laws and a dormant police make a community to appear in statistics nominally better than it really is.

As to vagrants, the transfer of so many from the pauper to the prison population is due in some measure, as shown by the testimony of magistrates and prison governors, to the fact that England is apparently treating its prisoners better than its paupers. Whether really true or not, vagrants have acquired the idea that in the workhouses the dietary is inferior to that of the prison and that the tasks set to casual paupers is more severe in many workhouses than that set in prison. Tramps

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openly violate the workhouse regulations in order to be transferred to prison. The last judicial statistics show that the number of paupers proceeded against for misbehavior in workhouses, which has oscillated during the last twenty years between 2,000 and 4,000, increased in 1901 to 5,118. Yet this is but a small percentage of the total number committed to prison. The prison commissioners defend the prison system against the impression that prison life is unduly attractive, and contend that the diminution of this class is not likely to follow from any alteration in prison *rêgime*. They raise the question whether labor colonies might not be established to advantage on the Belgian model, where the professional tramp who now goes from prison to prison may be detained for a long period of time. "A necessary condition of its application would be some system of identification, so that a vagrant, after undergoing a sentence in one locality, should not as now be able to commit another offence in another locality, again become subject to a light penalty, and so on *ad infinitum*."

As to the effect of the war in South Africa, it appears that the number of soldiers who actually served in South Africa committed to prison by ordinary courts during the year was but 1,568, forming but a small proportion of the prison population. The London prisons show a great increase in the number of commitments for drunkenness, and this is doubtless one of the most influential causes in the increase of the prison population.

One of the most notable facts is the considerable rise in the number of prisoners committed for debt—16,312 in the last year as compared with 14,039 the previous year. The tendency to increase in the number of this class is evident in all parts of the country. "In Wandsworth prison there is an increase of 336 on the previous year; at Bristol prison an increase of 137, while at Wakefield prison the greatest increase in any class of commitments was in those for debt, the numbers received having been 1,328, or an increase of 160 per cent. The commissioners do not comment upon the social conditions or legal relations which create this great number of debtors. It was anticipated that the more rigorous treatment of debtors in

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prison, which was one of the objects and one of the results of the Prison Act of 1898, would lead to a smaller number of debtors coming to prison. This expectation, however, has not been fulfilled; the number of debtors has increased. This is but another illustration of the fact that increased rigor of punishments does not always reduce the prison population; and that conditions which result from social complications outside of prison cannot be cured by a new set of rules within the prison. But legislators are constantly expecting prison wardens to solve problems which they are unable to solve themselves.

The increase of crime in England, or more accurately the increase of commitments, does not furnish any ground for alarm as to moral or social decline. The increase is for the most part in petty offences and can be traced to the more or less superficial causes named.

In two directions English prison authorities are proceeding on rational lines. They are devoting their attention to the professional or habitual criminal on the one side, and to the juvenile offender on the other. The detention of habitual offenders for long periods instead of for short ones, based upon their known character, instead of sentencing them for a brief period after each illegal act, is the only rational way of dealing with them. To submit youthful offenders to reformatory treatment is, on the other hand, the only way of saving them from becoming habitual criminals. Notwithstanding the large number of industrial schools in England and other preventive and partially corrective agencies, it is still a matter of surprise to note the large number of boys who in England are committed to prison for trivial offences. In a small and cautious way they are trying an experiment at Borstal by the separation of juvenile from old offenders, and the introduction of a grading and marking system. As yet it is applied to juveniles from 16 to 20 years of age, and but 100 have been subjected to it during the last year. In the United States several states have adopted with much success reformatories for offenders from 16 to 30 years of age.

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It is a startling fact that in the last ten years 192,279 juvenile offenders in England under 21 years of age have been committed to prison. Of these, 518 were under 12 years of age: 16,548 were between 12 and 16, and 175,213 were 15 years and under 21. There is no means of securing any exact comparison between the number of juvenile offenders in the United States who were committed to prison. In some states there is no adequate provision for juvenile offenders, and the conditions in the south are notably bad; but the development of the juvenile court in this country is a hopeful feature and the gradual extension of the reformatory system is another indication that curative methods are taking the place of those that are merely punitive. The English commissioners are making an earnest appeal for more rational and humane methods of treating youthful offenders, and will doubtless be supported by an intelligent and sympathetic English sentiment.

One gratifying fact is brought out in the English statistics, and that is the increasing number of offenders upon whom sentence is suspended under the First Offender's Act and under the Summary Jurisdiction Act. Under the First Offender's Act nearly 6,000 were suspended in 1901, and those suspended under the Summary Jurisdiction Act bring up the total to 50,000 persons whose cases were disposed of without imprisonment. This is a steady annual gain from the 33,862 cases disposed of in 1892. The English system, however, is deficient in not providing for probation officers. Mr. William Tallack, for many years secretary of the Howard Association, in a recent communication to the *London Times,* has called attention to the need of investigation and surveillance by probation officers. Especially has he shown the need of adopting a system of juvenile courts which are having such a success in the United States, and he finds the germ of the idea in an ancient English act which was never developed, however, to any extent in English practice.

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NEW YORK.

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THE CYNICS.*

"Other dogs," once said Diogenes, punning upon the designation of his School, "bite their enemies: I bite my friends for their salavation"; and it may be confidently affirmed that he and his friends were admirably fitted for the friendly office. Gifted with impressive intellectual force, with unbounded capacity of contempt, and with a pungent humor, they did not know how to spare either men or institutions. The retort of Diogenes to his fellow citizens of Sinope is typical. He was told that they had condemned him to banishment. "And I," was the rejoinder, "condemn them—to live in Sinope." The attitude of Diogenes to the men of Sinope was the attitude of the Cynic school to society at large. Like most ascetic systems it had its roots, in part at least, in revolt against the world. Nothing pleased them. With a trenchant dichotomy that reminds one of Carlyle, they divided mankind into the handful of wise men and innumerable fools. "Of what am I guilty," once exclaimed Antisthenes, "that I should be praised?" And the words came well from one to whom popularity was but "the babble of madmen." Even the most cherished ideas of the Athenian served only to point corrosive retort. Was it civic patriotism? "Why should I be proud of belonging to the soil of Attica with the worms and the slugs?" Was it the warlike spirit—that spirit that Plato, even in his idealized Greek state, weds so closely to philosophy? "Let a man apply himself to philosophy till he has come to regard the leaders of armies as the drivers of asses." Was it popular election? (The Athenians, it will be remembered, were so democratic that they elected even their generals). "They might as well nominate their asses to be horses." So all along the line. Political institutions, property, the family, luxury in all modes, culture at least in many aspects —all serve but as targets for Cynic projectiles. Even the Athenian attachment to ceremonial religion—so singularly tenacious despite all the free thought of the Sophistic era—finds short

*A paper read before the Literary and Philosophical Society of Liverpool.

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shrift in the blunt declaration that a temple is no holier than any other place.

It might seem that views like these have at any rate the merit of being unambiguous. And it would not do to accuse the Cynics of saying anything they did not think, or of thinking anything they did not say. Yet for this very reason there is possibility of misconception. This in two directions. For (1) we must not take these Cynic utterances too solemnly. The Cynics were philosophers; but they were also satirists and humorists. Like all the masters of vituperation, they had a zest in the commination service. And this being so, it would betray a lack of humor to read all these flings, flouts, sneers, sarcasms, as if they were meant for philosophic formulæ. Once, it appears, Diogenes was shown some ingenious kind of dial; "Not a bad contrivance," was the rejoinder, "to avoid missing one's meals." We make take this seriously if we like. But it may be safer to put it alongside of Antisthenes' asseveration (wrung from him possibly in some moment of exasperation with dilettantism) that "awise man will not learn to read so as not to be troubled by trifles." One must beware of the pedantic literalism of the men who cannot laugh.

(2) There is, however, a second possible misinterpretation. The Cynics, it must be already evident, were men of extreme opinions and unbridled speech. That element of "measure," "proportion," "symmetry," so dear to the Greeks, to them was wanting. And as they had the virtue of living up to their doctrines, it was equally wanting in their eccentric and sometimes indecent lives. Hence the temptation to dismiss Cynicism as a travesty of philosophy, and the Cynics as no better (if one may borrow the phrase) than spiritual clowns.

For two reasons any such misinterpretation would be grossly unjust. (*a*) One that the Cynic revolt against society was far from unprovoked. In our gratitude for what Greece has done for us (and what has it not done for us?), we must not forget that even the Greece of Pericles had its blots. It was devastated by constant wars, and it could be ruthless in its manner of waging them. It was split up into little municipal states which hated each other with a perfect hatred, as Athens hated Thebes

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or Sparta, or as Thebes hated Athens. It was built upon slavery —the horrible slavery of the mines as well as the milder bondage of the household; and it grew into slavery rather than out of it. Beautiful in so much, even as its own Parthenon, Greek civilization could as little assimilate this servile substratum as could the Parthenon transmute into frieze and columns the native rock of the Acropolis. And then these little States were torn by those intestine rivalries, and cursed by those unscrupulous ambitions which led to the political inferno described in lurid pages by Thucydides. Add to this the perennial vices that may only too surely be reckoned upon where wealth has grown, and luxury increased, and command of leisure and facilities for culture borne their usual harvest of dilettantism. Who will say that such a society did not need its censors and satirists? There was a word of advice once given by Diogenes. It may be commended to all those, whether individuals or nations, who wince under the lash of their critics: "Associate with your enemies: they will be the first to tell you of your faults." (*b*) The second point—the second consideration which forbids us to take Cynicism too lightly—is that, despite all its extravagances it rested on a principle. Disgust with social life was part of it. But it was not the main part, nor would it ever have been so bitter had it not found inspiration elsewhere in the life, and in the doctrine, of Socrates.

It sometimes happens that a great man, though himself far enough from being sectarian, becomes the founder of sects. He cannot help it. He is so great that his followers, being lesser men, and quite unable to see around him, come to mistake the part for the whole, to fashion their god in their own imperfect image, and to subsist each of them upon his own favorite fragment of the master's example and teaching. This, at least, was what happened to Socrates. None of the world's great thinkers has ever gathered into discipleship men of such varied types; and never did philosopher trouble himself less than did this philosophic genius to keep all his utterances formally consistent, or to hand on to successors the doubtful legacy of a dogmatic system. The result followed. When he passed away, it was Plato alone who reproduced him in his splendid many-sided-

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ness. For the rest, the varied aspects of truth that had found unity in the Socratic personality fell asunder into fragments, which were portioned out among followers who, as usual, all claimed the true apostolic succession, and all repudiated every succession but their own. Hence arose those schools so fitly called the incomplete Socratics; and among them, arrogant in their incompleteness, the Cynics.

When Antisthenes, the founder of the school, first made the acquaintance of Socrates, he could hardly have appeared a promising disciple. He was already middle-aged, "too old to learn." He was himself already a teacher of philosophy; and who does not know that for a man to have disciples is by no means the surest way to become a disciple himself? Yet Antisthenes was not deterred. We see him, cross-grained and cantankerous though he seems to have been, tramping his five miles from the Peiraeus to meet with Socrates in the Agora, and to learn from his lips the open secrets of a deeper philosophy. And then there was so much in Socrates that came half way to meet his admiration. For Socrates was anything but the typical Greek. He was rugged and plain. His dress was coarse. His manner of life was frugal. He was an admirable campaigner. Hunger and thirst, cold winds and scorching suns, could make no impression on that iron frame. He often went barefoot. And though he could enjoy himself in due season—witness *The Symposium* of Plato—he could also be abstemious to asceticism. Nor was he fastidious in his company. Rich men and poor came much alike to him. And as for his talk, it was not at all of the kind that the Greeks, or most of us since, have been accustomed to hear from philosophers. For it seemed to deal little with the high themes of the schools, with the cosmologies of the early philosophers, or with the abstract science of some of his contemporaries. Has not Zeller even called him "philistine"? In truth, there were men who, when they met him, were shocked to find to what an extent his conversation ran upon smiths, tailors, tanners, saddlers, and such like. And though in this homely talk, in these analogies, thrice-vulgar to Greek ears, there lay in germ nothing less than the idealism of Plato, this did not appear upon the surface.

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There were remarks, too, which must have found in Antisthenes a receptive soil. "To need nothing is divine, to need as little as one can is all but divine." It was sayings like this that Antisthenes carried with him to bear their fruit in due season in Cynic life and doctrines. There were, of course, other sides to Socrates—urbanity, zest in the gaiety of life, humorous toleration for human weakness, reverence for the laws of the land, a profound religious spirit. But Antisthenes cared for none of these things. Enough for him that he had found a pattern of austerity, conviction, and rationality.

Yet it was not the character only of Socrates that wrought upon the Cynics. It was also his doctrine.

Socrates was not merely a moral philosopher. Like Plato and Aristotle after him, he was also, and even more, a moral reformer. For his lot was cast in an age of transition. The unsuspecting confidence of the morality of tradition was passing. Not all the forces of reaction, with Aristophanes to head them, could bring it back. Athens had turned that earlier page. The swift brilliant expansion of national greatness that followed the Persian war had brought new problems; and a widened horizon had opened Athenian eyes to the diversity and variability of moral standards. Not least, there was at work the searching solvent of those great thinkers of the Attic illumination—the Sophists. In their hands a rhetorical sensationalism was raising doubts as to the possibility of knowledge of an objective moral order; and a rhetorical egoism in ethics rapidly preparing the way for an identification of right with might, of law with force, of obligation with fear, of justice with a perishable and changing thing of human institution. Can it be wondered at if there were those who feared that before this the very props of moral and political obligation were going, and that an urgent practical need called for a supreme effort of reconstruction. Among these were the great constructive thinkers of Greece.

Two courses lay open. The one was to recognize the organic dependence of morality upon social conditions; and in the light of that, to attack the vast problem of reconstructing society upon a more rational basis. This was the way of Plato and Aristotle. But it was not the way of Socrates. In the eyes of

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Socrates—as in the eyes of Mill and Carlyle—the one vital reform was the reform *of individual men.* And the needful specific was of the simplest. It was what has now become the good old way of hoisting scepticism with its own petard, of meeting the critical and sceptical reason by appeal to reason that was critical and not sceptical. This was the way of Socrates. In season, and sometimes out of season, he insisted that morality stood or fell simply with the possibility of bringing men to think, or (to be more precise) of bringing them to clear, well-defined, and sound ideas of what their duties were. As all the world knows, he taught that virtue is knowledge. And though an exact interpretation of the formula is far from easy, the dictum meant (and this is what concerns us) that, if the moral life is to be set upon a sure basis, it must be through the enlightening of the will—the will which, to Socrates, as to the Stoics, to Spinoza, to Kant, meant the reason of the individual.

It was here the Cynics laid hold. One may not say they reproduced their master. It is evident that reason in their eyes had not the same function as in his. There was less of knowledge, less emphasis on definitions. There was more of simple strength of rational personal conviction. But on one point there was entire agreement, on the vital point that, in things moral, it is the spirit that profiteth, or, as Antisthenes has it, that "men are rich and poor not in their establishments, but in their souls." No philosopher of either the ancient or the modern world, not even Kant, has so insisted that in comparison with the good will all else is as dross.

It was in fact just this which led them to leave their master far behind. In identifying virtue with the enlightened or rational will, Socrates had made virtue inward. But he had never meant that, therefore, virtue was not outward. On the contrary, he had frankly accepted the life of Athens as he found it. He had done his duty as a citizen on the field and in the dicastery. He had submitted himself to the laws, even when they adjudged him to die. And in giving his life to the mission of personally influencing individuals, he had taken it for granted that the men he dealt with were, like himself, living the ordinary civic life of the average Athenian. Not so the Cynics.

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Seizing upon the truth that virtue is, in its essence, inward (a state of will or reason), they went on to infer that, therefore, it must not be outward; and in that uncompromising spirit declared that there is no true moral life for man till he has cut himself loose from every tie, every resource, every institution which social life has to offer.

They had a certain justification. "He who hath a wife and children hath given hostages to fortune." Extend the trite aphorism and we have Cynicism in a nutshell. Not wife and children alone, but friends, wealth, reputation, public position, institutions, all things on which men have set their hearts—are they not all "hostages to fortune"? For all ordinary life is at best precarious. It is precarious even by reason of its outward resources, which, whatever security they may bring, do, as a matter of fact, in proportion as they widen the range of interests, offer thereby a larger target to the slings and arrows of misfortune, and stake our happiness upon eventualities beyond our own control. There is but one effectual security. Care for none of thes things. Give never a hostage to fortune. Minimize wants even to the vanishing point. Be independent

"Rally the good
In the depth of thyself."

Such is the message of the Cynics. All external goods were in their eyes obstructions, all social interests distractions, all dependence, whether on men or on things, an imperilment, a sacrifice of the soul's self-sufficingness. Like the Stoics when they asserted their freedom in the last abnegation of suicide; like the Christian anchorites when they sought for their own souls in the desert; like the monks when they strove for spirituality of life in the austerities of the cloister; like the begging-friars who raised mendicancy into an article of their faith, so did these Cynics turn their backs upon all the world had to offer, in the conviction that this was the path to moral victory. "He taught me," said Diogenes, of Antisthenes, "what was mine and not mine. Property was not mine. Kith and kin, acquaintances, friends, fame, intimate associates, places of abode, occupation—all these he taught were no concern of mine. What then was

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thine? The exercise of my own thoughts. This I might possess unhindered."

This result is even more apparent if we glance from the Cynic doctrine to the Cynic life. The typical figure is of course Diogenes. When he came to Athens, it appears he had a slave who ran away. The owner's consolation was peculiar: "If Manes can do without Diogenes, so, surely, can Diogenes without Manes." This was the keynote of all his long life. It is all a progressive discovery of how many things he can do without, a prolonged process of self-denudation. It went on till his death, which was characteristic. His friends found him one morning lying on the stones of one of those porticos which were his usual sleeping place. They thought him asleep. But he had in truth at last achieved the final minimization of wants.

We can now perhaps understand how the two aspects of Cynicism stand related. There was the revolt against society; there was the conviction inspired by Socrates that the seat of virtue is the rational will. These two joined hands in the life-long struggle after a moral independene, an individual self-sufficingness, which carried in it an affirmation at once of the supreme moral worth of life, and of the worthlessness of everything that life had to offer.

If we are to do justice to this strange and picturesque philosophy we must not dwell too much upon its externals. Ascetics are never to be judged by the singularity of their austerities; and in this case rags, filth, and indecency must not obscure the fact that Cynicism was the first thorough-going plea for moral freedom which the western world had seen. In this aspect it is in advance even of Plato and Aristotle. For these, though by far the greatest ethical thinkers of the ancient world, have yet their limitations. To both of them, the moral life is still identified with the peculiarly Greek form of civic organization. It is so even in the ideal republic of Plato, which is, after all, no more than the Greek state glorified. Hence that intense civic exclusiveness persistent even in Platonic and Aristotelian ideals, to which the larger unities, national or cosmopolitan, were hardly yet above the horizon. Hence the profoundly aristocratic spirit even of the municipal so-called democracies;

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and hence, too, the basal institution of slavery of which the great philosophers were the apologists. These limitations were, in time, to disappear, and it needed other forces besides theory to demolish them. But it is to the credit of the Cynics to have declared, and that while the πολις was still in full vitality, that the moral life of the individual did not stand and fall with Greek civilization. They were cosmopolitans when as yet the Christian and Stoic cosmopolitanism was a long way off. Nor had they anything of the aristocratic leanings of Plato. Far from it; "philosophers of the proletarit" they were, after their own fashion, men with a mission who were convinced that philosophy had its message to the multitude—the multitude whom Plato declared to be inherently incapable of philosophy. And as they were certainly no respecters of persons, to them the barriers between bond and free, so insurmountable even to Aristotle, were broken down. Nor is it easy to exaggerate the importance to ethical thought of the idea upon which all this indifference to externals rested; the conviction that in all moral estimates it is the good will that is alone significant. It was a doctrine which was peculiarly needed in Greece. For where—as in Athens—private life and public life were so intimately related, and where the individual found free and satisfying expression for himself in political activities, as well as in attainable enjoyment of the best literature and art, there was a risk that the inward life might receive less than its due. Lives that find a quite congenial environment are apt to lack something of spiritual intensity. And though it might be maintained that the antidote was already there in the teaching of Socrates, and the deepening of the moral consciousness which it involved, it may be doubted whether, without Cynic exaggeration of Socratic doctrine, Plato and Aristotle would have laid such impressive stress upon the spirit in which an action is done as the supreme condition of its goodness. It is a lesson that has never been lost. Caught up by the Stoic philosophy, and incarnated in the Stoic life, it became one of the great legacies of ancient thought to modern ethics.

Nor is it to be denied that even the Cynic gospel of self-detachment from social life rests on a truth. We are all in some

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sense (to use the Leibnitzian term) monads, self-centred in our being, however manifold our relations to others. Our thoughts, ouh hopes, our fears, our sorrows, all our experiences, are in a very peculiar sense our own. "It seems to me," says Sir J. F. Stephen, "that we are spirits in prison, able only to make signals to each other, but with a world of things to think and to say which our signals cannot describe at all." Or, as Wordsworth has it—

> "Points have we all within ourselves
> Where each stands single."

And, indeed, it is something of a common-place that when the world—even our own intimate world—has done its utmost for us, a limit is reached in every grave crisis beyond which we must be ourselves or succumb. It is but a half-truth perhaps. But then it was precisely the strength of the Cynics to belong to that order of one-sided minds without which mankind would never know what whole truths mean.

Mankind, however, and more especially philosophic mankind, are never content to live long upon half-truths. They have an irresistible tendency to pass to the other halves. And it is a striking comment upon this text that when Antisthenes was declaring that he had rather be mad than feel pleasure, Aristippus was maintaining the supreme end of life to be the pleasure of the moment. Hence that line of criticism which sets itself to show that Cynicism does but scant justice to the volume and variety of human life.

This, however, is perhaps beyond our limits. It must suffice at present to point out that, taking these Cynics upon their own ground, the manner of life they praised and practiced was anything but well fitted to compass the end they so strenuously laid to heart.

For, in an evil hour for their own cause, they turned their backs upon speculative philosophy. This was the more perverse in that Socrates had suggested a better way. For though Socrates was not himself a speculative philosopher, his ethical teaching had opened the way for a metaphysic. His life-long labor was a search after definitions of our moral concepts and categories; and the pre-supposition of this great effort was the

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conviction that these concepts, these definitions, had an objective ground in the nature of things. Hence it came about that his philosophy left as legacy to the speculative genius of Plato the epoch-making problem of finding a metaphysic of morals. Now with Socrates the Cynics went a certain length. To them, as to him, morality spelt reason, and reason meant moral conviction. But then, in their case, this moral conviction, as so often happens with ascetics, lacked "content." How could they pass on to the Socratic task of defining the concrete virtues—justice, temperance, bravery, and the rest—when they were spending all their lives in flinging contempt on those relations of social life in which, and through which, these, and all other virtues, could alone gain "content" and actuality? Add to this that, in their excessive pre-occupation with the moral life, they came to regard speculative philosophy as an intellectual luxury, or, in other words, as but one of the modes of culture which fell under their ban. It fits with this that, in such speculative excursions as they did make—and Antisthenes had enough of the thinker to indulge these up to a point—their results only served to accentuate this divergence from the fruitful Platonic development of Socrates. For Antisthenes was a thorough-going nominalist, and as such stood committed to the anti-Platonic doctrine that all general concepts, be they of the virtues or of things in nature, are no more than general terms without objective counterparts or confirmatory realities in the nature of things. This blocked for him effectually the path that led Plato, in *his* development of Socratic teaching, to his metaphysical doctrine of a cosmos of "ideas" in which all general concepts, whether ethical or scientific, find their objective ground. Small wonder then if Antisthenes disparaged speculative thought when thus, in his eyes, it had become barren.

It is not our present concern to examine the value of this nominalistic doctrine. Our object is simply to point out that, in the interests of Cynic morality, nothing could have been more fatal. For, by this disparagement of the speculative life, the Cynics robbed themselves of what has ever been, and still is, one of the most effective of all pleas for the life of self-detachment from the world. Surely if man be ever justified in

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sitting loose to the life of institutions and the duties of citizenship, it is when he is possessed by a passion for scientific investigation or speculative truth. Not all the triflings of dilettantism can obscure the fact that a passion of this kind, if it be sincere, exacts an undivided allegiance. It is not simply that life is too short for any one to do great things both in theory and practice. It is that the whole speculative and scientific attitude of mind is fundamentally diverse from that of the restless and crowded life of affairs. Plato saw this. He saw it, although no speculative thinker has ever been sterner than he in exacting social service of the philosopher. For Plato tells us also that, however strenuously the thinker must take the burden of the commonwealth on his shoulders, his heart and mind are really elsewhere, and ever ready to quit politics for that serene pursuit of truth in which his closing years are to be spent. And Aristotle follows Plato. There is no mistaking the sharpness of the antithesis in which he sets the practical and the contemplative life, nor can words be more explicit than those in which, in the tenth book of "The Ethics," he tells us that, in proportion as a man rises to the life of thought, the less does he stand in need of those outward resources, and of that part-partnership in action with his fellow-citizens, without which the *moral* life is impossible. And, indeed, his words here and in the context have actually been pressed (falsely, but not unnaturally) into a plea for the life of retreat from the world. Surely then it was in an evil hour that the Cynics turned away from speculative thought. Even if they lacked the speculative instinct—and no doubt they did—they would still have been wise not to defraud themselves of this strongest of all arguments for detachment from the world. There have been quietists, who have had little to show to the world for years which were filled with communion with their God. There have been thinkers, both in science and philosophy, whose epoch-making speculations have been only possible to men who, like Spinoza, lived remote and secluded. Who will say that theirs were empty lives? Yet this is what the Cynics missed. They abjured, they decried the life of citizenship—and for what?

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This leads to a further criticism. For when philosophy or science demands self-dedication to the theoretic life, it is not barren of most practical results. It is of the very essence of it that it brings the finite individual life into conscious relation to a supreme Realty—call it Idea of the Good, Infinite Substance, the Absolute, *Deus sive Natura*—which, in Spinoza's language, can fill the soul entirely. And it is because the individual, otherwise insignificant indeed, can turn to this alike in thought and in feeling, that he can become capable of the strength to lift himself above the shocks and cares and vanities about which those who have not seen the vision disquiet themselves in vain. Such at any rate has been the experience of most of the great prophets of individual independence. It was so with the Stoic sage, strong to defy the world because consciously at one with the reason which moves through all things. It was so with the Reformers and the Puritans, who resisted principalities and powers, not in their own strength, but "by grace." It was so with our own Carlyle, in whose eyes true self-reliance finds its ground, much as it did in his prototypes the Hebrew prophets, in unshaken trust in "the old eternal laws that live for ever." In all there is a gospel of self-sufficingness; and in all it is self-sufficingness through conscious dependence upon some supreme Reality that exists beyond the flux and commotion of human affairs.

From this source of strength the Cynics were cut off. In their struggle after an absolute moral independence, in their narrowly practical concentration upon this, they turned away, with fatal blindness, from the perennial sources of individual strength. So will it ever be with all who follow them in magnifying the moral life to the neglect or disparagement of a religious faith or a speculative philosophy.

Nor, quite apart from this, can one admit that their practical philosophy was the true path to that personal morality for which they were so ready to offer up, on a ruthless altar, all the world could give. One can see this in the later history of the school. With the passing of its great founders, Antisthenes and his disciple Diogenes, its inspiration seems to have left it. For, though the later Cynics kept up the old heroic tradition of

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plain living, their plain living gravitated downwards to unredeemed beggary, squalor, and indecency. They still, of course, flattered themselves that they possessed their own souls, but their souls, like those of many a raving anchorite in the desert, or fanatical Stylites on his pillar, could hardly be said to be worth the possessing. It is a well-known epigram of Aristotle that the solitary is either beast or god, and it is to be feared that these later Cynics had little of the god.

One cannot wonder. It was but the Nemesis that is so apt to overtake all votaries of an extreme asceticism which, in a leap after the moral heroic, rashly renounces the homelier ordinary incentives to virtue. Such incentives, be it the love of home and kindred, the affection for friends, the kindliness of daily life, the honorable pursuit of wealth, the loyalty to an institution, the stimulus of public spirit, the love of country, these incentives may look commonplace beside the passion for saving souls, the heroic spirit of renunciation, the rupture of all ties, the hating of father and mother for the Kingdom of Heaven's sake. Yet it is at our peril that we try to cut out these incentives, and, like the Cynics, cast them from us. For, however, nobly the forlorn hope of morality may still struggle upwards by the way of renunciation, the risk is that the mass of mankind, bereft of the ordinary motives that are the permanent safeguards of morality, may find nothing to check their descent towards the brute.

This is what Aristotle saw with convincing clearness. Aristotle does not denounce the Cynics. In his usual tolerant and inclusive fashion he goes all the way with them in insisting that the moral life must be a thing complete and all-sufficing in itself. He adopts the very watchword of Cynicism, "self-sufficingness" *αὐταρχεια*. But then the Aristotelian self-sufficingness is not of the sort that minimizes wants, and leaves the individual isolated from his kind and stripped of life's resources. On the contrary, it is the self-sufficingness which can only be won by the slow process of self-realization; and which sees in life's resources *not* clogs, *not* distractions, *not* hostages to fortune, but the instruments by whose right use alone human nature can develop its powers. It is all summed

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up in a single aphorism: "the state is the limit of self-sufficingness," meaning, that for a full and soul-satisfying life the "social animal," man, needs no less than all that is included in a well organized society. This exactly hits the weakness of Cynic asceticism. So long as ascetics content themselves with railing at the world, they are not likely to fail of occupation. The crux comes when we ask, What next? Denunciation, renunciation, satire, negations however forcible, however witty, are impotent to develop the soul of the man who tries to subsist upon them. There is but one way—the way of Aristotle and of Carlyle—it is by finding one's work and doing it. For without a sphere of action the soul is irretrievably atrophied, and without a sphere adequate at least in some measure to the varied potentialities of man, the best gifts of the soul, which come by acting in the world, not by withdrawing from it in an impotent fancied superiority, will never be possessed. It was the paradox of Cynicism, as it is of many other forms of asceticism, that in a true antinomian fervor it at once magnified the moral life, and in the very act of doing so denied to it on the threshold the elementary conditions of its realization. For the wisdom of Aristotle here points the way not only to a fuller, more many-sided, and more beneficent life than the fanaticism of the "mad Socrates," Diogenes, but to a more than Cynic self-possession and a more than Cynic independence.

Nor it is to be granted that, even in its denunciations, Cynicism made war upon the world in the most effective way. Human nature will endure, and even welcome, satire and commination, especially when humorous. Satire is good reading, and the masters of invective, Juvenal, Swift, Carlyle, are far from unpopular. But there is nothing which so effectually turns the edge of invective as the perception that it is undiscriminating. We feel this about the diatribes of Antisthenes and the rest. They denounced war, but to what purpose, when we feel that they would have equally denounced a filibuster's raid and the civic devotion of Marathon or Salamis? They rose above the narrow exclusiveness of the πολις and were the first cosmopolitans; but what of that, when we feel sure that they would have risen above the kingdom of heaven could it

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have descended four-square upon earth? After all it is a spurious and an easy cosmopolitanism which comes of indifference to the fatherland. The true cosmopolitanism comes by antecedence, not by negation of patriotism. They protested, too, and vehemently enough, against Greek forms of ritual, but one feels that they would have swamped in one common condemnation the most devout achievements of religious art, and the mere antics of superstition. It is so all along the line. It is the easiest function in the world to object, if one has made up his mind to be always in opposition. It is also a *role* doomed to ineffectuality. The Cynics, ancient or modern, who give us no credit for our ordinary virtues, will find us slow to give effect to their diatribes against our extraordinary vices. Their moral purpose may be excellent, "to bite us for our salvation." But it is not reasonable, it is subversive of all just gradations of moral value, and would not cure but kill, were we to don the staff and wallet of Diogenes, and turn this sharp medicine into the daily diet either of individuals or nations.

And yet, when all is said, it would ill befit us to fall in to a Cynic attitude towards Cynicism itself. Rather let us leave it with the reflection that, so long as philosophy has a message for mankind, Cynicism will stand as a memorable reminder that the spirit is more than the flesh, life of more value than its trappings, duty greater than pleasure, and the rational will strong enough to overcome the world.

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THE INDIVIDUALISM OF MARCUS AURELIUS.

When Marcus Aurelius set down in his "Meditations" the results of those endeavors after self-discipline which were essential to his ideas of duty, he not only furnished the world with an example of the loftiest moral insight, but he gave expression to a temperament and type of mind which will always influence life. He is by no means "the last of his line"; he will never be without spiritual descendants. In the pages of Dr. Rendall, we have recently had placed before us a masterly portrayal of the man. Yet it would be giving a poor return for the benefit received if on that account we were to cease to study Marcus' actual work.

Let us glance for a moment at his teaching as a whole. Be resigned, he at all times insists. Self-submission to the continuous act of participation and surrender which the Stoic *cosmos* manifests, leads to the acceptance of whatever is in season for the universe. An individual man is part, but practically an insignificant part, of the whole. All is well with the cosmos, but we can only reach that view by the contemplation of the insignificance of particulars. It appears, however, as if the thought which underlies this doctrine must ultimately defeat its own end; for we are left finally with a limited individual which expresses, or at least participates in, the fullness of the whole, and, notwithstanding is ordered to acquiesce, literally without a murmur, in an incompleteness which is inscrutable. What wonder if the individual revolts? Curiously enough, we find the direct antithesis of this view in the hedonism of Omar Khayyám. Take the famous stanza—

> "Ah Love! could you and I with Him conspire
> To grasp this sorry Scheme of Things entire
> Would we not shatter it to bits—and then
> Remould it nearer to the Heart's Desire!"

In a former edition of the Rubáiyát the word "Him" is rendered "Fate" by Fitz Gerald, which appears to be an improvement. But in any case, the verse presents us with a striking

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contrast to the Stoic view of the universe. It reverses the picture, and shows how faith in the music of the spheres may be opposed by faith in the unfathomable injustice of things. For Marcus there is really no such conflict between the cosmic and the ethical process as Professor Huxley conceived, and therefore it does not need to be explained; for Omar (or Fitz Gerald masquerading as Omar) the cosmic process is so profoundly unethical, that the ethical process which arises within it is hardly worthy of the name.

Marcus, then, as so many great moralists have done, abides by the harmony. And the result is, that if we pessimistically subject ourselves to an over-ruling optimism, we reach one of his main points of view; we grasp his individualism in essentials. The problem thus indicated, indeed—the reconciling of the part with the whole—has probably not been satisfactorily solved yet. But there seems to be little question that the more isolated the individual is made—in accordance with Marcus' tendency—the more difficult is the philosophical task. If man harmonizes with his fellow-man merely by *fitting in* to him in a marvelous way, and not by being identical with him in spite of differences, the strain of unifying which is put upon the cosmos bids fair to break it. To assume that these parallel lines meet at infinity is very questionable metaphysics. The unifying power itself remains a mystery. But let us see how Marcus' compromise is worked out by him in some of the details of ethics.

The isolation of the inner man is the first point that strikes us. The inner man is self-swayed, makes itself just what it wills to be, makes all that happens seem to itself what it wills. Withdraw into yourself, says Marcus; for by nature our reasoning inner self finds content in just dealing and the calm which follows. As to pain, if it is past bearing, it brings an end; if not, it can be endured. And in doing all this we are discharging, of course, a cosmic function: "life in smooth flow" is the discharge of that function; to recognize that fact is reason. Such an attitude, when not only ourselves but others come to be considered, makes us regard justice, and indeed all virtue, as primarily cosmic—a duty to God or to the universe.

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Secondarily, however, virtue branches out into a social principle; and accordingly, we arrive in due time at the famous "World-city" of which all men are citizens. Virtue branches out in this secondary way, because man is the apex of nature. Man is by nature social, and he cannot get behind his nature. He has even, in addition, a lower sort of communion with the inferior parts of the world.

The practical result of this doctrine is that Marcus retreats into himself triumphantly at times when we should consider that he ought to be out of doors. It is well, therefore, to look for a statement in the "Meditations" which will show Marcus' attitude at its best, and yet indicate where his tendency breaks away from the modern world. For that will enable us to see where, in ethics, his compromise between the cosmic and the social differs from the compromise or reconciliation between the two which modern religious thought presents. And we find such a statement in the well-known passage: "The residue of life is short. Live as on a mountain. It matters not whether here or there; everywhere you are a citizen of the city of the world. Let men see and witness a true man, a life conformed to nature. If they cannot bear him, let them make away with him. Better that than life on their terms" (X. 15). The extract is striking for its nobility of spirit; not less so for the absence of eagerness to improve mankind positively. The tone is the true tone of kindliness; but not of "Compel them to come in." Marcus' harmonizing of the cosmic with the moral is subject to his usual restraint; "nothing too much," he seems to say. It has not such rich and full tones as that of Christendom. This fact seems to be an essential feature of the case.

In the struggle to show forth the characteristics of a true man, Marcus relied mainly on reason; and relied on it in a way that has so often been discussed *apropos* of Stoicism that we need not spend much time on it. Reason, the judgment-forming power, could, in his view, over-ride passion and sensibility generally. Yet strongly as he held that the good man must have severely disciplined passion and desire by reason, condemnation, in set terms, of the grosser forms of vice is singularly absent from his writings. He takes all that for granted. He

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is mainly concerned with the refinements of a rationalistic morality. And he only combats the doctrine of "pleasure" indirectly, as it has no vital interest for him. Death and life, good report and evil report, pain and pleasure, riches and poverty, he says, can neither enoble nor demean. This doctrine, no doubt, simplifies the problem for him unwarrantably, as it enables him to fall back on his idea of "indifferent things" in order to escape practical difficulties; but on the other hand some of his finest utterances are in enunciation of the partial truth contained in his error—the fact that virtue rises above the mere vicissitudes of fortune.

His view of life naturally affects his view of death. On the question of suicide, he is, of course, according to modern notions, unsound; though there are passages in his work which would themselves afford a good answer to those opinions of his which have been condemned. The passage at the end of the "Meditations," however—his *nunc dimittis*—shows the essential part of his sombre outlook. There he compares the end of life to the discharge given by the praetor to a player whose task is done. No tyrant gives us our dismissal, but nature. The completeness of the work is not in our hands. "Death" it has been said in modern times, "is an incident that doesn't count." Thus Marcus' apathy has a note in it which is characteristic of all disciplined minds. Life, no doubt, must not be made a meditation upon death; but death is a fact not to be gainsaid. The man who imagines that life is given him for the working out of purposes, for a connected and rational series of endeavors, and fails to consider how death, with its immediate possibility and its ultimate certainty, continuously affects these, has still something to learn from Marcus' "harping" on his latter end.

According to the traditional view, Marcus represents the approximation of the heathen to the Christian Schools; and his "piety" was almost a prophecy of the future. The "way of perfection," which, he proclaimed, was to live out each day as one's last, with no fever, no torpor and no acting a part, was a way which many were to tread after him—ascetic and individualistic like himself. And if he sometimes showed a pes-

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simism which was not exactly imitated afterwards, his ideas of life as over-shadowed by death and yet triumphing over it have a curious significance for us. There is little doubt that he did not believe in the immortality of the soul in any sense that would satisfy Chritianity. On the other hand he is absolutely free from "other-worldliness." He is not sordid in a spiritual way as some have been. Much discussion—some of it very unprofitable—has been spent on the endeavor to determine how far Marcus is entitled to the praises usually conferred on the "Saint" of Christendom; but surely, if we remember that his ideas of brotherly love were only a shade less intense than those of Christendom, and that, on the other hand, the future life was absolutely dark to him, we have sufficiently determined his general position.

Isolated as he conceived the moral self to be, Marcus builds his spiritual edifice confidently on men's moral convictions. "There is nothing absolutely good," he seems to say, "except the good will; and you know it. Be logical then in your conduct; act out your convictions." There is, however, a characteristically individualistic note in his utterances on the subject. If you can find anything better than virtue, he tells you, then seize hold of it by all means, and enjoy the result of your discovery. Yet he is not afraid of your making such a discovery. This confidence in the moral appeal reproduces itself in another light in our own day. We often hear it said that, for all practical purposes, the ethical view of the world is the widest and deepest we have. An ethical view is not necessarily opposed to an intellectual, but as a matter of fact it is more successful in reducing the world to unity or harmony than any intellectual view that we can find at present. It is supreme, therefore, for the time being. The teaching of Marcus might have tended towards such a doctrine, had it not been held back by Stoic dogma. The frame-work of his mental world, however, was an unquestioned Stoicism; and in the modern appeal, the individualistic note is less strongly accentuated.

It has sometimes been suggested that Marcus' outlook on life has in it, not merely an element of individualistic "detachment," but also an element of affectation, even of self-conceit.

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In a character less gifted by nature than his, it is said, his principles would result in "priggishness"; it is only the refinement of his disposition that prevents the baser element from showing itself more completely. Now it is, of course, a fact that the Stoic may be unduly self-important. But we must be careful to attribute the effect to the right cause. Conceit is clearly a besetting sin of humanity; and the misuse of any principle, or set of principles, of moral action is likely to lead to it. In Marcus' case, though it is very difficult to argue about such a point, the impression left as a whole seems to be anything but that of arrogance or pride. He can hardly be accused of vanity—a thing indeed which his soul loathed. Sincerity is conspicuous in his utterances; "no acting a part." And probably the reason why he seems to many readers to be so "Christian" a "heathen" is that the virtue of humility in the Christian sense was part of the fibre of his moral being.

One point there is, however, which may be considered more apposite. Marcus, like all moralists who lay great stress on the inner life, values character beyond all else. For him, as we have said, the good will is fundamental. Now when character is thus made prominent, and a man's attention is directed to what he *is*, there may arise the appearance of spiritual pride. But it is difficult to see how we can have morality at all on any other basis than that of character. If we are not to be allowed to differentiate sharply between ourselves "good" and ourselves "bad," we may as well give up the game. No doubt one who is continually occupied with his own character—who is continually fingering his own motives—generally becomes spiritually morbid. But the result flows, not from the conviction that he, personally, must be good, but from an introspection which is prosecuted at wrong times and in wrong circumstances. To have a reasonable conviction of the worth of character, not merely in others, but in ourselves, is essential, and it is not Pharisaic. It may be that Marcus' self-questioning is too continuous; but it must be remembered that the impression produced by his book is that of the cumulative effect of many musings. It was not intended that you should read the work all at once—if indeed it was intended that you should

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read it at all. Marcus wrote for himself. And if it is asked why the other side of life is not more adequately represented in his meditations, probably the best answer that can be given is that he wrote in the manner in which he could best remind himself of the principles he valued. If you do not like his methods, pass on; but you cannot generally condemn them.

There is another characteristic of the book which has a tendency to make it seem slightly pedantic, if not affected. Marcus' individualism, as we have pointed out, was philosophical, though not merely philosophical. And it strikes us perhaps that Marcus clung with undue tenacity to his Stoic dogma, because that dogma is no longer our dogma; and we are familiar with the names of great men who have arrived at practical ideas very much the same as those of Marcus, with a different kind of dogma supporting them. Marcus did not realize how in the future Stoicism itself would be separated into a kernel and a husk. His disciples indeed have always returned, as he told them to return, to philosophy, as the sore-eyed to the sponge and egg—but not always to *his* philosophy.

The great practical defect, then, of the ethics of the "Meditations" seems to be that there is no sufficient appreciation of the fact that it is not through the retiral but through the advance of the soul that personality develops, and its dignity is increased. To him that hath shall be given; and the personality which minimizes or despises its human relationships defeats its own end. The very essence of the individuality which Marcus desires consists, we might say, in its inability to exist for itself; and it is just this inability which constitutes its spiritual wealth, its great possession. It cannot become cosmic simply by abstraction. Nevertheless, by a back-stroke as it were, peace and tranquility of the inner self—so ardently desired by man—can be gained; and in representing the latter aspect of the human soul Marcus' work has great value. For he was driven forward, as it were in spite of himself, into the great world-city where men were not merely made to fit into one another for working purposes, like "the upper and lower rows of the teeth," but in some measure lived and died and had their spiritual being in common. Marcus could appreciate

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this in some degree, and, at the same time keep his eyes fixed steadily and calmly on eternal righteousness. He was a Stoic to whom life's fitful fever was not altogether as nothing, and therefore he has the power of imparting to those who are oppressed by that fever something of his own Stoic calm. He was not so strong as never to be weak.

Further, he raises in the minds of all who are interested in the problems of Theism, in a characteristic and telling way, the question of how far such patience and such faith in righteousness as he possessed are independent of a theistic basis, and whether his spiritual insight was in accordance with, or went beyond, his philosophy. In particular his individualism raises the question of the ultimate value of the human soul. Is his pessimism, pessimism? Is his calm really calm. The very nobility of his spirit, as I have already indicated, forces us to ask if his outlook was complete; because here we have Stoicism in the form in which it is most attractive to us. Not by his own arguments, but by his influence, one way or other, on our arguments, he primarily draws us to him. He has given us the means of understanding his inmost thoughts, and we are almost bound in honor to make the best spiritual use of them we can.

W. A. Watt.

Glasgow.

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THE SPRING OF SALVATION.

Time out of mind it has been customary with the fathers in their generation to stigmatize as "morbid melancholy of youth" that pessimistic thought which so often finds vogue with young men. In consequence of this the opinions of a young man who avows his pessimism are discredited beforehand. They are symptomatic of his state in life, and, though they may have, perhaps, pathological interest, they cannot be esteemed of rational value.

It is, therefore, with some hesitation that I, as a young man —opinionated, and hence under the obloquy—venture to lay bare my thinking; and before so venturing I would fain say a word in behalf of my kind. For I cannot consider *melancholia juventutis* either reprehensible or pathological. It comes in the natural course of events, and is due to awakening self-study. Up to a certain age the young of the human family find the outer world so real and weighty and full of tantalizing objects that its inner counterpart is hardly noticed; but bye and bye the novelty wears away, mastery of the objective world, sufficient to the day's need, is achieved, and then—lo, the new world! Is it strange that in the zest and flush of youth man finds himself an interesting animal, rather more interesting than all beside? So the gaze turns inward and we have awkward self-consciousness and that inquisitive self-study which the fathers term "morbid."

One having in mind the history of thought will see how, following after revelation of the new world, the same yet not the same as the old, full of unreason and contradiction, yet not unreal, the sophists must have their day. The skepticism of youth is a shadowing of that skepticism in thought which exploitations of the inner world have ever summoned forth. But the human mind, as history shows, never long rests content with skepticism. And so the young doubter casts about for materials with which to build him a house. He finds *facts of experience.* And they are not so many but that he must take

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them all. He may not cull and cull out of the manifold only the seemly. He must take all. And some are faulty and some are wry and crass. What wonder, then, if the house he builds be ugly, mad, of ruinous? What wonder, then, the pessimism? Nay, if the fathers themselves wrought into their stable mansions *all* the facts of experience, what might these mansions be?

For there are unwholesome facts in human experience. First among them is war, and with it wounds and pain and death. The survival of the fittest is the end of the fight, they tell us, and to kill is the way of life. Again, there is evil. No mere negation of good, but evil positive and black and stinking. And finally, ugliness. We are so accustomed to the traditions of a world beautiful that we are apt to forget that in these smoke-grimed days it is mainly a tradition.

Now whether pain and evil and ugliness mean any metaphysical truth or not, I think none of us can deny that in our poor irrational human experience they are very real and absolute fact. The young man accepts them as such. He meets them in the same spirit of natural curiosity with which in earlier years he met the objects of the outer world; and when he comes to frame his *Weltanschauung*, his world-vision, he includes them in it with the same naive conviction that all he finds in the world must, forsooth, belong to it. He leaves it to the fathers to construct worlds wherein no evil is, where the ugly is tinselled and the foul sweetened with perfume. Is it a wonder, then, that when he sees that the stimulus of life is pain, that the winged hopes of his happier days are but targets of fate, that the golden apples in the gardens of the Hesperides are husks and ashes, that death alone is lord of peace—is it a wonder that he comes to hold happiness to be only a chimera? Or, having felt the virulent potency of evil, having seen and loathed the vile, is it strange if he sometimes comes to doubt whether in truth there is a Power working for righteousness in the universe? And he does so doubt. Flaubert has somewhere likened life to a foul whiff from an underground laundry, and a young man, of clean mind and habit, I have heard use the same figure.

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Now I hold that that attitude of mind which courageously faces the facts of experience and takes them in their full consequence is not only the most admirable, but the most true as well and the most valuable in a search for truth. Age with its conservatism and reconstruction is partisan. It has range of experience and dialectical keenness, but it is lacking in receptivity, it is not without prejudice and, one might add, cowardice. The conceptions of the fathers are like systems of philosophy, framed and fixed, but to be outgrown; whereas the thought of the young men represents rather those periods of skeptical criticism which serve as indices of new developments. Pessimistic they may be, as facts compel; but the facts are taken without fear or favor. And surely, if only for this attitude and its indical value, the young man's thinking deserves to be considered of rational worth, not merely of pathological interest.

If the end of ethical study really were not knowledge, but conduct alone, as Aristotle said, there would be no purpose in its pursuit beyond the spheres of practical politics and applied sociology. For all action subservient to the biological need the conditions of life furnish us stimuli and direction sufficiently definite. Obeying these, we live; rebelling, we die. It is simple and inexorable enough. Nature offers us a *modus vivendi* and, perforce, we accept it. But for the civilized man it is not enough that the act of the moment he vouchsafed him, the need of the moment fulfilled. He demands a rationale in his ethical life just as he demands it in his cosmogony. He requires *motif* as well as motive for his actions. Perhaps his craving comes only from a sense of artistic fitness, a love of unity and harmony, but its satisfaction is quite as essential to his comfort as is a well-groomed person or congruous surroundings. The madiaeval search for the Summum Bonum has been transformed into a search for an adequate and appropriate *raison d'etre* in the ethic world.

Now it is a prime condition of such ethical rationale—as appealing to reason—that it should not only be satisfying and desirable, but that its aim, as an end of ethical action should in some measure be attainable. An individual may erratically

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buy gardens in the moon without ever expecting to pluck fruit therefrom or gain other satisfaction than his own eccentricity affords. So it is that we have the somewhat affected devotion to impossible ideals. But such cases are only the picturesque —they are without the pale of the truly artistic in ethical life. When we come to the domain of social ethics—our people's ethics upon which most intimately depends our self's own—no such eccentricity is admissible. The scientific mode of thinking makes reasonableness, and the biological fact of living makes practicability essential to our ideal. It is hardly necessary to add that attainability must be a characteristic of whatever is ethically reasonable as well as of what is practicable.

It may not be too much to assume that all ethical systems in some sort recognize human happiness, here or hereafter, as the real Summum Bonum. With the hedonists and utilitarians happiness in this world is avowed the good. With the intuitionists genetically at least happiness is the true ethical motive, for intuitional ethics is almost inseparably associated with the notion of divine interposition and divine rewards and punishments in the world to come. With the perfectionists there may be more question. And yet perfection is understood to mean approximation to the god-like and the heavenly estate, and surely Heaven is the place of joy. "Virtue is its own reward?" Yes, but there is reward. And why was the adage called forth, why is it necessary? Is it not because virtue is accustomed to cast envious glances upon vice, whispering, Lo, it is happy! even as vice says of virtue, It is happy!—is it not, after all, because joy is implicitly recognized as the most-to-be-desired? So all systems of ethics assume, consciously or with hazy circumlocution, that the greatest good is human happiness.

And now comes the young man asserting that happiness is a chimera. He holds that a world conceived in pain, reared through brother-battles and nourished by steaming blood from the sacrificial altar can never be a happy world. Of happiness in a world to come he has no assurance, perchance no faith. It is not his fault. It is the malady of the age, and it is bitter in his heart. But it is in his heart; he is a child of his time.

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Wherefore he has broken with ethics—with all the systems which declare that the happy man is the perfect man or the perfect man always the happy one. There is no ground beneath his feet—only a falling away and a falling. Is it strange, then, that he becomes skeptical and pessimistic and mad and morbid, a contumely unto his fathers?

I do not say that he values happiness less than do other men or that he is more willing to abandon the strife for it. He sees that Nature—*mater durissima!*—grants to her children that modicum of joy necessary to mere living; and being a young man not over-filial, he is ready to wrest from her what further joys chance or battling offer. Happiness in his eyes is indeed good and to be sought for; but at the same time he recognizes that the ideal of a happy world is of the unattainable and so cannot be a rational ethical ideal. For in ethics, where the ideal must determine the *motif* of a life's action, the sense of harmony and sufficient reason cannot be satisfied with an ideal which *per se* is in no wise attainable. And so our young man is in a sorry case when he casts about for materials with which to build him a house. What is worth while? he asks, as others have asked before him. What is there that is at once harmonious and reasonable and attainable and ethically satisfying?

Now if he could know the purpose of the whole world and the sum of it and the substance, he could doubtless find his place in it satisfactorily enough. But to know these things is the province of the wise men and the elders. And being wearied of the vanity of philosophies which are beyond him, he is only concerned for a candle unto his feet. But where shall he find that little light?

I think there can be but one answer. He must search for it within *his* world. If anything in all his world is pronounced worth while for him it is so. By being worth while I mean that it must satisfy the needs of ethical reason: it must be adapted to an harmonious, reasonable and attainable ethical experience. "Well, and why not happiness? It is reasonable and harmonious in human life, for all men seek it instinctively. It is in a measure attainable." Yes, in a measure, for individ-

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uals; but the ideal of a happy world is an impossible ideal; there can be no such thing as a happy life which is the average life. Of course, the young man might adopt a purely egotistic hedonism if he believes that his own life may be made happy. But that would be neither reasonable nor harmonious, for it is essential to ethical reason and harmony that the ethical ideal be framed for society and not for elect individuals; and the ideal of egoistic happiness in such a sense is even more unattainable than any other.

The notion of happiness as the ethical ideal must be abandoned; and again the builder asks, What is worth while? And passing in review all his experiences, I think he will find certain of them which his consciousness will ratify as pre-eminently the worthful. For there are certain realities of our worlds which we reverence and love and hold to be most noble and most sufficient unto themselves. I am not here concerned with any question of a real worth beyond that which consciousness attests, nor of whether the conscious measure may be true or false, nor whether it is constant or consistent. I want only to show that we do ascribe high worthiness to some things without requiring any reason for the ascription, but instinctively and because we must. The feeling of their worth is inevitable and ultimate in our consciousness.

What are these self-sufficient experiences? Well, because they may not be defined nor narrowly mapped out, I will call them the beautiful. And if beauty seems to you a term not sufficiently broad to cover all, consider that I would extend its meaning until it does cover them. For I hold that when we speak of the noble and the pure and the exalted, of the great and the glorious, of the altogether lovely, we are not using so many empty words nor a phraseology of dreams whose substance is to be analyzed out of consciousness, but designations of very real and living experiences, as vividly potent as aught that is external. And I hold that self-abnegation and self-immolation and sympathy and the spirit of compassion are of this company; and strength and strife and fearlessness, the will to achieve, the glory of righteous battle, the magnificence of devotion unto death as well; and that which is gratifying to the

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æsthetic taste, to the sense of form and color, of sound, of touch, and that which is merely appropriate and cleanly. All these I would include in the one wide term—beautiful!

Thus the life beautiful and the world beautiful is our ethical ideal. How, then, does it meet the conditions: harmony, satisfactoriness, reasonableness, attainability? They are all bound up with one another, these conditions. They form one of those complexes of consciousness the psychologists love to juggle with; and I think that when we say of anything that it is worth while we mean nothing more than that the whole complex consciousness is satisfied. Yet some answer may be made.

First, of harmony. How is the beautiful life harmonious? To reply, because it is beautiful and harmony is essential to beauty, is verbal tautology. Yet in consciousness there is no tautology, for there harmony and beauty have fixed values apart from their relationship.

Of satisfactoriness. Consciousness itself gives the warrant of sufficiency; this by hypothesis.

Of reasonableness. Whatever appeals to the human mind as worth endeavor and is at the same time harmonious and satisfactory and attainable, is it not therein reasonable?

Of attainability. Is the dream of dreams possible? Can our world, laden with so much ugliness and ever amenable to the laws of life, be made on the whole a beautiful world? I am afraid this question cannot be answered objectively nor from scientific premises. The truth is, the answer depends partly upon one's notion of beauty, but mainly upon one's opinion. The proposition is not for a *priori* determination, but for experience to demonstrate. The court of final resort is purely subjective. We are forced again to verbal tautology: the attainable beauty must mean the persistence of a type which is not impossible. So far as ethical ideals and actions are concerned, the weighty question is of belief. If I can hope for the actual incarnation of my ideal beautiful the condition is met. And the enthusiast whose mind's eye sees a world beautiful is likest to believe in it. Wherefore, blessed is the enthusiast!

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But, after all, you will say, is not this beautiful the old ideal of happiness come back under different masking? Is it not at least the instrument of happiness, for all men know that happines sought in her own name is coy and elusive? The beautiful has been defined as the most-to-be-desired; men most desire joy; are joy and beauty not, then, one? I had thought to be well rid of this notion of happiness, for it is but a wan hope. I will not dispute the premise that men do most desire happiness, or, at any rate, that which shall bring happiness, for it would involve much profitless talk on the meaning of this and that, on what happiness is and what desire; and, indeed, we have not words to tell what they are nor even what is their mental kin. I want only to show that for me beauty is diverse from joy, that the two do not involve each other, that they are often antagonistic. If your experience does not accord with mine, there is no more to be said.

But I have known a beautiful life—a life of courage and achievement, of generosity and sacrifice, of blithe spirit in the face of death. And the theme that life was pain, so that when he came to die it seemed not ill for him. That was a beauty without joy.

More than this, have we not all felt the sorrow of a beautiful night and the pains of a musical wind? Have we not wept with the violins and trembled with the shock of cymbals? And was this for joy? When I live Lear or Hamlet it is not because I find in their lives happiness, but because the tumultuous sorrow of Lear and the cankerous grief of Hamlet somehow ennoble and beautify my sorrows and my griefs. though they do not make them less sorrows and griefs.

So it is that the young man says, happiness is a chimera.

"But what is beauty, with all the talk of it?"

I have been expecting the question long. And if I had eyes to give, and not words only, I might hope to show it. The truth is, beauty, like the geometrician's axioms, is not subject to demonstration. It is not even amenable to logical definition, for its form is not the logical form. Further, and unlike the axiom, it is not necessarily nor yet probably nor actually universal. For each consciousnes it is bound to be

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in some respect peculiar. Nevertheless it exists in most consciousnesses, and with definite content and meaning. What that content is I can only suggest, hoping that your consciousness will seize and ratify the suggestion, and that your beautiful and my beautiful will in some degree fall into accord. Only so may we have ground of common understanding.

And now I suspect I am beginning to be called all sorts of names. Platonist, perhaps, first of all, though I will not bother about that. But for ethics, intuitionist or perfectionist? I confess I do not like them. But let us not quarrel over names; only let us come to an understanding. To my mind perfectionism implies two conditions to neither of which I concede possibility. In the first place, the perfect is superlative—*issima;* and I do not believe that the *most* beautiful world or life I can conceive is possible, but only a world *on* the whole beautiful. Secondly, we have immemorially a triple-faced goddess, the Good, the True and the Beautiful, which the perfectionists seem to worship. And I hold this a false goddess, for I do not believe the true to be either wholly good or wholly beautiful, and I do not believe the good of common opinion (though not, of course, of my opinion) to be wholly beautiful. Concerning the use and meaning of "intuitionist" there are no such clear objections. But in general the associations of the term imply a universality of ethical insight, its inevitability and innateness, or even its divine implantation; and these I see no good reason for asserting. I had rather be called, not very euphoniously to be sure, "subjectivist"; for I hold that each man's ethical ideal must be the creation of his subjective life, and that each man must fight for his own.

And now, what of the power of beauty in ethical action? For, after all, we must return to Aristotle and concede that the end of our study is not knowledge but action. Apart from the well-known power of the nobler beauties, which have given us beautiful lives in times past and give us beautiful lives to-day, is the power of mere æsthetic taste. To prove this I would cite Petronious in Sienkiewicz's Quo Vadis, and bid you compare

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him with Nero and the unclean of Nero's court. What made Petronious fair and all this foul? Surely not moral nor religious restraint, as we conceive them; surely it was the power of good taste. I know a young man—yes, another, O fathers! —a friend of mine. He is susceptible to influence; he is sociable in habit; he is without conventional religious stay or restraint; he is free of many of the notions that go to make up its morality; he does not even have instinctive recognition of all the finer moral laws. On a time this young man was thrown freely into the companionship of certain of the unclean; but the mere unæsthetic ugliness of their life and their ways revolted him, so that his soul was saved. And I know another like him and another.

The potency of beauty as an agent of salvation in individual lives is not to be denied, but can it regenerate a world? This question, like so many others, cannot be precisely answered. An answer depends first of all upon one's notion of a regenerate world. If that is of a world freed from strife and pain, from tragedy, I should say that neither beauty nor any other power can ever bring it to pass. By my notion of a world beautiful is very different from that of a "good" world, in the common sense. And indeed, I hold the latter in much the same contempt that is implied when one apologizes for another, "O, but he is good-hearted and well-meaning." It is just a well-meant world.

If we change the question: can a leaven of beauty permeate and make beautiful our world? Again these is no answer. Only time can show. But I believe that it can; and the reasons for the faith that is in me are the visions which men have seen of that beautiful world, and the power of beautiful lives which I have felt, and the potency of beautiful ideals to make lives beautiful.

Finally, what are the living means to salvation through beauty? Here once again the young man turns to his experience. Even if there be no one power working for righteousness in the universe, yet there are powers in it. The young man has felt them. Powers of evil and powers of good and powers of mens' personalities,—all combatting one another,

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striving for mastery of him. There are impulses of duty calling for direction. There are impulses to act calling for motive. He sees, too, that life means action; that action means war; that war means the survival of the fittest. And being but a young man and yet a barbarian, he girds himself to do battle. It is his duty to fight for his beautiful and to strive to make it conqueror among all beauties. And so the impulse of duty finds direction; and the impulse to act finds motive; and the ethical life finds its motif; and the principle of life, which is war, is not esteemed an evil thing nor a God's mistake. This is the egotistic, the individualistic principle.

Of all potencies for the moulding of life, human personality is the greatest. Through the influence of man upon man, if at all, is to be wrought the world's salvation. We are too old and worldy civilized for a new Redeemer. The power of religion as supernaturalism is passed away; hereafter religion must mean humanism. The crying need is for men and men and men who shall be apostles of beauty, each a redeemer in his kingdom. This means wars of kingdoms, conquests and defeats; but it is the only way.

I have seen some such men. I have felt their influence and the glory of it, and have seen how it has wrought regeneration. And I have seen the world, the brute world, turn and strike with lies and slander when its shame has been revealed. And I have seen young men and young women sorrowing because the lord of their kingdom was taken from them. But I think some of them have carried away its beauties with them to deck new kingdoms.

Now this is the altruistic principle: that the conqueror loses himself and his personality in that he conquers. For if my beautiful is to conquer and become the living beautiful of the whole world, it must be appropriated by all men, and then it is no longer mine. So it comes to pass that "whosoever shall seek to save his life shall lose it." Nevertheless, it is the duty of each, as it is the law of nature, that each shall fight for his life.

So the spring of salvation is the Beautiful.

BOSTON, MASS. H. B. ALEXANDER.

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DISCUSSION.

REMARKS ON PROF. LEUBA'S CRITICISMS.

The INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS is not the place to carry on a too elaborate discussion regarding a technical question in abnormal psychology, but since I have been offered the opportunity for some remarks upon Prof. Leuba's criticism, in the October number, of my Report on the Piper case, it may not be out of place to comment upon the matter briefly. I must remark, however, that his frank recognition of the scientific character of the work, the admission that some of the incidents are at least suggestive of something unusual, and the evident care with which he has read the detailed record, something which it is hard to induce psychologists generally to do, make it an ungrateful task to enter into any defence of my interpretation of the phenomena in that Report. In fact, I shall not here say a word in defence of the spiritistic theory, as I do not think this defence is nearly so important as the work of experimenting and putting into scientific shape and record the facts that purport to have some sort of supernormal explanation. It was due to the apparent character of the facts to test the theory which they suggest, while the most important task was to have scientific method applied to them in both the record and the analysis, whether the conclusion presented is ever verified or not. All that I shall endeavor to do is to correct various errors of statement and representation which might prevent the reader of Prof. Leuba's discussion from going to the Report to judge the facts for himself. There are some general remarks to make before going into details.

1. The reader will observe in a careful reading of Prof. Leuba's criticism that his general treatment of the incidents labors under a serious misunderstanding of the grounds on which many of the incidents were spoken of as true. In spite of his recognition that I was not attempting to demonstrate spiritism, Prof. Leuba has treated many of the incidents as if I were assuming them to be evidence because they were true. I was very careful to say explicitly (pp. 116-117, 293) that I was *testing*, not proving, the spiritistic hypothesis. I had before

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me the alternatives of fraud, secondary personality, and telepathy, with perhaps the conjunction of the last two. Refusing to discuss the first, it was my duty, after showing that subliminal guessing had been excluded along with suggestion from myself, to examine every fact, important or trivial, with reference to its explicability by the hypothesis which I had proposed to test. This policy does not imply that I was treating every true incident as evidence. I explicitly said that I did not so treat them (p. 293). If I had been demonstrating the spiritistic hypothesis I should have been obliged to isolate the evidential from the true non-evidential incidents, and to have allowed the latter to be explained by other suppositions. But I was dealing with both an evidential and an explanatory problem. The evidential aspect may require discrimination between the various types of data offered, but the explanatory aspect will not permit this. The test of an hypothesis is what it will consistently explain throughout the total mass of material. If it will not explain certain facts it is defective and some other hypothesis has to be substituted. I should have done a very foolish thing, when avowedly testing a theory, if I had only picked out the evidential incidents and ignored those which were equally explicable by it though not qualified to prove it. Prof. Leuba has evaded the conception of the problem which I had explicitly formulated and treated the details as if I was regarding many of them as evidence because they were true.

2. Probably the most important reason for Prof. Leuba's failure to see the point of view from which I was discussing the problem is the circumstance that he has not remarked the point of view from which the spiritistic hypothesis was conceived. I had explicitly stated (pp. 16-17, 246, 250) that I had formed my conclusion upon a wider record of facts than my Report, as I was in duty bound to do, and was simply applying the hypothesis so obtained to the incidents of my record to test it in detail. Prof. Leuba does not reckon with this fact in any respect, and tacitly or openly implies that I was assuming incidents to be evidential which in fact I had no more treated as such than he would do. In testing an hypothesis, all facts have to be treated alike; in the true, both the evidential and the non-evidential, and in the false, their consistency with the main hypothesis through rational adjuncts.

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3. The whole weakness of Prof. Leuba's position is apparent in his treatment of what is false in the record. He calls attention to the false incidents without for one moment asking the question how they can, in the form in which they occur, be compatible with any of his hypotheses. Nor does he make it clear to the reader, as he should have done, that I had fully considered the false incidents. In fact, Prof. Leuba says: "The writer of the Report goes over the incidents which have, or might have, evidential value; the rest, *i. e.*, the false and irrelevant, is passed over unmentioned." I was especially careful throughout the Report in my Notes and Summaries to call explicit attention to the false incidents, so that I should not be charged with this very neglect, and I gave a most careful discussion of them in their relation to the spiritistic hypothesis (pp. 214-238). The reader will note that, in stating the "main advantages" of the spiritistic theory, Prof. Leuba omits to mention this consideration of "Mistakes and Confusions," though he specifies the arguments from the "Unity of Consciousness" and from the "Dramatic Play of Personality."

4. Almost every objection which Prof. Leuba presents against the Report was anticipated and answered by the experiments recorded in Appendix IV of the Report (pp. 537-623), and there is not the slightest evidence in Prof. Leuba's discussion that he has even looked at this set of experiments. My position and the evidential question will not be appreciated until these experiments are studied with the same psychological care that is due to the experiments with Mrs. Piper, and which Prof. Leuba has read with more care than the usual psychologist.

5. The close of Prof. Leuba's discussion makes it very clear that he thinks, if the spiritistic theory be adopted, the facts attest such a meagre existence that most of us would wish to be delivered from it. In this view he shows very distinctly what he missed by not examining Appendix IV with reference to this very point; for I there record experiments undertaken for the very purpose of showing that rational living persons would choose incidents to prove their identity that indicated nothing of their normal life at the time, and the result showed that, if Prof. Leuba's mode of interpretation and remark have any justification whatever, he would have to conclude that the "communicators" in those experiments, professors and students in Columbia University, were insane, and that the remarks and

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defective memories of some of the receivers even are laughable. Prof. Leuba's observations expose him to the accusation of not having studied the nature of the evidence which will prove personal identity and exclude fraud, chance, and suggestion.

6. Prof. Leuba notes what many critics neglect to observe in my discussion of the spiritistic theory, namely, that a most essential feature of it is the view that abnormal mental conditions prevail on the "other side" as necessary for communication, but he regards the view as a "damning supposition," though it seems essential. But Prof. Leuba does not indicate a single scientific reason for thus rejecting the supposition. He gives it a merely *ad captandum* rejection, with the assurance that the scientific plebs will accept the rejection without question. But what evidence has he that such a supposition is false? How would he prove a negative here? I grant that the supposition cannot be made without reasons, but it is equally certain that no man has any right without equally explicit reasons to deny or ridicule it. I was very careful to point out both *a priori* and empirical reasons for my supposition (pp. 284-285, 643-649), and this fact should have been recognized in any statement of my position. I showed that the conditions must be complex and not simple, and that we have no reason to suppose that the conditions for communication have the stability of our mechanical methods of communication through space. To have all messages clear and free from mistake there would have to be a constant and perfect adjustment between three sets of conditions: (1) The physical and mental condition of the medium; (2) the mental condition of the "communicator;" (3) the relation between two supposed modes of existence which must render communication more difficult than between living persons. Prof. Leuba forgets to note that, without motor vocalization, very little intelligent communication can be mediated between the living, and that little only by means of common experiences and symbols previously agreed upon. All communications from a transcendental world must involve some effect in our physical world and the most probable source of such effects must be the human organism, and there is no guarantee that this should be a very perfect instrument for any consciousness but the incarnate. It is more than possible that such a medium would offer almost insurmountable obstacles to any communications whatever, to say nothing of their being clear and without mistake. Prof. Leuba

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shows an inclination to demand a greater freedom from error in the message than any scientific man can make. The proper duty, however, of the scientific man is to explain the true facts that are obtained and not to make up his mind against the case on the ground of what is not obtained. If the positive evidence justifies a belief in the supernormal, the mistakes and omissions are not objections, but an additional problem.

7. In rejecting the argument from "selectiveness" against telepathy Prof. Leuba wholly misunderstands my statements about it and the point of view which I took in it and which every psychologist must take in it when estimating telepathy. I grant all the "selectiveness" you please for secondary personality when you are dealing with the subject's own experiences. But it is another thing when you are dealing with telepathic subjects. Secondary personality means that your selected content is mnemonic in its nature or constructive along the lines of the subject's normal experience. Telepathy, assuming it possible, involves access to other minds, and if it is selective here it is not confined to the present active states of consciousness, as it would be on mechanical or dynamic principles. The selectiveness about which I was talking did not mean that the selective process was carried on after the telepathic acquisition of the fact; for this would imply that much more had been acquired. But it meant that the telepathic process, if admissible as an explanation of the record, had to be supposed to imitate exactly what a surviving consciousness would necessarily be expected to do, and then face mistakes incompatible with the omniscient powers assumed to explain the facts actually selected. Prof. Leuba does not meet this issue by referring to the selectiveness of secondary personality, which I had explicitly granted and had even expressed the willingness to regard the trance personalities as nothing else.

8. In the matter of estimating evidence Prof. Leuba has totally evaded the fundamental value of confused incidents and the possibility of establishing personal identity on them as well, or even better than on other and clear facts. There are no better means of discrediting chance, suggestion, and fraud than by certain types of confused and erroneous messages. Prof. Leuba's criticism along this line shows no empirical evidence upon which to base his judgment. I had anticipated his whole plan of criticism and met it by special experiments to show that

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confused incidents and the barest hints, far less specific than in the Piper phenomena, were sufficient to establish identity and to exclude chance and suggestion. This was in Appendix IV, not noticed by my critic, where occasional instances of fragmentary messages between living persons succeeded well and the most specific and clear messages failed (pp. 586-590). The same phenomenon is frequently observable in this record between pp. 608 and 623 inclusive. I called special attention to this fact on p. 268 of my report and italicized one very interesting instance bearing upon the point at issue, namely, "'Question 7, p. 619," where the confusion was worse than in many of the Piper incidents and yet was the first source of identification.

9. There are a number of gratuitous references to "affective influences" and "unconscious influence" which it would be hard to prove, but which are more useful for imputing weakness than for making out a scientific argument on the other side. It is strange that scientific men always despise emotions when they are in favor of religion or a future life, but do not reckon with them in skepticism. I have never seen a monopoly of cool judgment on the side of doubt, but scientific men like to play Stoics in religious matters when this is not their attitude in any other relation of life. It seems to be good *ad populum* argument to impeach spiritists for "affective influences" without empirical evidence that this applies in the concrete case, assuming all the while that skepticism is an unprejudiced judge. Apropos of this assumed exemption of the skeptic from "affective influences" my critic says: "Let us rather listen to the conclusion of those who have only read and not witnessed." What kind of science is this? Here is advice to scientific men not to investigate and experiment for themselves, but to condemn *a priori* those who do! This is all the more remarkable from the fact that it comes from a man who is himself a psychologist and who is not supposed to form any convictions without personal investigation and experiment.

10. I should notice a number of misconceptions and errors of statement which the reader of the discussion would not remark without a careful study of my Report.

In regard to the incident about "tokens" Prof. Leuba's interpretation that it refers to "token of friendship" is not borne out by the text. It is invention pure and simple, arising out of an association in his own memory about the significance of

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the word, while the text alludes to the "communicator's having tokens which he *recollects* and in the next sentence refers to a photo in his "collection." If Prof. Leuba does not want me to complete the incidents to which the "communicator" apparently refers, he must not add to the actual record of facts ideas that are neither expressed nor implied in it. This is evading the force of the facts by invention. Then, again, I did not say or imply that it was a "wonderful incident." I only said that it was "interesting."

Prof. Leuba's remark that the second passage quoted by him "seems clearly within the possibilities of invention" is subject to the following comments: (a) It is not found on the pages mentioned; (b) I nowhere called it "remarkable," as I am said to have done; (c) It was not deemed or represented by me as such; (d) My first notes rejected the passage as false or nonsense. More careful inquiries proved many of the incidents true and I merely stated this fact without regarding them as either remarkable or evidential. The passage referred to was deemed of so little value that I did not even refer to it in the summary of facts. (e) The question why the "communicator" did not specify more clearly the special use of his paper cutter is answered by what I said on pp. 214-238, 249, 284-285.

If the reader will examine the record carefully he will observe that Prof. Leuba's remarks about the McClellan incidents are largely *apriori*. No reasons are given for his rejection of their pertinence, while contextual considerations are wholly ignored by him. Appendix IV shows identification of personal identity on far less pertinent evidence and without the giving of any proper names. I am quite content to let any student who is familiar experimentally with such incidents decide between Prof. Leuba and myself on the supposition that the McClellan incidents are due either to chance guessing or suggestion.

My own position is that the only hypothesis which can give any difficulty to the student is that of conscious fraud, and I only wish it distinctly remembered that I refused in the Report, and still refuse, to discuss that hypothesis until some one endeavors to apply it in detail, with the adjuncts necessary to make it probable and intelligible. I had carefully considered sugges tion and guessing and would not waste time in applying them in detail (pp. 16-17, 124, 247-248). I consider that every intelligent man who experiments on this subject of guessing and sug-

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gestion will rather take refuge in fraud as the best means of giving trouble in this problem.

On the whole, I cannot complain of any desire by Prof. Leuba to do the Report an injustice. I am rather pleased with the general spirit that is shown toward such work, and I am not anxious to make proselytes. Every man must make up his own mind on the problem and scientific psychologists cannot adopt the hypothesis which I have defended until much more has been accomplished in this perplexing field, and until they have the opportunity to come into direct personal contact with experimentation in it. But I will say that there will be little opportunity granted them as long as they publicly ridicule it. There are no doubt fakirs and silly performances have given the conception by which the average intelligent man and scientist has to judge of the subject, and the contempt with which this has to be met only make respectable people conceal genuine phenomena from the knowledge of scientific men. The only way to find facts which really require investigation is to exhibit the kind of tact and respect which the student of abnormal psychology has always to show in the treatment of pathological phenomena. When this is done, our psychologists will find it convenient to avoid public ridicule of the subject and they may actually discover some interesting facts right at home.

JAMES H. HYSLOP.

NEW YORK.

REJOINDER TO PROF. HYSLOP.

I regret very much the erroneous statement of which Prof. Hyslop complains in Section 3 of his answer. I do not know how to account for it and I cannot now do better than offer an apology.

The recognition of the mistake just referred to does not, however, modify my opinion that the first part of the volume gives a wrong impression, *i. e.*, an impression much more favorable to the spiritistic hypothesis than the one derived from the complete records filling the second part of the book. I had simply stated my own observation and that of other persons. I have since then verified its correctness. But, as I had said no blame attaches to Prof. Hyslop on that score.

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The other remarks of Prof. Hyslop are either without any force or bear upon points which affect in no way the position I have taken in the discussion. I beg the reader's indulgence for a word of comment upon the issues raised in the sections of his answers indicated by the numerals below.

1 and 2. If I have treated some of the incidents as if Prof. Hyslop assumed them to be evidences merely because they were true, the fault is probably as much with him as with me. It is not always easy to find out what evidential weight he ascribes to true incidents. He seems to me at times to vacillate from what might be termed an official attitude, quite skeptical, to a private one, more receptive.

3 and 6. The requirements with which Prof. Hyslop would burden a reviewer are not to be endured. He need not suppose that, because no reason is adduced the writer has none to offer. If I called attention to the false incidents without discussing their compatibility with my hypothesis, and if I was content with merely stating that the supposition of an abnormal mental condition prevailing on the "other side" was a damning supposition, it is because I was writing a critical review and not an exhaustive treatise. For the same reason, I could not summarize his discussion on this last point. I might, however, have referred the reader to the pages of the Report on which the discussion is to be found. I have the same sufficient excuse to give for the omission of "Mistakes and Confusions" in mentioning the main advantages of the spiritistic theory. The arguments I have mentioned (p. 102) are, in my opinion, and, I believe, in his own, the *main* advantages, as I was careful to say. Had I added "Mistakes and Confusions" wtihout explaining how they could be used to the advantage of the spiritistic hypothesis, my readers could not possibly have appreciated their value for Prof. Hyslop's thesis.

4, 5 and 8. I had carefully read Appendix IV. I did not, however, find it either possible to discuss it or necessary to refer to it. I can reconcile my opinion with the facts brought out in that Appendix without being driven to the conclusion that the Columbia University students were insane; for, if there are many points of similarity between the experiments reported in Appendix IV and the alleged communications through Mrs. Piper, there are also many points of difference.

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The failure on my part to discuss the value of confused incidents and of errors should not be called an evasion; it is the outcome of economy of space in a paper already too long.

9. My remark upon the strong biassing influence of the feelings in the peculiar circumstances under which these experiments were carried on is no "*ad populum* argument." It is a sound psychological remark. Instead of recognizing its truth, Prof. Hyslop prefers to turn around and impute the same to the skeptic. That does not help his case.

My sentence, "Let us rather listen to the conclusions of those who have only read and not witnessed," is not to be construed as an *a priori* condemnation of the scientific men who investigate and experiment for themselves. My meaning would have been better expressed as follows: "Let us rather listen to the conclusions of those who have been observers at the sittings, but not sitters themselves." This might have been gathered from the tone of the whole paper and particularly from my remark when, speaking of suggestion (p. 105), I made it clear that to my mind those best fitted to appraise the evidence were neither the sitters nor the outsiders, but those present at the sittings as investigating observers.

10. I am still of opinion that the only meaning of the word *tokens* allowed by the context is the one it has in the phrase "token of friendship." Let the readers go to the text and decide for themselves (pp. 397, 411). I did not make Prof. Hyslop say that it was a "wonderful incident." It is my own opinion that I was expressing when I said that his interpretation of the word *token* made, out of a common utterance, a wonderful incident.

I made Prof. Hyslop ascribe more weight to the second passage I quoted than he actually did. He does, however, mention some of those incidents in the recapitulation (p. 88) and there he *seems* to give them a good deal of importance.

JAMES H. LEUBA.

BRYN MAWR COLLEGE.

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BOOK REVIEWS.

SPINOZA'S POLITICAL AND ETHICAL PHILOSOPHY. By Robert A. Duff, M.A., Lecturer on Moral and Political Philosophy in the University of Glasgow. Glasgow: James Machleose and Sons. 1903, pp. x, 516.

In his preface Mr. Duff informs his readers that the present work is only part of a larger undertaking upon which he has been engaged for many years, and which he hopes to complete with a critical and historical account of the sources of Spinoza's thought and its influence upon later thinkers. "This volume, however, forms a whole by itself, and attempts what seems the most pressing need in connection with Spinoza's philosophy, namely, an exposition of his ideas in their mutual relations, and an account, more or less systematic, of his view of the world and man" (p. vii). Mr. Duff has brought to his task an intimate knowledge of his author, an eminently sympathetic power of interpretation, and a living interest in the questions at issue. The result is a book of remarkable freshness, full of interest and stimulus, both for students of philosophy and for the wider circle of those who wish to know the outcome of the work of a great thinker upon moral, social, and religious questions.

As a preparation for the elucidation of Spinoza's ethical and political philosophy, Mr. Duff devotes the first half dozen chapters of his book to an exposition of his author's general philosophical position. These chapters contain an abundance of good things, and throw a suggestive light upon more than one point of difficulty. This, however, only heightens my regret that Mr. Duff has not seen his way to give a fuller and more systematic account of Spinoza's metaphysics. The adoption of Mr. Duff's interpretation involves a considerable modification of current views concerning Spinoza, while the limits to which he has restricted himself do not allow more than an indication of the writer's position without the discussion necessary for its justification. It may perhaps appear ungracious to immediately demand more of an author who has just given us a volume of over five hundred pages and who announces his intention of supplementing it with others. But Mr. Duff's mode of treatment is itself symptomatic of his fundamental conception of

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Spinoza's work, and is not dictated soley by limits of space. He holds that Spinoza's metaphysic is itself only incidental to his practical philosophy, and would on this ground justify its merely incidental exposition. "Spinoza," we are told, "had no interest in metaphysics for its own sake, while he was passionately interested in moral and political problems. He was a metaphysician at all only in the sense that he was resolute in thinking *out* the ideas, principles, and categories which are interwoven with all our practical endeavor, and the proper understanding of which is the condition of human welfare" (p. viii). It was only "because a man cannot love the good unless he knows it, that he was interested in speculative problems at all" (p. 236). But surely this definite subordination of Spinoza's metaphysics, which is central for Mr. Duff's interpretation of him, itself stands in need of further explanation and support. As understood and employed by Mr. Duff, it seems to me to lead to a one-sided view of his thought and a quite undue depreciation of the more logical and formal influences by which it was moulded. Spinoza has doubtless suffered much from the tendency of historians of philosophy to direct attention too exclusively to this side of his work to the neglect of its more concrete development in his treatment of the moral and social life. The geometrical method, a few metaphysical definitions, and the proposition that all determination is negation, have too often been represented as his entire philosophical stock in trade. It is well to be reminded that he gave to the world a philosophy of morals as well as a metaphysic, and worked out a theory of the State as well as a method of thought procedure. Mr. Duff has succeeded, too, in showing, I think, that valuable light can be thrown upon his fundamental conceptions themselves from his applications of them to moral and social life. Still we cannot afford on that account to lay on one side or too treat as of slight significance the logical and more formal side of his system. Yet this is what Mr. Duff appears to do. Of the method we are told that it was probably regarded by Spinoza as "a more directly convincing mode of statement rather than a more cogent kind of proof" (p. 4). We are asked to regard the definitions which stand in the forefront of the Ethics as merely the "media" of his thought, from which it is important to distinguish his "ideas" and "principles," on the ground that "both the terms and the meanings they bear in his system are to be

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found in other writers antecedent and contemporary with him? (p. 3). It is of course the most important function of the critic to distinguish between the living pulses of a writer's thought, upon which the special significance of his work depends, and the merely traditional modes of thought and expression which he employs. I cannot, however, see any justification for such a wholesale clearance of metaphysical baggage as Mr. Duff prescribes, or admit the validity of the criterion suggested for the separation of the vital from the non-vital elements. If such a test is to be applied, it must at all events be applied fairly all round. Thus, in Spinoza's case, the identification of reality and perfection, which Mr. Duff treats as an essential element in his thought, must follow the rest of the definitions. The truth, of course, is that none of the definitions really have the same meaning in the hands of less comprehensive thinkers that they have as elements in Spinoza's system. As Mr. Duff says, "What is peculiar to him is the power and insight with which he fuses into a coherent whole, elements drawn from very different and divergent schools of thought, and quickens old materials with new life by setting them in fresh relations." What I would urge is, that we should not begin our attempt to understand his system by setting aside one half of the materials, and that our final judgment upon its coherence must be mainly based upon Spinoza's ability or inability to harmonize the logical and ethical motives of his thought in his conception of reality. Looking at the system exclusively from its more concrete side, Mr. Duff naturally does not find many of the difficulties which have perplexed other expositors. To them it has often seemed that while aiming at a conception of reality as a concrete unity realized in differences the imperfections of his Logic often lead Spinoza to treat the unity as merely abstract. For Mr. Duff, if I understand him aright, there is no such ambiguity. The unity is throughout concrete. Similarly, some of the difficulties which have seemed to surround Spinoza's treatment of error and evil have no place in his interpretation.

Mr. Duff's exposition of Spinoza's views of man and the state seems to me a thoroughly good piece of work. He insists strongly on the necessity of reading together the ethics and the political treatises, if we would grasp the whole of Spinoza's moral theory. "Many of the problems which force themselves upon a student of the former work find an answer only in the

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latter, such questions as, the relation of the individual to society, the nature of rights, the function of law, the end and conditions of government, the connection between moral character and civic patriotism, the arguments for free thought, free speech, and religious toleration, and the relation of Church and State" (p. 4). The supreme function of the State is in fact to establish and maintain those conditions of life without which the supreme good of man, as determined in the Ethics, cannot be realized. In his account of the too often neglected political works Mr. Duff has succeeded to a remarkable extent in revivifying Spinoza's thought. He makes us appreciate the breadth and sanity of his view. He brings out the constant reference of all his political thinking to the psychological nature of man, which constitutes the special strength and interest of his work in a region of thought in which fictions have secured so large a following.

In conclusion, as an illustration of the novelty and illuminating character of some of Mr. Duff's interpretations, I would draw attention to his manner of disposing of a difficulty which has proved a stumbling-block to most of Spinoza's commentators. Having defined *cupiditas* as *appetitus* with the consciousness of it, Spinoza proceeds, "Whether a man is conscious of his *appetitus* or not, the *appetitus* still remains one and the same." This has, as far as I am aware, been universally held to imply that there is no essential difference between self-conscious human desires and blind propensions. Spinoza's meaning, Mr. Duff contends, is the very opposite of what is supposed. "What Spinoza is contending is not that there is no difference between *appetitus* in general and human desire, but that there is no difference between a humanum appetitum et cupiditatem.' . . . Spinoza's argument is that consciousness is itself part of that essential difference by which man is distinguished from other objects, and that all impulses, whether they are consciously present to the mind or not, are intrinsically different in man from what they are in anything else, and admit of being thought and willed" (p. 79).

JAMES GIBSON.

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DISSERTATIONS ON LEADING PHILOSOPHICAL TOPICS. By Alexander Bain, LL. D., Emeritus Professor of Logic, University of Aberdeen. London: Longman's Green, & Co., 1903. Pp. vi, 277.

The following notice was written before Dr. Bain's much regretted death in September last.

This volume contains fifteen papers of varying lengths, and written at different dates between 1876 and 1894. Fourteen of the papers—for which Dr. Bain himself is responsible— are offered by him as his "amends for inability to execute that thorough revision of The Emotions and the Will which, although at one time resolved upon, had to be abandoned" for reasons of health. The remaining paper is by Mr. Bradley, and as it is not referred to in the preface, and no one, I think, would learn merely from the list of contents that it was not written by Dr. Bain himself, it is with a small shock of surprise that one discovers it to be a reprint of a discussion in *Mind* by Mr. Bradley. This, however, is the only surprise which the book has in store, and it turns out to have a very natural explanation.

The veteran psychologist disclaims in advance an obligation "to vindicate whatever either critic or opponent may think fit to challenge or impugn," or "to reconcile seeming inconsistencies" in these Dissertations. The present reviewer has no intention to challenge or impugn the well-known views which Dr. Bain now offers to philosophical readers collected in a reprint. It would seem both impertinent and useless to suggest here detached criticisms on Essays most of which appeared years ago in *Mind,* and are expressly put forth by their author as a sort of supplement to his perhaps most important psychological work. Dr. Bain's views as a whole, and the criticisms passed upon him by other distinguished thinkers who do not agree with him, are already sufficiently well known to students of the Moral Sciences in England and Scotland. Dr. Bain—Humian, Associationist, and Psychological Hedonist—and his opponents, have had ample time and opportunity to explain and defend their respective positions and have not been backward in doing so. Again, nobody wants or expects, in this place, a discussion at large of the questions involved, which would entail traversing the whole field of philosophy. There does remain a service of criticism which is at once useful and still unrendered—that, namely, of summing up the

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author's views, and the criticisms they have received, and making a careful evaluation of both. By this students would be helped to reach a clear estimation both of the great value of much of Dr. Bain's work, and also of his weak points. This, however, would be impossible on the present occasion, because of the limits of space, if for no other reason. I confine myself, therefore, to trying to give some indication of the contents of the book.

All the essays except the last have already appeared in full in print. Of this last, "On the Pressure of Examinations," a part came out in "Criticism of a Protest Against Examinations," issued by Mr. Auberon Herbert (1888). In this essay Dr. Bain objects to the diatribes of Mr. Herbert as too unqualified, though he admits two defects in examinations: "the hasty cram at the last minute," and "the saving of laborious preparation by ingeniously circumventing the Examiners through a close study of their habits, and proclivities"! and he goes on to discuss in an interesting way many topics connected with examinations. In the last Essay but one—"The Scope of Anthropology and Its Relation to the Science of Mind"—which was read at the British Association in 1885 and has been published in *The Journal of the Anthropological Institute*, the author is chiefly employed in discussing the way in which the various inquiries grouped together as anthropological have to refer to, and make use of, Psychology.

The remaining Essays have all been printed in *Mind*. They deal with the meaning of "Existence" and Descartes' "Cogito," Moral Causation, Mill's Theory of Syllogism, Association of Controversies, some points in Ethics, and Mr. Bradley's views about Malevolence; and in a later paper—Physiological expression in Psychology—Dr. Bain again comes into conflict with Mr. Bradley, and, in addition, with Dr. Stout. We have also a discussion on the Definition and Demarcation of the Subject-Sciences. By Subject-Sciences Dr. Bain means what Cambridge philosophers, following Hume, call *Moral* Sciences—sciences which have to do with what Dr. Bain distinguishes, as the Subjective or Unextended or Material world (the consideration of which belongs in Hume's nomenclature to the *Physical* Sciences). Papers on the Empiricist Position, Pleasure and Pain, Definition and Problems of Consciousness, and The Respective Spheres and Mutual Helps of Introspection and Psycho-physical Experiment in Psychology complete the list.

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In the Essay on Descartes' "Cogito," Dr. Bain considers, somewhat discursively the general difficulty of dealing with abstractions such as Life, Force, and—above all—Existence. He thinks that Descartes' formula is illogical, and remarks that, "If the proposition 'I think' is divided into subject and predicate, the latter does not add anything to the former: as the 'I' includes all the parts and functions of body and mind, the predicate only repeats part of the meaning of the subject."

The dissertation on Moral Causation takes as text Mr. P. Proctor Alexander's "Moral Causation" (1875) described as "A Counterblast to Mill on Free Will." Dr. Bain is of course a convinced Determinist, according to him, "the meaning of could or ability [is]—*what would happen in certain circumstances.* To say I could do a thing, were I in a definite state of mind, commits me neither to Free Will nor necessity. The question is, what is that state of mind? . . . *You can if you will* has, however, a rhetorical value. To look at the question in the most advantageous light, the laws of the mind must be observed in other persons, and not in oneself."

In the paper on Syllogism, Mill's Theory is criticised and the conclusion reached that while what Dr. Bain calls Real or Material Deduction is substantially continuous with Induction and Classification, Syllogism belongs to another order of things and "gives a discipline apart."

The long chapter on Association Controversies (*Mind,* 1887) is, as might be expected, somewhat discursive. The author mentions with approval Professor Croom Robertson's article on the subject in the "Encyclopædia Britannica" and he gives a discussion of the difference of view between Dr. James Ward and Mr. Bradley on the one hand, and himself on the other, with regard to the relation between Association by Similarity and Association by Contiguity, which is interesting but perhaps a trifle antiquated. Various views of Wundt, Adamson and Mr. Spencer are also referred to.

The next dissertation—On some points in Ethics (*Mind,* 1883)—the only one in the volume with a distinctively ethical title, is a discussion of "the relations of our existing psychology, as a whole, to our existing Ethics," and is carried on with constant reference to Mr. Leslie Stephen's views, as put forward in "The Science of Ethics (published 1882). Most of the great topics of Ethics are touched upon, and considerable space is given to

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a discussion of Malevolence. Dr. Bain believes in the existence of Malevolence pure and simple, and holds that it is "not a derivative passion, but . . . one of the original elements of our nature." This view is combated in the reprint of Mr. Bradley's paper already referred to, and is followed by Dr. Bain's lengthy rejoinder.

Dr. Bain's view of the relations between the Moral Sciences is illustrated in his Essay on "Definition and Demarcation of the Subject-Sciences" (*Mind,* 1888), the plan of which he explains thus: "Selecting the four leading departments of subjective knowledge—Psychology, Logic, Ethics, Philosophy (Ontology and Metaphysics being so far synonymous)—I will discuss their domains severally by dwelling on the points of contact between each one and every other. I may say in advance that the end I have in view is to isolate the questions most suitable to be included in the designation 'Philosophy,' by withholding from it every topic that can be claimed with good reason by anyone of the three others. I therefore take them in couples, thus: (1) Psychology—Logic; (2) Psychology—Ethics; (3) (3) Psychology—Philosophy; (4) Logic—Philosophy." *Inter alia* he suggests an interesting explanation of one of Aristotle's "distinctive merits" in not overstepping "the legitimate boundaries of the several branches of knowledge treated by him." It is that having " actually composed systematic and exhaustive treatises of Psychology, Logic, Ethics and Metaphysics, he is under no temptation to aggrandize one at the expense of the others. He is in a position of perfect impartiality." There may be more in this than appears at first sight.

The next Essay is an attempt to give a fair and up-to-date statement of the Empiricist position which Dr. Bain takes up, and a discussion of opposing views. It is notable that he seems to consider the problem of validity to be the great question in dispute. "If I do not greatly mistake," he says, "the most definite contrast between empiricism and its opposite, stateable at the present stage, is, that Intuition, to whatever length it may be *suggestive*, is in no case *valid,* without the confirmation of experience. The empiricist may not quarrel with intuitive or innate ideas; his quarrel is with innate certainties." He says that the empiricist's test of validity is *Consistency* and formulates it thus: "*the absence of contradiction throughout a sufficiently wide range of conscious experience.*" This, however, seems to add something to the ordinary meaning of consistency.

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In the dissertation on "Physiological Expressions in Psychology" (*Mind,* 1891), Dr. Bain sets out to make "an inquiry into the exact limits of the reference to the bodily functions, in speaking of the mind." He disagrees with Dr. James Ward, Dr. Stout and Mr. Bradley, gives reasons "in favor of the hypothesis of physiological activity, in a transformed character, being carried into the mental sphere," and cites Mr. Spencer's "Psychology" as "a sustained testimony to the main contention" of the paper.

In the paper on "Pleasure and Pain" (*Mind,* 1892), we have a detailed discussion with many illustrative examples, and it is suggested as a general law *that every organ needs exercise or relishes such in proportion to its active endowment.* The dependence of pleasure on harmony and of pain on conflict is also recognized. The discussion concludes with a criticism of Mr. H. R. Marshall's position (as expounded in *Mind*) that "Pleasure and pain are determined by the relation between the energy given out and the energy received at any moment by the physical organs which determine the content of that moment; Pleasure resulting when the balance is on the side of the energy given out, and Pain when the balance is on the side of the energy received. When the amounts received and given are equal then we have the state of Indifference."

Of the remaining discussions on Consciousness, the relation of Introspection and Psycho-physical experiment, and the relations of Anthropology to Psychology, the first consists largely of a discussion of different definitions of Consciousness, and the other two seem to be more or less popular statements of views now generally accepted on the topics with which they deal. We may be able in various points to criticise Dr. Bain's views, but we owe it partly to himself that we are in a position to do so—there was a time within the memory of some of us, when his "Mental and Moral Science" was the very anchor of the mind to students of psychology in certain English-speaking universities; and his work in Psychology, even though transcended, has permanent value, as the work of an honest and original thinker, with a genuine and inexhaustible interest in his subject, powers of keen observation, a great simplicity, and a large grasp of facts—a thinker who has rendered important service in the advancement of his science.

E. E. Constance Jones.

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THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ELEMENTS OF RELIGIOUS FAITH. Lectures by Charles Carroll Everett, D. D. LL. D., late Bussey Professor of Theology in Harvard University, Edited by Edward Hale, Assistant Professor of Homiletics in the Divinity School of Harvard University. New York: The Macmillan Company. London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1902. Pp., 215.

Those who remember the genial personality of the revered author of this volume and all who from reading his books knew his mental subtlety, largeness of view and delicate humor will welcome this product of the loving diligence of some of his colleagues and students in the Divinity School of Harvard University. If it disappoints us, it is chiefly because our expectations of anything from such a source are unusually high—and because material made up of notes taken by students cannot be entirely satisfactory.

Dr. Everett's method is not dogmatic,but, as the title suggests, objective and psychological. His object is to find out what religion really is as matter of fact and history. He wishes to ascertain all (and only) the essential elements of religion, and also the highest forms or form of the same—that is, to reach an inclusive or extensive definition, and a typical one. I can only state here his results, with some incidental criticism.

At bottom, he finds religion to be a state of feeling. It is not an answer to a question, certainly not the question as to the origin of the world. "In the history of religion the cosmogonists come late; people did not wait for the religious feeling until they knew how the world was made" (p. 54). Nor is religion primarily a relation to the infinite—the conscious recognition "of the infinite as the object of religion comes late; religion does not begin with it" (p.83). Chapters i to iv are an elaboration of the thesis that religion is essentially feeling, along with an attempt to maintain the priority of feeling as contrasted with any intellectual process. The latter is a separate and (to the writer) questionable proposition. For instance, in speaking of the supernatural he says that religion is not only a belief in it, but a feeling toward it (p. 88)—but could there be feeling without belief (of some kind? Dr. Everett even speaks of feeling as filling gaps which the intellect cannot fill (p. 20). But is not this assigning specific intellectual functions to feeling? An illustration is given of what is meant, namely, fear in a dark room cre-

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ating an object for itself in the thought of a person under the bed or behind the door (p.96); but is there not always some sensible impression suggesting such an object, is it not the imagination (an intellectual factor) that creates the fear? Moreover, Dr. Everett speaks in other connections of feeling as being determined by the idea of its object (p. 15), and of our feeling toward the supernatural as varying with our thought of the supernatural (p. 89)—so that what his real view is is not quite clear. It may well be admitted that the elementary mental processes on which feeling depends often antedate any *reasoned account* of them; and perhaps this is all that is meant by saying that the religious feeling is in advance of intellectual recognition.

Chap. v and vi are a criticism of Spencer and Schleiermacher With chap. vii begins the inquiry, If religion is feeling, what kind of feeling? The answer is, Feeling toward the supernatural. The author cites the savage, whose religious feeling is aroused by some object which has influenced his life for good or for evil, without the medium of the physical organs through which such influence is ordinarily exercised, that is, by spirits of the dead, or by a plant or a stick or a stone, which, without any external, physical contact, but simply by good will or ill will, have made themselves felt in his life. "The action of such objects he considers divine or magical" (p. 87). But sometimes religious feeling is excited, not by the extraordinary, but by the usual and patent action of objects. For example, Agni and Poseidon (who, as Dr. Everett aptly says on p. 54, were not the creators of fire and the ocean, but personifications of their own power and majesty) excited veneration by their direct, sensible and, so to speak, natural influence. Again, the author's definition of religion as feeling toward the supernatural encounters difficulties when Buddhism is considered. Freely admitting that Buddhism is atheistic, he makes out that it is a religion because of its thought of a hereafter (pp. 88, 92). But it was just the hereafter as currently conceived (and as conceived by Buddhism itself) from which Buddhism was a way of deliverance; and it was the way of deliverance that created reverence and awe and transport—not the hereafter from which it was a means of escape. In a word, the supernatural in Buddhism is the occasion for the development of that religion, not the religion itself. And Dr. Everett admits in considering Spiritualism (or Spirit-

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ism) that belief in a hereafter does not constitute a religion. "On the contrary," he says, "the spiritualist bears himself with as little awe or reverence in the presence of the spirits of the departed as among the living" (p.47). The question is, whether it is not just this awe or reverence that is the touchstone, the essential mark of religion—whether the feeling goes out to Agni and Poseidon, to the Heavenly Father of the Christian, to the spirits of the departed (when they *do* awaken reverence and create a cult), to the non-composite whole, the *natura naturans* of Spinoza and Dr. Everett, or to the way of deliverance, the moral law, of the Buddhist.

The author classifies the supernatural as negative—the simple negation of the ordinary, definite content of the world with which we are familiar, this kind of negative being little more than a basis for superstition; and as positive, the basis or object of religion proper (pp. 93-107). After an interesting psychological analysis of the religious feelings, of which three types are made out, the self-centered, the God-centered and a third intermediate between the other two (chap. viii), the author passes on in chap. ix and the three remaining chapters of the book to consider in detail the content of the (positive) supernatural, particularly of the highest form of the same. Without clearly mediating the result, he finds the content in the three ideas of the reason—truth, goodness and beauty. Feelings toward these ideas are always essentially religious, but they only become religious proper when "to the thought of truth or goodness or beauty is joined the thought of the supernatural" (p. 132). Religion thus reaches a final definition as "the feeling toward the absolute Being in whom are united truth and goodness and beauty" (p. 132, cf. p. 208), This is, I presume, the typical definition of which the author was in search at the outset, the inclusive one being simply, "Feeling toward the supernatural." Each idea of the reason has a chapter devoted to it. By truth the author means unity, which he thinks is prejudged not found in the world. The good is a form of unity, and is supernatural because the principle of unity is supernatural. The supernatural basis of beauty is also maintained.

One feels that in these later arguments the standpoint of psychology and history is more or less abandoned, and is ready to welcome the more elaborate, philosophical treatment of the subject that may be expected in a second (to be published) vol-

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ume. I may say in closing that the question of particular interest to the readers of the JOURNAL, namely, of the relation of religion to morality, is not quite clearly treated. On the one hand, service to man is spoken of as the outcome of our relation to God (p. 129). On the other, it is said, "obedience and order grew out of religious culture, submission also; but not the moral sense, the impulse to righteousness" (p. 176). The view is also expressed th. t morality and religion arise from different centres, uniting only in their highest forms, and that to a great extent even the development of the higher ethics has taken place independently of religion (pp. 187, 188).

WILLIAM M. SALTER.

CHICAGO.

LA RELIGIONE MORALE DELL' UMANITA. Di Giovanni Cesca, Bologna: Ditta Nicola Zanichelli. 1902. Pp. viii, 584.

The appearance in considerable numbers of books treating of the possibility and the desirability of establishing a system of practical morality which shall be wholly independent of all theological dogma, is the sign of an ever-increasing interest in a problem as important as it is difficult. So long and so closely has moral teaching been associated with religious beliefs that many earnest and sincere persons are incredulous that the strands should ever be separated. But if a successful war is to be waged against the imposition or maintainance of religious tests as determining a teacher's qualification, and against all infringements of "*Lehre-freheit*," whether in the school, the college or the uinversity, it is essential that the advocates of liberty should be able to show that the exclusion of theological doctrine is perfectly compatible with the inclusion of a sound and vigorous moral training. France is leading the way by demonstrating that social ethics may be systematically taught in educational institutions under government control. In England, in spite of recent reactionary legislation, there is a growing feeling that in this direction only can a permanent solution of the present educational difficulty be found. In America there is a demand for a more scientific and more thorough instruction in the principles of morality, both in the primary and secondary schools, such instruction to be, of course, wholly

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secular. Such a work as this now under review shows that in Italy thoughtful men are confronting the same problem and using their best efforts to solve it.

The book of Signor Cesca deals with the subject of a non-theological morality as an urgent social requirement. Interesting and suggestive on many points, it is somewhat weakened by insistence on a crude and rather dogmatic phenomenalism, which, in the writer's opinion, is the final outcome of the work of the scientific spirit. That all philosophy other than a pure empiricism must lead to an acceptance of supernaturalism, and ultimately to a dogmatic theology, is a proposition the truth of which is open to question. The author, like many others of his school of thought, tacitly assumes that philosophical speculation is the opponent, rather than the compliment, of science. Something, too, of one-sidedness and prejudice may be detected in his account of the relation between doctrinal Christianity and the moral life of Christendom in the past and the present. On the other hand, the account given of the growth in recent times of extra-theological ethical work is excellent; the information offered in regard to Societies for Ethical Culture and similar moral agencies is very considerable and will be a complete revelation to those who still regard secularism as a merely negative movement. Signor Cesca's criticism of the various forms of what we may call agnostic credulity, such as the theories of Balfour, Kidd and James, which all seek to support religious faith by minimizing the claims of reason, are acute and vigorous.

It is, not unnaturally, the constructive part of the work which contains most debatable matter. Having demonstrated that for the future development of human society a non-theological "religion" is needed, he urges that such religion must be based on a recognition of the solidarity of human society and the subordination of the individual to the general welfare. There must thus be present to the mind of each person an ideal world, which he is to endeavor as far as possible to realize. For this, however, the self-development and free spontaneity of the individual are essential, and the institutions of the family, civic society, and the state are not to be abrogated but used rationally to further the good of all. It is only when the attempt is made to fill in this excellent framework that we find reason for doubting whether the results of Signor Cesca's moral system, as he foresees them, would be altogether desirable. Thus, in

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the domain of aesthetics he seems to urge that all works of plastic art are to have a moral purpose, and that only such poetry is to be written as will eschew all allusions that would be incomprehensible to the uneducated man. In regard to the economic order of society we learn that women are to be excluded from all industrial occupations other than those of the household, and from all the learned professions, save teaching and medicine—they being excepted on the rather curious ground that, "in both these, love with benevolent and careful attention are of more value than genius and talent." In regard to the cult of the new religion, moreover, it may safely be predicted that such family and civic rites as are here suggested, together with the establishment of an ethical priesthood, would certainly, and probably with great rapidity, bring about a reversion to most of those time-sanctioned customs and ceremonies which the author regards as injurious and reprehensible under Christianity. Other objections might be urged, but defects are inevitable in an imaginary construction of a new order of things; and, after all, they do not affect the soundness of the main thesis. The book, as a whole, may be read with pleasure and profit by all interested in the progress of social ethics.

E. Ritchie.

Halifax, N. S.

Il Pentimento e la Morale Ascetica. Di Zino Zini. Turin; Fratelli Bocca. 1902. P.xii, 232.

We find here a subject treated which has perhaps met with less attention from ethical writers than its importance merits, namely, the degree of value to be attached to remorse and repentance as factors in the moral life. The conclusion reached by Signor Zini is that this value is very small, and that the insistence upon the need for an acute sorrow for evil already committed, which is to be found in the doctrine and discipline of the Christian Church, has been unwholesome, on the whole, and productive of moral degradation and weakness of character, though it is admitted that under certain circumstances, for children and for those whose moral life is still very little developed, it may have an effect that to a limited extent is salutory. The tone of the book is moderate and philosophical, and the author

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makes good the claim put forward in the preface that it is written in the impartial and non-polemical spirit of objective criticism. There is, moreover, ample evidence of the wide range of the author's learning, and of his possession of a sound historical sense.

The survey and criticism of Catholic doctrine in relation to penitence, to asceticism, and to predestination, are careful and thorough. The arraignment of the Christian Church is indeed severe, but it would be hard for its apologists to maintain that it is unjustifiable; and it is chiefly from the writings of orthodox theologians and Church Fathers that the author has gathered his evidence. Signor Zini might well have included Calvinism in his discussion, for it has had its own doctrinal chamber of horrors, unrelieved even by the purgatorial fires of the Catholic. The artificial and often highly morbid character of the repentance brought about by such means, and the heterogeneity of the moral standard set up, with the inevitable pessimism and depression of spiritual vitality produced by the ascetic view of life, are forcibly delineated. It is, moreover, certainly true that ethical progress calls for the substitution of a rational for a purely emotional system of ethics, and that it is the latter which has hitherto been most closely bound up with religious systems of belief.

We may grant that the author fully establishes his thesis that remorse for evil already committed is not always an emotion to be unreservedly encouraged; but can we accept the conclusion that it is in its essence unreasonable and abnormal, and therefore out of place in the rational moral life? When there is moral sensitiveness—and assuredly callousness is not a sign of advanced morality—there must be grief for actions committed which conflict with the agent's consciousness of what ought to have been done. The assertion that repentance implies a desire that what is done should be undone, which is necessarily absurd and irrational, seems to be based merely on a loose use of language. The repentant man has regret, more or less intense, for what has happened—surely an emotional state in no way incompatible with the use of reason—and connecting this past event with himself as its cause, he views with disfavor his own character as far as it is revealed in the act in question. Such self-judgment is not only not adverse, but is even directly favorable to moral progress, if only there be a healthy reaction

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toward what is right in future conduct rather than a morbid brooding over the past failure. It is noticeable that only in a note are the views of Spinoza referred to, though his teaching in the "Ethics" on this subject is essentially the same as that here inculcated.

E. RITCHIE.

HALIFAX, N. S.

SOCIAL ORIGINS AND PRIMAL LAW. By Andrew Lang and J. J. Atkinson. London: Longmans Green & Co., 1903. Pp. 311.

This work, although it is bound up in one volume, is in reality two distinct and independent essays,—the first essay being Mr. Lang's, on "Social Origins," and the second, the late Mr. Atkinson's, on "Primal Law." In an introduction to the book Mr. Lang informs us how it has assumed its present shape. Mr. James Jasper Atkinson, he says, was born in India of Scottish parents, and, after completing his education in Scotland, went to New Caledonia, where some property had been bequeathed to him by his father; and, except for visits to Australia and a visit to England, he lived and died in the French colony. Mr. Atkinson took a deep interest in the singular laws and customs of the natives of the New Caledonian archipelago, and before he had made any acquaintance with the works of modern anthropologists, such as Mr. McLennan and Mr. Tylor, he wrote an account of native manners and customs. A study of modern anthropology widened his horizon and some time before his death he was engaged in speculations as to the origin of morality as regards the family. These speculations had been committed to manuscript and this manuscript—"Primal Law"—Mr. Atkinson, at the time of his death, committed to the care of his relative, Mr. Lang. In introducing Mr. Atkinson's essay to the public, Mr. Lang, has taken the opportunity of reviewing the present state of the discussion as to the beginning of the rules regulating marriage among savages.

It is remarkable to observe that among uncivilized races, no matter how low down in the scale of social life, there exists, in most cases, a code of rules regulating marriage of a much more elaborate and complicated character than is to be found among civilized men. How did these rules arise? In the most primitive

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stages of human society, when man was emerging from what we may call "beasthood," did marriage—the permanent cohabitation of man and woman, a cohabitation sanctioned by tribal custom—exist? Or, if marriage in this sense was non-existent, was promiscuity the rule? If promiscuity is the earliest form of sexual relationship, how did the prohibitions on primitive license arise? In the earliest times did men live in hordes, and, if so, was each horde bisected into exogamous and intermarrying moieties? Are the groups and kindreds commonly styled totemic earlier or later than the division into a pair of moieties or "phratries"? Do the totem-kins represent the results of an early form of exogamous custom, or are they additions to or consciously arranged subdivisions of the two exogamous moities? Is a past of group marriage or communal marriage proved by the terms for human relationships employed by backward races and by survivals in manner and custom? Most of these problems have been under discussion among anthropologists for the last forty years, and in spite of much fresh material collected during that period no satisfactory solution meeting with general acceptance has yet been reached. Each anthropologist has his own theory, which he is able to support with a variety of ingenious arguments and hypotheses. But in no case do the views of one anthropologist commend themselves in their entirety to another. The accumulation of pertinent facts is so small and the field for speculation is so wide that it is to be feared the origin of human marriage and the origin of many of the regulations which have grown up around it must always remain in the region of conjecture.

Mr. Lang's contribution to this volume is, in the main, occupied with an exposition and criticism of the various theories at present current among anthropologists as to the origin of marriage and of the restrictions which have grown up around it among uncivilized peoples. In the course of this review it becomes clear that one of the first duties of anthropologists is to try and arrive at some common understanding as to the technical terms employed by them in their discussions of the origins of the family and society. Each writer appears to have a terminology more or less peculiar to himself, and in many cases the terms selected are not of the happiest. "Most perplexing," says Mr. Lang, "is it to find words like clan, family, tribe, gens, phratry—words peculiar to civilized peoples, Greek, Roman or Celtic—applied to the society of savages. The term clan implies descent in the female

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line, says the late Mr. Dorsey, following Major Powell: but why take the Celtic term "clan" which has no such signification and confer it on what is really a totem kindred with descent in the female line? Next, several of the Siouan tribes are divided into two and one into three sub-tribes. Other tribes are composed of phratries and each sub-tribe or phratry composed of a number of gentes. Is there a distinction between the sub-tribes of some tribes and the phratries of others or not? Apparently there is not, but the method of nomenclature is most confusing."

Passing from Mr. Lang to Mr. Atkinson, it may be said that the most valuable part of his essay is the place which he assigns to sexual jealousy in determining the marital relations of primeval man. According to Mr. Atkinson our anthropoid ancestor was an unsocial animal, living as the gorilla now does, with several wives and driving out the young males from the family circle as soon as they approached sexual maturity. "The patriarch," says Mr. Atkinson, "had only one enemy whom he should dread, an enemy with each coming year more and more to be feared—deadly rivals of his own flesh and blood and the fruit of his loins—namely that neighbouring group of young males exiled by sexual jealousy from his own and similar family groups—a youthful band of brothers living together in forced celibacy or at most in polyandrous relation with some single female. A horde as yet weak in their impubescence they are, but they would when strength was gained with time inevitably wrench by combined attacks, renewed again and again, both wife and life from the paternal tyrant. But they themselves, after brief communistic enjoyment, would be segregated anew by the fierce fire of sexual jealousy, each survivor of the slaughter relapsing into lonely sovereignty, the head of the typical group with its characteristic feature of a single adult male member in antagonism with every other adult male." Mr. Atkinson cites his experience in New Caledonia to show that this is the kind of social life to be found among most mammals.

How is it possible for anything in the nature of a primal marriage law to arise under such circumstances? Mr. Atkinson attempts to answer this question by tracing the origin of brother and sister avoidance, common among uncivilized peoples and which he found in full force among the natives of New Caledonia. "In New Caledonia," says Mr. Atkinson, "all intercourse between a brother and sister by speech or sign is absolutely prohibited

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from a very early age. Whilst the girl will remain in the paternal home, the boy at the age of seven or eight (when not, as is usual, adopted by the maternal uncle) only comes there for his meals, partaken solely with the other males. He dwells until married in the large bachelors' hut, set apart for youths in all villages. Even after marriage, if brother and sister have to communicate on family matters, such communication must be made through the intermediary of a third person, nor can the sister enter the brother's hut, even after his marriage, despite the presence of the sister-in-law therein. If the two should unexpectedly meet in some narrow path, the girl will throw herself face downwards in the nearest bush whilst the boy will pass without turning his head, as if unaware of her presence." Such are some of the aspects of the great law of avoidance which runs through savage life. Mr. Atkinson considers it to be the primal social law and he traces its origin to the time when man began to emerge from his primitive condition as the solitary head of a group of females. He conjectures that at a certain stage of human development the solitary male, as he was advancing in years, permitted the mother to retain a young male within the group on condition that he abstained from all sexual relationships with the female members of the group. Restriction of intercourse between the young male and the females who would be in the relation of mother and sisters to him would be the most primitive rule of action. This restriction would inevitably take the form of avoiding those relations. Thus would arise the wide-spread custom of avoidance which, in Mr. Atkinson's opinion, is the primal matrimonial law. "It ordained," he says, "in the dawn of time a barrier between mother and son and brother and sister, and that ordinance is still binding on all mankind. The custom of avoidance explains the origin of exogamy or marriage outside the primitive group. It follows that if the young male had to aviod all the females within the group he was obliged to find a mate outside."

In this brief outline it is impossible to do justice to Mr. Atkinson's theory, and the space at my command forbids me to criticise it in detail. It is, of course, only a theory, but it is very ingeniously worked out, and exhibits a minute acquaintance with the fundamental facts of uncivilized life. The book, on the whole, is an excellent introduction to the study of the earliest forms of family life. It would have been still more useful if Mr. Lang, who is so competent a guide in these matters, had extended his

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criticism to what has been done by German writers in recent years on the subject of social origins.

W. D. MORRISON.

LONDON.

LIFE AND LABOR OF THE PEOPLE IN LONDON. Third Series. RELIGIOUS INFLUENCES, Volume VII. Summary, Final Volume: NOTES ON SOCIAL INFLUENCES AND CONCLUSION. By Charles Booth. London: Macmillan & Co. Limited, 1902.

Mr. Booth has completed his task of giving an account of the Life and Labor of the People of London. The complete work consists of the four volumes on Poverty and the five volumes on Industry, published some years back; seven volumes on Religious Influences, recently published, and a Final volume. Volume seven of the series on Religious Influences is a summary of the preceding six volumes and enables us in a short space to see the result of Mr. Booth's inquiry into the effects of religion in London. The inquiry has lasted years; it has been conducted with care, tact and sympathy and the result is summed up by Mr. Booth in a singularly calm and dispassionate way. To many persons his conclusions may come as a surprise. To sum them up again in a few words is not easy, but the total effect left on the mind of the reader is that religion in London is a matter of very small importance, that the amount of social good effected by it may exceed the amount of harm, but not to a very large extent; that the ordinary hardworking respectable citizen is in general hardly influenced by it at all—in short, that it is a thing for the parasites and supers and not for those who are trying to do the real business of life. Exceptions exist, of course; but the general result is that if all religious influences in London were suddenly annihilated the effect of said annihilation would be remarkably small. Such, at any rate, is one impression that the book gives; it is hard to know whether to feel glad or sorry at the result; many worthy people are striving to do good without religion and it would be tragic if it turned out that their non-religious efforts were of little value. On the other hand, it is awful to think of the number of persons who are engaged in religious work when they could do so much better work if the religion was omitted. The enormous sums too which are an-

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nually spent for religious purposes might so often be better employed in other ways. But whether we are glad or sorry at the result of Mr. Booth's inquiry, it is a great thing to have learned the truth. The religious influences in London have been weighed in the balance and found wanting. The various organized religions in London appear to be fairly equal in point of ineffectiveness, but they have different characteristics which Mr. Booth points out very shrewdly. The High Church appears to have only a very limited influence on the male sex, but it is more successful with women and children (p. 51). On the other hand, with regard to the Evangelical party, we read of (p. 52) "a blindly self-satisfied piety, hiding its head in the sand, narrow in its sympathies and entirely out of touch with the world." The Broad Church is said to offer (p. 53) "thought rather than doctrine and cool judgment rather than exaltation." The Congregationalists belong to the middle classes to the exclusion of the poor and the rich. The chief fault of their religious system is (p. 118) "that, beyond self-confidence, it is apt to engender a spirit of self satisfaction." The Baptists appear to be vigorous. "Minds of firm or perhaps coarse texture, unable to take sin, or anything else, lightly: such as these are apt to be fostered by middle-class education and habits, and to such of these as are spiritually awakened the Baptist faith appeals with force" (p. 125). In spite of energy, activity, enthusiasm and zeal "there is something hollow, unsatisfactory, and unreal about Wesleyanism as a religious influence" (p. 135). "It does seem as though the Unitarian view of the spiritual world in its relation to man awoke little response in the human soul, comparing in this respect unfavorably with even the most extravagant assertions of any African medicine man" (p. 146). Finally, as to Roman Catholicism, Mr. Booth sums up his impressions in the following words (p. 253): "With Catholicism, at any rate, and all the more because of the success that can be claimed, the question of underlying value arises. We are ready to doubt whether the price paid even by the individual soul for its religious endowment is not too high; and when we go on to measure the influence of this great Church on thought and on education, on social or on political life, hesitation ends. We refuse the professed blessing and rejoice to feel assured that the conversion of England to Roman Catholicism is a chimerical dream. It may be very unfair to lay stress on the

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possible injury to character in the case of this Church, and not in others; but the fact that most people in England habitually do so, regarding it, moreover, with jealous eyes as something foreign, only strengthens the impression that as a nation we are not likely to become Catholic."

The above extract will give some notion of the nice and careful sense of discrimination which Mr. Booth possesses. Religious influence can not be adequately measured by statistics, but his long statistical inquiries have no doubt assisted Mr. Booth to judge calmly and dispassionately. No doubt each sect feels aggrieved—many of them have already protested—but this only confirms one's belief in Mr. Booth's fairness.

The most striking characteristic of the volume of notes on social influences, which forms the concluding volume of the whole series, is that Mr. Booth has, as a result of seventeen years' labor, very little to say or suggest. The statistics are of great value; the facts lie before us. What ought to be done? is the natural question to ask. Mr. Booth cautiously offers a few suggestions for tackling the obvious and serious problems of drink, prostitution and so on, but he only proposes one important economic reform. In England fiscal changes are in the air. Mr. Booth highly commends and advocates the scheme for taxing site values put forward by a minority of the Commissioners on the Local Taxation Commission. Of the statistical facts the most interesting is the correlation between poverty, overcrowding, the birth-rate and the death-rate; but for some unexplained reason Mr. Booth has not troubled himself to work out the correlation co-efficient. Of the social facts the most interesting is the condemnation of Bank Holidays (p. 50). "Very rarely does one hear a good word for the Bank Holidays. The more common view is that they are a curse, and, as already stated, the mischievous results from a sexual point of view, due to a general abandonment of restraint, are frequently noted in our evidence. But the rough crush must act as a safeguard of a kind, although nothing, says one witness, can surpass the scenes of depravity and indecency that sometimes result." The evils of drink are more readily recognized than those of Bank Holidays. Mr. Booth is a moderate temperance reformer; he proposes nothing drastic. He suggests (p. 111) that the ideal which we should set before us "would be to improve the conditions under which alcoholic drinks are supplied to all classes

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of the community. That the standard of propriety in these public places should not only be set as high as possible, but should everywhere at best equal, and in poorer neighborhoods rise above, that ordinarily obtaining in the homes." A very moderate ideal!

Prostitution is always a curse, but the condition of the London streets is so much worse than that of great towns on the Continent that the problem is specially urgent. Mr. Booth makes an interesting proposal. He suggests (p. 129) that brothels should be persistently hunted down and prosecuted, while houses of accommodation should not be attacked but only watched, and at the same time places of resort should be permitted and open solicitation on the streets stopped. These steps might palliate the evil, but they cannot cure it, and, above all, they do not touch on the really vital question—that of disease.

The final volume also contains an abstract of the former seventeen volumes, an index and a map showing places of worship and public houses. Without question, Mr. Booth's great work will have a permanent value; a century hence it will be even more interesting than it is to-day. Mr. Booth has conferred a great benefit upon the present and the future generations of English-speaking people. He has already found one imitator in England. The best of all possible results would be that a host of imitators should spring up on both sides of the Atlantic, to offer Mr. Booth a more sincere form of flattery than is possible in mere words.

C. P. Sanger.

London.

The Pathway to Reality. Being the Gifford Lectures delivered in the University of St. Andrews in the session 1902-1903. By the Right Honorable R. B. Haldane, M. P., LL. D., K. C. London: John Murray, 1903. Pp. xix, 316.

These lectures were, Mr. Haldane tells us, delivered *ex tempore,* though with the help of carefully prepared notes, and are published exactly as they were delivered. The impromptu method, as he felt, offers the great advantage of enabling the lecturer to keep in touch with his audience. But when the

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spoken word becomes a book and the reader gains no elucidation by any look of bewilderment, the attendant dangers of vague phrasing and loose arrangement come full into view. Mr. Haldane's aim has been to describe for the plain man the vast building of Absolute Idealism as constructed by Plato, Aristotle, Kant and Hegel, whom he conceives as working in fundamental harmony; and in many ways he is well fitted for his task. His range of reading is extraordinarily wide, his sympathies many-sided, his command of expression remarkable, and his admiration for the great builders unfeigned. But too often the plain man, instead of realizing the principles of construction, will receive the impression of being whisked upstairs and downstairs with doors opened and shut in his face, until he would find it hard to say where a single passage led or what was the size of any room.

The main theorem upheld is that Reality will be found in the last resort to consist of one harmonious experience in which the mind thinking is indissolubly bound to the thing thought. This relation—call it that of thought to things, or of subject to object—is ultimate and unanalysable. We can only say that neither element can be reduced to the other, and yet that each is meaningless alone. *Something* must be present to consciousness,—here we have the "thing" side of the relation, and what we may call in logical language "the particular,"—but this something must have a character, and any character, any quality, any "*whatness*," involves the work of thought and may be described as "a universal." So much seems clear enough. But obscurity thickens when we come to details. Reality, we are told again and again, is essentially individual, and individuality unites the two "moments" of the universal and the particular. But Mr. Haldane has at least four main meanings for this word "individual," none of which is expressly distinguished. It stands for: (1) Any sensation recognized as such and singled out by itself, *e. g.*, the sensation "*red*." See p. 148. (2) What the plain man would call "*a thing*," that is to say, an x, which is conceived not as having for its content one quality alone, but as forming in some way or other a nucleus for many. See p. 173. (3) The ordinary finite *self*, i. e., a consciousness, conceived as one among many, *to* which things can be presented. See p. 150. (4) The ultimate "*experience*" described above. It is not clear why this last is called "individual." It may be either because it has the power

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of selecting points among all that is presented to it, and so individualizing its data—cf. sense (1). See pp. 112, 130. Or it may be because it is itself to be conceived as individual in sense (3). See pp. 162, 131. The matter is further complicated by isolated sayings hard to reconcile with either view. We are told, cf. (1), (2), and (3), that they are inadequate conceptions. But then, apparently, they could not maintain themselves at the standpoint of the ultimate experience. If so, in what sense can it be called "individual," after all?

Nor is it quite easy to see why Mr. Haldane pours such contempt on those who try to construct the world out of universals or speak of it as "a thick complexus of intelligible relations." Perhaps he only means that such attempts overlook the fact that the universals must *be*, as well as *be universals,* and further, that they must have a thinking principle to think them. But one cannot help suspecting that his real reason lies deeper, that he wants something more than all this, something that an Hegelian of Mr. McTaggart's type wants when he demands a union of selves. Again, we are told that "of course" the categories of the one and the many must be transcended, and yet the ultimate experience is spoken of as *unique,* as the experience of *one* subject.

Reality being thus defined, Truth, we are given to understand, consists in a perfectly harmonious general experience (pp. 70, foll.). But Mr. Haldane, in trying to establish this position, uses a two-edged argument. He points out that, as in the case of the stereoscope, a man may have an impression which is perfectly harmonious and clear and so far as it goes, and yet be deluded. This is an important point to make. But we must ask, if self-consistency is no guarantee for truth in the case of *one* individual, why should it be so any the more in the case of *all?* To bring in the concept of *all* is only to push the difficulty further back. Would a dream be the less a dream if it were universal?

After the general account of Reality and Truth, Mr. Haldane goes on to a criticism of the categories which the mind, presumably the finite mind, applies in its work. These categories are said to vary in value, but there is no attempt to work out in any detail their relation to one another. Nevertheless, this part of the book seems much more definite and systematic than the rest. One after another Mr. Haldane reviews the fields of

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Mathematics, Physics, Chemistry, Biology, and the study of Consciousness and Personality, and shows with many happy illustrations how each department uses conceptions which cannot be deduced from the earlier, and how the earlier deal with limited aspects alone and have no claim to be taken as adequate statements of reality. In the case of Physics, it is suggested that the attempt to construct a self-consistent world out of such abstractions must inevitably break down.

In his preface Mr. Haldane tells us that he hopes to show in a subsequent course the meaning of his plan for Conduct and Religion, and it is interesting, if premature, to forecast his view. We have distinct indications that the conceptions of the family, the state, and the species are to be taken as higher than that of the ordinary individual self. And, since we have already been led to suppose that this self is a mere transitory appearance, the State here set up for admiration looms before us as the *kaltes Ungeheuer* of Nietzsche's detestation, the monster that swallows up the living persons into its own vacuity. As to the reality of this creation, Mr. Haldane asks, "If the organism is real as a whole, why not the state as a whole?" But there is a sheaf of questions which he does not touch and which call for answers. Have we any reason whatever to conceive the State as possessing a point of consciousness of its own—a self—distinct from that of the individuals? If not, how can we, on Hegelian principles at least, call it more real than they? Is not the presence of a self, of consciousness, the sign and seal of a higher stage?

Of the other discussions that bear on Ethics the most important is that on Free Will. The best statement of Mr. Haldane's view is at the end of the book, pp. 298, foll. But throughout he insists, as Idealists do since Kant, that the freedom man desires is bound up with consciousness, that volition and intelligence are united. This does seem a ray of light in the darkness, but we have no analysis of the union. "If we could conceive an intelligence," he says, "which, in the act of knowledge, of being subject, was aware of itself as object, and of its object as one with it, then we should have *likewise* conceived a will that was wholly free." (Italics mine.) One feels inclined to emend this passage by omitting the *likewise* and reading "then, if we had a conception of this intelligence as also will, we should have

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conceived a will that was wholly free." Is not the element of *Approval* an essential part of Will? And how is the element of Approval to be found in Knowledge as such? But more urgent is the pressure of an old difficulty that remains behind. How is this ideal freedom connected with the ordinary freedom which the plain man supposes himself to possess? The freedom in the perfect world would surely not be the freedom *to go wrong*. Indeed, this perfect will would seem to be above choice of any kind, if choice involves the deliberation between better and worse. But the plain man's freedom does involve choice and often choice of the wrong. Is there a common element between wrongful choice and the unfettered perfect will? If so, what is it? Mr. Haldane simply identifies the two without a word of explanation (p. 299). To say, with all this unsolved, that "the problem of free will is founded upon a false metaphor and disappears," (p. 171), is indeed to cry Peace, peace, where there is no peace.

But criticism of such a kind on such a book is a thankless task. Mr. Haldane does not profess to attack the problems at their roots, but only to bring forward illuminating ideas. Yet it is in sympathy with his effort to spread the light that the criticisms are made.

F. MELIAN STAWELL.

LONDON.

LIFE IN MIND AND CONDUCT. Studies of Organic in Human Nature. By Henry Maudsley, M. D. London: Macmillan, 1902. Pp. xv, 444.

The main difficulty in criticising Dr. Maudsley's book lies in discovering why he wrote it, what new theory he has to advocate, or what good it would do to his readers supposing it attained a circulation equal to his highest hopes. The title tells us nothing. "Studies of Organic" is a particularly mysterious neologism. There is no preface, so one turns with hope to a section in the introduction summarized in the table of contents by the phrase "General aim of the enquiry." There, however, we read "There has been no thought of writing a methodical treatise nor of setting forth any system of doctrine. By bringing several subjects usually treated as if they were separate, and

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for the most part abstractly, into touch with the realities of organic life and into vital relations with one another, they are put into positions in which they may be safely left to suggest their own lessons. Nor is there anything new in the moral reflections made, which for the most part have been made over and over again." In short, there is no definite plan in the book at all. It consists merely of a rambling survey of human experience from Dr. Maudsley's well-known standpoint of medical materialism, written with a cocksureness and neglect of past and contemporary thinking which no one but a medical materialist would venture on. The section on Conscience is a fair specimen of the small portion of the work devoted to the discussion of "Ethical Theory and Practice." Here we learn that conscience has a physical basis which "is, of course, the exquisitively delicate pattern of fine cerebral reflexes which subserve the highest human feeling," a basis "so long flouted by moralists as materialistic blasphemy, and still loftily evaded by them as beneath the dignity of philosophical notice." Conscience is rudimentary and inchoate in savages and the lower sort of civilized men; it is subject to evolution and dissolution; is "defaced and denuded" by senile decay, and attains an abnormal sensitiveness in neurotic people. The section concludes with the "lessons of materialism." "If man does not obtain perfection through the improvement of his bodily nature he certainly will not obtain it at all in this world." People should also be very careful how they produce children. "It is a sober, and well might be a solemn lesson of materialism that as surely as bodies gravitate to the earth so surely do unwholesome moods of mind and states of body as well as native lameness and meanness of moral nature tend to breed infirmity, vice and madness in offspring." Truly, a moral reflection which has been "made over and over again." In this passage Dr. Maudsley is at least edifying. Very often he is quite the opposite. He is constantly indulging in the cynical pleasure of ripping up the seamy side of things. A favorite term of Dr. Maudsley's is "lust," and he is fond of illustrating various points of experience from some of the least pleasing aspects of human nature in a way which hardly renders his work suitable for family reading.

HENRY STURT.

OXFORD, ENGLAND.

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A HISTORY OF THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY. By Paul Janet and Gabriel Séailles. Translated by Ada Monahan, edited by Henry Jones, LL. D. Macmillan & Co. 1902. 2 vols.

"Cette histoire de la philosophie," writes Dr. Séailles, "est conçue sur un plan nouveau. Nous avons pris l' un apres l' autre, dans leur order dogmatique, les grands problèmes de la philosophie, et nous avons fait l' historique, en remarquant les origines, les phases diverses, enfin le point où ils sont arrivés aujourd'hui." The book is, he says, intended to be a class book for beginners. "Nous remontons aux sources, nous multiplions les textes, nous ne substituons pas des interpretations ingenieuses à la pensèe vraic des philosophes dont nous exposons la doctrine."

The first volume is devoted to Psychology, and contains ten chapters on: What is Philosophy, The Psychological Problem, The Senses and External Perception, Reason, Memory, The Association of Ideas, Language, The Feelings, Freedom, and Habit. The second volume is devoted to Ethics, Metaphysics and Theodicy, and contains two chapters on: The Ethical Problem in Ancient Times and The Ethical Problem in Modern Times; four chapters on: Scepticism and Certitude, Matter, Mind, and The Relation Between Matter and Mind; and three chapters on: The Religious Problem in Ancient and Mediæval Times, The Religious Problem in Modern Times, and The Problem of a Future Life.

The plan of the book, that of giving a 'historique' of the various problems, is plainly a good one; and it is somewhat strange that a method which has been employed so often with such success on individual philosophical points, should never till now have been employed in a systematic book. But it is to be regretted that the authors deliberately omitted to accompany their historique with a criticism. It is true that it is sometimes as difficult, if not more so, to understand the doctrine of a philosopher with regard to a given problem, as it is to solve the problem itself —and this is a position in which a reader of this book will not infrequently find himself—but at the same time if the intention is to write a history of philosophy, it is very necessary to explain the doctrines of philosophy, wherever that is possible; and though this may necessitate interpretation, ingenious or otherwise, it is difficult to understand how such explanations can be given without pointing out where and how their doctrines are right or

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wrong: that is, without criticism from a point of view which is assumed to be true, namely, from the philosophical standpoint of the authors. Possibly the authors felt that a sufficient element of criticism was supplied in the presence of the doctrines of philosophers who are many and by no means always in agreement: possibly, too, they may have felt that their own criticism would be no more exempt from objection than the doctrines of any of the philosophers whom they quote. And it is true that the plan of the book, by which the views of philosophers who disagree and often criticise one another, are presented upon the same problem, does remedy the defect to some extent. Yet even in this advantage there is a defect: for unless great care is taken in the use of the book, and unless the reader is careful to analyze and is helped by his teacher to analyze, there is a danger of his acquiring a spirit, not, it is true, of a "dogmatique etroit et outrecuidant," but of unwholesome eclecticism, and nothing for a beginner is more fatal than the habit, which is perhaps more than elsewhere conspicuous at philosophical debating societies, of criticising from a point of view that is not his own. The danger would have been lessened perhaps if the authors had supplied throughout the book one fixed point of view, and had criticised the various doctrines from that one point of view. For the great difficulty of philosophical teaching is to impress students with the necessity of their adopting a position of their own, whether or not they stick to it permanently.

But whatever can be urged on this score must be urged with all deference to the author and the editor, who are teachers of philosophy.

Another defect which arises out of the deliberately self-imposed limitation of the authors is that the problems and the doctrines of the various philosophers with regard to them are frequently but vaguely defined—indeed greater clearness would have necessitated the criticism of them by the authors—and the mistakes and inconsistencies are left for the student to discover; and the paraphrases given by the authors of the actual language of other philosophers are no more clear or unambiguous than is the actual language which is paraphrased. Yet for a beginner clearness is very important.

But in spite of these defects, the book, if it is used with care, and if the teacher is careful to insist upon the necessity of analysis, and to point out those things which the authors have

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omitted to point out, will prove no doubt of great utility. It supplies the student with the necessary texts of many philosophers, of whom otherwise he would know nothing, upon points which he will have to discuss, and also by the variety of doctrines set down, will, if he be a careful reader, stimulate him to be critical.

A. R. AINSWORTH.

LONDON.

MAN AND THE DIVINE ORDER. Essays in the Philosophy of Religion and in constructive Idealism. By Horatio W. Dresser. G. P. Putnam's Sons. New York and London. 1903.

This book is not to be criticised with the severer instrument of logic and technical philosophy. It is a system of lighter studies and reflections appealing to the general reader, while it also shows what the philosopher of the weightier pretensions might do to make his own work more attractive and influential. It shows wide reading, temperate and conciliatory judgment, scientific sympathy colored by due respect to the poetic and religious consciousness, and philosophic compass with its deeper purposes.

It is not a work for the academic man seeking a technical and scholastic solution of the great problems of the cosmos, but is adapted to the encouragement and satisfaction, perhaps, of earnest thought on the meaning and value of what one writer called "intellectual piety," and may well be read with profit by all who want the inspiration of general ideas without making themselves too responsible for various critical shades of meaning. The book will have all the more interest and usefulness from the fact that, whatever religious coloring it presents, it is or professes to be in entire accord with the spirit and results of science and sceptical inquiry. It rightly suggests that scepticism has as important a function in man's progress as any faith. There seems to be no concession to religious belief or emotion that does not first receive the assent of science. This attitude is the only hope for modern religious minds if they expect to save anything from the wreck of the past.

JAMES H. HYSLOP.

NEW YORK.

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ERRATA. (OCTOBER NUMBER.)

Page 119, twelfth line from top, for "Meanings" read "Meaning."
Page 123, fourteenth line from bottom, for "everything" read "anything."
Page 123, second line from bottom, for "Iron's" read "Irons'."
Page 124, eighteenth line from top, for "Having" read "Loving."
Page 125, insert quotation mark after "lyzable."
Page 125, fifth line from bottom, for "purely" read "surely."
Page 126, thirteenth line from top, for "psychical" read "physical."
Page 127, fifth line from top, for "seemed" read "seems."
Page 128, fifth line from top, for "restoration" read "realization."
Page 128, sixth line from top, for "quire" read "quires."

Articles by writers in Great Britain should be sent to
Prof. J. S. Mackenzie, Pendene, Llanishen, Cardiff, Wales.
Books to be reviewed, published in Great Britain, should be sent to
G. E. Moore, M. A., Trinity College, Cambridge, England.



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OXFORD UNION SOCIETY

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APRIL, 1904.

THE PROBLEM OF TELEOLOGY.*

A word by way of introduction on the imperfection of the philosophic vocabulary in respect to the subject under discussion, and the manifest inconveniences which spring from this imperfection. The term teleology signifies the science of ends. It is the counterpart of ætiology, or the science of causes. Now, in the case of cause, we have at our disposal for use the word cause itself, the word causation expressive of the action of a cause, and the invaluable word causality, denoting the principle itself or the nexus that subsists between a cause and its effect. In the case of the concept end we have the word itself and its Greek equivalent τέλος, and we have, as before said, the word which denotes the science that discusses or defines ends; but we have no term corresponding to causation and no unambiguous and accepted term corresponding to causality. In consequence we meet, even in careful philosophic writings, with such roundabout and unprecise phrases as "teleological causation," intended to describe the effect of a purpose or end in producing its own realization, whereas it can properly mean only the kind of causation which teleology, or the science of ends, has in view. But as the kind of causation which teleology has in view is manifold; as teleology is that branch of philosophy in which of all others the least agreement

*A paper read before the Philosophical Club of New York, January, 1904.

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has been achieved, the fundamental concepts of which are least clarified, it is evident that such a phrase as "teleological causation" is infelicitous and likely to be confusing. For the progress of any department of human knowledge, it is desirable that the vocabulary be unequivocal; that each term shall suggest one meaning and one only. The word teleology, according to a recent writer, suggests at least fourteen different meanings, and hence the use of teleological as a descriptive adjective is, to say the least, inconvenient. What we most require in our discussion is a counterpart of the term causality to designate the principle involved or the kind of nexus which connects means with end. The term finality is sometimes employed for this purpose. It is not free from objection because, in common parlance, it means "the quality or state of being final, or settled, or arranged." But it is also used with a more restricted philosophic connotation, in the sense just indicated, as the counterpart of causality, and I shall, in this sense, adopt it in my paper.

A critique of the principle of finality, then, is my task, or, rather, the outline of such a critique, for the limits of space at my disposal will hardly permit of more. There are two main positions which may be distinguished. The notion of finality may be employed as a principle for the scientific explanation of nature. It may be banished from the field of nature as a principle of explanation, though retained as a heuristic principle to cover the gaps that exist in our causal explanation, and be employed mainly in the ethical field. The first position is capable of being stated, and has been stated in various forms; by Paley, for instance, in his argument from "the marks of Design," by Lotze, and by the absolute idealists. Without entering into a consideration of these various positions, I shall briefly allude, for the sake of developing my own view, to that conception of finality which underlies the design argument as put forth by Paley. The gist of his argument has been put thus: A plurality of elements independent of each other, when so arranged as to produce a rational and valuable result, implies an architectonic intelligence which desired and fore-knew this

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result. The point to be noted is, that the stress is laid upon the entire independence of the elements; upon their deadness, their mutual uncongeniality, their lack of relation to one another. The force of Paley's argument depends on the fact of co-operation together with the circumstance that there is nothing in the nature of the co-operating members to account for the co-operation. The wheels and weights and hands and dial of a clock, the parts of any mechanism, for instance, have no intrinsic affinity for one another. Anyone who should examine each part singly, aside from a knowledge which he might have of the purpose in the mind of the mechanician, could never, by any stretch of the imagination, hit upon the shape or character of the machine in which this part is to perform its function. The relation of means to ends in this view of finality, therefore, is that the end or purpose is imprinted *ab extra;* that the means themselves are wholly incapable, when considered in themselves, of explaining the result to which, under outside constraint, they contribute. They are combined into purposeful operation by the despotism of extraneous mind. The passivity, the inertness, of the means is the evidence relied on to demonstrate that the rational and valuable result which they conspire to produce, is a result not of their own contriving, but can only be explained as due to the working of a superimposed intelligence. As opposed to this extrinsic notion of finality, we have in modern times the intrinsic notion as set forth in schemes of so-called immanent teleology, the point of which is to show that the plurality of elements are induced to combine by an inherent affinity; that plan or purpose is, as it were, self-active in them; that they are somehow themselves informed with spontaneous intelligence.

The finality doctrine, to which Paley gives blunt expression, was shaken long before the days of Darwin. But it cannot be denied that the prevalence of the Darwinian theory has served more and more to discredit the extrinsic view of finality, even in the popular estimation. The chief objections which Darwinism has advanced may be shortly summarized as follows: First, as to the method. The method of nature in the apparent prosecution of ends is not such as to argue the sure touch, the

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deliberate selectiveness of a planful intelligent author. The method of nature is marked by "wasteful prodigality and blundering indirection." It is compared, in a famous passage of Lange's "History of Materialism," to that of a hunter who should fire a million shots at random in every direction, finally in the millionth instance hitting the object of his pursuit. In such manner millions of seeds are wasted before one takes root; in millions of instances sentiency, intellectual and moral promise, are heedlessly crushed; and the results which nature achieves may be compared to the flowers that bloom in graveyards, or to the prolific vegetation which the traveler notes as he passes over some such battlefield as that of Gettysburg. The method then is characterized by wasteful prodigality and blundering indirection. The result is reached in haphazard, hit-or-miss fashion. It looks as if it were the outcome of a lucky chance rather than of purpose.

Secondly, the result achieved itself is far from answering what we should have expected if it had been the offspring of design and wisdom. Under this head belong the following considerations: *(a)* Forms of life are often imperfect in the sense of being ill-adjusted to the functions which they appear intended to fulfil. Of this the existence of rudimentary organs which impede rather than aid the living organism in which they are found, is a familiar example. *(b)* The living types which are satisfying in one sense—in the sense, namely, of being suited to their environment—are unsatisfying from another point of view, because the environment is not such as to call out or to tolerate what ideally we should consider the best. In popular phrase the strong survive, but not the good—not, at all events, the best. *(c)* There is no such thing as symmetrical progress. Progress is interrupted. Periods of progress are followed by periods of stagnation or of retrogression. The forward wave is checked, and in the reflux of the wave individuals, peoples and races are submerged. *(d)* In respect to such progress as there is, we have not the assurance that it will be continuous. In fact, the probabilities, regarded from a naturalistic point of view, are against its being so. If, nevertheless, we dare to affirm the hope that

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the forward movement will somewhere and somehow reach its perfect climax, it is on faith and not on the evidence of facts that we must rest such a hope. *(e)* Finally, Darwinism inverts the time relation of the terms denominated means and ends, and thus completely alters their significance. According to pre-Darwinian teleology, the idea of the end precedes, in time, the adoption of the means necessary to realize the end. The divine optician to whom is ascribed the construction of the human eye has in mind, to begin with, the result to be achieved, and then assembles the parts of the eye in such a way as to attain that result. From the Darwinian point of view the opposite is the case. An eye appears first, or the rudimentary beginnings of an eye. Its occurrence is due to chance, and thereafter as a consequence, as the effect of a cause, there comes into operation the function of seeing. The statement is no longer believed that we are equipped with eyes in order that we may see, but it is said that we see because we happen to have eyes. In other words, finality is reduced to causality. The *telos* is no longer a target nor a final cause of which means are the effect; but the so-called means have turned into mechanical causes, and the *telos* (no longer rightly so denominated) is their mechanical effect.

I am not prepared to say that Darwinism has triumphed along the whole line and routed its adversary, the old teleology, beyond the possibility of its repairing its fortunes. Darwinism does not account for the fact that nature is so ordered as to make a correspondence possible between organisms and environment. There are two series of so-called chance occurrences, between which there must be a certain parallelism in order to give room for adaptation. An environment must exist suitable to the maintenance of life forms, and the variations that occur in the organisms must be of such a kind as to correspond with the changing conditions of the environment. It is perfectly conceivable that variations might occur *ad infinitum* in the life forms which should have no relation to surrounding conditions, in which case organisms would wholly disappear. The fact that they do not disappear depends on a correspondence between two sets of variations so arranged that the struc-

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tural change shall appear at the propitious moment—at the moment when the environment is of such a kind as to provide the opportunity for the persistence and development of the living thing. Further, Darwinism does not account for the circumstance that, however brought about, there is, after all, an ascending scale of life forms; that is to say, of forms, which in their complexity, their more perfect integration and differentiation, increasingly correspond to the rational ideal of unity amid diversity. The Darwinian, indeed, is in a position to maintain that the concurrence of the two series of variations is fortuitous; that amid the infinite number of chances the chance of this concurrence is one; and, as to the ascending series of types, he is able to affirm, without convincing contradiction on our side, that it is a mere *lusus naturae,* or sport, which is perfectly compatible with the doctrine of chance, and does not of necessity point beyond it. The fundamental criticism that applies to Darwinism, when conceived of, not as a working hypothesis, but as a theory of life, is based on our inability to accept the notion of chance as final; or, more precisely, the causal interpretation of nature as final. We are therefore compelled to admit that the superintending intelligence of the old teleology as a possibility has not been excluded, but the demonstrative force of the argument from "the marks of Design" has been broken. The claims of that argument on our acceptance, on grounds of experience, have been incalculably diminished by the inverted view of the origin of organs to which Darwinism has given currency.

The problem of pre-Darwinian teleology turned about the question whether the course of nature gives evidence of the operation of a planful intelligence similar in kind to the human artificer, however different in degree. The human artificer,—mechanic, architect, optician, was ever in the background,—was indeed the model on which the conception of a supreme architectonic intelligence had been fashioned. That the anthropomorphic pattern can thus be extended to nature was rendered doubtful, as we have just seen by the Darwinian theory. Darwinism delivered a front attack on the old teleology and shook it to its foundations. But, at the same time, a

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far more insidious enemy appeared—an enemy who endeavored to destroy the teleological position by undermining it. If the question heretofore had been whether the principle of finality which is operative in human actions can be extended to nature, this new foe undertook to abolish the principle of finality from human action itself; to show that a true *telos,* a true purpose, even in the field of human conation, does not exist, and if not there, then nowhere else. If the Darwinian attack had made it questionable whether the human pattern can be applied to nature, the psychological attack undertook to reinterpret the human pattern itself, and to reduce finality, even in the case of man, to mere causality in disguise. The difficulty now is to justify the use of the term *telos* at all. For the notion of *telos,* or end, implies a certain finalness; implies, or seems to imply, a certain arrest in the ceaseless flux of antecedents and consequents; implies that the term of the causal series to which it is affixed stands forth at least in momentary fixity. And, if this be so, the prime question to decide is, whether there be such a thing as an end of pursuit for man; whether the so-called end is not an illusion. It is to this question that I shall now ask attention, and I shall endeavor to justify the notion of end by showing its relevancy and its indispensableness in the ethical field.

Kant defines an act of volition to be "an act which is determined by the anticipatory idea of the result of the act," but he fully admits that the forecast or anticipatory idea is the inevitable effect of precedent conditions, such as temperament, education—we should, perhaps, add heredity and the like; and in a well-known passage he says that if the whole history of the subject could be known, the voluntary acts of a man might be predicted with the same certainty as an eclipse. The metaphysical argumentation, by which he endeavors to reconcile this inflexible causality with freedom, need not here detain us.

The tendency of modern psychology is to proceed with more trenchant affirmation along the same path. All voluntary acts, we are told, depend on the memory of involuntary acts of the same sort previously performed. An impulsive quality or a tendency to issue in movements resides in all ideas what-

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soever, provided they possess a certain degree of intensity. The mystery of volition is not thus explained, but is generalized. The conative impulse, which we are accustomed to associate with certain ideas called ends, is the property of all ideas whatsoever. Any idea which can manage to occupy the focus of consciousness against its competitors is sure to eventuate in appropriate action. It is true there are certain cases in which William James, for instance, leaves room for an express fiat or consent, for a "sheer heave" of the will by means of which an idea naturally feebler is fortified and held in place; but when he speaks in this wise James speaks in the character of the metaphysician. The psychologist as a psychologist tends to abolish the notion of finality altogether; to submerge it in causality. Are we able to rescue the conception of finality from his hands? Are we able to define the notion in such a way as to satisfy the requirements of moral science and practice without affronting the causal conception of the physical scientist? It is this object which I have in mind. I should like to contribute toward justifying the concept of finality, primarily in view of and for the sake of its ethical uses. Before doing so I shall briefly refer to Paulsen's attempt to establish a basis for a new teleology, and then, as succinctly as possible, shall indicate my own thought.

Paulsen says we regard the result of a movement as an end, in case it was willed and in case the result is felt with satisfaction. As regards the former part of this definition, one is at a loss what to make of it. Paulsen lays down two requirements in defining *telos*. The first is that the result of an action was willed; the second that it is felt with satisfaction. But what does he understand by will? He expels from the notion of will the pre-existence in consciousness of the idea of the result. He thus assimilates the operation of volition in man to the movements of plants and even to the processes of crystallization. There remains, as the specific difference which distinguishes the ends pursued by human beings from results of physical movements like the processes of crystallization, just the fact that in the case of men the results achieved are felt with satisfaction. One gets the impression that Paulsen's

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voluntarism is a kind of automatism with sentiency, in the case of man and higher animals, superadded.

The problem is, how to account for the finality which attaches to an end. The procession of causes goes on without interruption, like a gang of prisoners marching in lock-step. Each cause takes hold of its effect; each effect becomes in turn cause of a subsequent effect. The notion of end implies that some terms of the series are singled out above others for the mind to rest on, and are conceived as themselves in a state of rest. Does feeling—the feeling of satisfaction of which Paulsen speaks—account for the repose, the arrest? But satisfaction is merely another name for the very phenomenon which we find it so difficult to grasp. Satisfaction means fullness, repletion; a cessation of the striving or outward-passing movement. Satisfaction is but another designation for the halt, however temporary, which we conceive to have taken place in the causal flux when we speak of ends; and to say, therefore, that the feeling of satisfaction explains the finality, is tantamount to saying that the feeling of a thing explains the thing. To transfer the arrest, as Paulsen seems to do, from the causal series to an essence or nature somehow standing aloof from the series and evaluating results as they appear, and to assert that this feeling is an ultimate datum beyond which we are not at liberty to extend our curiosity—this is but to elude the difficulty and not to remove it; for, in the first place, feeling, apart from the bodily changes and the mental representations of which it is the feeling, is perfectly empty. A feeling of satisfaction, or of a halt without a corresponding halt, having actually occurred, is inexplicable.

In the second place the feelings are purely subjective—infinitely variable from moment to moment even in the same individual, and in different individuals incomparable and incommensurable save in terms of the ideational elements to which they correspond. But an end or *telos* cannot be merely subjective any more than there can be a subjective cause. There cannot be such a thing as a cause private to the mental apprehension of a single individual. Every true cause is public; is objective. It is an antecedent which, though for the

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time being it may be recognized only by a single person of larger mental grasp than his fellows, must be capable of recognition by all rational beings when sufficiently developed to repeat the observations and follow the reasoning of the original discoverer. And in like manner there can be no private or subjective ends. A subjective end is a caprice or whimsy, and not an end at all. An end is an objective limit of pursuit; is a result which all normally constituted minds must accept as binding upon activity the moment they are able to understand the terms in which it is expressed. And, since the very nature of a *telos* is thus bound up with its objective validity, it follows that subjective feeling, infinitely variable as it is in the same individual and incommensurable as between different individuals, cannot supply the foundation on which to rest the conception of end.

It may be objected to this that the case, as it has just been put, against the feelings, is over-stated; that there are normal feelings of a physical kind, such as the gratification which follows the satisfaction of the appetites, normal æsthetic feelings, normal intellectual and moral feelings, such as the feeling of love and reverence toward parents and the like. My reply is, that even these feelings are by no means normal in the sense of being exactly alike in different individuals, but only in the sense that they exhibit a certain resemblance; and, aside from this, that their normal or objective character, so far as it exists, is borrowed from the objective changes in the external world or the objective ideational relations to which they correspond. It is not my purpose to depreciate the important role which the feelings play in the economy of human life. Without the feeling of rightness, as William James has truly said, rightness as such would be a mere neutral or cold mental perception, devoid of the power to warm the heart or to stir the will into action. The feelings are the response of our whole being to the sensory stimuli that come from without, and to the ideational appeals that derive from within. It may be that the very core of the mystery of our being is hidden in these responses. All I maintain is, that if we wish to become intelligible to one another, if we wish to secure normality in the feelings themselves and

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objectivity in the acts which they prompt, especially in the case of the higher class of feelings with which we are here concerned, we must resort to the ideational elements which they follow as satellites. And if there be such a thing as a feeling of satisfaction, it is in some note or characteristic combination which distinguishes the ideational elements that we must seek the justification of the conception of end, and not in the emotional counterpart of these ideational elements.

And now for the thesis which I wish to submit. The error generally committed, as I conceive, has been to seek for the *telos* along the line of a single causal series. The notion of *telos* is a bond that ties together a number of parallel causal series. An end may be defined as a term in a causal series, the existence of which, as end, depends on the simultaneous existence of corresponding or complementary terms, likewise ends, in other series. There is no such thing as a single end. An end is what it is only in a society of ends. By the same process and at the same instant in which it constitutes other ends, it becomes itself an end. The notion of an end is not properly orientated toward the series of antecedents which are called means leading up to it. These should more strictly be called causes producing their effect. The notion of end is properly orientated toward those simultaneous ends that flash up like answering lights in related series, beacon answering beacon as soon as the first torch of *telos* has been kindled. In fine, the concept end is a social concept; a systemic concept. The concept end cannot be justified by means of the category of sequence, namely, causality; but by means of the category of co-existence, namely, reciprocity. The several ends, it is true, lie each in its own causal series; but it is not their relation to the terms preceding them in the series that constitutes them ends, but their relation to parallel or complementary terms in other series with which they stand in systemic connection. An end is an element of a system, every other element of which is likwise an end.

Now, as member of a system, it may be considered in two ways: as a *terminus ad quem* and as a *terminus a quo*. As a *terminus ad quem*—that is, as constituted and sustained by the

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associate members of a system, it is an end in the strictest acceptation of the word. As a *terminus a quo*— that is, as helping to constitute and sustain the associate members of its system, it is also a means. Every end is both end and means, and means not in its relation to causal antecedents in the same series, but means in its relation to its co-relative ends. It is possible to use the word means in two senses. In common parlance, and even in philosophic writings, these senses are not distinguished as they ought to be, and hence often confusion results. The ethical vocabulary, as I have already remarked in the beginning, is not sufficiently elaborated or clarified. In the one sense means is equivalent to a precedent term in the causal sequence—a term which is merely ministerial, merely leads up to what follows; a part of the general flux in which there is no halt, no arrest; which lacks altogether the quality of finality. In the other sense the word signifies an element of a system containing an implicit cross-reference to corresponding terms of related causal sequences. It signifies a term or element which is at one and the same time means and end, which is both relatively dependent and relatively independent, and which in so far justifies the arrest, the halt, the quality of finality which we have been discussing, and which is the crux and mystery of all teleology.

The fallacies thus far met with are due, in my view of the matter, to the persistent attempt to reconcile causality and finality by deriving the latter from the former. The two are to be kept distinct. They stand for two separate principles. Finality is as much a part of the aboriginal equipment of the mind as causality. They are to be harmonized by showing that they apply to different sets of conditions or problems. The category of causality establishes the nexus of necessity between antecedent and consequent in the same causal sequence. The category of finality establishes a relation of unity or synthesis, or co-operation between different parallel and co-existent causal sequences. There is at least no contradiction, to my mind, in assuming a distinct point of view for the latter purpose. There is no contradiction in supposing that we are supplied with a separate mode for apprehending these cross-references between

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related terms of simultaneous causal series, just as we are supplied with a mode for apprehending the connection between anteriors and posteriors of the same series. If finality is an ultimate, we cannot of course explain it; but there is at least no contradiction to causality involved in supposing that certain terms, as they arise in the causal series, carry with them this earmark of cross-reference, and that this earmark or note is a factor not accounted for by precedent causes, though not at variance with them.

It is true that the gist of my contention, namely, that such a thing as a single end is unthinkable, is seemingly opposed to everyday experience. Do we not pursue isolated, marked-off ends all the time without at least the consciousness of their being connected with any congeners? We concentrate attention on the quest of food. The satisfaction of the appetite is for the time the only end we have in view, and we take the steps necessary to secure it; or we seek shelter and warmth, and for the time these are our ends; or some intellectual object is the aim. And how entirely it seems possible to restrict one's self to a single end appears to be proved by the example of the scholar who spends years of his life in the study of a minute point in philology, or of the scientific investigator who conducts experiment after experiment with a view to testing a single formula. Nevertheless reflection will show that appearances in this respect are deceitful. Even of the physical wants it holds true that each one of them, though it may come into consciousness singly, is conditioned by a complex structure or organism, and could only arise in connection with such an organism. There would be no such thing in the case of the higher animals at all events, as hunger and the quest for food which it incites, were there not also thirst, sexual desire, etc. Even physical need exists only in company with other needs, the physical end in the society of other ends. Still more is this true of the intellectual and volitional ends.

I have just used the word organism—used it reluctantly, and yet have been forced to use it for lack of a better. Yet it is necessary, at this last and most important turning point of my argument, to be careful lest by the associations which the word

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organism calls up, I may misrepresent and falsify the idea I wish to cenvey. I have said "physical ends" and "organism," meaning thereby the animal body. In reality I do not believe that we can properly speak of physical ends, or that the word organism can properly be applied to the animal body. An organism is not a substantive thing at all, but a spiritual idea. By organism we understand: 1. A system which completely expresses the plurality implicit in an underlying unity; the totality of the parts that make up the whole. 2. And, *per consequence,* a system of members, no one of which could be spared; each one of which is indispensable in its place and unique as expressing some aspect of the whole not expressed by its fellow members. 3. And again, *per consequence,* a system in which each member is both means and end in the sense above defined; is both *terminus ad quem,* constituted and supported by the system, and *terminus a quo,* constituting and supporting the system. Measured by these tests, it turns out that the so-called organisms are not true organisms. Of no living body can it be shown that it represents the total plurality implicit in an underlying unity. Of no living body can it be shown that its so-called organs are indispensable in their places to such an extent that some other possibly more perfect organs might not be substituted in their stead. Of no living body can it be shown that the various organs perfectly support and maintain one another in their functions; that they are so adapted to each other as to secure reciprocally the highest fulfilment of function. They are called organisms because, to some extent, but most inadequately, they approximate to or adumbrate to the scheme of relations which the term organism postulates; but they are not true organisms. They are not models upon which we are to fashion our conception of the organic relation. On the contrary, they borrow the distinction of being called organisms from the light of the purely spiritual organic idea, the illumination of which is reflected upon them.

It follows, and this is my final proposition, that the notion of end as being bound up with the notion of organism, exists in idea only and not in fact; that it cannot serve us in the busi-

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ness of explaining nature at all, but only of evaluating it; and that its principal use must be found in that field where ideas display their highest potency, namely, in the ethical field. The organic idea, the teleological idea, the principle of finality, is a directive of conduct. We are so to act as to convert human society into an organism, or rather ever to work in asymptotic approximation toward that ideal, though we know well that under finite conditions we shall never attain it. We are to regard each human being not as if he were already an end *per se,* but in such a way as to help him to become a *telos,* a true member of an organic system; that is to say, a personality, a distinctive self, unique in his expression of mental and moral possibility, and therefore indispensable in his place.

And it is in this direction that I see the lines of a new construction in ethics; of a new foundation for ethics. Not altruism, with its so-called good of others for an aim, nor egoism, with its *soi-disant* good of self, nor the Kantian formula, with the mathematical notion of equality underlying it; not the evolutionary formula, with its outlook on a general happiness which cannot even be defined, but just the idea of organism in its spiritual sense is, for me, the beginning of ethics—the beginning and the end. To express this highest idea, of which we are capable so far as possible in the finite material of human relations, is the aim. So act as to elicit what is autotelic (that is, mentally and morally unique) in the self of others, and thereby develop what is autotelic in thyself is the formula which I should choose.

The technical point of my paper lies in the contention that the end must not be sought in a single causal series; that there is no such thing as a single end, but that the very concept of end is social. The outcome, so far as the problem of teleology is concerned, is that there are no ends in nature, except such as ethically we read into nature. And therefore, also, there can be no such thing as an immanent teleology; for an immanent teleology would require that it be proved that the idea had also become fact—a proof which can never be furnished. The true field of teleology is in the realm of ethics. But after we have found and justified the concept *telos* there, we can then apply

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it, by way of interpretation and not of explanation, to the universe at large. We can dwell on such analogies to the organic idea as we see in the structure and functions of living bodies; we can contemplate the whole of nature as shimmering in the radiance of the ethical ideal. For the primacy belongs to the will, the crisis and climax of our being is in action, and the principle of finality which we find necessary for the regulation of conduct may, therefore, be extended for the purpose of ethical evaluation to the entire scheme of things.

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THE ETHICS OF PASSIVE RESISTANCE.

We are face to face in England to-day with a curious contretemps in educational matters, which is assuming considerable proportions. We have grown accustomed to such characteristic phenomena as "conscientious objectors" in respect to vaccination, and the objectors to medical attendance on the part of the "Peculiar People," and later in the case of "Faith-healers and "Christian Scientists." These cases have been so exceptional and isolated in this country that they have attracted comparatively little attention, and possibly may be more easily justified on the ground that they are not likely to become a "universal law," according to Kant, than the present movement. The revolution of feeling in England, however, threatens to become somewhat serious; and as it seems probable that it will increase rather than decrease in the course of time, it calls for consideration and comment. Already nearly ten thousand summonses have been issued, and it is said that there are not less than sixty thousand "Passive Resisters" in England. The movement has its political and its distinctively religious aspect, whilst being an educational problem. Its moral bearings and issues are those with which we are now immediately concerned, and possibly these are the most important in the long run. These issues are rendered still more

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important for the reason that although it might be shown that "Resisters" are fanatics, wrong-headed, seekers for a "cheap martyrdom," and "faddists," yet the facts that for the most part they are law-abiding citizens, who have never appeared before the magistrates as defaulters or criminals, and that they exert a wide-spread influence over the population, entitle them to respectful consideration and at least serious attention.

The actual ground of complaint or grievance need not here call for extended notice. The objection to the Education Acts of 1902 and 1903 is chiefly two-fold.[1] In the first place it is said that they do not provide adequate public control, and practically there is no direct representation on the educational authorities and boards of management. This is more entirely a question of politics, and we need not discuss it in this place. The other objection is that which is included in the Kenyon-Slaney clause, and that which immediately follows[2] which give the power of directing religious instruction in public elementary schools which are not provided by the educational authority to managers, who carry out the terms of the trust-deed subject to the decision of the bishop or other ecclesiastical authority as referee. Four out of six of these managers are appointed in accordance with the spirit and terms of the trust-deed. It thus eventuates that religious teaching, with the whole body of dogma and ritual that the schools in question were established to teach, is thrown upon the rates for maintenance, the buildings alone being contributed by the denomination whose doctrines are taught therein. The religious bodies of all persuasions are treated absolutely alike by this Act, and no charge of injustice can be brought against the Act, so far as its form is concerned, whatever its origin or intention. The "nonconformist conscience" is scandalized, however, at having to pay for teaching religious doctrine of any kind, or the tenets of any particular church, although there is no necessary objection to the teaching of morals, or of the Bible as literature. That the teaching of one Church should be devoted to the

[1] For the sake of brevity we omit the objection to the imposition of religious tests upon teachers.

[2] Education Act, 1902; Section 7, Paragraphs 6 and 7.

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"unchurching" of all others, and that such teaching should be supported out of the rates, is a special form of the grievance. If it be objected that the application of public money to purposes of which a section of the taxpayers do not approve is inevitable, the reply would be that in this case it is directly and specifically stated for what purpose the money will be used, and that such is not the case with Imperial taxation.

We have thus tried to state as simply and as briefly as possible the grievance which it is proposed to remedy by the "Passive Resisters," and it is considered by them serious enough to justify their action in breaking the law at the dictates of conscience.

Let us grant that the grievance is a real and genuine one, and that there is something to be resisted, and that the motives and desires of these persons are morally justifiable, all of which would have to be considered from other points of view in order to make a complete case, are these persons morally justified under the circumstances in resisting the legalized demands for payment of rates? This is the question to which we have to address ourselves. In this endeavor we have to consider whether law-breaking is in this case a violation of any moral law.

Some have sought to vindicate the conduct of "Passive Resisters" on the ground that the law provides an optional mode of payment. This has actually been stated in the courts. There is the voluntary mode of payment, by which the money is paid over on demand; and on the other hand, there is the mode of recovery by distraint, which the law provides, which relieves the conscience of the payer, inasmuch as he can say, "I do not willingly pay, but if the law compels me, you must come and take it." In either case the law is satisfied, and such is the meaning of "*Passive* Resistance."

The objections to this attitude are many. It may well be questioned if the payment of rates or taxes is voluntary at all, since the account is presented in the form of a demand, and not a polite request. Inasmuch as payment is compulsory in any case, is not Passive Resistance merely an awkward, expensive, and an inconvenient mode of payment for all concerned?

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Further, there can be no point or significance in the protest unless it is an act of law breaking. If it is nothing more than the choice of alternatives to which the law stands in an indifferent attitude, it seems to be absurd to throw needless obstacles in the way of the course of the law, since the result must be the same in either case. If "Resistance" means anything at all, it must mean resistance to an objectionable law that infringes upon the rights of conscience.

Besides these considerations, the wording of the warrant for distraint precludes any such supposition that distraint is a legalized form of payment. It is a summary measure (under the extension of the Act for Summary Jurisdiction) for the recovery of a lawful debt, payment of which has been refused.[1] Expert opinion supports the view that such resistance is illegal.

We may conclude therefore that Passive Resistance being a refusal to pay a legal charge is necessarily an illegal act.

The justification offered is invariably that the law of conscience, *i.e.*, the moral law, is superior to civil law, and that "we must obey God rather than man." For further support it is also adduced that whilst all other means of "killing the Act" should be tried, this will alone provide the remedy, and that civil and religious liberty has been won for us by acts which, whilst morally justifiable, were, according to the law of the times, illegal.

It will be convenient to take these reasons in reverse order. The examples that are generally adduced of lawlessness with a view to the overthrow of a harsh or unjust law are those of the resistance of the Parliament men to the Stuart kings, the action of the Puritan clergy in opposition to the Conventicle and Five Mile Acts, the case of John Hampden, the patriot, and the persistence in preaching on the part of John Bunyan and others. In recent years the violation of the Slave laws and the refusal to pay Church Rates are often given in support of

[1] The warrant for distraint contains these words: " . . . The said several sums have been duly demanded of them respectively, but they have not . . . paid the same sums . . . but they have refused and still do refuse to pay the same . . . and have not . . . shown to us sufficient cause for not paying the same."

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a defiance of the recognized law, with good moral intentions and results.

In reply to these instances and the argument they are brought forward to support, it must be pointed out that if such acts were justifiable in an age when the rights and liberties of the individual subject were not respected, and when they might have done something towards securing the privileges we now enjoy, it does not by any means follow that they are justifiable at the present time. Since we are in possession of the full privileges of citizenship, the franchise, the rights of free speech, freedom of the press, the facilities for influencing public opinion, and every opportunity of bringing others by the force of persuasion to our own point of view, the justification afforded by the actions of our ancestors does not hold. In fact, it is a somewhat unfortunate ground to take, for it only serves to show that we are unworthy of the efforts made by our fathers on our behalf, inasmuch as we have employed our privileges and opportunities to so little purpose. What may have been excusable and right under a tyranny, may be entirely wrong in a country that is endowed with so large a measure of freedom and enjoys so fully the advantages of democratic institutions.

We have in our hands, as all will allow, an exceptional and unprecedented degree of political liberty, and every thoughtful person will surely agree that whatever resistance is offered to an obnoxious measure, every constitutional resource should first be exhausted. It would lead us too far into the purely political aspect of the question to inquire if every resource has been tried and failed. The writer is of opinion that the merits of any truly righteous case will not fail to appeal to the enlightened common-sense of Englishmen sooner or later, and that the justice of any cause will most certainly, in time, working through constitutional methods, move public opinion, against which nothing can continue to stand or effectually resist.

In the meantime, is it the duty of non-conformists to resist the course of the law? "Passive Resistance" is not a criminal act unless it is organized and inducements are brought to

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bear upon others by those who "resist," with a view to secure their refusal to pay, in which case it amounts to conspiracy. Inasmuch as it is, however, in the eyes of the law a refusal, and therefore a violation of a legalized claim, it will be followed of necessity by some of the bad results of law-breaking. There will be a certain weakening of the authority of the law, especially as these acts are deliberate on the part of persons who are well competent to judge and calculate the results of their conduct. Whatever influence may be brought to bear prior to the passing of the measure into law, it is in the interests of good order and effective government that all citizens should maintain, uphold and respect the authority of the law. That the supremacy of the law as a whole should be honored is more important for the due development of persons as citizens and in political and social relations, than that an evil affecting a section, even an important section, should be remedied by the violation of the law.[4] If this movement continues to grow, one serious result will follow, viz.: that our police-courts will come to be regarded as somewhat more respectable for criminals, and for those with whom the officials of the law are having continual trouble. The presence of "Resisters" in the courts to answer to the charges of non-payment, whilst it may have something of the element of martyrdom, is likely to make the disgrace of appearing before the magistrates somewhat less in the eyes of criminals. If this objection is more fanciful than real, then must we adduce another argument. If "Passive Resistance" under the circumstances is right for those who believe in it, nevertheless some bad effects must be experienced, and we can hardly calculate what the end will be, or estimate the lengths to which these results may reach. Rightly or wrongly, there are sincere persons who conscientiously object to "secular instruction" as it is called, and they object not less emphatically to moral teaching without religion, and religion without dogma. This position may be unreasonable, but it may be a truly conscientious one. In the event of the "Passive Resisters" succeeding

[4] *Vide* "Principles of Political Obligation," by T. H. Green, Section 144.

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in turning the tables on their opponents, they will have given them direct encouragement, on their part, to "resist." If then each party, as it comes to be a minority, is to "resist" the measures passed by the majority, in relation to religious questions, something approaching to political chaos is before us.

It may be argued that the right has to be done regardless of consequences, and that if we were to stop to consider the direct or indirect bad results or attendant circumstances of our actions, all moral effort, and especially, moral reform, would be paralyzed. An act is to be judged according to its own inherent rightness, and the consequences are beyond the limits of our responsibility. Nevertheless, the results of our conduct, in so far as they may be reasonably forecast, must be a determinant to us amongst others as to the rightness of that conduct. They fall within the scope of our "intentions," using the term in the legal sense. The rightness of our conduct cannot be wholly judged without regard to results. There are some acts, more particularly those of cardinal rank, which may be undertaken without pausing to consider their results, the reason being that we are already convinced that their results must ultimately influence for good the morals of the community, and not because their results are ignored. "Passive Resistance," however, involves conduct on the part of citizens that is of a public character, and cannot but have far-reaching results upon others, in consequence of which these results must be taken into account.

We can deal with the argument better as we study the reason that forms the final justification, beyond which there can be no appeal. "We must obey God rather than man." It is not, perhaps, necessary to inquire *why* we must obey God rather than man; the whole question of the categorical imperative is herein raised. The plain man who believes in the Christian religion would doubtless reply that we are commanded in the Scriptures so to do. In the abstract, or rather as a principle, the will of the Divine Being would be regarded as paramount, and as superior to any human ordinance. There is not, however, in this case a clear issue. It means the facing of two evils from the nonconformist standpoint. The non-

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conformist conscience is in a dilemma. There is, at least, a certain degree of right on the side, both of Resisters and Non-resisters, to entitle each to respect from the other side.

Let us then assume that it is our duty to obey God rather than man. Why we should do so we may state to be based upon an intuition. The will of God for us, let us say, is that we should realize the best of which we are capable, the ideal contemplated in this case from the point of view of citizenship, and also as to our responsibility to the rising generation and the future of our country. If we have to "obey God," it is clearly in no private capacity in this case, nor is it in the assertion of a private right. It is the will of the Divine with respect to the handling of an objectionable law. What that will is cannot be determined by means of an intuition. The proper view of our duty has to be arrived at as the result of the balancing of considerations; and the estimation of probable consequences must enter into the calculation. The question is not to be settled in the same manner as a temptation to commit a breach of fundamental morality, with an instant and final negative, regardless of consequences. The command of God is heard in the legalized demand itself and by means of human law and institutions. Whatever the mystic may say with regard to his conscience and its demands, morality can recognize no call to a duty which disregards the obligations of the law and the claims it lays upon the individual citizen. These might be laid aside at the call of a higher duty, it is true; but in determining the higher duty in a case of this sort, legal obligations must enter in. To throw the matter into a more concrete form, it may be fairly reasoned that it is the duty of a conscientious citizen to pay an unjust charge if he has tried in vain to prevent the measure passing into law, on the ground that he is no longer responsible for the expenditure of public funds, after he has done his utmost to control that expenditure by legalized means, through legislation, and by doing his part in the appointment at the polls of candidates who may be trusted to carry out those principles which he as an elector holds.

The case assumes a somewhat different complexion when we

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bear in mind in what consists the sovereign power of modern England. "Passive Resistance" sets on one side the teaching of St. Paul, that "the powers that be are ordained of God." These powers are resisted on the ground that they no longer represent the authority of God in civil affairs. Their authority is superseded by the authority of conscience. This reasoning, however, disregards the fact that the ultimate authority and the sovereign power of England at the present time, is the goodwill of the citizens as a body. Unless we can charge the main body of citizens with having no conscience in the matter, such a course of action as "Passive Resistance" is to set up the conscience of the individual against the collective conscience, or, at least, to make the conscience of the minority superior to that of the majority. If the sovereign power is that authority which the citizens, as a whole, habitually obey, and if the government of our country can only be upheld as the whole body of citizens are willing that it should continue and are agreed loyally to support the laws when once they have been duly passed, then ought the collective conscience, or the conscience of the majority, to be recognized within certain limits, as indicating the duty of citizens and the will of the Supreme Ruler, in civil affairs. We would go so far as to say that, in this respect, *vox populi* is *vox Dei.* There is, in short, no personal or individual right in a matter of political obligation, on the ground of morality, to stand against or to resist the collective will or conscience of the majority, when once the proposals have passed from the legislative to the administrative stage.

It has been asserted throughout the course of this controversy that the Education Act of 1902 does not fairly represent the will of the people, inasmuch as the electorate was never consulted on the subject, and the Government forced the Bill through the House of Commons on the strength of a majority returned to bring the war in South Africa to a termination. There having been no "mandate" from the constituencies to deal with this question, the people are, so the argument runs, released from their obligation to submit, and,

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under the circumstances, "Passive Resistance" is the least objectionable form of resistance.

We can imagine the reply to be that there never is, in a General Election in England, an unequivocal and distinct pronouncement on any definite question before the country, nor is there at any time a single, clear, or unmistakable issue upon which the country gives its voice. It might also be said that, whilst there may be one outstanding question which mainly determines the majority, yet an election is never fought on that issue alone. There is always the general line of policy which belongs to each of the respective parties, and in an election regard must always be had to it. It might fairly have been conjectured beforehand that the Conservative Party would bring in, sooner or later, a bill dealing with education, in conformity with its relation to the State Church. Let us grant, however, for the sake of argument (and not that we necessarily commit ourselves to that view), that the Government of Great Britain, having been returned to power on a war vote, has presumed upon its huge majority to force a measure through the legislature in an unconstitutional manner, and has thus abused its immense strength by taking advantage of the weakness of its opponents. On that view of the matter we have an instance of the tyranny of the majority, which, of course, is quite possible in a democratic state. Two questions would then arise. Making all allowance for the subtle influence of vested interests, where they exist, for re-actions in public opinion and for accidental circumstances, is not an Opposition, to some extent, responsible in a modern community for its own weakness, especially if it is lacking in unity and enthusiasm? When an Opposition has a good cause and can present a united front, it is seldom, if ever, possible that a tyrannical government can fly in the face of strong public opinion, even though its exponents are in a minority, without the risk of swift and sure retribution.

Whether this be accepted or not, the question remains whether it is right and in the interests of law and order, and conducive to the well-being of the citizens as a whole, and good government, that tyranny should be met by lawlessness?

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Would not this tend to make "confusion worse confounded," if generally adopted. This position of affairs might afford a substantial argument in favor of the "Referendum," but in the present condition of party government, it would generally be considered by the most thoughtful persons of either party preferable in the interests of the community that those that compose the minority should always bide their time until they can, by regular and constitutional methods, remove their grievances, on the peril of making the "remedy worse than the disease." This argument has thus been briefly dealt with, because it is almost always used to strengthen the position of the "Passive Resisters." It has many other implications of a political character which we have no room in this paper to discuss. Nevertheless, we are not, I think, entitled to regard this as the main argument of the Resisters, for the reason that the grievance would exist, even though there had been an appeal to the country on the issue of Education. There would still remain a case for Resistance on the ground that these persons are called upon definitely to pay for the instruction of the children in public schools in religious dogma in which a portion of the community do not believe, and they would probably "resist" all the same. This political aspect of the question is adduced as an additional argument to strengthen the attitude taken in "Resistance"; but, as the writer has indicated, he does not see that such ground of justification can be maintained, nor, as before stated, does he consider that it has any justification on moral grounds.

We may take, however, yet another view of the matter. There may be ecclesiastical or religious grounds for refusing to pay the rate, but these lie beyond the scope of this discussion. A man may be convinced in his own mind that the voice of conscience bids him to "resist," as the most effectual protest against what he regards as false doctrine or ecclesiastical aggression. He may be absolutely incapable of justifying himself on moral grounds, or he may even be prepared to admit that some bad moral results may accrue from his action, and yet feel that it is his duty to "resist." It may be impossible to convince him that he is in error, because he main-

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tains it is a matter of religious conviction, and to be settled between himself and his God. We cannot, of course, make any headway against reasoning of this kind, even though we may be thoroughly convinced that, from an ethical point of view, the position is wrong.

Let it be understood, therefore, that we pass no opinion as to the religious or ecclesiastical aspect of the case. If, however, the "Resisters" have made up their minds on this point that they must "resist" in spite of argument and consequences, then a new question for ethics is raised. We have the spectacle of a number of earnest persons, women no less than men, who are prepared to suffer in their pockets and to be committed to prison for their principles, and with no material or private end to serve. Right or wrong those principles may be, yet in an age of moral indifference, and when the moral sense is seldom really stimulated or roused, these "Passive Resisters" set the example of a certain form of heroism that refuses not to suffer for conscience's sake. The same may be claimed, of course, for law-breaking Ritualists, who are at the opposite extreme in Christian doctrine. Thus "Passive Resistance" will have the further effect of keeping the whole subject, the religious and moral instruction of the young, prominently and vividly before the public, until a satisfactory solution to the problem is found. The very interest that attaches to such subjects will have a moral value of its own.

We may conclude by saying that "Passive Resistance" has no support on ethical lines alone. The writer is of opinion that it cannot be justified on ethico-political grounds. Nevertheless, on the assumption that it has any support in the religious convictions of the individual (upon which assumption no opinion is here offered), it may possess some moral value, such as will always attach to the movements that are carried out with moral seriousness and sense of moral responsibility. In any case, certain evil results are inevitable, and it is an open question whether, on the whole, more evil than good may not be the net result.

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THE DEVELOPMENT OF A PEOPLE.

In the realm of physical health the teachings of Nature, with its stern mercy and merciful punishment, are showing men gradually to avoid the mistake of unhealthful homes, and to clear fever and malaria away from parts of earth otherwise so beautiful. Death that arises from foul sewage, bad plumbing or vitiated air we no longer attribute to "Acts of God," but to "Misdeeds of Man," and so work to correct this loss. But if we have escaped Mediævalism to some extent in the care of physical health, we certainly have not in the higher realm of the economic and spiritual development of people. Here the world rests, and is largely contented to rest, in a strange fatalism. Nations and groups and social classes are born and reared, reel sick unto death, or tear forward in frenzied striving. We sit and watch and moralize, and judge our neighbors or ourselves fore-doomed to failure or success, not because we know or have studied the causes of a people's advance, but rather because we instinctively dislike certain races, and instinctively like our own.

This attitude cannot long prevail. The solidarity of human interests in a world which is daily becoming physically smaller, cannot afford to grope in darkness as to the causes and incentives to human advance when the advance of all depends increasingly on the advance of each. Nor is it enough here to have simply the philanthropic impulse—simply a rather blind and aimless desire to do good.

If then we would grapple intelligently with the greater problems of human development in society, we must sit and study and learn even when the mad impulse of aimless philanthropy is striving within, and we find it easier to labor blindly, rather than to wait intelligently.

In no single set of human problems is this striving after intelligence, after real facts and clear thinking, more important than in answering the many questions that concern the American Negro. And especially is this true since the basic axiom

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upon which all intelligent and decent men, North and South, white and black, must agree, is that the best interests of every single American demand that *every Negro make the best of himself.*

But what is good and better and best in the measure of human advance? and how shall we compare the present with the past, nation with nation, and group with group, so as to gain real intelligent insight into conditions and needs, and enlightened guidance? Now this is extremely difficult in matters of human development, because we are so ignorant of the ordinary facts relating to conditions of life, and because, above all, criteria of life and the objects of living are so diverse.

And yet the desire for clear judgment and rational advance, even in so intricate a problem as that of the races in the United States, is not hopeless. First of all, the most hopeful thing about the race problem to-day is, that people are beginning to recognize its intricacy and be justly suspicious of any person who insists that the race problem is simply this or simply that—realizing that it is not simply anything. It is as complex as human nature, and you do well to distrust the judgment of any man who thinks, however honestly, that any one simple remedy will cure evils that arise from the whirling wants and longings and passions of writhing human souls.

Not only do we to-day recognize the Negro problems as intricate, but we are beginning to see that they are pressing—asking, *demanding* solution; not to be put off by half measures, not answered by being handed down in thinly disguised yet even larger form to our children. With these intricate and pressing problems before us, we ask searchingly and often for the light; and here again we are baffled. An honest gentleman from the South informs us that there are fully as many illiterate Negroes to-day in the South as there were at Emancipation. We gasp with astonishment, and as we are asking "Where then is all our money and effort gone?" another gentleman from the South, apparently just as honest, tells us that whereas nine-tenths of the Negroes in 1870 could *not* read and write, to-day fully three-fifths of them *can;* or, again, the

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Negroes themselves exult over the ownership of three hundred million dollars worth of real estate, while the critic points out that the Negroes are a burden to the South, since forming a third of the population they own but one-twenty-fifth of the property.

Such seemingly contradictory propositions and others even more glaring, we hear every day, and it is small wonder that persons without leisure to weigh the evidence find themselves curiously in the dark at times and anxious for reliable interpretation of the real facts.

Much of this befogging of the situation is apparent rather than real. As a matter of fact, the statements referred to are not at all contradictory. There are to-day more illiterate Negroes than in 1870, but there are six times as many who can read and write. The real underlying problem is dynamic, not static. Is the educational movement in the right direction, and is it as rapid as is safe? or, in other words, What is satisfactory advance in education? Ought a people to learn to read and write in one generation or in a hundred years? How far can we hasten the growth of intelligence, avoiding stagnation on the one hand, and abnormal forcing on the other? Or take the question of property ownership: it is probably true that only a twenty-fifth of the total property of the South belongs to the Negro, and that the Negro property of the land exceeds three hundred million. Here, again, brute figures mean little, and the comparison between black and white is misleading. The basic question is, How soon after a social revolution like emancipation ought one reasonably to expect the appearance of habits of thrift and the accumulation of property? Moreover, how far is the accumulating of wealth indicative of general advance in moral habits and sound character, or how far is it independent of them or in spite of them?

In other words, if we are to judge intelligently or clearly of the development of a people, we must allow ourselves neither to be dazzled by figures nor misled by inapt comparisons, but we must seek to know what human advancement historically considered has meant and what it means to-day,

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and from such criteria we may then judge the condition, development and needs of the group before us. I want then to mention briefly the steps which groups of men have usually taken in their forward struggling, and to ask which of these steps the Negroes of the United States have taken and how far they have gone. In such comparisons we cannot, unfortunately, have the aid of exact statistics, for actual measurement of social phenomena is peculiar to the Nineteenth century—that is, to an age when the culture Nations were full-grown, and we can only roughly indicate conditions in the days of their youth. A certain youth and childhood is common to all men in their mingled striving. Everywhere, glancing across the seas of human history, we note it. The average American community of to-day has grown by a slow, intricate and hesitating advance through four overlapping eras. First, there is the struggle for sheer physical existence—a struggle still waging among the submerged tenth, but settled for a majority of the community long years ago. Above this comes the accumulation for future subsistence—the saving and striving and transmuting of goods for use in days to come—a stage reached to-day tentatively for the middle classes and to an astounding degree by a few. Then in every community there goes on from the first, but with larger and larger emphasis as the years fly, some essay to train the young into the tradition of the fathers—their religion, thought and tricks of doing. And, finally, as the group meets other groups and comes into larger spiritual contact with nations, there is that transference and sifting and accumulation of the elements of human culture which makes for wider civilization and higher development. These four steps of subsistence, accumulation, education and culture-contact are not disconnected, discreet stages. No nation ever settles its problems of poverty and then turns to educating children; or first accumulates its wealth and then its culture. On the contrary, in every stage of a nation's growing all these efforts are present, and we designate any particular age of a people's development as (for instance) a struggle for existence, because, their conscious effort is more largely expended in this direction than in others; but despite this we

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all know, or ought to know, that no growing nation can spend its whole effort on to-day's food lest accumulation and training of children and learning of their neighbors—lest all these things so vitally necessary to advance be neglected, and the people, full-bellied though they be, stagnate and die because in one mighty struggle to live they forget the weightier objects of life.

We all know these very obvious truths, and yet despite ourselves certain mechanical conceptions of society creep into our everyday thought. We think of growing men as cogs in some vast factory—we would stop these wheels and set these others going, hasten that department and retard this; but this conception applied to struggling men is mischievously wrong. You cannot stop the education of children in order to feed their fathers; the children continue to grow—something they are bound to learn. What then shall it be: truth, or half-truth, good or bad? So, too, a people may be engaged in the pressing work of accumulating and saving for future needs—storing grain and cotton, building houses, leveling land; but all the time they are learning something from inevitable contact with men and nations and thoughts—you cannot stop this learning; you cannot postpone it. What then shall this learning—this contact with culture—be? a lesson of fact or fable? of growth or debauchery? the inspiration of the schools or the degradation of the slums? Something it must be, but what? The growth of society is an ever-living, many-sided, bundle of activities, some of which are emphasized at different ages, none of which can be neglected without peril, all of which demand guidance and direction. As they receive this, the nation grows; as they do not, it stagnates and dies.

Whence now must the guidance and direction come? It can come only from four great sources: the precepts of parents, the sight of Seers, the opinion of the majority, and the tradition of the grandfathers; or, in other words, a nation or group of people can be taught the things it must learn in its family circles, at the feet of teachers and preachers, by contact with surrounding society, by reverence for the dead Hand—for that

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mighty accumulation of customs and traditions handed down generation after generation.

And thus I come to the center of my theme. How far do these great means of growth operate among American Negroes and influence their development in the main lines of human advancement?

Let me take you journeying across mountains and meadows, threading the hills of Maryland, gliding over the broad fields of Virginia, climbing the blue ridge of Carolina and seating ourselves in the cotton kingdom. I would not like you to spend a day or a month here in this little town; I should much rather you would spend ten years, if you are really studying the problem; for casual visitors get casual ideas, and the problems here are the growth of centuries.

From the depot and the cluster of doubtful houses that form the town, pale crimson fields with tell-tale gullies stretch desolately away. The whole horizon looks shabby, and there is a certain awful leisure in the air that makes a westerner wonder when work begins. A neglected and uncertain road wanders up from the depot, past several little stores and a post-office, and then stops hesitatingly and melts away into crooked paths across the washed-out cotton fields. But I do not want you to see so much of the physical as of the spiritual town, and first you must see the color line. It stands at the depot with "waiting room for white people" and "waiting room for colored people," and then the uninitiated might lose sight of it; but it is there, there and curiously wandering, but continuous and never ending. And in that little town, as in a thousand others, they have an eleventh commandment, and it reads "Thou shalt not Cross the Line." Men may at times break the sixth commandment and the seventh, and it makes but little stir. But when the eleventh is broken, *the world heaves.* And yet you must not think the town inhabited by anything inhuman. Simple, good hearted folks are there—generosity and hospitality, politeness and charity, dim strivings and hard efforts—a human world, aye, even lovable at times; and one cannot argue about that strange line—it is simply so.

Were you there in person I could not take you easily across

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the line into the world I want to study. But in spirit let me lead you across. In one part of the town are sure to be clustered the majority of the Negro cabins; there is no strict physical separation; on some streets whites and blacks are neighbors, and yet the general clustering by color is plain. I want to take you among the houses of the colored people, and I start not with the best, but with the worst: a little one-room box with a family of eight. The cabin is dirty, ill-smelling and cheerless; the furniture is scanty, old and worn. The man works when he has no whiskey to drink, which is comparatively seldom. The woman washes and squanders and squanders and washes. I am not sure that the couple were ever married formally, but still they'll stick together in all probability for life, despite their quarreling. There are five children, and the nameless child of the eldest daughter makes the last member of the family. Three of the children can spell and read a bit, but there's little need of it. The rest of the family are in ignorance, dark and dense. Here is a problem of home and family. One shudders at it almost hopelessly, or flares in anger and says: why do these people live like animals? Why don't they work and strive to do? If the stranger be from the North he looks suspiciously at the color line and shakes his head. If he be from the South he looks at it thankfully and stamps his foot. And these two attitudes are in some respects typical. We look around for the forces keeping this family down, or with fatalistic resignation conclude that nothing better is to be expected of black people. Exactly the same attitude with which the man of a century or so ago fought disease: looked about for the witch, or wondered at the chastening of the Lord; but withal continued to live in the swamps. There are forces in the little town to keep Negroes down, but they do not wholly explain the condition of this family. There are differences in human capabilities, but that they are not based on color can be seen in a dozen Negro homes up the street. What we have in degraded homes like this is a plain survival from the past.

What was slavery and the slave trade? Turn again with me even at the risk of hearing a twice-told tale and, as we have

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journeyed in space to this little southern town, so journey again in time, back through that curious crooked way along which civilization has wandered looking for the light. There was the nineteenth century—a century of material prosperity, of systematic catering to human wants, that men might eat, drink, be clothed and transported through space. And with this came the physical freeing of the soul through the wonders of science and the spread of democracy. Such a century was a legitimate offspring of the eighteenth century, of the years from 1700 to 1800, when our grandfathers' grandfathers lived —that era of revolution and heart searching that gave the world George Washington and the French Revolution. Behind the eighteenth century looms the age of Louis XIV of France, an age of mighty leaders: Richelieu, Gustavus Adolphus, and Oliver Cromwell. Thus we come back on the world's way, through three centuries of imperialism, revolution and commercial democracy, to two great centuries which prepared Europe for the years from 1600 to 1900—the century of the Protestant Reformation and the century of the Renaissance. The African Slave trade was the child of the Renaissance. We do not realize this; we think of the slave trade as a thing apart, the incident of a decade or a century, and yet let us never forget that from the year 1442, when Antonio Gonzales first looked upon the river of Gold, until 1807, when Great Britain first checked the slave trade, for three hundred and sixty-five years Africa was surrendered wholly to the cruelty and rapacity of the Christian man-dealer, and for full five hundred years and more this frightful heart disease of the Dark Continent destroyed the beginnings of Negro civilization, overturned governments, murdered men, disrupted families and poisoned the civilized world. Do you want an explanation of the degradation of this pitiful little nest perched in the crimson soil of Georgia? Ask your fathers and your father's fathers, for they know. Nay, you need not go back even to their memories.

In 1880 a traveler crossed Africa from Lake Nyassa to Lake Tanganyika. He saw the southern end of the lake peopled with large and prosperous villages. The next traveler who

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followed in 1890 found not a solitary human being—nothing but burned homes and bleaching skeletons. He tells us that the Wa-Nkonde tribe to which these people belonged, was, until this event, one of the most prosperous tribes in East Central Africa. Their people occupied a country of exceptional fertility and beauty. Three rivers, which never failed in the severest drought, ran through their territory, and their crops were the richest and most varied in the country. They possessed herds of cattle and goats; they fished in the lake with nets; they wrought iron into many-patterned spear-heads with exceptional ingenuity and skill; and that even artistic taste had begun to develop among them was evident from the ornamental work of their huts, which were unique for clever construction and beauty of design. This people, in short, by their own inherent ability and the natural resources of their country, were on the high road to civilization. Then came the overthrow. Arab traders mingled with them, settled peacefully among them, obeyed their laws, and gained their confidence. The number of the traders slowly increased; the power of the chief was slowly undermined, until, at last, with superior weapons and reinforcements, every vestige of the tribe was swept away and their lands laid in red ruins. Fourteen villages they razed from the ground and, finally, seizing more slaves than they could transport, drove the rest into the tall dry grass and set it on fire; and in the black forest was silence.

This took place in the nineteenth century during your lives, in the midst of modern missionary effort. But worse was the tale of the eighteenth century and the seventeenth century and the sixteenth century, and this whole dark crime against a human race began in 1442 when the historic thirty Negroes landed in Lisbon.

Systematic man-hunting was known in ancient times, but it subsided as civilization advanced, until the Mohammedan fanatics swept across Africa. Arabian slavery, however, had its mitigations. It was patriarchal house service; the slave might hope to rise and, once admitted to the household of faith, he became in fact, and not merely in theory, a man and a

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brother. The domestic slavery of the African tribes represented that first triumph of humanity that leads the savage to spare his foe's life and use his labor. Such slaves could and did rise to freedom and preferment; they became parts of the new tribe. It was left to Christian slavery to improve on all this—to make slavery a rigid unending caste by adding to bondage the prejudice of race and color. Marauding bands traversed the forests, fell upon native villages, slew the old and young and drove the rest in herds to the slave market; tribe was incited against tribe, and nation against nation. As Mr. Stanley tells us, "While a people were thus subject to capture and expatriation, it was clearly impossible that any intellectual or moral progress could be made. The greater number of those accessible from the coast were compelled to study the best methods of avoiding the slaver and escaping his force and his wiles; the rest only thought of the arts of kidnapping their innocent and unsuspecting fellow creatures. Yet, contradictory as it may appear to us, there were not wanting at the same time zealous men who devoted themselves to Christianity. In Angola, Congo and Mozambique, and far up the Zambesi, missionaries erected churches and cathedrals, appointed bishops and priests who converted and baptized; while at the mouth of the Congo, the Niger and the Zambesi their countrymen built slave baccaroons and anchored their murderous slave ships. Europeans legalized and sanctioned the slave trade; the public conscience of the period approved it; the mitred heads of the church blessed the slave gangs as they marched to the shore, and the tax-collector received the levy per head as lawful revenue."

The development of the trade depended largely upon the commercial nations, and, as they put more and more ruthless enterprise into the traffic, it grew and flourished. First came the Portugese as the world's slave trader, secured in their monopoly by the Bull of Demarcation issued by Pope Alexander VI. Beginning in 1442 they traded a hundred and fifty years, until Portugal was reduced to a province of Spain in 1580 and her African settlements neglected. Immediately the thrifty Dutch began to monopolize the trade, and held it for a

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century, until Oliver Cromwell deprived them of it. The celebrated Dutch West India Company intrigued with native states and gained a monopoly of the trade in Negroes from 1630 to 1668. They whirled a stream of cargoes over the great seas, filled the West Indies, skirted the coasts of America and, sailing up the curving river to Jamestown, planted the Negro problems in Virginia in 1619. Then the English scented gain and bestirred themselves mightily.

Two English slave ships sailed from Plymouth in the middle of the sixteenth century, but the great founder of the English slave trade was Sir John Hawkins. Queen Elizabeth had some scruples at the trade in human beings, and made Hawkins promise to seize only those who were willing to go with him—a thing which he easily promised and easily forgot. This Sir John Hawkins was a strange product of his times. Brave, ruthless, cruel and religious: a pirate, a man-stealer and a patriot. He sailed to Africa in the middle of the sixteenth century, and immediately saw profits for English gain. He burned villages, murdered the natives and stole slaves, and then, urging his crew to love one another and serve God daily, he sailed merrily westward to the Spanish West Indies in the good ship called the "Jesus," and compelled the Spaniards to buy slaves at the muzzle of his guns.

Thus the English slave trade began under Queen Elizabeth, was encouraged under James I, who had made the translation of our Bible, and renewed by Oliver Cromwell, the great Puritan, who fought for it and seized the island of Jamaica as a slave market. So kings, queens and countries encouraged the trade, and the English soon became the world's greatest slave traders. New manufactures suitable to the trade were introduced into England, and the trade brought so much gold to Great Britain that they named the pieces "guineas" after the slave coast. Four million dollars a year went from England, in the eighteenth century, to buy slaves. Liverpool, the city where the trade centered, had, in 1783, nine hundred slave ships in the trade, and in eleven years they carried $76,000,000 worth of slaves to America, and they did this on a clear profit of $60,000,000.

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These vast returns easily seduced the conscience of Europe. Boswell, the biographer of Dr. Johnson, called the slave trade "an important necessary branch of commerce," and probably the best people of England were of this opinion, and were surprised and indignant when Clarkson and Wilberforce began their campaign.

Gradually aroused by repeated and seemingly hopeless assaults, the conscience of England awoke and forbade the trade, in 1807, after having guided and cherished it for one hundred and fifty years. She called for aid from America, and America apparently responded in the statutes of 1808. But, true to her reputation as the most lawless nation on earth, America made no attempt to enforce the law in her own territory for a generation, and, after that, refused repeatedly and doggedly to prevent the slave trade of the world from sailing peacefully under the American flag for fifty years—up until the very outbreak of the civil war. Thus, from 1442 to 1860, nearly half a millennium, the Christian world fattened on the stealing of human souls.

Nor was there any pretence of charity in the methods of their doing. The capture of the slaves was organized deceit, murder and force; the shipping of them was far worse than the modern shipping of horses and cattle. Of this middle passage across the sea in slow sailing ships, with brutal sailors and little to eat, it has often been said "that never in the world before was so much wretchedness condensed in so little room." The Negroes, naked and in irons, were chained to each other hand and foot, and stowed so close that they were not allowed more than a foot and a half each. Thus, crammed together like herrings in a barrel, they contracted putrid and fatal disorders, so that those who came to inspect them in the morning had frequently to pick dead slaves out of their rows and unchain their corpses from the bodies of their wretched mates. Blood and filth covered the floors, the hot air reeked with contagion, and the death rate among the slaves often reached fifty per cent., not to speak of the decimation when once they reached the West Indian plantations.

The world will never know the exact number of slaves trans-

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ported to America. Several thousand came in the fifteenth century, tens of thousands in the sixteenth, and hundreds of thousands in the seventeenth. In the eighteenth century more than two and one-half millions of slaves were transported, and in 1790 Negroes were crossing the ocean at the rate of sixty thousand a year. Dunbar thinks that nearly fifteen millions were transported in all.

Such was the traffic that revolutioned Africa. Instead of man-hunting being an incident of tribal wars, war became the incident of man-hunting. From the Senegal to St. Paul de Loanda winding, beaten tracks converged to the sea from every corner of the Dark Continent, covered with the blood of the foot-sore, lined with the bleaching bones of the dead, and echoing with the wails of the conquered, the bereaved and the dying. The coast stood bristling with forts and prisons to receive the human cattle. Across the blue waters of the Atlantic two hundred and fifty ships a year hurried to the west, with their crowded, half-suffocated cargoes. And during all this time Martin Luther had lived and died, Calvin had preached, Raphael had painted and Shakespeare and Milton sung; and yet for four hundred years the coasts of Africa and America were strewn with the dying and the dead, four hundred years the sharks followed the scurrying ships, four hundred years Ethiopia stretched forth her hands unto God. All this you know, all this you have read many a time. I tell it again, lest you forget.

What was slavery to the slave trade? Not simply forced labor, else we are all in bondage. Not simply toil without pay, even that is not unknown in America. No, the dark damnation of slavery in America was the destruction of the African family and of all just ideals of family life. No one pretends that the family life of African tribes had reached modern standards—barbarous nations have barbarous ideals. But this does not mean that they have no ideals at all. The patriarchal clan-life of the Africans, with its polygamy protected by custom, tradition and legal penalty, was infinitely superior to the shameless promiscuity of the West Indian plantations, the unhallowed concubinage of Virginia, or the prostitution of

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Louisiana. And these ideals slavery broke and scattered and flirted to the winds and left ignorance and degradation in their train.

When the good New England clergyman thought it a shame that slaves should herd like animals, without a legal marriage bond, he devised a quaint ceremony for them in which Sally promised Bob to cleave to him. For life? Oh no. As long as "God in his providence" kept them on the same plantation. This was in New England where there was a good deal more conscience than in Georgia. What ideal of family life could one reasonably expect Bob and Sally to have? The modern American family (considering the shame of divorce) has not reached perfection; yet it is the result of long training and carefully fostered ideals and persistent purging of the socially unfit.

As I study this family in the little southern town, in all its degradation and uncleanness, I cannot but see a plain case of cause and effect. If you degrade people the result is degradation, and you have no right to be surprised at it. Nor am I called upon to apologize for these people, or to make fun of their dumb misery. For their condition there is an apology due, witness High Heaven; but not from me.

Upon the town we have visited, upon the state, upon this section, the awful incubus of the past broods like a writhing sorrow, and when we turn our faces from that past, we turn it not to forget but to remember; viewing degradation with fear and not contempt, with awe and not criticism, bowing our head and straining willing ears to the iron voice

> " . . . . of Nature merciful and stern.
> I teach by killing, let others learn."

But the Negroes of the South are not all upon this low level. From this Nadir they stretch slowly, resolutely upward, by infinite gradation, helped now by the hand of a kindly master or a master's son, now by the sacrifice of friends; always by the ceaseless energy of a people who will never submit to burial alive.

Look across the street of your little southern town: here is a better house—a mother and father, two sons and a girl. They are hard-working people and good people. They read

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and write a little and, though they are slow and good natured, they are seldom idle. And yet they are unskilled, without foresight, always in debt and living from hand to mouth. Hard pressed they may sink into crime; encouraged they may rise to comfort, but never to wealth. Why? Because they and their fathers have been trained this way. What does a slave know of saving? What can he know of forethought? What could he learn even of skill, save in exceptional cases? In other words, slavery must of necessity send into the world of work a mass of unskilled laborers who have no idea of what thrift means; who have been a part of a great economic organization but had nothing to do with its organizing; and so when they are suddenly called to take a place in a greater organization, in which free individual initiative is a potent factor, they cannot, for they do not know how; they lack skill and, more than that, they lack ideals!

And so we might go on: past problems of work and wages, of legal protection, of civil rights and of education, up to this jaunty, little yellow house on a cross street with a flower-bed struggling sturdily with the clay, with vines and creepers and a gleam of white curtains and a decorous parlor. If you enter this house you may not find it altogether up to your ideals. A Dutch housekeeper would find undiscovered corners, and a fastidious person might object to the general scheme of decoration. And yet, compared with the homes in the town, white or black, the house is among the best. It may be the home of a Negro butcher who serves both sides the color line, or of a small grocer, a carpenter, a school teacher or a preacher. Whatever this man may be, he is a leader in a peculiar sense—the ideal-maker in his group of people. The white world is there, but it is the other side of the color line; it is seen distinctly and from afar. Of white and black there is no mingling in church and school, in general gatherings. The black world is isolated and alone; it gets its ideals, its larger thoughts, its notions of life, from these local leaders; they set the tone to that all-powerful spiritual world that surrounds and envelopes the souls of men; their standards of living, their interpretation of sunshine and rain and human hearts, their thoughts

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of love and labor, their aspirations and dim imaginings—all that makes life *life.*

Not only does this group leader guide a mass of men isolated in space, but also isolated in time. For we must remember that not only did slavery overthrow the Negro family and teach few lessons of thrift and foresight; it also totally broke a nation from all its traditions of the past in every realm of life. I fear I cannot impress upon you the full meaning of such a revolution. A nation that breaks suddenly with its past is almost fatally crippled. No matter how crude or imperfect that past may be, with all its defects, it is the foundation upon which generations to come must build. Beauty and finish and architectural detail are not required of it, but the massive weight of centuries of customs and traditions it must have. The slave trade, a new climate, a new economic regime, a new language and a new religion separated the American Negro as completely from his fatherland as it is possible for human agencies to do. The result is curious. There is a certain swaying in the air, a tilting and a crumbling, a vast difficulty of adjustment—of making the new ideas of work and wealth, of authority and right, fit in and hitch themselves to something gone; to the authority of the fathers, the customs of the past in a nation without grandfathers. So, then, the Negro group leader not only sets present standards, but he supplies in a measure the lack of past standards, and his leading is doubly difficult, since with Emancipation there came a second partial breaking with the past. The leader of the masses must discriminate between the good and bad in the past; he must keep the lesson of work and reject the lesson of concubinage; he must add more lessons of moral rectitude to the old religious fervor; he must, in fine, stand to this group in the light of the interpreter of the civilization of the twentieth century to the minds and hearts of people who, from sheer necessity, can but dimly comprehend it. And this man—I care not what his vocation may be—preacher, teacher, physician, or artisan, this person is going to solve the Negro problem; for that problem is at bottom the clash of two different stand-

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ards of culture, and this priest it is who interprets the one to the other.

Let me for a moment recapitulate. In the life of advancing peoples there must go on simultaneously a struggle for existence, accumulation of wealth, education of the young, and a development in culture and the higher things of life. The more backward the nation the larger sum of effort goes into the struggle for existence; the more forward the nation the larger and broader is the life of the spirit. For guidance, in taking these steps in civilization, the nation looks to four sources: the precepts of parents, the sight of seers, the opinion of the majority and the traditions of the past.

Here, then, is a group of people in which every one of these great sources of inspiration is partially crippled: the family group is struggling to recover from the debauchery of slavery; the number of the enlightened leaders must necessarily be small; the surrounding and more civilized white majority is cut off from its natural influence by the color line; and the traditions of the past are either lost, or largely traditions of evil and wrong.

Any one looking the problem squarely in the face might conclude that it was unjust to expect progress, or the signs of progress, until many generations had gone by. Indeed, we must not forget that those people who claimed to know the Negro best, freely and confidently predicted during the abolition controversy—

1. That free Negroes would not, and could not, work effectively.
2. That the freedman who did work, would not save.
3. That it was impossible to educate Negroes.
4. That no members of the race gave signs of ability and leadership.
5. That the race was morally degenerate.

Not only was this said, it was sincerely and passionately believed, by honorable men who, with their forefathers, had lived with the Negro three hundred years. And yet to-day the Negro in one generation forms the chief laboring force of the most rapidly developing part of the land. He owns twelve

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million acres of land, two hundred and fifty million dollars worth of farm property, and controls as owner or renter five hundred millions. Nearly three-fifths of the Negroes have learned to read and write. An increasing number have given evidence of ability and thoughtfulness—not, to be sure, of transcendent genius, but of integrity, large knowledge and common-sense. And finally there can be to-day no reasonable dispute but that the number of efficient, law-abiding and morally upright black people in this land is far larger than it ever was before, and is daily growing. Now these obvious and patent facts do not by any means indicate the full solution of the problem. There are still hosts of idle and unreliable Negro laborers; the race still, as a whole, has not learned the lesson of thrift and saving; fully seventy-five per cent. are still fairly designated as ignorant. The number of group leaders of ability and character is far behind the demand, and the development of a trustworthy upper class has, as is usually true, been accompanied by the differentiation of a dangerous class of criminals.

What the figures of Negro advancement mean is, that the development has been distinctly and markedly in the right direction, and that, given justice and help, no honest man can doubt the outcome. The giving of justice means the recognition of desert wherever it appears; the right to vote on exactly the same terms as other people vote; the right to the equal use of public conveniences and the educating of youth in the public schools. On these points, important as they are, I will not dwell. I am more interested here in asking how these struggling people may be actually helped. I conceive that such help may take any one of four forms:—

1. Among a people deprived of guiding traditions, they may be furnished trained guidance in matters of civilization and ideals of living.

2. A people whose family life is not strongly established must have put before them and brought home to them the morals of sane and sanitary living.

3. The mass of Negro children must have the keys of knowledge put into their hands by good elementary schools.

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4. The Negro youth must have the opportunity to learn the technical skill of modern industry.

All these forms of help are important. No one of them can be neglected without danger of increasing complications as time flies, and each one of them are lines of endeavor in which the Negro cannot be reasonably expected to help himself without aid from others. For instance, it cannot be seriously expected that a race of freedmen would have the skill necessary for modern industry. They cannot teach themselves what they themselves do not know, and consequently a legitimate and crying need of the south is the establishment of industrial schools. The public school system is one of the foundation stones of free republican government. Negro children, as well as other children, have right to ask of the nation knowledge of reading, writing and the rules of number, together with some conception of the world in time and space. Not one Negro child in three is to-day receiving any such training or has any chance to receive it, and a decent public school system in the South, aided by the National government, is something that must come in the near future, if you expect the race problem to be settled.

Here then are two great needs: public schools and industrial schools. How are schools of any sort established? By furnishing teachers. Given properly equipped teachers and your schools are a foregone success; without them, I care not how much you spend on buildings and equipment, the schools are a failure. It is here that Negro colleges, like Atlanta University, show their first usefulness.

But, in my list of ways in which the Negro may legitimately be helped to help himself, I named two other avenues of aid, and I named them first because to my mind they are even of more importance than popular education. I mean the moral uplift of a people. Now moral uplift comes not primarily from schools, but from strong home life and high social ideals. I have spoken of the Negroes' deficiency in these lines and the reason of that deficiency. Here, then, is a chance for help, but how? Not by direct teaching, because that is often ineffective and it is precluded in the South by the color line.

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It can be done, to my mind, only by group leadership; by planting in every community of Negroes black men with ideals of life and thrift and civilization, such as must in time filter through the masses and set examples of moral living and correct thinking to the great masses of Negroes who spend but little of their life in schools. After all the education of men comes but in small degree from schools; it comes mostly from the fireside, from companionships, from your social set, from the opinion of each individual's little world. This is even more true of the Negro. His world is smaller. He is shut in to himself by prejudice; he has, by reason of his poverty, little time for school. If he is to learn, he must learn from his group leaders, his daily companions, his social surroundings, his own dark world of striving, longing and dreaming. Here, then, you must plant the seed of civilization. Here you must place men educated, not merely in the technique of teaching or skill of hand, but above and beyond that into a thorough understanding of their age and the demands and meaning of modern culture. In so far as the college of to-day stands for the transmission from age to age of all that is best in the world's deeds, thoughts and traditions, in so far it is a crying necessity that a race, ruthlessly torn from its traditions and trained for centuries awry, should receive back through the higher culture of its gifted children some of the riches of the great system of culture into which it has been thrust. If the meaning of modern life cannot be taught at Negro hearthsides because the parents themselves are untaught, then its ideals can be forced into the centres of Negro life only by the teaching of higher institutions of learning and the agency of thoroughly educated men.

W. E. Burghardt DuBois.

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IS VIVISECTION JUSTIFIABLE?

I.

It might reasonably be supposed that nothing new now rests to be said about a question which has been so often and so hotly discussed in the past as this, and has again and again temporarily become a theme of public interest. A little consideration, however, must show that the controversy has been confined almost entirely to parties in whom it is impossible not to suspect a certain degree of prejudice,—namely, those who practice vivisection and those who claim to be protectors of animals. It has, moreover, been carried on under the unsatisfactory conditions in which one side denounces the other as an ignorant, sentimental folk, whose enthusiasm for the immediate welfare of the animal world blinds their eyes to truthfulness and to the benefits of vivisection while, the "protectors of animals," on the other hand, insist that vivisectors have about the same right to be heard upon the justifiability of vivisection as a bird-catcher on the propriety of cooking larks or of wearing osprey feathers.. Vivisection is to their mind merely a passing fashion, for which unmerited academic position and the mistaken sanction of those occupied in scientific research form the attractive recompense. It is clear, then, that the subject can be treated with the necessary impartiality only by one who, while sympathetic towards dumb creatures and having adequate knowledge of modern biological science, does not engage in the practice of vivisection; who, if he desire adequate competency, should have some general acquaintance with the principles of ethics and have had a training in psychology that will help him to gauge the probable extent and intensity of animal suffering.

Two distinct questions have to be answered. Is vivisection moral? Is vivisection useful? The former question clearly deserves consideration before the latter, for, if once vivisection be proved immoral, its utility can hardly remain a matter of serious concern.

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II.

Of those opposed to vivisection on the ground of its immorality, there is a small section whose views may be conveniently stated at once, as they can then be dismissed with little further consideration. These people consider that the animals of this world are specially placed under man's protection by the Divine Will. They regard it as sinful and as an abuse of our superior intelligence for man to give pain to animals for any purpose whatever. They would, if possible, refuse to avail themselves of the discoveries obtained by such means, classing them, as did Miss Frances Power Cobbe, with the results obtained by "robbery, perfidy or any other crime between man and man." The end, they declare, never justifies the means. Now, to those who uphold this variety of anti-vivisectionist opinion, there is absolutely nothing to be said. Their standpoint rests on religious faith, which is naturally impregnable to argument. Were they only consistent; did they, for example, refuse to slaughter cattle or to poison vermin for the sake of increasing their creature comforts, one could not but respect their attitude.

This, which may, for brevity's sake, be styled the "religious" view, is the extreme form of another, more generally held and regarded, perhaps, as the "common sense" view. It permits the infliction of a certain amount of pain upon animals, provided that the gain to man is sufficiently great. It countenances the operation of castration, so crudely performed on millions of animals annually, on the ground that man obtains thereby better beasts of burden and finer quality of flesh and wool. It justifies the introduction of horses into the battlefield, because cavalry are indispensable in warfare. A salmon may be "played," a fox or stag may be hunted, because sport is man's instinctive recreation and because the skill or the social pleasures involved are sufficiently great. But vivisection is intolerable, as its results are incommensurably small compared with the suffering produced. Such, no doubt, is the attitude of the majority of anti-vivisectionists,—an attitude which only a careful estimate of the resulting pains and gains of vivisection can confirm or condemn.

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These two views, the "religious" and the "common-sense," as they have here been styled, are alike obtained from the "zoocentric" standpoint; that is, where vivisection appears immoral because of the suffering which must inevitably be inflicted on the animal world. But there is another and totally different point of view from which the subject may be regarded, the "anthropocentric" standpoint, which condemns vivisection, not so much on account of the *pain* endured by the animals, as on the ground of the *cruelty* involved; that is, the effect produced by animal suffering upon man. This third view may, perhaps, best be designated "naturalistic."

The question here arises, Who, in the absence of scriptural authority (rejected by naturalism), has a right to condemn as immoral a practice which is confined to a small but intelligent section of a community? It is well recognized that nearly every walk of life sanctions certain acts which in the other walks would be deemed immoral. Different communities, different sections of communities, frame their own systems of morality. The ethical codes of the company-promoter, the farm-hand or the slum-dweller differ both from one another and from that of the general population, just as, on a larger scale, the morality of the savage is different from that of the European. May not vivisection in this way be regarded as a moral act by physiologists and pathologists and as an immoral act by other people? In this event, have the latter the right to interfere with the practice? Most certainly they have. For, even if vivisection has not a deteriorating effect on the natures of those engaged in it, even if it does not render them callous and insensitive to the sufferings of others (a protasis which will be examined immediately), yet the general community may legitimately intervene on the ground that it is harmful for them to feel that such suffering is being inflicted in their midst.

At his examination before the Royal Commission on Vivisection in 1875, Dr. Klein was asked (Q. 3539), "When you say that you only use them [anæsthetics] for convenience' sake, do you mean that you have no regard at all for the sufferings of the animals?" And his reply, "No regard at all," has been widely held to prove the utter heartlessness of those who experi-

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ment on living animals. Yet not only is Dr. Klein perfectly right, but—as everyone who knows them can testify—vivisectors are not less kind and sympathetic than any other body of men. The truth lies in the fact that everyone lives a life of multiple personalities. The man of business is one person at his office; he is another in the heart of his family. The thoughts of the botanist, when dissecting flowers, are not those he has when admiring a beautiful landscape. The surgeon and the vivisector before the operating table have to banish all regard for the victim of their knife. Sympathy would be not only useless, but positively detrimental to the success of their work. All attention has to be concentrated on the operation which mature consideration has previously dictated.

Indeed, there is no ground for suspecting that vivisection has a baneful effect on the temperament of those that practice it. The question remains, then, Has the public a right to intervene on account of the cruel acts which, it feels, are being perpetrated? And thus the further question arises, How much pain does vivisection produce? It is well understood that two kinds of experience of very different origin are included under the word "pain." In one sense, pain is opposed to pleasure, and has reference to the general tone of consciousness, called feeling. Thus, we are pleased at success, pained at bereavement; an animal is pleased at the sight of food, pained when chased by the foe. In the other sense, pain is the result of appropriate stimulation of almost any sensory nerve in the body. Common parlance distinguishes these two kinds of pain as "mental" and "physical." Now, there is little evidence of mental pain in the subjects of vivisection. Again and again dogs have been observed to wag the tail or lick the hands of the operator, even immediately before the beginning of the experiment. Shortly after the severest operation an animal is generally ready to eat its food. With regard to physical pain, it is desirable to consider somewhat fully the object of vivisection experiments, before an estimate of the amount involved can be arrived at.

Vivisection is employed to throw light either on healthy (physiological) or on morbid (pathological) processes. The prime aim of physiological experiment, broadly speaking, is to

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place the animal under the most natural conditions attainable. Pain itself is hardly ever the object of study. It is detrimental to the purposes of physiological experiment and is studiously avoided. Every effort is made to diminish it, even in those cases where organs or parts of organs are removed from the body in order to test their function by a process of elimination; in such operations an anæsthetic is always administered. "In no case has a cutting operation more severe than a superficial venisection been allowed to be performed without anæsthetics"[1] during recent years in this country. Surgery is strictly aseptic. Should sepsis set in, the law requires that the animal be killed. Pain is obviously detrimental to physiological experiment because of the accompanying disturbances in muscular action by which we commonly recognize it. Changes in the calibre of the blood vessels, changes in the force and frequency both of the heart-beat and of the respirations, cries and bodily movements,—these are the signs of pain. Clearly, all, in various degrees, impair the success of physiological research, and are to be avoided. But, while they are all *concomitants* of pain, it must never be forgotten that they are by no means sure *evidence* of pain. Cries and muscular movements, apparently indicative of pain, may occur during operation on man, when the subject is perfectly under the influence of an anæsthetic. They may be evoked from an animal when its cerebral hemispheres are no longer connected with the rest of the nervous system. Nor are these concomitants a sure *measure* of pain. Man is only too prone to suppose that the behaviour that he observes in others implies the presence of the same state of feelings in them as would induce the same behaviour in himself. When an animal manifests the appropriate signs, the sentimentalist at once leaps to the conclusion that it must suffer just the feelings of distress which would be his under similar conditions. Errors of this kind are so well known to students of mental phenomena that they have been termed "the psychologist's fallacy." Now, there is abundant evidence to show that, even in man, wide

[1] Reports of the Inspector of experiments performed on living animals (Acts 39 and 40 Vic. C. 77) 1901, 1902. A similar sentence occurs in Reports 1899 and 1900.

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differences in sensibility to pain exist, varying according to race and civilization. The natives of the Torres Straits, for instance, who have been expressly examined in this respect, proved to be about as half as sensitive to pain as Englishmen.[2] How much more obtuse, then, must be the suffering of animals, who differ in mental build from man immeasurably more than the races of men differ from one another!

Moreover, those areas of the body, stimulation of which can produce painful sensations, are far less numerous than might be supposed. It is true that, when inflamed, almost any part may become painful. But, under non-inflammatory conditions, most, if not all, the internal organs may be handled painlessly. Thus, Sir Charles Bell wrote of the human brain, "I have had my finger deep in the anterior lobes of the brain, when the patient, being at the time acutely sensible, and capable of expressing himself, complained only of the integument."[3] The recent experiments of Professor Lennander on man have confirmed the view that the human viscera and their supporting peritoneum are wholly insensitive to pain. Bichat long ago wrote that he had seen dogs tearing their peritoneum and devouring their own intestines, which had protruded from a hole in the abdominal wall. Considerations of this kind only show what control the layman should exercise over the springs of his natural pity, when he reads of seemingly painful, but really painless, experiments upon the internal organs of living animals, which physiologists of this country compulsorily, of others voluntarily, put under the influence of an anæsthetic during such operations.

It is not to be denied that some pain must ensue during physiological experiments, and it may be urged with reason that the amount of pain must be considerably greater when vivisection is performed for pathological ends. This objection gains apparent support from the fact that the greater number of vivisections performed by pathologists in this country require

[2] Reports of the Cambridge Anthropological Expedition to the Torres Straits. Cambridge, 1903. Vol. 2. p. 195.

[3] Quoted in "Experiments on Animals," by Stephen Paget. London, 1903. P. 75, footnote.

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a license, known as Certificate A, which permits experiment without an anæsthetic. It has, however, been already explained that no operation more severe than the section of a superficial vein is allowed to take place with this certificate. Of the 12,776 vivisections performed with Certificate A last year, 7,854 were merely inoculations, the chief objects of which were to diagnose various diseases in animals and man (no less than 153 referred to the detection of rabies), to examine milk for the bacillus of tuberculosis, hair for the bacillus of anthrax, to test the safety of atmospheric air and sewage, to standardize antitoxins for the purpose of protecting animals and man from disease. A large proportion of such experiments must have been absolutely negative. The air or the milk, for example, must have been often healthy, and the inoculated animal suffered no more pain than was involved in the needle-prick. Moreover, the law of the country compels the vivisector to kill the animal when the object of the experiment is completed, if, as is sometimes inevitable, pain ensues from inoculation. Even when it dies of a drug or a toxin, the pain of such a well-fed animal cannot exceed that of a poisoned, uncared-for rat or house-mouse.

In fine, not only is the pain of vivisection reduced to its lowest limits, not only do the interests of the experimenter and the law compel him to take good care of the animal, but the severity of animal suffering is far less than the lay mind would naturally suppose, and there is no reason to believe that vivisection renders the operator indifferent to the feelings of others.

III.

It is, fortunately, needless to examine the second part of the problem, namely the utility of vivisection, at such length as the first. The necessary material has been ably and impartially published by Stephen Paget in his "Experiments on Animals," and may be directly consulted by those who wish to investigate the subject without prejudice. Foremost among the results of modern vivisection stands our vast progress in the study of micro-organisms and their relation to the prevention and cure of disease. Now, certain essentials have to be rigidly fulfilled, before any micro-organism can be definitely proved to be a

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factor in the production of a disease. The bacillus must be constantly present in all cases; it must be isolated and cultivated outside the body; it must produce a similar disease *when introduced into another organism,* in which, again, the presence of the bacillus must be proved. Bacteriology, then, *depends upon* vivisection. By means of inoculation, not only is the absolute proof established of the dependence of disease upon the micro-organism, but antitoxins—certain chemical substances which are elaborated in the blood of appropriately inoculated animals by nature for the purpose of resisting the disease—have been isolated for use, to the enormous benefit of animals and mankind. As Stephen Paget points out (*op. cit,* p. 289), "in Cape Colony alone, so far back as 1899, almost half a million cattle had received preventive treatment against rinderpest." Tuberculosis in cattle has been likewise checked by the use of tuberculin. The severity and fatality of typhoid fever, and especially of diphtheria, have been unquestionably reduced by the use of the appropriate antitoxin. Similar success has attended the antitoxin treatment of Mediterranean fever, which for so long defied every known drug. Hardly a failure is on record from the treatment of snake-bite. The value of vaccination in small-pox is universally recognized by those competent to judge. And even where bacteriological research has yielded no cure, its influence has been scarcely less striking. The remedy for tuberculosis has still to be found, but untold good has already resulted from the discovery that a bacillus lies at the root of the disease. Precautions are now taken (rightly or wrongly, it remains to be seen) against tuberculous meat and milk, a more sanguine view of consumption of the lungs is entertained, the sputa are disinfected and the patients are isolated at any early stage of the disease. Contrast this condition of affairs with the present attitude towards cancer of the causes of which we are totally ignorant, or towards diabetes of which vivisection has so far taught us something, but not everything of the ætiology. Experiments on living animals are at this moment being performed, to preserve animals and men from these dread diseases. Who, in the name of reason and humanity, would forbid them?

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Heroes have not been wanting who have offered their own persons for experiment to advance pathological knowledge. In the researches upon yellow fever, several individuals were experimentally inoculated. The transmissibility of bovine tuberculosis to man has been similarly tested. A martyr met his death, demonstrating the contagiousness of Peruvian Sore. Two Englishmen, to prove the connection of the mosquito with malaria, submitted their bodies to be bitten by mosquitoes which had been sent here from Italy after having been fed upon the blood of malarious patients. If legislation can stay experiments on living animals, it is powerless to prevent voluntary experiment of man on himself. The first use of a new drug, the first performance of a new operation, are not these experiments of man on man? Should the invaluable anti-plague *bouillon* have been tested on men, instead of on rabbits, before its introduction as a national remedy? Or should men, instead of monkeys, have been experimentally fly-bitten, in order to obtain proof that the tsetse-fly transmits to men the micro-organism of sleeping sickness; the *Anopheles* mosquito, the micro-organism of malaria; the *Culex* mosquito, that of yellow fever and of elephantiasis? Havana is practically rid of yellow fever for the first time in history, and malaria is fast disappearing in similar fashion from its haunts, wherever stagnant pools are properly treated so as to make them serve no longer as the breeding places of mosquitoes.

It is almost needless to give further examples of the value of vivisection experiments. The experimental determination of the functions of various parts of the cerebral hemispheres, especially in the monkey, has led to successful operations in certain forms of epilepsy and cerebral tumor where the affected area can be accurately localized, inspected and removed. The discovery of the meaning of the sounds of the heart was aided by the modification of one or other sound in animals by experimental means. Vivisection has completely changed our views of the relation of the internal organs of the body to the general economy. Indeed, as Charles Darwin declared, "I cannot think of any one step which has been made in physiology without that aid."

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It has been said that these various advances might have been made without the aid of vivisection, but history shows plainly enough how in the absence of experiment men cling to authority rather than admit the discovery of new facts. In his address at the last year's Medical Congress at Cairo, Professor Bouchard declared that "the empiricism of older days has given us nearly all our drugs, among which are several which cure, . . . the use of which we have learnt by happy accident."[4] Fortunately, "happy accident" and mediævalism no longer content us: the modern spirit requires accurate and systematic investigation. It is true that quinine was known to cure malaria long before the *plasmodium malariae* was found, but the discovery of the *plasmodium* and our knowledge of its life-history have enabled us to administer the drug for men rationally and efficiently.

A favorite quotation in anti-vivisectionist literature is culled from the works of the great English vivisector, Sir Charles Bell: "Experiments have never been the means of discovery." This sentiment is broadly true in one sense. Experiments are rarely performed with a view to discovery, and rarely lead to it by accident. No scientific investigator would say, "Let us make this experiment and see what we can discover." He frames a theory on the basis of the facts already known to him, and he proceeds to confirm or to reject this theory by an appeal to experiment. It is in this way that knowledge advances. Without experiment it must stagnate.

Apart from all question of its morality and utility, vivisection leads directly to increased wisdom. Apart from the fact that the useless disconnected knowledge of to-day becomes the useful co-ordinated knowledge of the morrow, any rational mode of research which yields new results is imperishable. With all its power Legislation can never quench the thirst after Truth, or extinguish the race of Martyrs. As long as retrograde and progressive sections co-exist in the same community, so long will the efforts of the reactionary always be felt within it. There will be always some to maintain the geocentric theory

[4] Lancet, Feb. 7, 1903.

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of the universe or the seven-day theory of creation, however clear the evidence to the contrary; always some to believe that the Fall of Man comes from the Fruit of Knowledge. These are the real opponents of Vivisection.

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PROFESSOR WILLIAM JAMES' INTERPRETATION OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE.*

The increasing consideration shown to empirical reality is strikingly illustrated in the recent attempts of certain investigators to establish, on empirical ground, the belief in immortality. In a somewhat different sphere we find a similar effort on the part of some who are endeavoring to replace Naturalism and Absolute Idealism by a Pluralistic Idealism not very distant from Polytheism. It is in connection with this attempt that "The Varieties of Religious Experience" chiefly deserves attention. It is in many respects a marvelous book, well deserving the abundant and high praises it has received. But some of its principles and its chief conclusion are so unusual and of such pregnant consequences to Science and Religion, that they ought not to be allowed to pass without further discussion.

I confess that the admiration I have for the author of the "Principles of Psychology" and the gratefulness I feel for his many valuable contributions to Psychology, make it particularly unpleasant to keep my mind, for the purpose of this paper, upon the weak points of his book. I cannot even have the satisfaction of beginning with something like the fine appreciative review of Professor Flournoy in the Revue Philosophique, as I would try to do if space permitted.

*"The Varieties of Religious Experience," being the Gifford Lectures for 1901-1902.

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Professor James has been known so far, almost exclusively, as a psychologist. In this book he treats psychologically of a number of religious experiences. Most readers suppose, therefore, naturally enough, that they have in hand a more or less systematic treatise on the psychology of religious life. The author, however, does not make that claim; he gives us his work as a "crumb-like" contribution to the dawning *Science of Religions.* Unfortunately, he restricts its task to the elimination (by comparative and historical criticism and by confrontation with the results of natural science) of the local and of the accidental, of old incrustations in dogma and worship and of the doctrines now known to be scientifically absurd or incongruous. The result to be expected from this science is, the "extraction from the privacies of religious experience of some general facts which can be defined in formulas upon which everybody may agree." That is, he tells us, "the laborious attempt" upon which he has been engaged.

Had he been able to keep within the strict limits of a science of religions so narrowly defined, the outcome of his effort would have been no more than what it seems to be when he sums up, in the concluding lecture, the uniform deliverance in which religions all appear to meet:—

1. A sense that there is something wrong about us as we naturally stand.

2. A sense that we are saved from the wrongness by making proper connection with the higher powers.

The second proposition includes a three-fold belief: (1) in a more spiritual universe of which the physical world is a part and from which it draws its chief significance; (2) in union or harmonious relation with that higher universe as our true end; and (3) in prayer or inner communion with the spirit thereof—be that spirit "God" or "law"—as a process wherein work is really done, and spiritual energy flows in and produces effects, psychological or material, within the phenomenal world.

Many will be of opinion that these conclusions might have been taken as already sufficiently well established by the philosophers of religion who have labored at the same task. Fortunately for us, the author of the "Principles of Psychology"

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could not limit himself to a delineation of the universal features of religion, and one could not do him a greater injustice than to take this summary as a measure of the value of the lectures. His purpose, we take it, was not so much to contribute to the science of religions, as defined by him, as to take a further step[1] in the preparation of a startling system of Pluralistic Idealism soon to be completed and made public, and nowhere has Professor James' rare personality found freer, fuller and more brilliant expression than in these studies, at once ethical, psychological and philosophical.

Of late, and on several occasions, Professor James has given fragmentary utterance to a Pluralistic Idealism, in which his passionately individualistic soul, enamored of the fullness and picturesqueness of life, could find affective as well as logical satisfaction. In the phenomena studied by the Society for Psychic Research, he had already seen intimations, if not proofs, of the interference in human life of spiritual agents. Was there no such indication in religious experiences? Would not religious life yield its support to the hypothesis that the universe is, in fact, a *multiverse* of spiritual beings? "The Varieties of Religious Experience," I venture to affirm, was prepared primarily as an answer to this query, for it is a survey, not of religious life as a whole, but of that portion of it which seemed to promise a favorable answer to that question. The lectures consist essentially of a description and appreciation of two classes of religious phenomena (conversion and mystical experiences) to which is added, in conclusion, forty pages of philosophical speculation. The real outcome of the volume for the author—and it should be the outcome for the reader also—is, as far as the facts are concerned, that "there is actually and literally more life in our total soul than we are at any time aware of," and that "the conscious person is continuous with a wider self through which saving experiences come." It is, moreover, touching the interpretation of the facts, that "the further limits of our being plunge into an altogether other dimension of existence from the sensible and

[1]See "The Will to Believe" and his "Ingersoll Lecture on Immortality."

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merely 'understandable' world." It plunges into a realm of spiritual agents, with whom we come in contact, at certain points of our being, and from whom "higher energies filter in."

When this is admitted to be the animating spirit of the work, one understands the omission from it of a type of religiosity not so striking and, philosophically, less interesting than the mystical, but much more common and probably as influential over human life. It is the type of which Calvin and Jonathan Edwards may be taken as illustrious instances, and the ordinary believers in a transcendent personal God as the commonplace representatives. For these people God and man never fuse together as the essential mystical doctrine would have it. The Sovereign Lord remains, beyond and outside of man, the Judge and Dispenser of punishments and rewards. With this distant, majestic Maker man can maintain only objective relations. It is, I presume, the failure to take into account the objective type of religiosity that has led Professor James into the unqualified statement that "personal religious experience has its root and centre in mystical states of consciousness." Strictly construed, this affirmation denies religious experience to the large mass of people, Christians and others, who never "mix it up" with their God, to the cold, dispassionate, logical, but often aggressive and grimly earnest individual whose transactions with God retain throughout the mark of externality. They are the spatially-minded people, hard-wed to the physical world, for whom the essence of the mystical experience can be but sheer nonsense.

One understands also, according to our interpretation of his purpose, how it happened that, of all men, Professor James should have taken on this occasion such a narrow view of the science of religions. One would have expected of him at least some vigorous utterance as to the particular task, and the great possibilities, of the so-far neglected Psychology of Religion. No one could have done as much as he for its advancement. Why he chose to define the science of religions so as to include in it no more than a part of the customary philosophy of religion, is a question to which I find no other answer.

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So far we have dealt only with side issues. The "Varieties of Religious Experience" is, as already said, primarily an attempt to fasten on facts of religious experience a transcendental hypothesis. It purports to give empirical intimations in support of an hypothesis involving the existence of extra-human personalities. Our chief task, to which we now turn, is, therefore, the criticism of this alleged evidence.

Professor James is, of course, as fully aware as any representative of Naturalism, that the sudden moral transformations and the mystical phenomena which he studies may be claimed to be the results of unconscious, subliminal activities, *i.e.,* may be of purely subjective origin. He is even of opinion that the most important step forward in the science of psychology during the past forty years lies precisely in the discovery of the subconscious. And yet the subjective hypothesis leaves him unsatisfied. There are portions of these experiences which seem to him to remain outside its sphere of influence. One might ask why the author of the "Principles of Psychology" did not attempt a further extension of a principle of explanation already consecrated by the reclaiming of extensive portions of life heretofore surrendered by science to devils and angels, *i.e.,* multiple personality, the varied psychic manifestations of hysteria and of other nervous disorders. One of the clearest impressions one gets from the book is, that he does not desire to help out science. Psychologist turned metaphysician, his interest now lies in a ground of explanation which, as Kant says, "lifts us above the necessity of investigating nature." Professor James' peculiar empiricism is one which calls for the repetition of Kant's remark, in the "Discipline of Pure Reason," that transcendental hypotheses "do not advance reason, but rather stop it in its progress; that they render fruitless all its exertions in its own proper sphere, which is that of experience. For when the explanation of natural phenomena happens to be difficult, we have constantly at hand a transcendental ground of explanation which lifts us above the necessity of investigating nature."

For how much does the subconscious hypothesis satisfactorily account and what remains over? If we follow our

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author in his exposition of the meaning and scope of the subliminal,[2] we shall have what seems to be a definite answer to the first part of the question.

There is in man not only the ordinary primary consciousness, but, in addition, a set of memories, thoughts and feelings which are outside of the primary consciousness, but yet must be classed as conscious facts of some sort, able to reveal their presence by unmistakable signs. This subliminal or transmarginal region "is obviously the larger part of each of us, for it is the abode of everything that is latent and the reservoir of everything that passes unrecorded or unobserved. It contains, for example, such things as all our momentarily inactive memories, and it harbors the spring of all our obscurely motived passions, impulses, likes, dislikes and prejudices. Our intuitions, hypotheses, fancies, superstitions, persuasions, convictions and, in general, all our non-rational operations, come from it. It is the source of our dreams. . . . In it arise whatever mystical experiences we may have, and our automatisms, sensory or motor; our life in hypnotic and 'hypnoid' conditions, if we are subject to such conditions; our delusions, fixed ideas and hysterical accidents, if we are hysteric subjects; our supranormal cognitions, if such there be, and if we are telepathic subjects. . . . In persons deep in religious life, as we have now abundantly seen,—and this is my conclusion,—the door into this region seems unusually wide open; at any rate, experiences making their entrance through that door have had emphatic influence in shaping religious history" (pp. 483-484). "The most important consequence of having a strongly developed ultra-marginal life of this sort is, that one's ordinary fields of consciousness are liable to incursions from it of which the subject does not guess the source, and which, therefore, take for him the form of unaccountable impulses to act, or inhibitions of action, of obsessive ideas, or even of hallucinations of sight and hearing . . ." (p. 234). One could not be more explicit and hardly more inclusive. The sudden disappearance of old vicious habits, the coming to the front of likes

[2] A considerable portion of the second lecture on Conversion is devoted to this topic. See pp. 230-243, 483-4, and again p. 512.

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and dislikes until then unknown or not tolerated; unusual feelings, transes, automatic writing and other automatism, hallucinations, as well as various other functional disorders of sensibility and of motility,—in short, the facts observed in conversion and in the various mystical experiences are, or at least may be, the product of subconscious life. This subjective explanation is the one the psychologists endorse unanimously, I suppose.

It would seem after this that, for Professor James, the question of the *modus operandi* is closed; that he is irrevocably committed to a recognized principle of explanation. And yet it is not so. The door into the extra-human world he has apparently so well closed with one hand is forthwith reopened with the other: "But if you, being orthodox Christians, ask me as a psychologist whether the reference of a phenomenon to a subliminal self does not exclude the notion of the direct presence of the Deity altogether, I have to say frankly that as a psychologist I do not see why it necessarily should. The lower manifestations of the subliminal, indeed, fall within the resources of the personal subject. . . . But just as our primary wide-awake consciousness throws open our senses to the touch of things material, so it is logically conceivable that if there be higher spiritual agencies that can directly touch us, the psychological condition of their doing so might be our possession of a subconscious region, which alone should yield access to them. The hubbub of the waking life might close a door which, in the dreamy subliminal, might remain ajar or open" (p. 242).

For this ingenious contribution to a scientific explanation of the doctrine of predestination, Theologians ought to return thanks: he is predestined to be saved who chances to have a well-developed subliminal life, for then God will be able to reach him. But what will the empirical Philosophers say to this proof of Professor James' open-mindedness? They will say "the transcendental hypothesis remains a mere play of the imagination until you point out in human experience such phenomena as cannot be accounted for on the ground of explanation, acceptable to you as well as to us. Tell us what

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you call the lower manifestations of the subliminal, and show us the higher. It will then be time for us to consider whether the naturalistic hypothesis is not sufficient." Professor James would, I believe, profess unreserved agreement with these would-be detractors. And he might use the opportunity to remind them that in metaphysics he is a sceptic and that he terms himself a radical empiricist. After this answer nothing would be left for the objector but to ask again that the so-called higher experiences be produced.

How many such have been vouchsafed to him we are not told. He refers to but one; the one of greatest convincing power, we may well suppose. It is an experiment with nitrous oxide. With an admirable and quite justifiable broadness of mind, Professor James classifies the drunken consciousness together with religious states as mystical,[3] because it possesses the four marks by which he would identify mystical states, *i.e.*, ineffability, noetic quality (these two bring about the feeling of illumination), transiency, and passivity. This experiment with a drug, or rather his way of regarding it, is at the root of his "overbelief;" it is the pivotal point of the discussion; the key to his argument. Nitrous oxide, we are told, stimulates the mystical consciousness in an extraordinary degree. Depth beyond depth of truth seems revealed to the inhaler. One conclusion which was forced upon him at the time is, that "our normal waking consciousness, rational consciousness as we call it, is but one special consciousness, whilst all about it, parted from it by the filmiest of screens, there lie potential forms of consciousness entirely different. . . . No account of the universe in its totality can be final which leaves these other forms of consciousness quite disregarded." So far we can all follow him. The particular forms of consciousness realized in dreams, in various forms of intoxication, in trances, etc., differ from the ordinary consciousness and ought to be taken into account in psychology and philosophy. What of it? Nothing to his purpose unless those experiences be interpreted in his own, to our mind, illegitimate, way. They all converge,

[3] "The drunken consciousness is one bit of the mystic consciousness." (P. 387.)

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he tells us, towards a kind of insight to which he "cannot help ascribing some metaphysical significance. The keynote of it is, invariably, a reconciliation. It is as if the opposites of the world, whose contradictions and conflict make all our difficulties and troubles, here melted into unity. Not only do they, as contrasted species, belong to one and the same genus, but one of the species, the nobler and better one, is itself the genus, and so soaks up and absorbs its opposite into itself. I feel as if it must mean something like what the Hegelian philosophy means, if one could only lay hold of it more clearly" (p. 388).

Truly the new beatitude is a hard saying: "Blessed are the intoxicated, for to them the kingdom of spirits is revealed!" Observe that this mysterious insight justifies itself only in and to the artificial mystic state of mind: "To me the living sense of its reality only comes in the artificial mystic state of mind." One would look in vain anywhere in the whole extent of the book for any elucidating addition to the foregoing statements. Whatever is, and may be, apprehended by the ordinary rational consciousness in the remarkable religious and non-religious happenings put before the reader, has been, with perfect candor, surrendered to the enemy, and the only empirical excuse for supplementing the subjectivistic hypothesis with a transcendental one is the alleged existence of experiences declared unintelligible to the ordinary, rational consciousness.

At the close of the lectures on Mysticism our author sets down, more formally than he had done before, his position in regard to the authoritativeness of the claim of supernaturality made for the mystical consciousness. They are, to my mind, the most important propositions of the book, both from the point of view of psychology and of philosophy. They constitute a new and momentous step in the fulfillment of the task Professor James seems to have undertaken, *i.e.*, our deliverance from the bondage of the senses and reason, by extending to regions beyond their pale the legitimately believable. They are three in number: —

1. Mystical states, when well developed, usually are, and

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have a right to be, absolutely authoritative over the individuals to whom they come.

2. No authority emanates from them which should make it a duty for those who stand outside of them to accept their revelations uncritically.

3. They break down the authority of the non-mystical or rationalistic consciousness, based upon the understanding and the senses alone. They show it to be only one kind of consciousness. They open out the possibility of other orders of truth, in which, so far as anything in us vitally responds to them, we may freely continue to have faith.

If the authority claimed for these states of consciousness was to be proved unfounded, absolutely nothing would remain, in the sphere of life considered in the "Varieties of Religious Experience," to give one the right of indulging in Professor James' overbelief. If, on the other hand, we are to abide by these conclusions, the judgment of absurdity and irrationality commonly passed by the ordinary consciousness upon mystical, insane, and drunken dreams would have to be declared altogether irrelevant, for the reason that they would belong to other aspects of consciousness. Each aspect of consciousness would be its own judge of reality. Let us, therefore, devote the rest of this paper to the consideration of these propositions.

Psychic life is a very complex affair. Its constituents cannot, generally, be dealt with together. In the present instance it seems an error to have treated the mystical states as a whole, instead of discriminating between what is immediately presented to consciousness and the interpretation of it furnished by the intellect; between, for instance, a group of sensations and feelings, and the belief, arising from them, in spiritual powers having a particular existence of their own.[4] The absolute authority over the subject of what is merely given—the sensations, the feelings, the volitional attitudes—cannot be denied. When the participant in the new beatitude speaks of entrancing feelings, of visions, of voices, of levitation, he is not, of course, to be contradicted. Neither is he to be gainsaid when he

[4]The fact that primitive experience may be described as involving, at once, subject and object does not in the least affect the present argument.

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mentions the feelings of repose, of safety, of vastness, of union, of illumination; nor when he draws attention to the increased courage and moral vigor frequently resulting from the higher mystical states. These experiences are, on their merely subjective aspects, absolute; they are not amenable to the criticism of any form of consciousness whatsoever. So far we are in full agreement with Professor James.

The matter is altogether different when causal relations and other inferences are considered. When we are told, in addition, that the ecstatic feelings are due to God's descent into the believer; that Christ was actually, bodily, present; that the feelings of repose, of vastness, of illumination and the increased ethical power, imply the existence of a world of spiritual existences, we pass beyond experience into the field of rationalistic elaboration. These and every other product of mental activity, as far as they go beyond the mere presented, are amenable to the criticism of every and any form of rational consciousness, because the canons of logical interpretation cannot be conceived to vary from one to another state of consciousness. The principle of logical contradiction, for instance, remains valid throughout experience.

Does Professor James deny this? I, for one, do not see how his statements, taken at their face value, could mean anything but a denial. Has he not written, for example, "the mystic is, in short, invulnerable and must be left, whether we relish it or not, in undisturbed enjoyment of his creed?" If he tells us, almost in the same breath, that the intellectual contents of mysticism may be almost anything, "what comes must be sifted and tested and run the gauntlet of confrontation with the total context of experience, just like what comes from the outer world of sense," it is because he has in mind, for the moment, the practical value of mysticism and no longer the objective truth of its deliverances, for he adds, "its value must be ascertained by empirical methods, so long as we are not mystics ourselves." He would therefore say, it seems, to the person fresh from a Christian conversion: "You claim to have been saved by God's Grace and the power of Christ's atonement. I, who have not had your experience, have not the right

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of contradiction. The authority of your mystical consciousness breaks down the authority of my rationalistic consciousness. But, on your side, you have no right to claim that I ought to accept the deliverance of your particular experience." And this same answer he would have to make to everyone who could claim the advantage of a form of consciousness other than the ordinary, whatsoever it might be. Mutual toleration could not well go further. The running rats and twining snakes of delirium tremens would stand unimpeachable together with the doctrinal beliefs and hallucinations of saints and the dreams of sleeping life. And yet, although I do not see how he can consistently escape this conclusion, I believe he would, as a matter of course, give another answer to the Convert; he would somehow make the above distinction between immediate experience and its interpretation, and subject the latter to the test of the more rational consciousness, as he calls it himself. It is, in fact, what he did with the surviving portion of his own nitrous oxide dreams when he declared it "the veriest nonsense." If I were asked, what is it, after all, which he holds to be invulnerable, I could not do better than draw attention to the terms in which he sums up the deliverances of the mystical consciousness. "The keynote of it is invariably a reconciliation. It is as if the opposites of the world, whose contradictoriness and conflict make all our difficulties and troubles, were melted into unity;;" the mystical states "tell of the supremacy of the ideal, of vastness, of union, of safety and of rest." Is that, and that alone, the "invulnerable" message? If so, I shall venture to remark that as Professor James formulates it, it is not as it is given by the mystical consciousness. It has been brought to the bar of the more rational consciousness to rid it of what appears to him its irrational adjuncts. In doing this, he has set aside his own objectionable principle. It would, in that case, have been the part of consistency to submit to the ordinary consciousness everything going beyond immediate experience. If the words reconciliation, unity, vastness, safety, are intended to describe immediate experiences and nothing more, they cannot, of course, contain any metaphysical implication whatsoever; they are mere sub-

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jective impressions. And, if they are interpreted so as to include the metaphysical implications so dear to Professor James, it becomes the right of the more rational consciousness to pass in last instance upon their pertinence. It seems as though Professor James held that metaphysical implications need not be rational.[5]

In the field of interpretation the more rational consciousness is supreme simply because it is more rational than any other known to man. That the ordinary consciousness is the more rational is not, I believe, a mooted point. No one who need be taken seriously has yet ascribed to intoxication, religious ecstasy, sleep, etc., a greater degree of rationality than to the ordinary consciousness.

The following four reasons seem to me to account satisfactorily for the impression of illumination in religious ecstasy:—

1. As mental activity decreases with the deepening of the mystical trance, the feelings and desires belonging to the subject and those ascribed by him to God, are no more held separate. All desires and tendencies opposed to His will, as understood by the subject, disappear, and nothing remains but the bond of love and of common intent. St. Theresa says, for instance, "My Orison did not take place in my head; it was an Orison of enjoyment and of possession in the will . . . all distinctions disappeared, there was nothing but a desire for deeper love, without the presence of any motive or ground for loving." The impression of intimacy resulting from the fusion of the divine and human feelings and purposes would readily lead uncritical people to the belief that there had been intellectual penetration of the divine mystery, even though they should be aware of the fact that in the higher degrees of Orison the mind is inactive. St. Theresa, for instance, tries to give intellectual form to the very revelation she has declared to be entirely in the realm of the feelings and of the will. Her most successful attempt is ludicrous enough: "I shall say then that the Divinity is like a diamond, superlatively clear and much larger than the world; or like a mirror similar to the one in

[5] Cf. "Varieties of Religious Experience," p. 73.

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which the soul was shown me in the preceding vision, only so much more sublime that I have no words to describe it."

2. The clearer understanding of God's will after the ecstasy and the greater ability to perform it is a second reason. The reinforcement of the desires in accord with God's will is the natural result of a trance dominated by the idea of God.

3. Tauler, in a sermon for Whitsunday, indicates a third and frequent cause of the feeling of illumination: "When all the powers of the soul are collected and turned inwards, it often happens that some eternal truth presents itself with irresistible clearness. This happens not infrequently in morning sleep just before awakening." That a feeling of illumination frequently happens in sleep and usually, then, just before awakening, is well known to the psychologist. But, ordinarily, nothing remains on awakening but the feeling of a glory that is no more, the feeling of having entered the Holy of Holies, or the feeling of having encompassed the deepest philosophical mysteries. Nothing but the supposed after-tastes of such dim fancies remain when the intellect returns to its task. The psychology of this illusion is clear enough. Three things only are necessary to its production: (a) the absence of those ideas which, in waking life, would resist the premature solution of a great problem; (b) a feeling of ease and of power, due, in part, at least, to the circumstance just mentioned; (c) an affective condition compounded of the tender feelings and of something akin to awe. The first and the second of these conditions occur commonly in sleep. The third is the unfailing accompaniment of the mystical trance, because it is dominated by the thought of the Great Lover.

4. The auditory and visual hallucinations with which the mystic is at times favored. God speaks to him comforting and guiding words. But the moral guidance he receives is so evidently within the possibilities of ordinary mortals, that one cannot think of ascribing to it, on the ground of content, an extra-subjective origin.

For these reasons the religious mystic is convinced that God reveals Himself to him. As he finds, however, that he cannot give definite verbal form to the supposed revelations, he is.

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naturally enough, driven to believe in a mysterious faculty, above reason, to which the Revealer addresses Himself. Ruysbroeck, for instance, affirms, in the "Mirror of Eternal Bliss," that "When manifesting Himself the Father elevates the soul above the reason, in the Void without image. There the soul is simple, pure and without any content, and in this pure vacuity the Father brings forth His divine light. In this light neither the reason, nor the senses, nor observation have any share." In the new garb under which Professor James offers us this old doctrine—let me call it a superstition—the "Faculty above reason" to which the Revealer addresses himself has become the Subliminal.

It may be that the favor with which Professor James looks upon the quasi-polytheistic hypothesis finds its empirical warrant in provinces of life other than the religious. I do not know what these provinces may be. The conclusions of Meyers, Hodgson and Hyslop have "somewhat impressed" him, but, in his opinion, the facts are still lacking to prove spirit return. The truth of the matter is, that Professor James' belief is not the outcome of an empirical investigation of religious experience, but a conviction based upon considerations not yet anywhere satisfactorily set forth and supported by some of those "reasons of the heart," *que la raison ne connait pas,* on which Pascal fell back in his attempted apology for the Christian faith. His is one of the conceptions for which, in the "Will to Believe," he claimed the right of belief on affective, utilitarian ground, provided they be free from logical contradiction. Let the reader turn to the last pages of the concluding lecture beginning with the words, "The whole drift of my education goes to persuade me that the world of our present consciousness is only one out of the many worlds of consciousness that exist, and that those other worlds must contain experiences which have a meaning for our life also," etc.; let him recall the frequency and earnest impatience with which our author utters his aversion to the abstractions of Science—those hollowest things in life—and the conviction with which he proclaims that the world of generalized objects which the intellect

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contemplates, is without solidity or life compared with the pinch of one's individual existence and destiny, and he will know on what kind of food Professor James' overbelief is sustained.

It is from the religious sphere of life that the most compelling "reason of the heart" comes. Had Professor James been content to use his consummate art merely to exhibit the needs of Religion, in the interest of the hypothesis on which he chose to make his own "personal venture," no one could have found just cause for complaint. But these Gifford Lectures are not so much an exposition of those needs as an attempt to make it appear that a particular belief, which would satisfy them, is empirically justifiable. I am almost willing to describe this attempt as "unfair" because, although everything tangible has been admitted by him to remain within the limits of the individual, there is spread throughout the book, with marvelous skill, the mysterious, imaginary shadows of spirit-agents. So that a work providing no empirical basis whatsoever for spirit-intervention is, nevertheless, made—I do not say intentionally—to cast the great weight of a mass of impressive facts in favor of that hypothesis. The perfect candor of the author, so evident when he makes definite statements as to his attitude, does not much mend matters. The bewitched reader is not in a position to give them their full value. In one of the very first lectures (the Reality of the Unseen), a most interesting and valuable chapter, the reader is almost unavoidably thrown into the temper of the materializing seance and easily imagines that the author adduces the recorded impressions of the presence of persons actually absent as a *proof* of spirit intervention, although he recognizes here also the validity of the purely subjective explanation. The atmosphere of the rest of the volume does not tend to dispel the superstitious mood into which the uncritical reader is thrown at the very start. Ghosts pop out of the very places he has just shown you to be empty. The experiences with which he deals are not alone to blame for this effect. Even simple, natural things become mysterious in passing through the hands of the prestidigitator.

If Professor James' philosophical understanding of life in

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general involves, for reasons not given in these lectures, the existence of Spiritual Beings, could he not, at least, do without the intervention clause? I do not see what advantage accrues from it to Professor James' Individualism, neither how that hypothesis can be a gain to a Pluralistic Idealism intent upon preserving individual freedom and moral dignity.

As to the practical value to religion of the hypothesis, one could only pity the temperamental believer who should be induced to give up his *bona fide* omnipotent God for agents who cannot do better than crawl in through the subliminal door when it happens to be open; agents whose power is limited to the execution of a nameless work of supererogation left over after the observable and describable in human experience has been performed by the subject himself in his subliminal depth. What a fall this would be from the belief in the omnipotent Christian God, or even in the mighty Dieties of the Greeks!

In so far as the question involved in the present discussion is concerned, the status of empirical knowledge may be summed up thus: The progress of the physical sciences during the past thirty years, has added nothing that could affect one's opinion about it. On the contrary, the advance of the psychological sciences during the same time, has in many ways increased and modified the knowledge on which philosophical systems are built. But, instead of producing anything that would strengthen the belief in extra-human spirit-agents *influencing human destinies,* psychology has made intelligible, conformably to the rest of our organized knowledge, most, if not all, the striking phenomena which have been the empirical props of the popular faith in spiritism, whether Christian or not. We refer to anæsthesias, analgesias, hallucinations, monitions, trances, the sense of illumination in ecstasy, etc., including the facts considered in Professor James' lectures. In making this statement, I do not forget the work of the Society for Psychical Research. Its achievements may be declared to have been so far, and without prejudice of the future, absolutely inconclusive with regard to spiritism.[6] They

[6] See my criticism of Prof. Hyslop's exhaustive report on Mrs. Piper's trances in this journal, October, 1903.

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have, however, served directly or indirectly to make more definite the *intra-human* explanation of many phenomena previously not well understood.

The establishment, on empirical evidence, of spirit-communication is a remoter possibility than ever before. "The Varieties of Religious Experience" provides further evidence in support of this affirmation.

It may not be useless to add that the rejection of spirit-interference does in nowise commit one to Materialism. It leaves a clear field to Absolute, as well as to many forms of Pluralistic, Idealism.

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WORDSWORTH'S IDEAL OF EARLY EDUCATION.*

IT is a healthy sign of our time that in all the leading departments of humane study we are coming more and more to distrust commentators and dispensers of second-hand knowledge—the school-men of science—and turning with a fresh interest, not unlike the revival of learning itself, to the sources of first-hand inspiration. "Many are the thyrsus bearers, but few are the mystics," and it is the mystics and their scriptures that we are being taught in these days to search for ourselves—to pass from the commentator to the text, from the theological to the religious writer, from the sociologist to the seer.

Such a seer in education is Wordsworth. Others write about education. Wordsworth gives us the story of his own, the steps by which a great heart and mind reached a view happiness. Anything which enables us to realize their mean- of things, a feeling for nature and the world of men which was to him, and might, he believed, some day become to all, a source of abiding peace and happiness. It is this which

* Paper read before the Educational Society, Cardiff, December 4, 1903.

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makes his "Prelude," with its amazing depth and fineness of psychological insight, perhaps the greatest, certainly the most interesting, modern treatise on education which we possess. Its teaching rests, as on twin pillars, on his view, first of man in general, and, secondly, of the child who is the father of the man.

1. Wordsworth is, in the best sense, the Poet of Democracy. His name stands for the discovery, or rather, the re-discovery, that the simplest things—the things that all men have in common: birth and death, rest and labor, parents and children, home and country—are the most important factors in human happiness. Anything which enables us to realize their meaning (such as wholesome surroundings and the best kind of books) is of essential human value. On the other hand, anything which seems to estrange us from them, like a great deal that is artificial and vicious in modern industry and civilization, is the enemy of true peace and of all real enjoyment of life.

These ideas, it may be said, were common to the leading writers of his time, and by this time are commonplaces. This is true, but what distinguishes Wordsworth and places him above all his contemporaries and all commonplaces is, that he sought to make clear to himself and to others the reason of the undying freshness of simple things. He found it in the fact that they are not really things at all, but the most universal language in which the mind that animates nature and human life speaks to our minds: the points at which we stand in closest union with it, and therefore with one another. From this doctrine, which Wordsworth accepted from Berkeley, or, at any rate, held in common with him, flowed the ideas which are familiar to the reader of his more popular poems. Nature and human life are one: the laws that bind the Heavens are the same as that which binds one human being to another. To be in touch with these laws, whether in the speculations of a Kepler or the piety of a Westmoreland alesman, is to be in touch with the sources of our own inmost being: it extends and deepens our hold upon life, it tranquilizes the soul, strengthens the will and permeates the character. It even reacts upon the body and moulds the features with a reflection of the underlying harmony of things.

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Wordsworth is usually described as a Nature poet, his ideas as the "return to nature." But it would be more accurate to describe them as the return to Spirit, and the form he gave them widely separates him from Rousseau and other leaders of the nature school. To one to whom these truths were not only intellectual convictions, but practical principles, tested and proved in a life uncommonly full of hardship and trial,[1] no ideal of education could appear for a moment tolerable which failed to lay the main stress on the development in the soul of the capacity to draw upon these secret sources of power. As compared with this—still more put in the place of it—all other objects were bound to appear hopelessly inadequate and unworthy. Yet, when he looked round about him at the ideals held most in honor in the high places of education, any serious care for it seemed precisely what was lacking. "A thousand projects," so John Morley describes the time, "all taking for granted that ignorance is the disease and useful knowledge the universal healer; all of them secular, all dealing with man from the outside; none touching the imagination or the heart."[2] The leaders of the prevailing Utilitarian philosophy had just succeeded in 1828 in crowning their educational achievements by the foundation of the London University. Yet Wordsworth was profoundly dissatisfied. "We have no guarantee," he writes, summing up his objections to the whole movement, "in the social condition of these *well-informed* pupils for the use they will make of their power and their knowledge. The scheme points not to man as a religious being; its end is an unworthy one, and its means do not pay respect to the order of things."[3]

2. We shall better appreciate the meaning of this criticism, and especially the better part of it, if, having said so much of Wordsworth's view of man, we turn now to what he held about the child. His starting point here, as in the case of man, is the

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[1] M. Legouis, in his recent monograph on Wordsworth, disposes of the common view that Wordsworth was singularly happy in the external circumstances of his life.

[2] "Life of Gladstone," I, 156.

[3] "Prose Works," Vol. III.

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wholeness of the child's nature. The child is one with Nature; he is one in himself. From the first it followed that there exists in the child's mind a natural responsiveness to the deeper tones of the world in which he lives—a pre-established harmony between the soul and the impressions that education seeks to deepen and develop in it.

> "Our childhood sits,
> Our simple childhood sits upon a throne
> That hath more power than all the elements."

Those who know most of children under normal circumstances, their amazing imperviousness to evil and their equally amazing affinity to good, will be the most ready to agree. But it is necessary to emphasize the point here, as Wordsworth's teaching with regard to it has been lamentably misunderstood. It is commonly thought that he believed in the pre-existence of the soul, and that the child comes into the world out of a state of innocence, compared with which all earthly life is but a sleep and a forgetting:—

> "Heaven lies about us in our infancy,
> Shades of the prison-house begin to close
> Upon the growing boy."

If taken seriously such a doctrine can only mean the futility of all schemes of education which are not directed to the prolongation of prenatal innocence—the preservation of the soul from the obliterating impressions of the senses. Whether Wordsworth at any time held the doctrine of pre-existence, we need not here inquire. It is sufficient for our present purpose to notice that the application of it to the child's mind is altogether foreign to the teaching of the "Prelude." There are lines here which, like those above quoted, seem to recall it. But what the poet wishes to bring out is not the weakening and blinding effects of experience, but "the happy adaptation to the universe" which, as M. Legouis explains, imparted to the child, in Wordsworth's view, "an initial impulse in his journey along the path which leads most surely to the noblest ends of human life."

This natural adaptation, however, is only the beginning. The feeling for the truth and beauty of things—the admiration, hope and love by which we live when we truly live at

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all—are no prenatal endowments, but require to be developed in the soul of the child, and for this development Wordsworth has no more miraculous means to suggest than the familiar, though much misunderstood and neglected, method of habit and association. His doctrine involves nothing more recondite than the familiar psychological truth that isolated feelings grow into sentiments and prevailing habits of mind through the unconscious deposits of repeated experience and the associations they leave behind. If you hold, as he does, that love of his natural environment—parents and home, work and play, animals and his fellow-men—is the foundation of all true happiness in a man, and if you would seek to lay this foundation deep in the mind of the child, what you have to see to first and foremost is to make provision for these living deposits. In their fully developed form—love of Nature and Humanity, as we find them in the poet and saint—they stand for our life at its highest; but they have very simple beginnings in the vivid sensations of which every child is capable—the sound, the sight, the taste, the smell and feel of things about it; the services of its fellow creatures to its primitive wants; the pleasant background that Nature and simple types of human life, shepherds and sailors, ploughers and fishers, producers and carriers, form for its own imitations of them: its soldiery and sailoring, its hunting and fishing, its riding and coaching, its making and carrying. It is out of such raw material and not from any prenatal vision that deeper sentiments develop in us:—

> "Truths that wake
> To perish never;
> Which neither listlessness nor mad endeavor,
> Nor Man nor Boy,
> Nor all that is at enmity with joy,
> Can utterly abolish or destroy."

The whole of the "Prelude" is an exposition of this simple but forgotten truth. It might be called a Treatise on the Association of Ideas—one of the few readable ones. The most characteristic passages of the poem are those in which the poet narrates incidents in his own life which formed the soil out of which in due time sprang—

> "The passions that build up our human soul;"

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the boat he untied from the shore of the lake, his skating by night, his meeting with an old soldier by a gateway on the road, a blind beggar in a crowded London thoroughfare, his waiting for a cart by misty wayside bush—dramatic narratives in which nothing happens except in the soul. And as though he would leave no room for misunderstanding on this head, he sums up his teaching for us in the lines:—

> "And thus
> By the impressive discipline of fear,
> By pleasure and repeated happiness
> So frequently repeated, and by force
> Of obscure feelings, representative
> Of things forgotten, these same scenes so bright,
> So beautiful, so majestic in themselves,
> (Tho' yet the day was distant) did become
> Habitually dear and all their forms
> And changeful colors by invisible links
> Were fastened to the affections."[4]

These passages are all the more significant, as one of the most characteristic of them[5] occurs in close connection with a vigorous attack on the current ideal of education, to which we may now return.

What is involved in such a view as to early education? First and foremost that by early contact with nature and human life in its simpler forms, children should have the amplest opportunity of forming for themselves the associations out of which the sentiments, on which we have been discoursing, spring. Education here, as at all other vital points, must be self-education. Nothing can take the place of the self-appropriation, the inwardizing by the soul of its own first-hand impressions. For this process leisure, freedom from distraction and officious interference, fuss and worry, are from the first essentials. It was Wordsworth's profound reverence for the natural workings of the child's mind, in connection with the material furnished by wholesome natural and social surroundings, that explains the somewhat amusing distrust with which he regards the attempts of enthusiastic educationalists of his own time to found a system of infant schools. To Wordsworth this mis-

[4] "Prelude," II, 602 foll. Cf. II, 235-244. [5] V, 364.

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directed enterprise, aiming, as it did, at separating the child just at the most impressionable age from its proper environment, seemed to be nothing short of the sin against the Holy Ghost—Nature, itself, cried out against it. He describes, in sober wrath and true Wordsworthian blindness to the humor of the situation, a Lancashire town, "in which, about nine o'clock in the morning the streets resound with the crying of infants wheeled off in carts and other vehicles (some ladies lending their carriages for this purpose) to their school prisons." Bell's system, then coming into vogue, only added heinousness to the offense against childhood. Shenstone's schoolmistress, by her winter fire and in her summer-garden seat, he will back against all Dr. Bell's sour-looking teachers in petticoats that he has ever seen. Nature had been shut out of these infant penitentiaries. The attempt to reintroduce her by pictures stuck up against walls and such mummery, was a mere parody of her teaching: "a moment's notice of a red-breast pecking at the winter's hearth is worth them all." What he would have said of the lions and tigers, the leopards, giraffes and still more blood-curling monsters that commonly embellish the walls of infant schools at the present day, is mercifully veiled from us.

This was his first objection to the current practice: the too early severance of the child from the objects and events which formed the natural stimulus of its growing powers. All that was really valuable in early school education, the development of attention, imagination and memory, he held, could be far better obtained by leaving children alone:—

> "Attention springs,
> And comprehensiveness and memory flow
> From early converse with the works of God
> Among all regions; chiefly where appear
> Most obviously simplicity and power."

The second count in his indictment of the popular system followed from his views of the unity of the child's nature in itself. Instead of paying proper regard to its essential wholeness, it seemed to encourage an unnatural severance of one part from another. Power was sacrificed to knowledge, taste and character to intellectual precocity; the aim being rather to show

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what a child can do than to prepare it for what it will be called upon to do. It was against this one-sidedness in education and the abortion that was its product, that he directed his keenest satire. Here is his account of the terrible infant, to the wholesale manufacture of which Mr. Edgeworth and his co-adjutors were devoting an ability and an enthusiasm worthy of a better cause:—

> "Ships he can guide across the pathless sea,
> And tell you all their cunning; he can read
> The inside of the earth and spell the stars;
> He knows the policies of foreign lands;
> Can string you names of districts, cities, towns,
> The whole world over light as beads of dew
> Upon a gossamer thread; he sifts, he weighs,
> All things are put to question; he must live
> Knowing that he grows wiser every day,
> Or else not live at all, and seeing too
> Each little drop of wisdom as it falls
> Into the dimpling cistern of his heart—
> For this unnatural growth the trainer blame.
> Pity the tree."

If we ask what Wordsworth would substitute, his answer is merely an extension to the first school years of what he has already claimed for earlier childhood:—

> "Meanwhile old grandame earth is grieved to find
> The playthings, which her love designed for him,
> Unthought of: in their woodland beds the flowers
> Weep and the river-sides are all forlorn.
> Oh! give us once again the wishing-cap
> Of Fortunatus, and the invisible coat
> Of Jack the Giant-killer, Robin Hood
> And Sabra in the forest with St. George.
> The child whose love is here at least doth reap
> One precious gain that he forgets himself."[6]

To the same effect are the suggestions he writes to an anxious parent in one of his later letters. After denouncing the mistake of overrunning the child's infancy with moralizing books, he goes on to explain that formal education must begin "by putting the child in the way of acquiring, without measure or limit, such knowledge as will lead him out of himself; such knowledge as is interesting for its own sake; things known

[6] V, 315 foll.

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because they are interesting, not interesting because they are known; in a word, by leaving him at liberty to luxuriate in such feelings and images as will feed his mind in silent pleasure. This nourishment is contained in fairy tales, romances, the best biographies and histories, and such parts of natural history relating to the powers and appearance of the earth and elements, and the habits and structure of animals as belong to it not as an art or science, but as a magazine of form and feeling."[7] Here, as elsewhere, what Wordsworth is concerned to bring home is, that education from first to last is concerned with the production of a state of mind. If this is right, all else will be right. If it is wrong, no technical acquirements can compensate for the loss. This explains his indifference to details of later education. He is concerned with first principles. The application to details of school curriculum is for others.

One subject, however, closely connected with his view of higher education, calls for a word of notice. It is commonly thought that he is an enemy of science. "Wordsworth," says Leslie Stephen, "hates science because it regards facts without the imaginative and emotional coloring."[8] This is incredible. It would be strange if one, who laid so much stress on the insight of the soul into the laws and unities of things, should have failed to see in science one of the chief sources of this deeper insight. What is repellent to the poet is neither science nor its applications, but the partiality and exclusiveness of much that claims the name of science.

True science retains—

> "Among least things
> An undersense of greatness; sees the parts
> As parts but with a feeling for the whole."

"Admiration and love," he elsewhere declares, "to which all knowledge truly vital must tend, are felt by men of real genius in proportion as their discoveries in natural philosophy are enlarged." Nor has any poet more finely told us how the most abstract of sciences may feed these higher emotions:—

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[7] "Prose Works," Vol. III, p. 332.

[8] Quoted by Mr. Spence Watson in his admirable paper on "Wordsworth's Relation to Science" in the publications of the Wordsworth Society.

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"From the same source I drew
A pleasure quiet and profound, a sense
Of permanent and universal sway,
And paramount belief; there recognized
A type for finite natures of the one
Supreme Existence, the surpassing life,
Which—to the boundaries of space and time,
Of melancholy space and doleful time,
Superior, and incapable of change,
Nor touched by welterings of passion—is
And hath the name of God."[9]

While thus acknowledging the aid to insight that science gives, the poet would not have been a poet had he not insisted that the higher kind of knowledge came from poetry. "Poetry," he writes in the Observations prefixed to the Lyrical Ballads, "is the first and last of all knowledge—it is as immortal as the heart of man. If the labors of men of science should ever create any material revolution, direct or indirect, in our condition and in the impressions which we habitually receive, the poet will sleep then no more than at present; but he will be ready to follow the steps of the man of science, not only in those general indirect effects, but he will be at his side carrying sensation into the midst of the objects of the science itself. The remotest discoveries of the chemist, the botanist or mineralogist will be as proper objects of the poet's art as any upon which it can be employed, if the time should ever come when these things shall be familiar to us, and the relations under which they are contemplated by the followers of these respective sciences shall be manifestly and palpably material to us as enjoying and suffering beings. If the time should ever come when what is now called science, thus familiarized to man, shall be ready to put on, as it were, a form of flesh and blood, the poet will lend his divine spirit to aid the transfiguration, and will welcome the being thus produced as a dear and genuine inmate of the household of man."

So Wordsworth conceived of education rounding into self.

[9] Prelude, VI, 29 foll. To which we may add his well-known lines to the statue of Newton in Cambridge.

"With his pensive and silent face
The marble index of a mind forever
Voyaging thro' strange seas of thought alone."

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Beginning in a genuine feeling from the appearances of things —passing through first the imaginative then the analytical handling of them—ending in the reinterpretation of the results of science by poetry, "the breath and finer spirit of all knowledge."

Such an ideal, having as its object not man as an intellectual machine, not man as a wage-earner or even as a citizen, but man as a religious being, challenges comparison with our common views, both as to the end and means of education.

1. As an ideal of the end, it may appear to some sufficiently remote from anything that we commonly regard as either possible or desirable. Theoretically teachers and parents alike acknowledge the supreme importance of religion, but seriously and continuously to treat the child as primarily a religious being scarcely crosses our minds. The reason is doubtless partly that, in spite of a hundred years of progress, we hardly yet realize what Wordsworth means by religion. We are still boggling over theological points, and still possessed by the idea that religion is a "subject" capable of being taught by Scripture and Catechism, perhaps with something of the same perverse optimism that led our fathers to believe that the scientific spirit could be inculcated by committing to memory selected passages of Dr. Brewer's "Guide to Science."

But it is time we put the question seriously to ourselves: What is the side of man's nature that is most closely connected with his permanent happiness, and is most worthy of our care? Do we really live by admiration and love, and has the child a right to be prepared from such a life? Or is the life for which we seek to prepare him something quite other in its essence? Granting (as who dare in heart deny?) that the poet's view is Gospel truth, is any of us really satisfied with the net result of our schooling and colleging: the deadness to the best things in nature and in human life with which the average youth and girl are apt to be turned out—the secularity and parochialness of their interest in a world that everywhere appeals to the spiritual and the cosmic? And have we not to admit that the fault for it is, at least in part, our own coming from our half-heartedness in accepting the Wordsworthian doctrine in all its



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fullness and veracity? Perhaps if we were more willing to do so, we might find that "the religious difficulty" is a self-made one, and that the question how to teach religion is bound up with the wider question how to teach at all.

There is crying need for some unanimity on this subject among our educators. We live in a secular age. From all sides it is dinned into us that education should be more practical; that our position, as a productive and commercial nation, demands the complete reorganization of our system in the interest of industrial and administrative efficiency. How much of it all are we to believe? I hope we shall believe a good deal of it. The practical man has a way of going pretty straight to the point when things are wrong. He knows where the shoe pinches. In the present instance parents and teachers, it is to be hoped, will take to heart what he has to say as to the shortcomings of present-day education. But it is to be hoped, at the same time, that we shall largely discount his claim to prescribe the means to make them good. What teachers mainly want at such a time is to keep their heads and to believe in themselves and in the great guidance they have from the prophets of their art. This is unmistakable whether we take it from Wordsworth or not. "There is nothing to be gained, but everything to be lost, from putting any nearer or narrower object in the place of the wider and more distant. The best industrial, as the best religious education, cannot be separated from the best education in general—indeed is identical with it. 'Seek ye first the kingdom of man and his happiness, and all these things will be added unto you.'"

2. On the second question also, that of the means, there is necessarily much in Wordsworth's theory that seems out of touch with our own time. In its details, as well as in its want of details, Wordsworth's ideal is the ideal of an earlier, a narrower, a more leisurely, and, withal, a less strenuous world than ours. It is an ideal that is better suited for Hawkshead or Bowness than for the crowded city populations of the present day. Few, for instance, would be found to advocate an extended and more unrestricted familiarity with its city environment at the basis of a child's education. Yet changing what

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requires to be changed, Wordsworth's main contention seems to me to contain the most essential word for the educational reformer of our own day as well as his. To put it in a sentence: the aim of the teacher is, in the last resort, to procure in the child a condition of mind (which is also a condition of feeling and will) in respect to the objects that are brought before it. As this condition is one into which the child must initiate itself by an inward process of assimilation, it requires time and an atmosphere of large leisureliness, the antithesis of the crowded time-tables—the everlasting drill and pressure that are apt to characterize even the infant departments of our schools. Method, of course, there must be even in these; but might it not, for the younger children, be a method which exists far more in the mind of the teacher and far less in time-tables and directions for the scholars, than at present? Such an ideal implies the highest skill and intelligence on the part of the teacher, and this is the reason for the claim sometimes put forward without much lucidity that the best teachers should be assigned to the infant departments. In the upper classes there must, of course, be routine with its accompaniment of drill and direction. But here, too, the principle is the same. Nothing can be effectively learnt, learnt, that is, so as to become its own, and thus the fertile soil of fresh thoughts and feelings which is not appropriated by the whole mind. And for this again, far more leisurely (I do not say less peremptorily exacted), progress in acquisition at the earlier stages of an art or science, than is commonly thought necessary, is essential. All this is generally admitted by us in theory. Teachers, I notice, commonly applaud one another when they announce such sentiments. But when they are asked why they do not practice what they preach, they commonly fall back upon the plea that the time is wanting, and the time is wanting because the whole system is bad. There is truth in this, but not so much as is supposed; not enough wholly to exonerate us.

There was a time when social reformers blamed the Government for all the evils that civilized flesh is heir to. By and by they discovered that they, themselves, were, or might, become the Government. Since that fateful discovery government has

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been changed and has, on the whole, become an instrument of progress. It sometimes strikes one that it may be the same with educational, the most important of all kinds of reform. The system is, in many ways, bad, but parents and teachers, after all, are themselves the system, or they may, by greater unity of feeling and organization amongst themselves, become it. Even as things are, if any group of them, who became convinced of the incontrovertible soundness—ethical and psychological—of the view for which Wordsworth stands, had the courage to take their professional and parental lives in their hands and lead the way in a bold attempt to apply it, something, after all this education talk, might be really done in the way of practical reform—more faithful regard to the nature of man as a religious being, and to the true order of things.

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NOTE: Some striking testimony on the value of the whole Wordsworthian contention comes to hand from a teacher whose brilliant and almost unparalleled success gives her authority peculiar weight, in the recent published "Story of My Life," by Helen Keller, pp. 319 and 376. "I am beginning to suspect all elaborate and special systems of education," writes Miss Sullivan. "They seem to me to be built on the supposition that every child is a kind of idiot who must be taught to think. Whereas if the child has hidden somewhere in his being noble capacities which may Let him go and come freely, let him touch real things and combine his impressions for himself, instead of sitting indoors at a little round table while a sweet-voiced teacher suggests that he built a stone wall with his wooden blocks, or make a rainbow out of strips of colored paper or plant straw trees in bead flower-pots. Such teaching fills the mind with artificial association that must be got rid of before the child can develop independent ideas out of actual experiences. . . . I believe every child has hidden somewhere in his being noble capacities which may be quickened and developed, if we go about it in the right way; but we shall never properly develop the higher nature of our little ones while we continue to fill their minds with the so-called rudiments. Mathematics will never make them loving nor will the accurate knowledge of the size and shape of the earth help them to appreciate its beauties. Let us lead them during the first years to find their greatest pleasure in Nature. Let them run in the fields, learn about animals and observe real things. Children will educate themselves under right conditions. They require guidance and sympathy far more than instruction."

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"WHAT SHOULD BE THE ATTITUDE OF TEACHERS OF PHILOSOPHY TOWARDS RELIGION?" A REPLY.

In the number of this JOURNAL for April, 1903, appeared an article on this question by Professor Royce. The question, in one form or another, has probably given more or less serious perplexity to a large number of minds, perhaps to a larger number than the writer had immediately in view. It may be regarded, therefore, as forming a real problem in practical Ethics; and any contribution which Professor Royce may make to the solution of the problem, is sure to be welcomed by those who know the work he has done in the teaching of philosophy.

In the solution of the problem there is obviously room for individual diversities of opinion and practice, and therefore no individual can easily represent every aspect of the question involved. For that reason, without any disrespect to Professor Royce, it may be contended that there are some aspects of the question which he has not adequately represented in his discussion. At all events, it may not be without interest to discuss the question from another's point of view.

In doing so it is desirable to avoid complicating the issue unnecessarily by any controversy about the sense, in which the term Religion is to be understood; and, therefore, for the nonce, Professor Royce's definition may be accepted. "By Religion," he says, "in its higher sense, I mean the consciousness of practical relations to a real, but at present unseen, spiritual order, whose authority as furnishing the rule for our conduct is conceived as absolute, and whose worth and dignity we recognize as above every other worth and dignity known to us. . . . I expressly define the general term," he adds, "so that Buddhism and Christianity, the so-called Ethical Religions of some modern teachers, and the more positive creeds of tradition, equally fall within the scope of my definition" (p. 280). The abstract merits of this definition it would be unfair to discuss. It is offered, not as a definition of Religion

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in itself, but merely to serve a specific purpose; and for that purpose it may be adopted as sufficiently serviceable. I shall only emphasize, as Professor Royce does, the intentional comprehensiveness of the definition, as this is of essential moment in considering whether teachers of philosophy may find a spiritual home in any of the religious communities which the definition includes.

There is another term, equally prominent in his question, on which Professor Royce has unfortunately not been quite so definite. The question refers, not to men in general, but to teachers of philosophy in particular. Who are to be included under this designation? Here, again, to avoid needless complications, Professor Royce's statement may be accepted, so far as it goes. Without attempting to define philosophy in technical form, he explains that "there are two things, and two only, that the philosopher, as philosopher, can contribute towards training humanity to do better its work of striving after a sound religious consciousness. These things are: (1) Clearness of thought about religious issues, and (2) a judicial spirit in the comparison, in the historical estimate, and in the formation of religious opinions" (p. 282). I take it that the former of these is implied in the very possibility of the latter; and, consequently, in this discussion we may speak of the function of the philosopher as being simply to maintain towards religion that mental attitude which is commonly characterized as *judicial* or, by a Greek equivalent, *critical*

The question raised, as we have seen, is limited explicitly to teachers of philosophy. Is this limitation to be understood in the narrowest professional sense as including only those members of the teaching staff in educational institutions, to whom the designation in question can be technically applied? Such a limitation is obviously based on a purely external aspect of men's occupations in society, and has no intrinsic connection with the question at issue here. Under such a limitation the discussion would be rendered wholly futile; it could not grapple with the central principle involved, but would inevitably run off into side issues of trivial import in regard to conventional proprieties, local usages and other points of a similar nature.

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Any conclusion thus reached would be of value to an exceedingly small fraction of the human race, and even to a comparatively small number of educated men, while the vast majority of those with whom the question is a practical problem, would find their perplexity unremoved. It may seem unnecessary to make this explanation, for Professor Royce evidently had no intention of restricting his discussion within the limits indicated. He uses, in fact, the terms "philosopher" and "teacher of philosophy" interchangeably, implying that he has not merely the professional teacher in view. But his own demand for clearness in philosophical thinking must form the justification for being thus explicit. To give the discussion of his question any philosophical value, it is indispensable that we should be perfectly clear as to the persons to whom the question refers.

For this purpose it is surely by no means superfluous to keep in mind that the philosophical spirit, as defined above, is not a prerogative vested exclusively in the professional teachers of philosophy. There is good ground in educational science for the contention that all teachers, whatever their specialty may be, should be imbued with the critical catholicity of the philosophical spirit. Indeed the contention may be widened to the extent of insisting that education should in general aim at the development of that spirit in all men; and the culture, which results from any education, may be said to be defective in proportion as it fails to develop that spirit. Teachers of philosophy themselves often find that their best students—those who have caught the philosophical spirit most fully—go into all sorts of occupations,—theology, law, medicine, applied science, literature, manufactures, commerce. These do not abandon their philosophical tastes and habits of thought entirely in their practical occupations. Moreover, may it not be said that religion develops, in an unreflective form, that spiritual endeavor which becomes reflective in philosophy, to reach the divine, that is, the universal and eternal point of view. The difference, however, between religion and philosophy, if taken absolutely, is a mere abstraction of thought; in actual life religion shades away into philosophy by innumerable

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gradations which cannot be indicated by any sharp line of demarcation. The result is, that all through general society we meet with men whose thinking is governed more or less effectively by the critical spirit of philosophical culture. But, as no man liveth to himself, it is impossible for these men to avoid exerting an influence upon others. Consciously or unconsciously they become teachers. They leaven society with the spirit of their own thought, and they do so sometimes more extensively and more intensively than the professional teachers of philosophy. This seems to be eminently the case in English-speaking communities. What Professor Seth Pringle-Pattison says, specially of Scotland, holds good, not only of Great Britain and her colonies in general, but also of the United States. Speaking of Reid, he observes: "His works were addressed to the reading portion of his countrymen generally—to his old students, in great part, and the ministers of religion, into whose ranks many of them had doubtless passed. . . . What Scottish philosophy has lost in scientific precision, may have been compensated for, in part, by the greater influence which it has exerted upon the body of the people—an influence which has made it a factor, so to speak, in the national life."[1]

This wider diffusion of philosophical influence seems to me wholly beneficial. It may fairly be questioned whether it does not react beneficially on philosophy itself by keeping it in more intimate touch with the realities of nature and of life. But whatever may be the influence of the outside world on philosophy, all philosophical teachers are agreed on the desirability of bringing its influence to bear on the outside world so as to mould thereby the intellectual and moral and religious life. As philosophical teachers, they will interpret the function of teaching in its most thorough significance. They will include under it every kind of influence by which the mental life may be trained. As it is those who *do* the truth rather than those who merely *speak* it, that come to the light themselves and lead others to it most effectively, the philosopher will endeavor

[1] *Scottish Philosophy*, pp. 125-6.

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to exert an educational influence, not only by his words, but also by his deeds. How? 'Tis on this question mainly that I regret to part company with Professor Royce. "For the rest," he says, "I, myself, am glad when, under the conditions as they exist to-day, the philosophical teacher's convictions are such that he sees his way to avoid all connection with any sect or form of the visible church." For this preference two reasons are given: (1) "that a personal relation to the visible church has to-day a value which concerns chiefly the man engaged in certain practical philanthropic tasks;" (2) that "the philosopher, by holding aloof from the visible church, helps himself to maintain in himself and to display to his students that judicial spirit which I have insisted upon as his especial possession" (p. 285). Now, while it may be acknowledged that there are local and other conditions which must modify the individual's action in regard to religious society as well as on other subjects, to me it seems that the course which Professor Royce views with gladness is rather one to be adopted only with profound regret as a last unwelcome necessity, to be justified only when imposed on the philosophical teacher by the stress of circumstances which he cannot control.

I take it that Professor Royce vindicates his preference mainly on the second of the reasons which he pleads. That reason claims that the course advocated is helpful, if it is not necessary, to enable the philosophical teacher to maintain and display the judicial spirit which is his especial possession. But is that spirit inevitably prejudiced by connection with some "sect or form of the visible church," when that church is widened so as to comprehend Buddhism and Christianity and the so-called Ethical Religions, as well as the more positive creeds of tradition? 'Tis true that all the thoughts and sentiments and actions of men are influenced by their associations. The bias, arising from association with fellowmen, is one that can never be evaded except in the life of an absolute solitary, and the solitary simply brings himself under the influence of other associations which are generally much more detrimental to a healthy intellectual life. Religion is not distinguished by imparting any abnormal intensity to social influences. There

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is, therefore, no special reason for evading the bias of human fellowship in religious life more than in other spheres of human activity. Certainly there are some spheres,—politics, for example,—where the bias of association with a party leads at times to results quite as calamitous as any religious sectarianism. If, therefore, the only effective, or the most effective, method of maintaining the judicial impartiality of the philosopher were that preferred by Professor Royce, the result would be that men, aiming at an impartial attitude, would be prevented from uniting with their fellows in the promotion of any common object, if such union might bring them into conflict with another party.

But a man does not necessarily surrender the spirit of a philosophical critic by taking one side in a controversy, nor does he, with certainty, maintain that spirit by refusing persistently to take any. Suspension of judgment is, indeed, imperative for the critic or judge when he begins his work, but is for him a means, not an end. This it is that distinguishes the critic from the sceptic. With the sceptic—the absolute sceptic, at least—suspended judgment is the end of all inquiry. But the very function of the judge is to pronounce judgment *(jus dicere),* and there could be no more flagrant violation of the judicial temper than a judge who refuses to pronounce judgment when the evidence appears to him conclusive. Some thought of this it may have been that led Professor Royce to explain that the philosophical teacher, in one aspect at least of his work, is a mediator rather than an appellate judge. I confess I fail to appreciate the point of the distinction. The mediator may, from sheer honesty, be forced to take one side very unmistakably, or he may distribute the right and the wrong pretty evenly between both parties, or he may refuse to enter into the merits of the dispute at all, seeking to convince the parties that the matter is not worth quarreling about, and that the wise course for both would be simply to " let bygones be bygones." But whatever attitude he may adopt it involves a judgment on the case. From that he cannot escape; for it should not be overlooked that suspension of judgment is a judgment itself. It is a judgment to the effect that the evi-

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dence available is inconclusive. Such a judgment is an eminently valuable attitude of mind; it is the only attitude compatible with intellectual virtue as long as the evidence appears inconclusive. But the man who maintains this attitude does not thereby avoid committing himself to a judgment on the question at issue; he commits himself to the very serious judgment that the evidence *is* inconclusive. Moreover, unless he has betaken himself to the life of a hermit, he brings himself inevitably into association with those who maintain his own attitude; and such association must be expected to exert the same influence, for good or for evil, as the association of those whose attitude is different.

It is not, however, assumed by Professor Royce, that in order to maintain critical impartiality, the philosophical teacher must be without convictions of his own on the subject of religion. On the contrary, it is admitted not only that he will have convictions, but that he will express them (p. 284); and it is not denied that a man's conduct will, in general, be taken as a more effective expression of his convictions than any language he can use. But a man's religious convictions must commonly find their most prominent expression in his practical relation to the religious institutions of the community in which he lives; and, as we have seen, it does not follow that he surrenders his critical impartiality by joining one religious society any more than by holding himself aloof from all. It may, indeed, be pleaded that, though the critical attitude would not thus be necessarily abandoned, it might be lost in the eyes of men,—that the philosopher might be misinterpreted,—be compromised, and his influence as a teacher might be impaired, if not destroyed. But it must, on the other hand, be borne in mind that a man does not escape misinterpretation by avoiding such connection; he may, at times, be thereby even more seriously misinterpreted. He cannot hold himself entirely aloof from the active religious life of his fellows without thereby exciting the suspicion of hostility, or of what may be worse than honest and earnest hostility, an indifference that is frivolous in thought and frivolous in feeling. Am I wrong in believing that Professor Royce would cheerfully run the risk of any misinterpre-

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tation which might arise from his connection with a religious society of his choice rather than the risk of being confounded with those who maintain an attitude either of hostility or of indifference? Certainly the language is very explicit in which he assigns "the highest worth to religion among the interests of humanity" (p. 281).

The truth is, that the attitude of aloofness entails disadvantages of its own, and these are often quite as perilous to critical impartiality as practical devotion to a religious cause. The highest order of minds, indeed, may rise above such disadvantages, but our discussion cannot assume that philosophical teachers all take rank in this order. Professor Royce certainly claims for them no prerogative of exemption from the common frailties of intellectual life. In his view, "as religious inquirers, they are extremely fallible" (p. 282). Their estimate, therefore, of religious life from an outside point of view must often be liable to the prejudice arising, if not from positive antipathy, at least from an estrangement of that sympathy which is indispensable to a truly critical appreciation.

But it would seem as if an active sympathy with religious society were imperatively required of a philosopher who places religion, with Professor Royce, among the highest interests of humanity. He does not, however, recognize this requirement. To him it seems that "a personal relation to the visible church has to-day a value which concerns chiefly the man engaged in certain practical philanthropic tasks" (p. 285). He admits, of course, that "these tasks are of the utmost social importance," but he contends that "they form no part of the philosopher's peculiar and social function" *(Ibid.)* The same may, however, be said of most other men. In fact, philanthropic tasks form, far less properly, any part of their peculiar and special function, just because their lack of philosophic culture often disqualifies them from grappling intelligently with the problems which those tasks involve. Moreover, though such tasks are not the philosopher's peculiar and special function, yet he is a man before he is a philosopher; and as a man he is bound to take a reasonable share in those philanthropic labors which form an important part of social virtue.

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The contention of Professor Royce, with regard to the main value of religious association, seems to assume that religious life can be separated from philanthropic work; or, in other words, that there can be a genuine service of God distinct from the service of our fellowmen. To waive unnecessary discussion, let this be granted. It is true the noble apologue of Abou ben Adhem, which Leigh Hunt has put into English verse, would imply, when translated into tame prose, that the love of God, on scientific analysis, reduces itself to the love of our fellowmen. Still it is not necessary to deny that there is in the religious consciousness a veritable communion of the finite spirit of man with the Infinite Spirit of the Universe, and that there is ample justification for the quietist and the mystic indulging the joy of that communion. But it remains an unquestionable fact, that to the philosophical teacher, as well as to the great religious teachers of all the ages, there can be no reality in a love of God which does not realize itself in the loving service of mankind. It is surely significant that the very apostle who stands out most conspicuously among the writers of the New Testament as representative of the quietistic and mystical side of the Christian life, should burst into an unwonted intensity of language at the idea of attempting to divorce the love of God from the love of man. "If a man say, 'I love God,' and hateth his brother, he is a liar; for he that loveth not his brother whom he hath seen, how can he love God whom he hath not seen?" (1 John 4: 20.)

It requires no profound study in the history of religion to discover that one of the main tendencies towards degeneration of religious life has always been the development of a kind of religiosity which is offensively indifferent to the claims of social morality, substituting, for the enthusiasm of humanity with its philanthropic manifestations, a rigorous exactness of thought or of phrase on dogmatic questions, or a punctilious observance of ritualistic forms. But the task of the philosopher, as explained by Professor Royce, is to "contribute towards training humanity to do better its work of striving after a sound religious consciousness" (p. 282); and therefore that task must consist, partly at least, in counteracting that

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tendency to corruption of the religious consciousness which has just been described. If the philosopher's attitude is that, not of the idle sceptic, but of the earnest critic, he must bring into the light of clear thought the impassioned message of the great religious seers; and there is no reason to believe that, in his case, that message will necessarily be obscured; on the contrary, it may gain an unmistakable significance, by his active participation in the philanthropic labors in which the churches manifest the vigor of their spiritual life.

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BYRON VERSUS SPENSER.

Byron told Shelley that he could see nothing in Spenser; and he was probably sincere when he used this emphasis of negation; for though exaggeration both in feeling and ironical expression was characteristic of him, we need not suspect it in this particular case. Ideals, aims, methods, views of art and life, were so contrasted in Byron and in Spenser, that had they been contemporaries, a mutual indifference would have been certain to exist. As a subject of literary criticism, the contrasted aims and methods of these two poets are extremely interesting; and among the many inquiries they suggest may be noticed: what relation morality has to art?—how much of action, energy, passion, is present in each form of it?—how, finally, the older poetry triumphs—what special treasures of thought, feeling, and language it enshrines; and what triumphs and treasures of its own the later poetry contains? It is of course quite impossible to follow out these differing contrasts and relations of the old and the new poetry in the space of an article; but, granting that Spenser stands on a height inaccessible to many readers who often read and appreciate Byron, the inducement has proved overmastering for the present writer to attempt a two-fold appreciation which will perhaps be instructive if not expansive to taste and judgment.

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Mr. Devey in his excellent "Estimates of the English Poets," speaking of Byron, points out "his dashing vigor, the intensity of force arising from his concentrated earnestness,—his absolute freedom from the fetters of prejudice." These few phrases perhaps summarize the whole of Byron's power and excellence—whether it be the swift vehemence of his Tales, the picturesqueness and brilliant reflectiveness of "Childe Harold," the declamatory strength of his dramas, or the combination of all these qualities together with keen satire in "Don Juan." With Byron the audacity and energy of youth was joined to the intellect of manhood and produced poetry such as had never been known to English literature—not by any means the highest and best poetry hitherto known, but the most effective, unmistakable, and accordingly popular poetry hitherto known. In reality, such vigor and passionate directness of poetic invention bring with them limitation of power and restricted rule in the kingdom of art. Little thought his lordship's eager admirers and imitators in the early decades of the last century that by studying and emulating his force of expression and varied originality of ideas they were fatally dimming and restraining their poetic taste and judgment. Byron is indeed inimitable; and with all the vogue he created, with all the devotion he inspired in the young and the emotional, no inheritor of his brilliant and effective powers has appeared; but brilliancy and effectiveness in poetic expression and invention, however fascinating and inspiring to most minds, never fail to restrict the free flight of imagination and to give a material aim to the mind's ideal faculty. So that, though no reader can withhold astonished admiration at the "grand bursts of reflection," the acute psychological analysis and the able historic summaries which diversify the passion and poetry of "Childe Harold," or at the witty satire and observant faculty which interweave themselves with the poetry and passion of "Don Juan," yet every reader who has studied the older poetry (native or classical) to any purpose must realize that the whole of this added acute reflection and intensely intellectual element is, so far as pure poetry is concerned, mere padding. It is only so acceptable and popular, together with

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the accompanying poetry, because comparatively few people care for poetry pure and simple. Nor will it surprise those whose taste and appreciation have enabled them to follow the flights of great poets, to learn that this alternating poetry and fine declamation of Byrons' had in reality, with all its apparent verve and supremacy, less inspiration and weaker afflatus, needing every aid from early enthusiasm and from intoxicants.

Speaking of Byron's limitations, Mr. Devey notices his blighting cynicism which prevented any deep sympathy with others and greatly marred his success as a dramatist,—his ignorance and ignoring of the world of quiet human nature by the loss of which he shut himself out from the domestic affections and social interests—his making his home in the heart of the unquiet passions which destroyed harmony between the faculties of the soul and prevented the recognition of myriad sympathies that reveal a spiritual presence and essence in the material Universe. All this is quite true, and such self-exclusion from the large world of Shakespeare and Wordsworth implies serious deduction from the value of Byron's work. A poet with little sympathy for others, no charity, in whom religious and moral feeling towards domestic and social environment does not exist, so narrows his sphere that great and genial poetry is impossible to him. At the same time, if great poetry is denied him, powerful poetry is in his reach, should, as with Byron, high poetical endowment be his. Not only does Lord Byron gain strength of conception by the unity which his vigorous personality afforded, but the force and energy of evil in our world—its daring and unscrupulousness—its close affinity to the active qualities of our nature, if not its preponderance in most natures—its varied interest and creditable association with manliness and courage in the full-blooded type of men—all these advantages, so to speak, which evil has over good, make its choice as a constantly recurring subject and an inspiration for poetry a distinct source of power. Nor is this the whole account of Byrons' powerful poetry. Directness, owing to the unity of a vigorous personality, allowed haughty precedence over all others, and full representation given to pervading and energetic evil will account for his sup-

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remacy in the delineation of passion, but Byron is equally powerful in the region of abstract thought and contemplative grandeur. On the evidence of such power, Mr. Devey calls him a great representative poet. "No meditative poem," he says, "deriving its topics from an objective source, ever accomplished half so much as 'Childe Harold.' The hero is brought into contact with every scene which suggests the most stirring events of the antique and modern world and the cast of his thoughts imparts dignity even to the ennobling associations he recalls. . . . The Fourth Canto is an unapproached marvel for abstract grandeur," etc. This is so; for Byron, with all his restless energy, and though he made his home in the heart of the unquiet passions, could at will command a peace while he dwelt meditatively with creative imagination on some great object or collective object (it is significant that he always required some outward and actual object to work upon), and while never losing sight of it, illumined and transcended it with noble thought and feeling. He knew of this power in himself and cherished it. The following stanza may be called the articles of his poetic faith:—

> "The beings of the mind are not of clay,
> Essentially immortal, they create
> And multiply in us a brighter day
> And more beloved existence: That which Fate
> Prohibits to dull life in this our state
> Of mortal bondage, by these spirits supplied,
> First exiles then replaces what we hate,
> Watering the heart whose earlier flowers have died
> And with a fresher growth replenishing the void."

This is the grand burst of reflection with which Byron varies his description of Venice. It expresses a law of the mind and the faith of his mind, as well as indicating his conceptual power. Yet with all its transcending force, its easy adequacy, its representative variety coming home to every intelligent mind, this highest range of Byron's genius cannot be identified with great poetry, but only with powerful poetry. The force, the beauty, the energy, the variety, the unity of conception belong to Byron's nature alone and not to universal human nature of which his is a part. His love of outward beauty, of the splen-

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dors and grandeurs of outward forms, of physical beauty in man and much more in woman, is at once perceived to be shallow and untrue when it is clear that moral and spiritual beauty are completely ignored; his ardor and vividness and resource of expression, so delightfully clear, direct, and sufficing, are seen to be artificial and arbitrary almost to madness when the underlying and recurring motives are obviously, not enthusiasm, admiration, or love, but the most inveterate pride varied by intense scorn. The power of such conceptions of adored beauty in the outward forms of nature and of man, together with such eloquent, resourceful expression, certainly remains, but, as compared in its effect on our mind with that of truly great poetry, there is in Byron's creations only relative truth and limited appeal. Let us do him full justice by affirming that no poet equals him in the animated, brilliant, sincere delineation of outward beauty, grand circumstance, and dignified associations, all deepened and harmonized by rapid abstraction and a facility of pointed, unsuperfluous reflection never before so happily and effectively allied to color of image and glow of feeling. If the deep harmony and universal appeal of great poetry depended upon such ready and felicitous intellectual power, Byron would be the greatest of poets. But great poetry is of much more simple appeal; and this ubiquitous, coruscating reflection of Byron's is, so far as it is concerned, misleading and superfluous. It is, however, with the majority of readers, a most acceptable and agreeable interruption to pure poetry; and they cannot long endure the absence of any such relief in reading Spenser. Indeed the representative power which this grand reflection of Byron's confers has induced so good a critic as Mr. Devey to state decidedly that in his opinion Byron is to be placed above Spenser.

Spenser is certainly so great a contrast to Byron on this important point and many others that there are excellent reasons for setting the two together as the subject of this article. And having said so much already of Byron we will now pass on to speak of Spenser.

In Spenser, religious and moral principles, activities, precepts and sayings take an important place and constantly assert

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themselves both in the design and the execution of his great poem. All the Cantos of the "Fairy Queen" are marshalled under books bearing such titles as, "The Legend of the Knight of the Red Crosse, or of Holiness" "The Legend of Sir Guyon, or of Temperance" "The Legend of Britomartis, or of Chastity" and so on. The characters or actors of the poem, their doings, adventures, and speeches, support these serious themes; the narrative of the poet always gives them place and emphasis. Spenser's beautiful proverbs, as we may call them, such as "Entire affection hateth nicer hands," "The noblest mind the best contentment has" are so many weighty and pithy comments of the same seriously moral kind. Nor do knightly principles and chivalrous sentiments, though of course very fully and frequently represented in Spenser, take the place of moral precept or become identified with morality and religion as there is no doubt they often do in Tennyson's "Idylls of the King." Spenser's knights are above all Christian knights and his Ladies Christian ladies who subordinate chivalry and its laws to Christianity and Christian morals; their poet, too, is above everything a Christian poet, who, with all his digression and episode never loses sight of his poem's elevated plan or fails to add divine graces to its worthier personages and to the speeches he puts in their mouths.

Thus the whole design and execution of Spenser's poetry show a marked contrast to the design and execution of Byron's poetry; he chose, as we observed, evil as a constantly recurring subject and an inspiration for his poems; and there can be no doubt that his work gains by that choice an energy and a general power of appeal to average men and women which is not to be found in Spenser. But (except in one direction to be presently mentioned), with so much advantage, all further gain ceases; and a serious deficiency reveals itself. Spenser by his choice of morality and religion as a subject and an inspiration has obtained ideal and imaginative results which, so far as poetry is concerned, infinitely outweigh the value of passion and energy; moral beauty in Spenser much enhances physical beauty; spiritual elevation greatly deepens and expands heroic action and character, while the broader

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intellectual conception is more truly representative than that of Byron's with its ubiquitous reflection. Not all the modern poet's power of rapidly expanded abstraction, earnestness of will rather than feeling, and forcible diction can raise his subjects to the poetical level of the older poet's work; they are seen to be intellectual and individual rather than human compositions. Spenser's feeling is rich, grandly simple, varied, continuous; there is no apparent effort, no personal will put forth, the range of his imagination is absolutely free and self-sufficing; his thought and his fine diction are not allowed to interrupt this continuity of feeling, or to check this freedom of imagination by drawing attention to detail and bare or single inference. This has been objected to by some critics, who find Spenser too fluent, unrestrained, and indefinite; but any one who reads him carefully will find that there is wonderful pertinence and harmony in thought, feeling, image, and fancy,—that if the thought is subordinated and never much abstracted, it is, nevertheless, exerting its restraining and connective power with excellent effect, while the diction, though never sought for itself or prominent, renders Spenser the most felicitous of all poets in expression. But in Byron's alternate reflection and observation, brilliant as both are, we find nothing of this continuous yet beautifully harmonious and consistent flight of poetic invention. And his imaginative inferiority seems to spring from his rejection of moral and spiritual truth; in foregoing the inspiration of what is deepest and most influential over man's heart and intellect, he has lost the aid and guidance of the associated and mutually helpful faculties; he has left himself, therefore, only the chance and disconnected suggestions of the commoner mind and its worldly experience. All Byron's poetry will be found of detached, fitful character, bearing on it the stamp of a hasty, distracted mind, inartistic, alike in design and execution. It is true, however, that in parts and in disconnection he showed striking genius and power; this is especially the case where the sublime in nature, with all its lawlessness and confused violence, defiant of man and of man's thoughts and moral law, called forth the sympathy of his own lawless and defiant spirit. No poet has equalled

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him in the delineation of vast destructive forces, of Alpine terrors and desolations, of oceanic and tempestuous violence; the similar rage and destruction of battle and shipwreck found in him an eloquent and delighted narrator. The misanthropy shown in his famous verses on the storm in the Alps and on the ocean, and his hearty thorough-going sympathy with forces that, unchecked, would put an end to society and the whole race of men, has been overlooked on account of the sublime poetry. In Don Juan, the much admired shipwreck and battle pieces are in reality still more corosive and inhuman because they are harmoniously set in the midst of immoral event and scoffing comment subversive of all social order. Byron was not only against society in the England of his day, but, like Timon, he would have arrayed and set to work every destructive force in the physical and moral world against all society. It is true, indeed, that he held fast to his own ideal—the individual energy and constructive thought of his own mind and to a true if vague conception of liberty; so that, amid all the parade of destructive force and scoffing license of Don Juan, the result is not barren negation and anarchy; but the spirits of discord and destruction there aroused would have been sufficient had they become operative to sweep away all society. Nevertheless, in spite of its almost insane rejection of moral rule and civil order, critics are probably right in saying that Don Juan is Byron's masterpiece, for in no other poem of his are the terrible and chaotic forces of nature in their sublimity alternated so energetically and consistently with the corresponding fury and wide-spread warring of evil principle and practice in the moral world. Furthermore, the knowledge of the world it displays, its Mephistophelian wit and shrewdness, its amazing variety, and its supple, easy movement of thought, as well as its direct English style, have received deserved praise and recognition.

But this power of delineating the sublime and the lawless in nature and man—this tremendous egotism which could deliberately conceive the ruin of the outer and of the social world while the idea of his own individual thought and liberty were preserved—was dearly bought, so far as poetry is con-

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cerned (if indeed it did not indicate a most anti-poetic coldness of heart) by the sacrifice of the beauty and order of a world in harmony with the moral beauty and order of man. From an æsthetic or poetical point of view, nine-tenths of his masterpiece are disgusting and contemptible rubbish;—these nine-tenths, say his partial critics, were not meant to be poetry, no; but the point is that by no exertion of power could Lord Byron have made them poetry. The unflagging flight of Spenser is only possible when moral and spiritual truths are always present and often triumphant, where the external grandeur and beauty of nature are not placed either in contemptuous rivalry or in destructive conflict with man's life—as is always the case in Byron—but aid, illustrate, and accompany as friends his thought and deed, enabling the poet who responds to them to attain a richer yet deeper harmony of thought and expression; for neither is it so necessary to generalize by reflection where such genial, human, outward illustration is available; thus conception is richer; nor is the accompaniment of poetic diction at all intrusive where the thought is so eloquent and discursive; thus conception is deeper; in short, the mind's different faculties are mutually helpful with a balanced strength and an energy such as they never can have where moral and religious principle and influence are denied and suppressed. In conclusion, we propose to take some of the finest passages in Byron and in Spenser for comparison in order to bring out their poetic value in accordance with the views set forth in this article.

"But thou exulting and abounding river
Making thy waves a blessing as they flow
Through banks whose beauty would endure for ever
Could man but leave thy bright creation so
Nor its fair promise from the surface mow
With the sharp scythe of conflict—then to see
Thy valley of sweet waters were to know
Earth paved like Heaven. . . .

Brief, brave, and glorious was his young career—
His mourners were two hosts, his friends and foes;
And fitly may the stranger lingering here
Pray for his gallant spirit's bright repose;
For he was Freedom's champion, one of those

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The few in number, who have not o'er-stept
The charter to chastise which she bestows
On such as wield her weapons; he had kept
The whiteness of his soul and thus men o'er him wept."

In these two stanzas we have very fine examples of Byron's treatment of inanimate beauty and of the beauty of character. It will be seen that though outward charm and outward relationship are eloquently conveyed with such adequacy of expression and choice, direct diction that they are very impressive; yet the heights of the ideal are not attained.

"Above me are the Alps
The palaces of Nature, whose vast walls
Have pinnacled in clouds their snowy scalps
And throned Eternity in icy halls
Of cold sublimity where forms and falls
The avalanche—the thunderbolt of snow
All that expands the spirit yet appals
Gather around these summits. . . .

Clear placid Leman, thy contrasted lake
With the wild world I dwell in is a thing
Which warns me with its stillness to forsake
Earth's troubled waters for a purer spring.
This quiet sail is as a noiseless wing
To waft me from distraction; once I loved
Torn ocean's roar, but thy soft murmuring
Sounds sweet as if a sister's voice reproved
That I with stern delights should e'er have been so moved.

It is the hush of night, and all between
Thy margin and the mountains, dusk, yet clear
Mellowed and mingling yet distinctly seen
Save darkened Jura, whose capt heights appear
Precipitously steep; and drawing near,
There breathes a living fragrance from the shore
Of flowers yet fresh with childhood; on the ear
Drops the light drip of the suspended oar,
Or chirps the grasshopper one good-night carol more."

The first of these shows Byron's mastery of the sublime where a powerful effect is gained without the aid of moral or spiritual principle and in defiance of both; the second and third stanzas show again his power of depicting the outwardly beautiful of Earths' loveliest scenes and at the summer season's loveliest hour; the details are of the choicest and the diction fine and clear.

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"The moon is up, and yet it is not night;
Sunset divides the sky with her, a sea
Of glory streams along the Alpine height
Of blue Friuli's mountains; Heaven is free
From clouds but of all colors seems to be—
Melted in one vast Iris of the West—
Where the Day joins the past Eternity;
While on the other hand, meek Dian's crest
Floats through the azure air, an island of the blest.

"But thou Clitumnus, in thy sweetest wave
Of the most living crystal that was e'er
The haunt of river nymph, to gaze and lave
Her limbs where nothing hid them, thou dost rear
Thy grassy banks, whereon the milk white steer
Grazes; the purest god of gentle waters.
And most serene of aspect, and most clear;
Surely that stream was unprofaned by slaughters
A mirror and a bath for Beauty's youngest daughters.

And on thy happy shore a temple still
Of small and delicate proportion keeps
Its memory of thee, beneath it sweeps
Thy current's calmness; oft from out it leaps
The finny darter with the glittering scales
Who dwells and revels in thy glassy deeps;
While, chance, some scattered water lily sails
Down where the shallower wave still tells its bubbling tales."

These are glorious descriptions with choice examples demonstrating Byron's sensitiveness to external beauty which his intellect enhances so that they never cloy with sweetness nor become tedious with repetition.

"The Niobe of nations! there she stands,
Childless and crownless in her voiceless woe;
An empty urn within her withered hands,
Whose holy dust was scattered long ago;
The Scipio's tomb contains no ashes now
The very Sepulchres lie tenantless
Of their heroic dwellers; dost thou flow
Old Tiber thro' a marble wilderness,
Rise with thy yellow waves, and mantle her distress. . . .

He heard it, but he heeded not—his eyes
Were with his heart and that was far away
He reck'd not of the life he lost, nor prize;
But where his rude hut by the Danube lay,
There were his young barbarians all at play,

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There was their Dacian mother—he their sire
Butchered to make a Roman holiday;
All this rushed with his blood—Shall he expire
And unavenged; Arise, ye Goths, and glut your ire."

These two stanzas represent Byron's power of calling up the pathetic; the ruin of the city, the death of the gladiator are alike hopeless and desperate and the darkest colors are not spared; passion energises but does not mitigate the despair; and the reckless invocations to yet further destruction which end each stanza—Tiber rising—the Goths arising, in pique or in vengeance, is characteristic of Byron's artistic limitation: the facts narrated—the death described, remain merely pictorial and the pathos remains superficial for want of moral and spiritual suggestions that would have deepened and humanized both.

"Tis sweet to hear
At midnight on the blue and moonlit deep
The song and oar of Adria's gondolier
By distance mellowed, o'er the waters sweep;
Tis sweet to see the evening star appear;
Tis sweet to listen as the night winds creep
From leaf to leaf; tis sweet to view on high
The rainbow based on ocean span the sky.

'Tis sweet to hear the honest watch-dogs bark
Bay deep-mouthed welcome as we draw near home.
Tis sweet to know there is an eye will mark
Our coming, and look brighter when we come.
Tis sweet to be awakened by the lark,
Or lull'd by falling waters. Sweet the hum
Of bees, the voice of girls, the song of birds.
The lisp of children, and their earliest words. . . .

Then rose from sea to sky the wild farewell;
Then shrieked the timid, and stood still the brave—
Then some leap'd overboard with dreadful yell
As eager to anticipate their grave:
And the sea yawn'd around her like a hell,
And down she suck'd with her the whirling wave,
Like one who grapples with his enemy,
And strives to strangle him before he die.

And first one universal shriek there rushed,
Louder than the loud ocean, like a crash
Of echoing thunder; and then all was hushed,
Save the wild wind and the remorseless dash

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Of billows; but at intervals there gush'd,
Accompanied with a convulsive splash,
A solitary shriek, the bubbling cry
Of some strong swimmer in his agony."

These four stanzas from Don Juan, so contrasted in the peaceful beauty of the first two and the sublime terror and awful circumstance of the last two, must conclude our extracts from Byron. They are as fine as outward object and action, admirably selected and conveyed in passionately direct, choice diction, can make them; but the final grace and power of the larger, more ennobling moral and spiritual conception is denied them. For this imaginative, rather than objective, beauty, and powerful, expansive human conception, rather than inhuman sublime effect on the mind, we must look to Spenser:—

"It was a chosen spot of fertile land,
Amongst wide waves set, like a little nest,
As if it had by Nature's cunning hand
Been choicely picked out from all the rest,
And laid forth for ensample of the best;
No dainty flower or herb that grows on ground,
No arborett with painted blossoms drest
And smelling sweet, but there it might be found
To bud out fair and throw her sweet smells all around.

No tree whose branches did not bravely spring;
No branch whereon a fine bird did not sit;
No bird but did her shrill notes sweetly sing;
No song but did contain a lovely ditt.
Trees, branches, birds and songs were framed fit
For to allure frail mind to careless ease. . . .

Into that forest far they thence him led,
Where was their dwelling, in a pleasant glade
With mountains round about environed
And mighty woods which did the valley shade;
And like a stately theatre it made,
Spreading itself into a spacious plain;
And in the midst a little river played
Amongst the pumy stones which seemed to plain
With gentle murmur that his course they did restrain. . . .

As a tall ship tossed in troublous seas,
Whom raging winds threat'ning to make the prey
Of the rough rocks do diversely disease,
Meets two contrary billows by the way,
That her on either side do sore assay,

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And boast to swallow her in greedy grave;
She scorning both their spites, does make wide way,
And with her breast breaking the foamy wave,
Does ride on both their backs and fair herself doth save."

These stanzas from the "Fairy Queen" are examples of various description—of landscape, forest, and sea. They are not so realistic—not so graphic—as Byron's description of scenery; they refer to no particular place, as his always do. A careless reader, or a reader prejudiced in favor of strong, personal feeling and expression (as Byron was) would doubtless prefer the poetry resulting from more material conception and more graphic expression. To them, as to him, Spenser must always seem tame and without point. But let any one consider what the sacrifices of pointed realism and expressive detail implies in Spenser. It implies a conceptual breadth that gives free and equable scope to all the human faculties—to thought, to imagination, to fancy, to observation. The varied continuity and large grouping of object and idea in Spenser is never found in the more brilliant Byron. To say nothing of such detached observation and thought as the above quoted stanzas on the wreck and on the sights and sounds of evening show, his most carefully wrought, ambitious descriptions of Rome, of Clitumnus, and of Lake Leman, show the same loosely linked or separate effects, successive, not unified. The result of such detachment is to make our faculties, higher and lower, equally valid, and never in perfect agreement, much less mutually helpful in the attainment of a grand human conception. But with Spenser the imagination is so free and the feeling so continuous, that sharp distinctive example and shrewdly dividing reasoning faculty, as well as mere style, are not perceived; the transitions are as easy as those of dreaming. Yet the strength and scope of the conception are very shortly afterwards evident when such associations, processional or otherwise, are presented as "The House of Holiness," "The Bower of Bliss," "The Gardens of Adonis," "The Procession of the Sins," "The Cave of Mammon." It is needless to say that there is nothing of such sustained associative power in Byron. Far from it; all his poetry is detached in conception and only connected in form by such threads of association as

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a pilgrimage or a name; while his masterpiece, as it is called, reveals the contrary of large harmonious conception—discordant contradiction of ideas. We may say that no poet of truly intuitive and grand human conception could possibly have associated license and ribaldry, scoff and tavern jest, with eloquence and poetry as Byron did in "Don Juan."

A few more stanzas of the "Fairy Queen" may be quoted to show Spenser's highest ideal of moral and spiritual beauty and also his energy of idealized action. It will be seen that Byron, owing to his low ideal and rejection of morality and religion, has nothing to show approaching this divine idealism and ideal energy.

"Her ivory forehead, full of bounty brave,
Like a broad table did itself dispread,
For Love his lofty triumphs to engrave
And write the battles of his great godhead;
All good and honor might therein be read,
For there their dwelling was. And when she spake
Sweet words like dropping honey she did shed;
And twixt the pearls and rubins softly break
A silver sound, that heavenly music seemed to make."

The other three stanzas before and after this should be read describing the first appearance of the semi-divine Belphœbe:

"Then up arose a man of matchless might,
And wondrous wit to menage high affairs,
Who stirred with pity of the stressed plight
Of this sad realm, cut into diverse shares
By such as claimed themselves Brute's rightful heirs,
Gathered the princes of the people loose
To taken counsel of their common cares
Who with his wisdom won him straight did choose
Their king.

Fair Helena, the fairest living wight;
Who in all godly thews and goodly praise
Did far excel, but was most famous hight
For skill in music of all in her days,

Ne thine the kingdom, ne the sceptre thine;
But realms and rulers thou dost both confound,
And loyal truth to treason dost incline;
Witness the guiltless blood poured oft on ground,
The crowned often slain, the slayer crowned;
The sacred diadem in pieces rent
The purple robe gored with many a wound,

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Castles surprised, great cities sacked and brent;
So mak'st thou kings and gainest wrongful government.

Most wretched man,
That to affections does the bridle lend.
In their beginning they are weak and wan,
But soon through suffrance grow to fearful end:
Whiles they are weak betimes with them contend:
For when they once to perfect strength do grow,
Strong wars they make and cruel battry bend
Gainst fort of Reason, it to overthrow;
Wrath, jealousy, grief, love, this Squire had laid thus low."

With this splendid energy of conception, human and moral in our eas, such as Byron, with all his power of depicting lawless sublimity, with all his command of passionate thought and of choice diction, was incapable of, we will now conclude.

J. KINDON.

MANCHESTER.

BOOK REVIEWS.

PRINCIPIA ETHICA. By George Edward Moore, Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge. Cambridge: At the University Press, 1903. Pp. xxvii, 232.

Though this is quite a short book, there can be little doubt that it is one of the most important works on Ethics that have been published in recent times. Its importance is due mainly to the extraordinary clearness with which some leading conceptions are discussed. Whatever may be thought of its results, it is certainly a model of philosophical method and lucid exposition.

Mr. Moore takes as his motto the saying of Bishop Butler—"Everything is what it is, and not another thing." His main contention is that Good—the fundamental conception of Ethics—is unanalysable, and consequently indefinable. We can no more say what we mean by it, in terms of anything else, than we can in the case of a particular color, such as yellow. Yellow is yellow, and good is good; neither of them is resolvable into anything else. Hence Mr. Moore urges that almost all ethical writers have gone astray at the very outset of their inquiries;

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since almost all have made some attempt to define what good is. The most conspicuous cases of this mistake are those in which an attempt is made to identify good with some particular experience—*e. g.*, pleasure. This Mr. Moore calls the naturalistic fallacy. It is a very bad mistake; because we find, when we consider it, that good is not a particular experience, but rather a universal determination, like number. The more metaphysical writers on Ethics have generally been free from this blunder, but still they have nearly always attempted to show that good is something other than itself, and in this way have gone nearly as far astray as the naturalists.

Mr. Moore's view on this point is enforced by trenchant criticisms of Herbert Spencer, J. S. Mill, Green and his school, and others. Most of the points emphasized by Mr. Moore have already been brought out by other critics, but perhaps never so tersely and so clearly. The points against Mill in particular have probably never before been so thoroughly pressed home. Here, at least, his statements may well be accepted as the last word on the subject. His criticisms on the more metaphysical writers are also keen; but, naturally enough (as I happen to be one of those brought under the lash), they do not seem to me equally conclusive.

In contrast with these writers, Sidgwick is especially commended for his insistence on the independence of the conceptions expressed by the terms "Good," and "ought"; and one gathers from the preface that Mr. Moore finds himself still more closely in harmony with Franz Brentano on the general foundations of Ethics.

While, however, Mr. Moore maintains most emphatically that Good is indefinable, he is equally explicit in the contention that it is quite possible to give an account of *the* Good; and the latter part of his book is occupied with an attempt to set forth the nature of the chief objects to which the term can be strictly applied. Mr. Moore thinks that most previous writers have failed in their quest for such objects, owing to the fact that they have defined Good in a particular way, and have regarded nothing as being included in the Good except what answers to the definition that is put forward. But even Sidgwick, though he abstains from defining Good, falls into the same sort of error when he seeks to explain what the ultimate Good is. He also endeavors to show that only one kind of object—viz., pleasure—

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can be accepted as a Good. Mr. Moore urges that there is no real ground for such exclusiveness, and even that pleasure, by itself, cannot be accepted as a complete Good at all. Further inquiry brings out the fact that the chief positive goods are personal affection and æsthetic enjoyment. Mr. Moore urges further that, though pleasure is not in itself a good, pain is an evil, and that, though knowledge is not in itself a good, it is an essential constituent in most great goods.

One of the most interesting incidental points in Mr. Moore's treatment is his conception of organic unity, which he explains in a striking and original way, and which he appears to regard as one of the points in which his general view is most definitely marked off from those of Sidgwick and Brentano. He considers that the idea of organic unity that has been put forward by recent writers is in some important respects confused. In particular, an organic whole has generally been understood to mean a whole of such a kind that a part of it has "no meaning or significance apart from its whole." "This doctrine," says Mr. Moore (p. 34), "must be utterly rejected. It implies itself that the statement 'This is a part of that whole' has a meaning; and in order that this may have one, both subject and predicate must have a distinct meaning." Rejecting this view of organic unity, Mr. Moore defines an organic whole as one that has a value different from the sum of the values of its parts; and of the conception, as thus defined, he makes very considerable use in the latter parts of his discussion.[1]

Now, it appears to the present reviewer that it is just at this point that both the strength and the weakness of Mr. Moore's position are to be found. The strength of his work lies here; it appears to be by means of this conception of organic unity that he has been able to get beyond the point of view of Sidgwick, with whom otherwise he has much in common. The value of things for Sidgwick, it seems fair to say, is simply the sum of those elements into which they can be resolved by analysis. Mr. Moore sees clearly that in many cases a real whole

[1] As I appear to be one of the group of writers to whom Mr. Moore is referring in the above criticism, and as he definitely mentions me at a later point as a representative of that school, I may perhaps be allowed to state that I am not aware of having ever said that in an organic unity the part has "no meaning or significance apart from the whole." In my "Introduction to Social Philosophy," I have discussed the conception at some length; but none of my statements, as far as I can see, amounts to this.

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has a value that cannot be thus split up. But, on the other hand, the weakness of his position lies in this, that he regards this peculiarity of some real wholes as being found only in their relation to the idea of value. He does not recognize that a whole may, in other respects also, mean and be something more than the sum of its parts.

Now, this is a matter of considerable importance in its bearing on Mr. Moore's view of definition, which, by the bye, appears to be substantially that of J. S. Mill. Mr. Moore seems to think that we define a whole by analysing it into its constituent parts, and that what is not thus analysable is necessarily indefinable. But if there are such things as organic unities, an unanalysable part might be capable of definition with reference to the whole—*i. e.*, it might be defined by pointing out its place within the organism. Even yellow would seem to be definable in this way. For I suppose even Mr. Moore would admit that we are justified in saying that yellow is a color; and if we go on to add that it is the color that comes between red and green in the scale of pure color qualities, I do not see why this should not be regarded as a definition. No doubt yellow, as it exists apart from all reference to other colors, would not thus be defined. But yellow thus conceived is hardly the yellow that anyone would wish to define. Definitions have no meaning except for a thinking consciousness, and for a thinking consciousness at least yellow is a part or aspect of the color continuum. [2]

Now, Good could surely be defined in a somewhat similar way. We can connect it with conation, just as we can connect yellow with the scale of colors. Mr. Moore is probably right enough in objecting to most of the attempts that have been made to define Good in terms of Will or Desire; yet, if all reference to these were omitted, it may be doubted whether Good would retain any meaning for us at all. I am inclined to think that Mr. Moore begins at the wrong end in trying to understand the meaning of Good. He begins by thinking of

[2] It should be particularly noted that Mr. Moore, like J. S. Mill, appears to regard all definitions as nominal. When any one tries to define Good, Mr. Moore conceives that he is setting forth what he intends the term to mean. But surely most people who have defined Good—even Mill himself—have rather been trying to point out the essential characteristics of an aspect of experience which, in the concrete, they have assumed to be well enough known. They have been attempting, in short, to arrive at a real definition, and not merely to fix the meaning of a word.

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the Good as that which has absolute value; but it is pretty certain that the original meaning of the Good in human experience is one that is distinctly relative. What is good is, in the first instance, what is good for something or other. It is only by after-reflection that we come to recognize that such mediate goods must have reference to some end to which they are means; and so we are led gradually to the conception of some Good which is not a means, but is valued purely in and for itself. What is good thus signifies, first of all, a means to some desired or desireable end, and afterwards some ultimate end involved or presupposed in desire. There are thus two meanings of Good, both connected, directly or indirectly, with desire, and both capable of being defined in relation to desire. It is no doubt wrong to say simply that Good is what is desired or willed; it might be truer to characterize it as the objective counterpart of desire or will, or as that which would satisfy desire. It is difficult to see how it could have any meaning for us at all apart from some such reference to conation.

Another point that appears doubtful in Mr. Moore's theory is his distinction between pleasure and consciousness of pleasure. It is no doubt true to say that we can distinguish what we mean by truth, and other objective contents, from the subjective part of their appearance in consciousness; and Mr. Moore deserves considerable praise for his insistence on this point, both here and in a recent article in "Mind." But can this be applied to the case of pleasure? Is not pleasure purely subjective? Does it *mean* for us anything more than it *is* as a simple fact of experience? There are, I think, several indications that Mr. Moore, while rightly emphasizing the antithesis between the subjective and the objective, has not sufficiently thought out the relations between the two.

Mr. Moore's criticism of metaphysical conceptions, as applied to Ethics, is also unsatisfactory. He complains—somewhat after the manner of Aristotle—that the metaphysical Good is eternal, and consequently throws no light on good as realized by human effort; but rather makes the latter unmeaning. This is true of some metaphysical conceptions, but not of all. According to some, what is eternal involves a process. In a sense, the nature of a tree is eternal; but this does not prevent trees from growing, nor does it enable them to grow into the skies. It is hardly necessary, however, to dwell on this; nor have we space to do

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so to any purpose here. It may suffice to say that the only real difference between Mr. Moore and the metaphysicians seems to lie in his contention that Good cannot be defined. If once he recognized that it could be defined, it may be taken as certain that his definition would lead him into metaphysics; and, once he got well launched into that kind of speculation, one may well feel convinced that he would not lack the necessary ingenuity to get over the difficulty about eternity. Even as it is, his criticisms appear to be valid against the statements of many metaphysical writers.

A comparatively small point may be noticed in conclusion. We have seen that Mr. Moore calls attention to a certain want of parallelism between pain and pleasure in their relations to evil and good respectively. But surely it ought by this time to be recognized, by all who deal with psychological questions, that pain is not the opposite of pleasure. Pain seems clearly to be a special mode of organic sensation, which has no real opposite. Pleasure, on the other hand, means simply agreeable feeling, and its opposite is disagreeable feeling. If this were fully borne in mind by writers on Ethics, it would help to remove many troublesome paradoxes. In connection with this point, Mr. Moore rightly enough remarks that philosophers must not attempt to force an artificial symmetry. At the same time, philosophers must try to get an intelligible view of experience; and any arbitrary lack of symmetry undoubtedly interferes with this.

On the whole, it must, I think, be said that Mr. Moore's book is not free from blots. While we may accept Butler's saying that "Everything is what it is, and not another thing," we are probably justified in adding that it is never altogether without reference to another thing, and that it can seldom be properly understood without considering that reference. But we have much reason to be grateful to Mr. Moore for his keen criticisms; and even his more constructive efforts are full of stimulus and suggestion. Certainly every one who cares for Ethics ought to read his book.

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UNFORSEEN TENDENCIES OF DEMOCRACY. By E. L. Godkin. Second Impression. Westminster: A. Constable & Co. Small octavo. Pp. vii, 265.

Of all the publicists who have reflected on contemporary Democracy, Mr. Godkin was perhaps the most informed, as he was certainly the most moderate. He neither holds with the optimist that there are short cuts to political happiness, nor with the pessimist that democracy is unteachable. "Experience counts with it for less than it used to count for under the old aristocratic governments;" but its own experience will in the end be its schoolmaster. The main purpose of these Essays, however, is not so much to describe democracy as to "describe some of the departures it has made from the ways which its earlier promoters expected it to follow." But as Mill suggested in the case of de Tocqueville, Mr. Godkin is perhaps too much inclined to attribute to the effects of democracy what are really the effects of civilization, and this in spite of his own caution against "giving only one cause for political effects." The "uniform failure to predict what democracy will say, or do, or think, under certain given circumstances," he says in one place, is "owing largely to the enormously increased number of influences under which all men act in the modern world;" and among these influences he assigns a first place to the "enormously increased facility for money-making which the modern world has supplied, and the inevitably resulting corruption." But that phenomenon, as Mr. Godkin admits, is not peculiar to a democracy. What, then, are we to understand by a "deduction" from Democracy? The answer to this question must depend upon the way in which we conceive the fundamental idea of Democracy. Mr. Godkin represents it simply as "the principle of equality;" but equality may be very differently understood. However understood, many of "the democratic tendencies" described by Mr. Godkin seem in no way deductions from, or consequences of, "the principle of equality." He himself dwells not only on the different conceptions of democracy in ancient and modern times, but also on the differences between American democracy on the one hand and Australian democracy on the other. In the latter case the main differences are to be found in two facts peculiar to Australia—"the adoption of the cabinet system from England, and the absence of a constitution containing restraints on legislation." Mr. Godkin's book would have been more correctly described as an inquiry into

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the unforeseen tendencies, not of democracy, but of democracies: it is in effect a concrete description of some of the difficulties which democratic governments—that is, governments in which the whole community participates in the work of government—have under different conditions actually encountered, difficulties that are only partly inherent in the nature of democratic government as such.

Following out this line of inquiry, Mr. Godkin gives special prominence to the fact that "democracies have not shown that desire to employ leading men in the management of affairs which they were expected to show." In other words, democracies have not as yet solved the problem of combining administrative efficiency with popular control. This, of course, is not so much a reflection on democracy itself as upon the force and degree of political intelligence in a given democracy. But some evidence at least could be produced to show that "the wish of the people to control their own business" does, in proportion as it is a real and effective will, develop at the same time the recognition of the need of knowledge and the value of the expert. There is certainly nothing in the essence of Democracy which suggests either that one man knows as much as any other, or that government is any the less a science because it is controlled by the community as a whole.

"The disregard of special fitness, combined with unwillingness to acknowledge that there can be anything special about any man, which is born of equality, constitutes the great defect of modern democracy;" but this is not a characteristic of democracy, as such; it is not a logical consequence of its principle or idea, and the remedy for it is not less, but more, democracy. All that Mr. Godkin's studies tend to demonstrate is that democratic government is difficult; and it is difficult because, more than any other form of government, it depends upon ideas—makes a greater demand upon morality and intelligence. It is not, therefore, surprising that modern democracy has not as yet proved equal to its responsibilities: it means that the democratic idea is incompletely realized—that the collective intelligence is imperfectly developed or organized. As Mr. Godkin himself indicates, democracy is groping its way, and is by no means at the end of its resources or expedients: his criticisms, indeed, proceed on the assumption that there is a demand for a more excellent way; but the demand is only half-hearted. "The demand for good and enlightened government is as great as ever; but the desire for simple government, which can be carried on without drawing largely on the time and attention of the private citizen, is greater than ever."

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"The refusal of respectable citizens to take part in the primaries" —*i. e.*, the "primary" meetings for the selection of candidates for office—to which most American writers ascribe the failures of American politics, is due, in Mr. Godkin's opinion, to "the increased industrial activity and complexity of private affairs"—to the importance which "private affairs have assumed as compared with public affairs." Mr. Godkin traces to this desire for economy of attention the familiar phenomena of "the nominating system," which he describes as "the great canker of American institutions." He is skeptical, however, of any "remedies" other than the great remedy which has been "one of the democratic characteristics"—the "popular determination" to find some better way. In other words, the cure for the evils of modern democracy is not less, but more, democracy.

The studies on "The Decline of Legislatures" and "The Peculiarities of American Municipal Government" are excellent examples of thoughtful and refined observation. Mr. Godkin suggests that the representative system, having been used for a century and found wanting, is likely to "make way in its turn for the more direct action of the people on the most important questions of government, and a much diminished demand for all legislation whatever." The last point is connected with Mr. Godkin's extreme skepticism, not only as to the value, but as to the necessity, of legislation in modern states. Necessary legislation is a rare thing: "the communities in our day seldom need a new law." This is a generalization that seems to have no wider or better foundation than American experience of State legislation. Mr. Godkin's observations on the history and condition of municipalities in America are still more restricted in their scope, though they are interesting enough.

The essay on the growth and expression of Public Opinion seems to us by far the most interesting and suggestive. It is full of admirable reflections, not only on the difficulty of "consulting a modern democracy," but also, and more particularly, on the position and influence of the modern press. Here Mr. Godkin speaks with special authority and instructiveness. On the other hand, the essay on Australian Democracy is admittedly "nothing more than a set of impressions formed from books"—and not always the best books; it also betrays, rather more than the other essays, the limit and the prejudices of the literary politician. His conception of socialism being that it is "essentially a form of domination over the whole individual by the constituted authorities, without consulting

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him," it is not surprising that Mr. Godkin should regard it as merely the antithesis to "competition," or as a system devised for "the sinking of superiority" and the suppression of individuality.

Mr. Godkin's political essays are a good example of the best periodical literature of the time, but they have also the defects of their qualities—much of the observation is instructive, but it is also somewhat limited, and never goes particularly deep.

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LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN ENGLAND. By Josef Redlich. Edited with additions by Francis W. Hirst. 2 vols. Pp. xxvi, 427, and viii, 435. London: Macmillan & Co.

Almost all the best accounts of existing social conditions in England have been produced in Germany. One reason is, no doubt, that England is unique both as the field in which modern industrialism first appeared and as a country whose cumulative social experience is unequaled. To study coral islands the naturalist goes to the Pacific; to study industrialism the foreigner has found it necessary to come to England, for a short time, at least. Another reason, however, for the number of German studies of British institutions and conditions is unquestionably the realistic trend of German economic and political thought, and its greater volume. But, whatever the explanation, the fact is undoubted. The only exhaustive study of the social changes which took place at the time of the industrial revolution is Adolf Held's,—Toynbee's essay is wider in scope and slighter in the social side, besides being unfinished,—the book most used in teaching the history and principles of the English Poor Law is Aschrott's; and there are the well-known works of Brentano, Schulze-Gaevernitz and Von Plener on Guilds and Trade Unions, Social and Industrial matters and Factory Legislation; some of which, however, it is satisfactory to remember, are now being supplemented by even more thorough English studies.

And now another work has just appeared in Austria—a detailed, exact and thoughtful work—on the subject of Local Government in England, by Josef Redlich, of the Faculty of Law and Political Science in the University of Vienna. Mr. F. W. Hirst has done the good service of translating it, or, rather, rendering it,

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and adapting it by excisions and additions to English readers. Such alterations as have been made, Mr. Hirst informs us, "have been dictated by regard for the different atmospheres which the two versions must breathe. Explanations necessary in a German work upon English local government may not be required in an English work on the same subject. Details tedious to a German reader may be useful to an English one." The task which Mr. Hirst set himself has been performed in an eminently satisfactory way, as we should have expected from one qualified for the work by studies of his own on the same subject. One of Mr. Hirst's additions is a chapter on the recent Education Act; we refer to this in particular—and chiefly for benefit of the American reader—because the subject is a controversial one. The tone of the chapter is by no means markedly partisan; yet one rises from reading it with the impression that the government must have introduced the bill out of sheer naughtiness, an impression which may weaken when one remembers that Mr. Hirst is a politician, as well as a political scientist.

The scope of the book is wide. An historical treatment takes the first place. The center of interest in the work will be gathered from the fact that, while only 57 pages bring us up to the end of the eighteenth century, 161 pages are devoted to the growth of English Radicalism and its influence on the government of the country. The descriptive part which succeeds occupies more than 500 pages. The subjects dealt with are ranged as follows: Constitution and Government of Municipal Boroughs; The Structure and Working of County Councils; Urban and Rural District Councils; Parish Councils and Parish Meetings; The Local Administration of the Poor Relief and Education; The Structure and Working of the Central Authority in Local Government; The Position of Parliament and the Courts of Law in the System of Local Government. Dull matters, these, some would-be readers might be inclined to think, but they are, on the whole, dealt with in the fascinating manner which an absorbing interest seldom fails to impart, especially when it is combined with the skill in exposition which our authors display.

The second volume closes, except for tables of cases and statutes and the index, with a rending and tearing to pieces of all Gneist's most cherished and oft-repeated theories as to English self-government. Gneist held that self-government implied an association of political rights with personal duties, and contended

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that it decayed when elected boards took the place of the Justices of the Peace and executive functions were handed over to paid officials. The institution of the boards marked the introduction of "commercial" self-government, which meant the selfish pursuit of local interests, as opposed to the dutiful performance of State functions. "State" and "Society" are set in antithesis by Gneist in Hegelian fashion, and this false contrast was doubtless responsible for many of his mistaken conclusions. It was natural, perhaps, for a Prussian official to see as perfect self-government, the mere localization of officialism, the assumption by local groups of executive functions. Thus, Gneist viewed with no little alarm a conception of taxation as more than a substitution for personal service, and foretold the ruin of a country which, through its commercial self-government, raised money to satisfy the needs of Society. Mistaken in several respects as to the real trend of recent English politics, and almost unpardonably wrong-headed in his interpretation of Mill, Gneist, with his great authority, has been responsible for the creation of a totally erroneous idea abroad of the essentials of English democracy. What readers have regarded, in consequence of the claims put forward by this great leader, among others, of the Historical School in Sociology, as the facts speaking for themselves, have been but the distorted impressions conveyed by them when forced into the schema of the Hegelian dialectic. The modern renascence in social studies, we should do well to remember, was not a pure reaction to history, but a reaction which took place in the direction of history for one reason, because it was associated with the acceptance of a new philosophy, for the application of which the facts of the past were requisite. Mr. Redlich's criticisms of Gneist are excellent, because they show not merely keenness of insight, but also an all-round understanding of the broad issue involved.

These two volumes will prove indispensable to all who would become fully acquainted with the nature and bearings of English Local Government.

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WORLD VIEWS AND THEIR ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS. A syllabus of Lectures in Advanced Ethics. By W. R. Benedict, Professor of Philosophy in the University of Cincinnati. Cincinnati University Press, 1902.

I am glad to have an opportunity of calling attention to this little volume of a hundred pages, prepared as a syllabus accompanying collegiate lectures. No one would doubt for a moment that all systems of philosophy, or World Views, carry with them implications of the utmost significance for conduct; few would deny that one of the main *motifs* in the generation of philosophic systems has been the consciousness of certain ultimate issues as to morality, the possibility of rationally valuing life as worthy or unworthy. Such being the case, it is a striking fact that there is almost a total lack of literature upon the inherent bearings of philosophic standpoints and outlooks upon the moral problems of life. The great writers, Plato, Spinoza, Kant, Hegel, turn up, of course, both in histories of metaphysics as such, and in histories of ethics as such; but rarely do we have a consideration of what the metaphysical view means, *per se,* when translated into ethical equivalents. Professor Benedict's book is worthy of recognition as a sincere and rational attempt at just this translation.

Moreover, the way the test is undertaken is worthy of note. Self-imposed limitations practically exclude periods before Kant —an outcome specially to be deplored, I think, in the case of Spinoza, who is an unapproachable instance of an organic union of a typical World View with a typical theory of life; one which, while analogous in some regards to the Idealistic Monism, finally adopted and expounded by Professor Benedict, has its distinctive points. There is an account of the ethical implications of the systems of Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel and Schopenhauer, occupying about half the volume, while the remainder discusses the ethical implications of systems as such: Dualism, and, under Monism, Materialism and Idealism. The historical account might perhaps be criticized on the ground that in the case of Fichte the treatment falls short of the ideal held in view in the book, and also of the possibilities of the case. It is brief and there is little rendering of Fichte's theory of knowledge and being into their ethical evaluations; Fichte's system might be made very fruitful as a type-case of an effort to construe the whole universe in terms of the moral standpoint as such.

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Dualism is rejected on the ground that its ethical correlates are an unsolvable antagonism of good and bad, animal and spiritual, principles in man's life, whose logical outcome is ascetism, and an assumption of an arbitrary struggle of external forces. Materialism is welcomed in so far as it represents a movement toward unity; but is criticized on the ground that it attempts to define existence apart from existence-for-consciousness, which is impossible. Moreover, it is contended that science itself in its apparently most materialistic conquest, physiological psychology, really transcends materialism. "Matter has drawn very close to consciousness. Here, in the consciousness which brain makes possible, is the explanation of matter, the reason for matter, and the reason in matter" (p. 72).

It is impossible to summarize the idealistic Monism set forth by Professor Benedict, because the account is itself but the summary appropriate to a syllabus. It is in line with certain recent renditions of Hegel, notably Bradley's and Royce's, but is truer to Hegel, in the reviewer's mind, as well as more satisfactory in itself, in laying greater stress upon the *positive* significance of conflict and the suffering that attends it, in the constitution of an active and worthful universe, instead of tending to give a negative interpretation of conflict as due to the "finite" over against the complete, or to "appearance" over against Reality. It is to be hoped that Professor Benedict will give in ample form what he has set forth here in outline. Especially noteworthy is the temper in which Professor Benedict holds to the irrationality of a demand for finality—for absolute explanation—upon one side, while, upon the other, he insists upon the moral duty of adopting as a hypothesis that world-view which, all things taken into account, seems to serve relatively best the purpose of rationalizing existence and life.

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SCOTTISH PHILOSOPHY IN ITS NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT. By Henry Laurie, LL. D., Professor of Mental and Moral Philosophy in the University of Melbourne. Glasgow: James Maclehose & Sons. 1903. Pp. viii, 344.

Professor Laurie has done both a real and a needed service to the history of philosophical thought by the publication of

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this work. The full meaning and significance of Scottish Philosophy are becoming always more obscured by the German speculations and more recent theories which absorb the attention of the philosophical student to-day. The Scottish philosophy is to us a thing of the past, but it deserves to be studied, not only for its place in the history of philosophy, but because of the impulses it gave to modern thought in the case of men like Hume, Reid, Hamilton, and Ferrier. The excellence of Professor Laurie's work lies in this, that while doing sympathetic justice to the Scottish Philosophy of the past, he is yet in no sense impervious to the broader, fuller light of the philosophical to-day. In a word, his work is extremely well done, and no points of detailed criticism I may make are meant in the least to detract from the abundant credit I give to his work for freshness, acuteness, interest, and discriminating power. And the worst of that criticism shall come first. The book leads up, in its final issue, to a chapter on "recent developments," which I cannot accept as very complete or satisfying. Rightly enough, it makes due note of the "more universal character" of philosophy, as studied in Scotland to-day, in consequence of the mingling with "the fuller tide of European thought." The chapter is all right so far as it goes, but it does not go very far. No mention is made, for example, among these "recent developments" of the enormous amount of idealistic teaching that has taken place under the Gifford Lectures foundation—as by Prof. Wallace, Principal Caird, and Prof. E. Caird at Glasgow, Prof. E. Caird and the Rt. Hon. R. B. Haldane at St. Andrews, and Prof. Ward and Prof. Royce at Aberdeen. In a "national" development, one must not write as though Edinburgh were Scotland; nor must the lectures or books of resident professors be the only thing taken into account, far less potent in some instances than other agencies or influences. It seems to me strange that Prof. Laurie has not discussed the relation of these and like idealisms to the realistic philosophy of McCosh and the Scottish thinkers—a relation more interesting and suggestive than is here brought out under "recent developments."

Professor Laurie's historical chapters on individual thinkers are excellent, and make interesting reading. After a brief but careful Introduction, he begins with an account of Francis Hutcheson, of "moral sense" fame. Dr. Laurie says "the importance of his influence on later thought is not to be denied

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Scottish philosophy inherited its psychological method from Hutcheson and his teachers. While outwardly attached to the empiricism of Locke, his affirmation of perceptions of beauty and virtue as ultimate and original was at least a premonition of the inquiry into first principles which was afterwards characteristic of the Scottish School." Passing over Andrew Baxter, we come to David Hume, "a thinker of the first importance who has left his mark, directly or indirectly, on all subsequent speculation." Professor Laurie's account of Hume is tolerably full and lengthy, and it is also very clear and careful, although I should not like to pronounce it the clearest statement or criticism of Hume's positions I have read in recent times. But it shows, beyond doubt—as indeed these chapters generally show—a painstaking and enlightened grasp of themes which he has carefully studied at first hand, and this is much. As I am writing in an ethical journal, I quote his words as to Hume's ethical position: "The value of Hume's ethical philosophy lies, not in its positive conclusions, but in its connection with the empiricism which preceded it, and in the light which it throws on later theories of Utilitarianism. He who can discern the limitations of an empirical philosophy, and the consequent failure of the solutions offered by the clear-sighted and clearly speaking Hume, will have little difficulty in penetrating the confusion of similar theories in more recent years." Passing Lord Kames, we come next to the chapter on Adam Smith, which, of course, dwells rather on his "Theory of Moral Sentiments" than on his "Wealth of Nations." Dr. Laurie notes the indebtedness of Smith, in working out his ingenious attempt to resolve morality into sympathy, to Hutcheson and Hume. Sympathy is described as an original principle of human nature, and a distinction is drawn between praise and praiseworthiness. But, as Dr. Laurie shows in working out the subject, we are forced beyond those facts of sympathetic feeling on which Smith professes to found his theory of morals. Nor has he, again, been able to show how sympathy of any kind can be "metamorphosed into a conviction of duty." The truth is, he has had to assume the imperative claims of duty, and, so doing, has had to go far beyond the facts of sympathetic feeling. But this "absent-minded scholar shows a wide and subtle knowledge of human nature, and never was a moralist more free from platitudes."

This brings us to Thomas Reid, the founder of what is commonly called the Scottish School of Philosophy. His was the

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so-called philosophy of common sense. For Reid, holding reason and common sense to have one author, made it his business to reconcile them. His stress lay on the instinctive beliefs of men, since to him philosophy could only be founded upon these. Professor Laurie well describes how he opposed a philosophy of faith to the philosophy of scepticism, and insisted on the need of trusting certain first principles of human belief as ultimate. And Professor Laurie is right in describing Reid's philosophy as "the incongruous result of two methods of inquiry,—one, an appeal to common conviction; the other, the method of critical analysis. The first is unphilosophical and erroneous, since the truth which our beliefs contain can be tested only by submitting them to reflective thought; and in so far as he adopted the second method, he was only following in the footsteps of the philosophers who had preceded him, for this was the method of Descartes, of Locke, and of Berkeley."

Dr. Laurie discusses Reid's analysis of the facts of perception, and shows both how little original it was, and how far he had wandered from the unreflective thought he set out to conserve, in his ambiguous representations. Professor Laurie yet shows, at close of the chapter, the advance marked by Reid's philosophy, spite of its imperfections, as seen in the immediate effect it had on its own country, and in the preparation for Kant's deeper analysis, by its assertion of necessary truths. He rightly notes, also, what a powerful instrument it became in France, against prevailing sensualistic and materialistic philosophy, in the hands of Royer-Collard, Jouffroy, and Cousin. It is interesting, also, to be reminded of what Professor Sidgwick wrote so late as 1895, in *Mind*, that the student "may even now find profit in communing with the earnest, patient, lucid, and discerning intellect of the thinker who, in the history of modern speculation, has connected the name of Scotland with the Philosophy of Common Sense." And Dr. Laurie significantly adds, that "no one who has read the "Methods of Ethics" can have failed to notice the value attached by its author to common-sense beliefs as starting points for practice and for speculative investigation. " Reid was, after all, no small thinker.

But space limits forbid my going into detail with every thinker. Lord Monboddo, Adam Ferguson, Dugald Stewart, Thomas Brown, Thomas Chalmers, Sir William Hamilton, and James Frederick Ferrier, all have their interest and place well set forth by Professor Laurie. The chapter on Ferrier—whose

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merits have lain too long unrecognized—is very interesting and welcome, as bringing into more general notice his significance for modern speculation. With this book of Professor Laurie in the one hand, and that by Professor Pringle Pattison on "Scottish Philosophy," with its fine comparison of the Scottish and German answers to Hume, in the other, the student will not fail to know what is most important for him to know of this interesting phase of philosophy.

KILMARNOCK, SCOTLAND.

JAMES LINDSAY.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY, with Other Lectures and Essays. By Robert Adamson, M. A., LL. D. Sometime Professor of Logic and Rhetoric in the University of Glasgow. Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood & Sons, 1903. In two Volumes. Pp. xlxviii, 358, and xv, 330.

These volumes are edited by Prof. Sorley, who has prefixed to them an interesting and sympathetic memoir. The whole of the first volume is occupied with the lectures on the Development of Modern Philosophy, which are reproduced from the notes of students. The lectures on Kant formed part of a separate course, and are on a considerably larger scale than those on the Philosophers who precede and follow him. The historical lectures are followed by others entitled "Suggestions towards a theory of Knowledge based on the Kantian." The views put forward here are of great interest, but any attempt to give an account of them would take this notice more deeply into Epistomology than would be suitable for a Journal of Ethics.

The latter half of the second volume is occupied by a course of lectures on the "Principles of Psychology," any detailed notice of which would also be beyond the sphere of this paper. There remain the seven Essays and Addresses with which the second volume commences. These are, an Inaugural Address in the University of Glasgow, a lecture on Giordano Bruno, another on Psychology and Epistemology, an early fragment on Kant's view of Psychology, and addresses to popular audiences on Philosophy and the Social Problem, the Basis of Morality, and the Regeneration of Germany.

The address on Philosophy and the Social Problem contains some valuable criticism of the ideas of Organism and Development as applied to society. Of the first, Dr. Adamson says,

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"undoubtedly no conception has more commended itself to our ordinary thinking. It was among the earliest, it is among the latest of the general ideas brought to bear on the social life. . . Yet I venture to say that the employment of the notion is always a sign of an unscientific stage of sociological thinking. No one would deny the historical value of the idea. . . . But it has to be borne in mind that the differences between the social life and that of an organized living being are far more important and go far deeper than the resemblances which at best are but superficial" (ii. 81).

With regard to the notion of Development the author does not deny that it may have some validity as applied to human history, but insists that "it is an intruder, and a uselessly disturbing intruder, to sociological inquiries (ii, 84). For, although, when events have happened, they may perhaps be profitably considered as the unfolding of a plan, yet the ground of our endeavor to bring about certain events can never reasonably be that they are included in the eternal plan, which cannot be certain till they have happened. In guiding or predicting action we must base our conclusion, not on the nature of the eternal plan, but on the human desire to bring about a state better than the present.

In the address on the Basis of Morality the main contention is that the idea of an absolute end is itself a derivative notion and cannot be taken as the ultimate foundation of morality. While rejecting much of Green's position, the author entirely agrees with him in the admission that all our definite conceptions of morality have to start with existing usage and law. What remains rather obscure is how, from this starting point alone, a start is ever to be made. After all, morality frequently find itself in the position of asserting that the present state of things is wrong. Now, is it possible to justify this assertion if we have no other basis for morality than the very state of things we are condemning? On this point the address gives us no guidance.

J. Ellis McTaggart.

Trinity College, Cambridge.

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THE DATA OF JURISPRUDENCE. By William Galbraith Miller, Advocate. Edinburgh: Wm. Green & Sons, 1903. Pp. ix, 477.

This is the first volume of a treatise on jurisprudence. The title is a suggestive one. As Mr. Miller points out in his preface, he is attempting in this work rather to state the problem, "What is Law?" than at present to offer any solution. This cannot but be regarded as a step in the right direction; for, as Aristotle saw, to ask the right questions is an important help towards obtaining the right answers. The author expresses his attitude towards this problem as being that of the "common sense man." To the reviewer this seems an unfortunate expression. It is apt to call up in one's mind the philosophical doctrines of Reid and his followers. In other words, one would expect to find a number of "laws of nature" set forth as axiomatic and as being those to which positive laws should conform. But such is not Mr. Miller's position. He treats jurisprudence as a positive science, dealing with law as it is and not with law as it ought to be. His way of looking at law is closer to that of Sir Frederick Pollock than to German jurists of the *Naturrecht* school. His method is primarily historical, inductive. This seems the right method for jurisprudence. To adopt the *Naturrecht* attitude is to bring within the scope of jurisprudence questions which can only be properly dealt with in Ethics or Politics. We require a name for a science which treats of the form of law and investigates the general characteristics of existing laws and legal institutions. According to traditional English usage the term "Jurisprudence" has been appropriated to indicate such a science. Mr. Miller does well in pointing out the close connection of form and matter in law. "Law is a result of social life and has no meaning apart therefrom" (p. 28). The Austinian doctrine is too formal and analytical. Society cannot exist without rules of social order, which are binding on citizens as such. These rules make up law. Austin's analysis of the term "law" is really only an analysis of an English criminal statute. Such is the result of applying the historical method in jurisprudence, and such is substantially Mr. Miller's position. He analyzes and discusses the meaning of the principal legal conceptions, right, duty, status, etc., and endeavors to show the close interconnection between law and social organization. The book displays throughout evidence of wide reading and knowledge. Mr. Miller's knowledge of law is not confined to Scot's law. Illustra-

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tions are drawn from English, Scandinavian, German, and Roman law, not to mention other systems. Politics and Ethics are also laid under contribution. A companion volume is promised on Abstract Jurisprudence.

W. F. TROTTER.

EDINBURGH.

A HISTORY OF FACTORY LEGISLATION. By B. L. Hutchins and A. Harrison. P. S. King & Son, 1903.

This book describes itself as an endeavor to expound the historical facts regarding a form of legislation on whose limits opinions still differ. "Whatever we may think of the policy of Factory Legislation," writes Mr. Sidney Webb in a Preface, "we must all regard it as an advantage to have the story told with honest exactitude, and it is as such an historical study that I venture to command this volume." Only rarely do the authors become opinionative, there being something more than a historical tone in the chapter on the "Women's Rights Opposition Movement;" in general, it is a clear and lucid exposition which certainly needed to be done, and for which we are indebted to them and the London School. There is no historical weariness in the style, and only one split infinitive.

The book appears to divide itself most easily into an earlier period, when Factory Legislation was still founded on only an "emotional, religious and charitable" basis; and a later period, when sanitary and other regulations have been studied from a scientific or quasi-scientific point of view. The former is a political history of a movement subject to numerous outside chances, especially to the competing Free Trade development; in the latter the appeal to theory emerges gradually. But over the whole of the nineteenth century, which embraces this general policy, checks, hinderances, evasions and omissions have continually been triumphed over, till nearly the entire manufacturing field has come within the law.

The authors are not content with what has been done. They are "conscious that they leave off with a note of interrogation. What prospect is there that the principle of collective control will be further strengthened and extended in the improvement of the conditions of industrial life, and the social and industrial efficiency of workers?" "The Factory Code is still the barest minimum,

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and scarcely ever is there a discussion in Parliament on the subject that does not reveal that the masses of information and material that exist for the full economic justification of further measures, are practically unknown to all but a select few of our legislators." It is not quite evident what there is behind this protest. Some reforms in the dual control of Factory inspection are the main hint of the lines in which, in the authors' view, further progress might take place. It is for the reader to judge of this pessimistic conclusion; a reviewer of this History can only commend its patient thoroughness.

D. H. MACGREGOR.

TRINITY COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE.

ANOTHER VIEW OF INDUSTRIALISM. By William Mitchell Bowack. London: T. Fisher Unioin. Pp. viii, 403.

The writer of this work set out with the intention of presenting economic phenomena in the social and spiritual elements in which they are involved.

"The ground plan of most political economists is limitation and exclusion. They never grade or merge their subject in the surrounding synthesis. They treat it solely as a thing apart, self-contained and sharply differentiated. There is, therefore, left in the mind of the student of political economy a sense of isolation from the living movements of the world around him—a wall of partition dividing him and his science from all that is living, ennobling and gladdening in modern thought and action."

In another place the author expresses his aim thus:—

"We say we present to the public another view of industrialism. Another view implies a particular standpoint. What is that standpoint? It is that of 'Will and Idea.' In the main it is the subjective of Schopenhauer."

This is somewhat grandiloquent and not altogether clear, particularly as no statement of Schopenhauer's position follows; but the author must be taken to mean that he proposes to look at social facts in a philosophical way.

The intention of the book is thoroughly good, and beyond question a sensible sociology, in which the philosophical point of view will not be ignored, is a pressing need; but we cannot feel that Mr. Bowack has added very much either to our knowledge or ways of regarding things. A great deal in the book is merely

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a more or less exact statement of ordinary economic doctrines, and not infrequently clearness appears to us to have been sacrificed to an attempt to clothe simple ideas with an appearance of profundity. Thus:—

"Price is an equilibrium reflecting an antecedent equilibrium—an equilibrium of action, of natural forces stereotyped or attested in material forms. The equilibrium is generally described as the law of demand and supply. Demand is not a law; it is a force. Supply is not a law; it is a concrete fact. But the interdependencies of these phenomena are laws, such as that the one creates the other, that they gravitate to equilibrium, that their equilibrium constitutes one price, their perturbation a different but still correlated price. Now we say, apart from all process of conscious or volitional valuation, the demand and the supply of commodities themselves adjust prices, and they adjust prices by previously adjusting themselves."

Moreover, our author does not always seem to have grasped adequately the ultimate workings of the forces with which he is dealing. His analysis of credit and its functions, for example, does not cut very deep. Hence, no doubt, his recommendation of "a return to the principle of the real possession of capital on the part of those entering in business." "We propose that all business should be conducted on such principles. Buy nothing that you cannot pay cash for. Have nothing on your premises that does not absolutely belong to you. Sell for nothing but cash down."

If the philosophy of the book is occasionally rather obvious and long drawn out, though magnificently expressed, the work is, on the whole, not an unwelcome one. The reader is carried over the surface of society, looked at as a whole, and no doubt if he is born to be interested in society, regarded as phenomena to be shaped as well as explained, he will be led on to profounder studies all in good time. The book should leave the reader thinking, and to say that is to praise.

S. J. CHAPMAN.

UNIVERSITY OF MANCHESTER, ENGLAND.



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Articles by writers in Great Britain should be sent to

Prof. J. S. Mackenzie, Pendene, Llanishen, Cardiff, Wales.

Books to be reviewed, published in Great Britain, should be sent to

G. E. Moore, M. A., Trinity College, Cambridge, England.

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OXFORD UNIVERSITY SOCIETY

INTERNATIONAL

JOURNAL OF ETHICS.

JULY, 1904.

MORAL INSTRUCTION IN SCHOOLS.

There is probably no point on which there is such general agreement amongst those engaged in or interested in education as this: that children when they leave school (and in due measure whilst they are still at school) should be equipped to encounter the moral problems of life. The building up of character is recognised to be an even more important aim in education than is the cultivation of the mind or the development of the body. Does it follow from this that there ought to be moral instruction in schools?

I think we shall be able to discuss the question with more clearness of mind if we in the first place attempt to define to ourselves of what instruction in a given subject consists.

Clearly it presupposes a desire on the part of the instructor in some respect to modify or encourage the development of those instructed. It further implies that active steps are taken by the instructor to secure that the particular development desired shall come about.

To illustrate by an example: Instruction in physical culture implies that the instructor has in view the increase of the health and strength of the pupils' bodies and takes measures to bring this to pass.

But there may be a desire to influence the development of the young, and the teacher may take active steps to bring influence to bear in the desired direction, without its necessarily

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following that he pursues his aim by means of *instruction*. He may simply try to secure that the conditions of life which surround his pupils shall be favorable to the end he has in view.

Thus a teacher bent on physical culture might encourage healthy games and out-door occupations; he might be careful as to school-room ventilation and heating, and he might see to it that the school furniture did not habitually either cramp or strain the body. Though this care for environment is not necessarily accompanied by instruction, it can scarcely be said that the converse statement holds good, for instruction can hardly be successfully undertaken if care is not exercised concurrently concerning environment. It is of little use giving children gymnastic exercises for an hour a week if they habitually live in close rooms.

Instruction itself, however, connotes something rather different from, though not necessarily more important than this care for surroundings. It involves a conscious direct relation between the teacher and his pupils, the latter being aware that the former is actively endeavoring to influence their development in some particular direction.

We may instance the difference between securing such healthful surroundings as have been enumerated above, and giving actual physical drill; or, again, the difference between, on the one hand, turning a squad of lads or girls into a gymnasium to amuse themselves, and on the other, directing all the proceedings in the gymnasium with an ordered purpose in view.

We have thus arrived at a conception of what instruction proper consists; but it is necessary that we should distinguish further between that part of it which is practical and the part that is theoretical. The first aims at accustoming the individual to the exercises that are considered beneficial, as when a child is given physical exercises. The second marks a departure from the position that up to this point we have assumed to be that of the teacher, viz., that of an autocrat. When the theory of a subject of study is taught the pupils are, as it were, taken into the confidence of the instructor and are told the *reasons* why certain chosen exercises and not others are imposed

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on them, as when children are not only given physical exercises but are concurrently taught physiology, and shown how the exercises are based on physiological principles.

Now it is to be noticed concerning theoretical as distinguished from practical instruction that it is usually not substituted for it but superadded to it. As it places the pupil at the same view point as that occupied by the teacher, it paves the way for self-instruction and eventual independence of the latter. The admixture of theoretical with practical instruction is generally most wisely accomplished in very slight measure with young pupils, but in increasing degree as the pupils grow older, thus leading up to complete independence by the time that emancipation from teachers takes place. In many subjects it is *possible* for a child to finish his school career without receiving any theoretical instruction, but that theory should, in the measure that the mind is ripe for it, be brought in to reinforce practice is in general the mark of enlightened as distinguished from discredited methods of education.

In this attempt to analyse what the term "instruction" imports we perceive that there is a conception and, as it were, a reflection of that conception. The conception is in the teacher's mind, its reflection is its reproduction in the minds of his pupils. It follows that for instruction to be efficient the original conception should be definite and as far as possible consistent, otherwise we shall have a blurred and unsatisfactory result, as when a drill master sets his pupils an exercise that induces unhealthy fatigue.

I say consistent "as far as possible," for an educational curriculum seeks to develop various characteristics the full acquirement of some of which may not be compatible with the full acquirement of others. Here all we can demand is that the teacher's conception shall take cognizance of the inconsistency and that he shall define to himself the limits within which disadvantage in one direction shall be accepted in order to secure more important advantage in another.

We are now in a position to construct a sort of table shewing what are the essentials to a system of instruction in a given subject:

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	Outline of Instruction.	Outline of Instruction more precisely stated.
The Conception.	The teacher desires to modify the development of his pupils in a given direction.	The teacher definitely realises to himself at what he aims in the development of his pupils in a certain direction, and exactly how far it is compatible with what he aims at in other directions, and where there is clashing how far each aim must give way.
The Reflection.	He proceeds (a) to make the environment favorable to such modification.	(a) He arranges each surrounding circumstance in accordance with his carefully thought out conception.
	(b) to *instruct* (1) practically,	(b) (1) By examples which he sets before them and by inducing constant practice in themselves he induces in his pupils the *habit* of the exercise which he considers conducive to the development desired.
	(2) theoretically.	(2) He secures his pupils as allies in his endeavor, by putting them in possession of the knowledge which has determined his own point of view.

Having thus mapped out our subject as it applies generally, we can the better appreciate and the better criticise the attitude of mind assumed towards its particular application to the question with which we are concerned (*i. e.*, the giving of moral instruction in schools), characteristic of those different sections of the community who are most concerned in the matter.

Of these there are in England three principal types amongst those who have adopted definite convictions.

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Those who consider that the problem is in the main to be met by giving dogmatic religious instruction. This is the Roman Catholic and the Anglican position.

Those who favor what is called "undenominational" religious teaching, the main feature of which is Bible lessons. This is what is called the "Protestant" position.

Those who oppose any association of supernaturalism with the teaching of morality, and yet consider it vital that moral instruction shall be imparted. The most important association for the furtherance of this policy is the Moral Instruction League.

But what does "the man in the street" say? The "men in the street" constitute a class of persons very little in evidence who, however, in reality vastly outnumber, I believe, the three classes enumerated above put together. This class is unlike the others in having no convictions that are felt to be completely satisfying as to how the problem is to be dealt with. The objections to the religious solutions offered by Roman Catholic, Churchman, or Noncomformist are half acknowledged. It is recognised that the mental development of children of tender age is not sufficiently advanced to grasp the dogmas laid down in the creeds. By some, too, it is acknowledged that the Bible, used as an inspired text book for moral teaching, exhibits inconsistencies which must sorely puzzle the child who is taught that he must treat with equal respect the code of morality laid down in the Old Testament, and that other and inconsistent code of morality which finds its expression in the Gospels. Nevertheless, the programme of the Moral Instruction League does not present to the people we now have in view a solution of the difficulty they are able to accept.

Now I am not self-confident enough to suppose that the argument contained in a paper of this kind is likely to affect the minds of those who are convinced that the particular form of religious instruction advocated by them includes in itself all moral instruction that is needful, that it does not exhibit inconsistencies between different parts of the moral system or between different parts of the religion inculcated, and, more-

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over, that it supplies the only motives that will induce pupils to lead good lives

This, no doubt, is the attitude of the priesthood, of some of the Nonconformist ministers, and of those of the flocks of both who have most thoroughly adopted their teaching. But the bulk of the laity, whether they be Churchmen or Nonconformists (perhaps *not* if they be Roman Catholics), are in a different category. Accordingly I believe there does exist a large class of persons whose convictions as to what it is right to do in this matter are nebulous, although they recognise the importance of the issues involved; and it may not be altogether in vain to look at the matter through their spectacles in order to see whether it is possible to make any contribution to the solution of their difficulties. It will, therefore, possibly be worth while to endeavor to summarise the principal points of such persons' thoughts, or perhaps it would be better if we said reflections, on the matter, and subsequently examine these points from a critical and, if possible, from a constructive point of view.

In setting them forth it will be understood that I am not confining myself to the position taken up by any one individual, but rather that I am recalling the pleas commonly advanced that seem most typical of the frame of mind about which I am speaking, even though some of these pleas may be inconsistent with others.

Indeed, one distinguishes in this amorphous mass of opinion two opposed tendencies. All alike, it is true, are inclined to distrust denominational religious teaching for children as being unsuited to their immature intelligence; if the denominational dogmatism is extreme, distrust begins to border on resentment. But whilst journeying so far together divergence soon becomes apparent.

At one end of the scale we find people hardly distinguishable from those who accept the Protestant position except that in the depths of their minds they are, perhaps, not so absolutely certain as are their pastors that Bible lessons are the complete solution of the difficulty; but they say the Bible is "a good book," and Bible lessons can at all events do no

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harm. On the whole, they view with favor "undenominational" teaching, even though it may be as dogmatic as that which is called "denominational."

From people who have half defined to themselves some such position as this, one passes by infinite gradations to those amongst whom the inclination is to consider any religious sanctions futile.

In practice these two schools of thought are not so far apart as might be supposed; for whilst on the one side we have faith in the Bible as a text book of morals, and therefore a desire that Scripture should be taught, we have on the other a readiness to maintain the necessity for Scripture lessons so that the Bible may at least be known "as literature." Moreover, the two schools of thought join hands in this. They are much alike in being doubtful whether any system of morals such as the Moral Instruction League advocates can be evolved which shall be simple enough systematically to be brought to bear on children. Even if such a system could be conceived by the philosophers, they do not believe that a faithful image of it will be found to exist in the minds of the various teachers; further, they are incredulous that such teachers as have themselves grasped the matter have the power to impart the conception to children.

The practical upshot of the whole matter is this. By some a certain amount of dissatisfaction with some of the available courses is felt; to others all possible courses are unsatisfactory; but to none does it seem worth while to depart very widely from the paths that are marked out as those that it is most easy to follow. If one of the number is a workingman, he will perhaps prefer to send his child to a "provided" rather than to a "non-provided" school; that is, if they are about equally conveniently situated; but if it is easier to enter his child at the sectarian school, having to send him there will not distress the father very much, and it is not likely that he will bestir himself to claim the protection of the Conscience Clause. If, on the other hand, he is a well-to-do parent the religious instruction given in the most public schools, and the "keeping of chapels," will not be expected to exercise a very baneful effect on

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character, and some may even anticipate that it "will do the boy good."

The more "emancipated" will, however, tell you that in reality everything depends on *the tone of the school's being healthy;* children will then assimilate virtue through every pore of the moral nature as they imbibe pure air through their physical organs. Nor is it the emancipated alone who care about the "tone of the school." It is a matter of universal concern to careful parents. Everyone considers it a matter of the very greatest importance; the only difference is that whilst the emancipated parent thinks it the predominant, perhaps the only influence for good, others place it side by side with religious influences.

Here, then, apparently, we have a point of agreement between almost all parents. What is meant by the "tone" of a school, therefore, is clearly worth careful examination. An understanding of it may even prove to be a key to many of our difficulties.

Like all vague phrases this conception of the tone of a school carries with it a fringe of meaning of differing import as it is used by different persons. To one it will be inherent in it that provincialisms of speech are eradicated; to another, that the children are the offspring of those who work in offices and are engaged in "commerce," rather than of those who "trade" in shops; to yet another, that there shall be no connection either with commerce or trade, that one of the pupils shall be the son of an Earl or a Bishop, and so forth, and so forth. Of many of these things it may be said that they are trivial, of all it is safe to say that they do not form part of the *essential* idea that engages most people's minds in this connection.

The essential, one might almost say the universally accepted. idea that the phrase imports is that a *moral ideal* is set before the school.

But does this help us very much? Does the fact that a moral ideal is an almost universal demand of parents give promise of unity of purpose? Is it not possible that there is infinite diversity of moral aim? Well, when one considers that some children are brought up to be grasping, others to

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be chivalrous; some to be modest, others self-assertive; some to be sensitive, others to be comparatively indifferent to physical or to moral pain; some to be independent, others the reverse of independent, and so forth, one is almost inclined reluctantly to answer, "Yes, it is true, the hope of finding a common platform here is a vain one."

But let us turn a moment from people's actions to their professions. Here, I think, we shall find a considerable and very important common factor, and, strange as the doctrine may seem, there is very good reason for preferring in this matter people's words to their deeds. Their professions are at the high-water mark of their ideals. Those who profess them are not ashamed to defend their position to their fellow-men, and their fellow-men are justified in holding them to what they thus profess.

Now, I think it is quite possible to set forth a moral ideal which will command general adhesion of this kind. Few people would object to the teaching of the Church Catechism if the instruction given were confined to giving in its own form two scriptural injunctions, in the *Question*, "What is thy duty towards thy neighbor?" and in part of the *Answer*, which replies to it, "My duty towards my neighbor is to love him as myself, and to do to all men as I would that they should do unto me." If this were put forward as the governing conception in the moral up-bringing of the young it would almost universally command nominal allegiance at least. It would be admitted that the conception here expressed is the kernel of the matter. As a basis of morals, however, it is pretty clear that it is incomplete, without a realization of what it carries with it; for it serves to mark for us what we shall strive to do, but it takes no security that we shall be able to accomplish it. What the welfare of others requires from us cannot be effected by a weakling in mind, body, or character, so that whilst unselfishness is enjoined, self-development is necessarily implied.

I do not suggest that to be capable of fulfilling the service we are called upon to perform for others is the only justification of self-development. That was the doctrine of James Hinton, and as presented by him it is felt to be a noble and inspiring

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theory of life. But after all the "natural man" has his claims. Except to the most elevated characters there will be a sense of unreality in referring every action to the good of others; for to most people it appears that each individual has claim to some share in the "joy of living" for himself. The extreme of self-abnegation would be especially difficult to make a vital doctrine to children in a healthy way. Our Biblical text does not suggest the complete renunciation of self-love, but only that it should not grow at the expense of love towards our neighbors, or be allowed to clash with it.

The duty of self-development can, no doubt, be taught effectively on the basis of self-love alone; it can, for example, be shown that the cultivated man will in his self-contained life be happier than the ignoramus will be in his. But though this is a part of the case for self-development that should be duly presented, it may easily be over-emphasised. At any rate, it is important concurrently with the necessity of self-development in individual life, to insist on its necessity for the due performance of our part as members of an organised society. If we are to recognise the call of the service of others we must be capable of that service and must maintain a dignified standard for ourselves no less than for others. As Locke says, we are "not to think meanly of ourselves, and not to think meanly of others." All this I take to be implied in the great conception of the Brotherhood of Man, which, perhaps, in one phrase summarises almost all we mean. Yet not completely, for we must admit into some share of comradeship those creatures which are below man. The ideal of the ordinary British person will hardly be satisfied unless some account is taken of the interests of the animals.

I have said I do not think that we shall encounter any widespread opposition to the proposition that in a school, the tone of which is good, the moral ideals of which I have spoken are fostered. If this be granted, referring for a moment to the table where I have attempted to map out the conception of what "Instruction" involves, it will be perceived that the teacher desires to modify the development of his pupils in a given direction, and we now see that though it is questioned whether he

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can do so profitably by direct instruction, he is permitted, nay, he is required to contrive that the mental surroundings in his school, the "atmosphere," as it has been called, shall be favorable to these particular modifications of development. We have seen that efficiently to accomplish this, quite as necessarily as if he were engaged in direct instruction, he must define to himself with absolute definiteness, and we may add with some elaboration of detail, precisely what it is that he wishes to bring about, and precisely how compatible this aim may be with other educational aims that he sets before himself. It is equally essential for the conception to be distinct whether the reflection is to be secured by indirect means or by actual instruction.

For example, the teacher may find a difficulty in reconciling the teaching of goodwill towards man with the justification of wars undertaken in the search for "glory" or for the furtherance of military ascendancy. But, how, then, is he to proceed to produce his environment favorable to the cultivation of the idea of goodwill towards man? He may, it is true, make the first idea familiar to the minds of his pupils by the use of biography, story, and history; but in the ordinary course of events the other set of ideas which clashes with it will also be rendered familiar in a similar way. As neither can flourish except at the expense of the other, the teacher must plainly settle with himself how far he desires that the one should override the other. Suppose him to have determined to his own satisfaction that the feeling of goodwill towards man is one to be fostered, even though it clash with what may be predominate national feeling, how then must he proceed? Something, no doubt, can be done by selection and elimination. When, for example, he chooses pictures for the adornment of his school-room walls, he may avoid battle pieces even though they record the victories of Wellington or of Nelson.[1]

[1] M. Payot, Inspector of Public Instruction of the Marne, issued in 1902 a circular containing the following passages: "I request the teachers to see to the removal from the walls of the school of all pictures representing scenes of violence. In one school I counted in fifteen engravings fourteen that gave beheadings, tortures, massacres, and

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But to rely altogether on selection and elimination is to attempt to bring up children without knowledge that evil exists in the world, an impossible task, and one that, even were it accomplished, would have furnished forth the child with but incomplete moral protection when the time came for him to go out into the world.

But if we are to set evil things as well as good things before the young we shall not be fulfilling what we have laid down as our purpose, if we do not aid them to discriminate the one from the other. The teacher must become commentator and point out what things are good and what evil.

But here the reader will pause to wonder where this argument is going to land us. For have we not by a process of reasoning from which there seems to be no logical escape, arrived at that dreaded result at which we are accustomed to look so much askance—full-fledged moral instruction not necessarily associated with religious instruction?

It is true that the particular form of words that I have quoted as indicating the basis of this moral system is Biblical. But if we define religion as including a belief in doctrines that are supernatural the text is not *religious*, but merely *ethical*. The idea might be expressed almost as well in a formula of words which will be admitted to be quite secular and non-religious, "Do as you would be done by." It is, therefore, at least conceivable that this common ethical platform may be used as the basis for moral instruction dissociated from religious instruction.

I shall defer the discussion of whether such dissociation would add to or take from its completeness and efficiency till a later part of this paper. But meanwhile we appear to have arrived at this result that whether in combination with religious instruction or not, direct moral or ethical instruction is the

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treacherous murders. We should be careful not to familiarise children with sights of violence and ferocity. The brutal instincts of the human race are not yet sufficiently weakened or crowded out by higher ones to admit of our placing before the eyes of the young scenes of murder and other atrocities."

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logical outcome of the demand of the parents that the tone of the school shall be good.

I can imagine an interlocutor replying, "Not quite. I admit the propriety, even the obligation that lies on a teacher to take advantage of opportunities that present themselves to point the moral in connection with the teaching of other subjects or in connection with incidents that may naturally arise. That is a different thing from sitting down in cold blood, as it were, deliberately to give moral instruction in an hour's set lesson." Well, yes, of course it is a different thing so far as machinery is concerned, but so far as the conception of the teacher's duty is concerned, so far as are concerned the relations between him and his pupils, there seems to me to be no valid distinction. By anyone taking up this postion the necessity for moral instruction is admitted; it only remains to be decided how such moral instruction can best be administered, whether in connection with other subjects of instruction (or it may be in comment on events of school life as they arise) only, or in addition by lessons expressly devoted thereto. Those who conclude against direct instruction exclusively devoted to moral subjects, will, it seems to me, do so more from the point of view of what is convenient and effective in teaching, than because they consider that such teaching is opposed to any of the principles they are following out. There are, for instance, few teachers who would not show disapprobation of untruthfulness. Their moral instruction in this particular is not only direct and exclusively devoted to the subject in point, but is often of a very emphatic character.

Surely, however, the presumption is that a subject admitted to be of the first importance cannot even on its practical side be satisfactorily imparted, it is certain that it cannot be on its theoretical side, if it is, as it were, only taught in asides in connection with what may otherwise transpire. It will be the second, not the first consideration, and it is impossible to convey the conception of a moral system as a whole, so that the importance of each part in relation to each other part shall be properly appreciated, in any such scrappy way.

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The code of conduct which will grow up amongst children subjected to such nurture will be but a distorted reflection of the original conception in the teacher's mind. In most instances it will cease to be a moral code and become what is called a "code of honor." Now the characteristics of a code of honor are, firstly, that it has hardly any measure of comparative moral value; what it characterises as delinquencies are reprobated with equal severity whether they involve a vital or an immaterial departure from virtue, or no departure from virtue at all; secondly, that its sympathies are apt to be narrow; the brotherhood it recognises does not embrace mankind, but rather pits a small fellowship against the rest of the world; and, thirdly, the virtues as well as the follies and, in some instances, the vices that in inculcates tend to become stereotyped. As a system it is not corrected and refreshed by continual comparison with a rational moral code. Its authority is as unquestioned, its maxims as inflexible as those of a dogmatic religion resting on authority, and in the one case as in the other what is inculcated does not adjust itself to the varying requirements of the problems that arise amongst living humanity. It is not imbued with vitality and is, therefore, unsuited to be the guide of living beings. A code of honor, like a stereotyped religious system, certainly gives some security that the good that has already been recognised as essential shall be guarded and practised, but both alike are obstacles in the way of an advance to a higher ethical standard.

I have spoken of the disproportionate value which the boy or girl often puts on one set of qualities which, when measured by the moral standard that ought to be set up, are trivial. It would not be impossible, I think, to find instances of virtues that are actually regarded as vices, of vices looked upon as virtues. I cannot think that this want of scale, so to speak, in moral perception is likely to be corrected by the casual moral instruction that is, as it were, "thrown in" with the history lesson, the literature lesson, or what not. It seems to me to demand a well-thought-out, well-ordered, systematic course of instruction, conscious precisely at what it aims and calculated exactly to bring the result about.

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The other two characteristics of the code of honor that I have noted, namely: its tendency to foster the fellowship of a coterie rather than a citizenship of the world, and its persistency in conceptions that are often trivial and sometimes worse than trivial, because of its divorce from a rational source of inspiration, both point strongly, in my opinion, to a need for direct moral instruction; nay, more, they point to the necessity of our proceeding a considerable distance along that path, to our teaching not only what I have called the practical side of the subject, but its theoretical side also. Except with very young children, it seems to me that confidence that precept will bring about obedience, and reliance solely on the inculcation of the *habit* of doing what is right, must certainly be reinforced by an appeal to the reasoning powers; for the learners will inevitably begin to question *why* their teachers consider such and such things right and such and such other things wrong. If they are to be made to see eye to eye with their teachers in these matters, the reasons must be brought home to them of *why* they should reject that which is evil and cleave to that which is good.

I have now advanced so far in my subject that it may be possible for me to sketch out what I think might be the substance of a course of moral instruction actually applicable to children, and in doing so I will try faithfully to adhere to the map of abstract instruction and what it involves that we previously constructed.

It will be remembered that it divided itself into the definite conception in the teacher's mind of the development which he wished to bring about in his pupils' characters, and the *Reflection* of that conception in the pupils' minds brought about (a) by making the surrounding circumstances favorable to its growth, and (b) by direct instruction.

Now when I placed environment (a), and definite instruction (b), in that order, it did not imply that in practice (a) would precede (b). It will be remembered that my hope of the acceptability of a system of moral instruction is based on the general concurrence of those concerned, and that concurrence is at present more consciously accorded to environment

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than it is to direct instruction; hence my order of enumeration. But now that we are considering the practical applicability of any such system we do not find it necessary to give precedence either to environment or to definite instruction. They will be brought into action *concurrently*, each supporting and reinforcing the other. For the purpose of exposition it will be convenient to consider (b) before (a), because (b) sets out definitely what (a) is as far as possible to conform to.

When, on the other hand, we consider the subdivisions of definite instruction (b), the arrangement into (1) practical and (2) theoretical *does* mark a precedence of the one over the other, for children of tender age are not yet ripe for theoretical work. We shall find that the age-grouping of children for this subject will have to recognise these two stages of instruction, and further that they will have to be supplemented by a third.

The first stage then will be practical instruction, taking account of simple problems of conduct only, *i. e.*, those problems where the conflict of motive is between unmixed good and unmixed evil. The second will traverse the same ground theoretically as well as practically. And the third will give theoretical as well as practical instruction not only in simple problems of conduct but in those complex ones where there is a mixture of, or actual conflict between motives, each of which is in itself commendable.

How then can we shortly describe the conception which is to be figured forth in the teacher's mind? It is that human beings are not an agglomeration of isolated units each fighting for his own hand, but that each is a part of a great human society and that each has definite duties and obligations towards the rest of society. Each, too, derives extraordinary benefit from his membership of this society, and if he live up to his privileges may enjoy the confidence and esteem of many, and from a smaller circle personal affection. The reverse of this is a state of isolation; so far as man can bring this about for his fellow-men, it is exemplified by the terrible punishment of solitary confinement.

A complete fulfillment of human fellowship kindles the sym-

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pathies to so bright a glow that it is impossible to confine their scope to human beings alone. A man can hardly be sensitively sympathetic to all around him including the most degraded as well as the noblest of mankind and yet delight in cruelty to animals.[2] (Apparent instances may perhaps be adduced to the contrary, as of the Spaniard, admirable in all other relations of life, who frequents bull fights, or of the seventeenth century benevolent Englishman who kept fighting cocks. In such cases it is hardly the cruelty that is enjoyed, but some other appeal to the human emotions so engrossing as effectually to enable men to blind themselves to the cruelty involved.)

Human society, then, rests on a system of mutual aid, the incalculable benefits of which it is our privilege to receive but no less our duty to give forth: benefits, indeed, which we cannot receive in the fullest and highest degree unless we also give forth.

The individual's part in life may be compared to that of a cog on a tiny wheel in some vast maze of machinery; compared—but with this difference, that whereas any failure on the part of any portion of the minute wheel may dislocate and bring to ruin the whole fabric of the machine, the failure of the individual in human society will not bring disaster on the whole world, but only wreak mischief of a more limited kind. That mischief *will* be wrought is, however, as certain in the one case as in the other; the difference is that we are not utterly but only in some measure dependent on each of the human units with which we come into contact, and that conversely we cannot utterly either make or mar the lives of those around us, but can only do so in some measure.

It thus appears that every man has his part to play in the great drama, and it follows that he must be equipped for the fray. And so all those qualities which make men strong to help forward what is good in the world are shown to have their purpose as certainly as it can be shown that the cog-wheel

[2] We have crystallized this idea in our extended use of the word "*humanity*" which includes in common parlance the disposition to treat with tenderness those orders of animals which are below man in the scale of life.

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must be strong, durable, accurately cut, or running without friction.

Thus the way is opened for definite lessons on such subjects as sympathy, and the hatefulness of cruelty; individaul friendship; self-respect and self-reliance; self-control and temperance in all things; justice; the necessity of work; truthfulness; the cultivation of the intelligence; the cultivation of the imagination, and of a true and not a false sense of humor; courage, moral as well as physical; courtesy and good manners, and many others.

Of all such qualities that which we must account the most fundamental is that which I have mentioned first, Sympathy; for Sympathy transfers to the breast of the individual that which without it exists only outside him; and as it is that on which the weal of the community depends, it is necessary that it shall be thus felt by the individual before it can become the motive force on which we count to regulate his conduct. Sympathy if complete is a sufficient guarantee of faithfulness in each to what is required for the common good; for a departure from such faithfulness means the infliction somewhere or other in the human society of injury, and sympathy means the participating in the penalties of such injury by the person (amongst others) who may be tempted to such departure from faithfulness. It therefore provides the direct motive to fidelity of life.

And if Sympathy is the foundation of a well-knit human society, Truthfulness is the quality which perhaps constitutes the most important piece of machinery by which the community of interest between each and all is emphasised. If we all lead completely isolated lives there would really be no necessity for Truth; and the high place accorded to Truthfulness amongst the virtues is the half-unconscious tribute paid to the paramounce of the conception of the solidarity of mankind.

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[to be continued.]

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HAS THE UNIVERSE AN INTELLIGENT BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE?

The struggle of modern philosophy to make its peace with both orthodoxy and scepticism is one of the most amusing and at the same time one of the most irritating and exasperating incidents in the history of thought. Just when the issue between the mechanical and the spiritual theory of things becomes clearly defined in its evidential character, the philosopher becomes frightened at the consequences of his own scepticism and goes off to dally with the spiritual view which he had learned to question. There is no objection to one's changing his convictions and returning to the older point of view, but it is not easy for one to retain a positive belief in a process of intellectual jugglery between two antithetic views. Philosophy has no excuse for its existence but for its willingness and ability to present a clear and defensible message in reference to the meaning of human life and conduct. That is perhaps recognized by all parties, but none of them outside the orthodox camp has any intelligible system to defend. The orthodox type is clear and intelligible, whether it is true or not. It may not be right and it may not be supported by adequate evidence, but it is intelligible. But the agnostic who is trying to appropriate the language of the orthodox and at the same time to repudiate his ideas is simply invoking the accusation either of insincerity or of ignorance of his problem. This is a hard saying, of course, but in the present confused condition of philosophic thought none other is appropriate. It has been the function of philosophy previous to Kant to defend some positive, and usually a Christian view of the cosmos. But since Kant it has had no character but scepticism, while it has been unwilling to admit that it was missionless for the world.

The "problem of teleology" is nothing more or less than the question whether the course of the world is "rational" and intelligent, or perhaps better, whether it is moving toward a result which is desirable for the highest ideals of man. It implies an intelligent background, and hence no man can

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discuss "teleology," in any accepted sense of that term beyond the Greek idea, without approaching the question of the existence of "God." If there is any "teleology" at all of the intelligible kind, it involves the assumption or assertion of the "Divine Existence," as a precondition of the purpose which "teleology" supposes and which is supposed to be in some way indicated as a fact. Of course it may be best not to use that precondition, but to show the actual existence of the purpose in the cosmic order, and so not to urge the case by a revival of worn-out controversies. But a matter of policy in conducting the discussion does not affect the actual implications which have to be recognized. Hence there is no escape from the admission that an assumed "teleology" in the cosmos means an intelligent process, unless "teleology" is taken to mean nothing more than a tendency toward a particular result either without any purpose or without the evidence of it. Such a "teleology" as this last, however, is only an appropriation of theistic language without the theism. It only deceives the theist and confuses the scientist.

One of the first things, it seems to me, for the student of this problem to learn is the radical difference between Greek and Christian "teleology." Greek "teleology" was nothing more than the tendency of a process toward a certain result, and this result might or might not be intended. Outside a few thinkers like Socrates and Anaxagoras, the philosophers avoided views that would imply anything more than an unconscious tendency toward a result rather than an end. The reaction against the earlier anthropomorphic conception of things and the discarding of *deus ex machina* views of the world left the Greek mind holding to a tendency in things minus ordinary intelligent purpose, and this tendency did not go beyond the present cosmic order. But Christianity came along with the view of an independent divine existence creating and governing the cosmos and assuring the immortality of human personality or consciousness, and making either the "glory" of God or the happiness of man, or both, the ultimate object of all things. The material universe in

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this scheme was the means to an end, and not a self-existent thing as in Greek thought. All its movements and changes were directed by an intelligent and purposive cause. There was thus more than a mere tendency in the cosmos. The tendency was accompanied by design, or initiated by it and directed to a result which becomes an end by virtue of this conscious direction. "Teleology" thus means purpose and not mere tendency, though the actual outcome in both is the same.

We do not need any refinements of distinctions in the use of the word "cause" in the discussion of the problem. All hair-splitting talk about the reconciliation of "final" and "efficient causes" simply fails to see how such phrases came to be adopted. I do not believe that such an expression as "final cause" would ever have been adopted but for the equivocal import of the Greek term *αἴτιον* and the influence of tradition in its transliteration of meanings rather than the translation of them. Aristotle used the term *αἴτιον* for a meaning far wider than our word "cause," except as the influence of Greek thought has here and there left the traces of the latter's more comprehensive conception. Instance the conjuctive term "because" and the use of "cause" to denote a reason or ground of conviction. In his classification of "causes" Aristotle was not thinking of active energy alone, nor even of antecedent facts alone, but of any facts, coëxistent or antecedent, which made other facts in some way intelligible. There was nothing in common between his "causes" but this characteristic, and it has only been the consequence of studying the dynamic evolution of things exclusively with its interest in antecedent active agencies to explain the occurrence of events, that has transmuted the term "cause" into that of an "efficient" agent alone, and so given trouble in the discussion of "final causes" which are not necessarily "efficient" at all, though their necessary concomitant may be this very efficiency. The common characteristic of the four Aristotelian "causes" was logical, not real, and hence there is no reason for talking about either a conflict or a reconciliation between them. They are simply different things, though they may be synthetically connected

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in various situations and separated in others. Recognizing this fact, what we have to do is to discuss the problem independently of the traditional associations of the word "cause" and of imaginary implication determined by meanings not applicable to the problem at hand.

Now as I refuse to recognize any form of identity but the logical in the four Aristotelian "causes," I equally refuse to confuse the discussion of "teleology" by any refined distinctions about its relation to "causality" of the efficient sort. I should treat "efficient" and "final causes" as different things, even though they be found always temporarily associated. To me "efficient cause" means a producing or originating agent, whether it be phenomenal or noumenal, and "final cause" a result aimed at consciously, not merely attained blindly as a consequence of a converging series of efficient agencies. With these conceptions in mind I think the problem of "teleology" can be intelligibly discussed, otherwise not.

I return, then, to the two fundamental conceptions of "teleology" which define the issue between two schools. One of them is the theistic, which represents "teleological" as implying conscious purpose looking to an end. The other represents it as referring to a result to which a number of other facts convergently point as a consequence. One of these, the former, implies the existence of mind as superintending the process and the other represents the process as a fact, whether mind be associated with it or not. The fact of such a process may be construed as an evidence of mind at the basis of it, but it is not assumed as a necessary concomitant of the system of causes converging toward the result. It construes them as at least unexpected conditions of results, and further investigation might reveal the presence of intelligence directing the process. But this view refuses to hastily conclude for this intelligence. It simply contents itself with remarking the necessity of the given coöperating causes in the production of the one combined result, showing that the fortuitousness of the effect is contingent upon the supposition of fortuity in the combination of causes.

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Just in proportion to the doubt about fortuity in this combination of causes must be the argument for intelligence, as an associate of the process. But it is at this point that the whole crux of the problem and its difficulties appears. The theistic view had specified quite clearly the result which made its "teleology" intelligible; this new "teleology" does not make its end clear. Let us examine both of them.

The "old teleology" is said to be represented by the conceptions of Paley, and I think they may be taken as representative of certain general conceptions determined by the prevalent philosophy of the age. This was a mechanical view of the cosmos, a view as mechanical to the theism of the age as it was to materialism. The theism of that time and for many centuries had supposed matter to be a created thing, and that all its combinations were the resultant of its creator's action either directly or indirectly. It proceeded on the assumption of the intrinsic inertia of matter as a created substance, and so traced all its phenomena to the action of divine intervention, whether this action were occasional or continual. This point of view conceived matter merely as a means to an end and not as having any intrinsic power to direct causal action. Matter was a mechanical instrument in the hands of its creator, and not being able to organize any complex agencies to a common end or result, such consequences were easily and rationally referable to an extramaterial agent. "Teleology" in this system of thought implied both personality and agency transcendental to the things used as means, and so conceived the process as analogous to human action in its use of material force.

The materialism of the time, which contrived still to call its position mechanical, excluded intelligence from the cosmos, and accounted for phenomena by the fortuitous combination of elements endowed with motion, which was supposed to be eternal. It still adhered to the doctrine of inertia, and in that way appropriated mechanical assumptions and conceptions without any discovery of its weakness. Two important developments of thought, however, both modified and strengthened the materialistic view. The first was the

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discovery of the indestructibility of matter and the conservation of energy. This discredited the old theory of creation both of matter and motion, so that the mechanical "teleology" of theism was completely eviscerated of its primary assumption. This victory was followed up by the supposition of "internal forces," as represented by the phenomena of chemistry and all phenomena indicating the internal action of matter affecting inorganic and organic compounds. This result modified the doctrine of inertia and still further limited the conception of mechanical "teleology" by assuming the existence of "internal forces" and excluding foreign intelligence from them. All that Evolution did was to organize and apply the principles involved in this point of view and to limit the necessity of an appeal to external intelligence. The indestructibility of matter and the conservation of energy eliminated the creationist theory, and the ideas of chemistry and "internal forces" eliminated the apparent necessity of concomitant intelligence in the explanation of phenomena, so that "teleology" was not regarded as expressing anything more than a process toward a result, which might either be calculable or intelligible from its conditions, but not necesarily intended by a foreign agent.

The same sceptical result was reached in another way and this was by the discovery of the evidential weakness of the "teleological" view prevalent for so long. Nothing is clearer than the old theistic scheme of the cosmos. It was perfectly intelligible and "rational." The creation of matter and the direction of its action, the arrangement of things in behalf of man and his development, and the assumption of immortality with its moral scheme of redemption, were perfectly intelligible conceptions, and as "rational" as any that one could desire. Even the golden paradise and the social and religious life of the future were no worse in conception than the ideal Greek state and the materialistic enthusiasm for science and art. All that the Christian did in his system was to extend the ideals of the present into the future for realization. They were quite as "rational" as the same objects pursued in the material life. But their defect was in

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their lack of evidence. There was nothing that made them necessarily bad, or any worse than the same things cultivated in the incarnate life. But they were without evidential criteria, and hence, however desirable they might be, they wanted the credentials to make them credible. They might be true, but there were no adequate reasons for accepting them. Their truth and the acceptance of this truth gave an intelligible "teleology" to things, because such an outcome seemed "rational" and, in so far as it pointed to a moral scheme and ultimate human perfection and happiness, showed as "rational" a system as any utilitarian ethics could advocate. But the moment that the system lost its evidential character, though it retained its ideal "rationality," in so far as man was concerned, it was nothing for the theistic "teleology," which depends as much for its value upon its evidential as upon its explanatory character. But its explanatory power has no practical value if it cannot claim to be a fact.

We have seen that the "old teleology" based its claims partly upon the inertia of matter involving its inherent incapacity to organize complex results or to display intelligence, and partly upon the belief in a future life which gave rationality to an order in which human perfection and happiness were not fully realised until a discarnate existence could be attained. But this sytem lost its cogency for human belief for several reasons: (1) In default of evidence for immortality it had not the facts necessary to maintain the desirable rationality in the system in so far as end or result was concerned. (2) The indestructibility of matter and the conservation of energy dispensed with the necessity of creation by a transcendental agent and left unconscious matter as the only Absolute necessary for science. (3) The laws of chemical action and the possibility of artificial compounds by human experiment in which material action was due to "internal" and not divine action, at least as previously conceived, introduced the idea of immanent "forces" in nature, which set aside the transcendent "forces" of the theistic view, and as consciousness was not assumed to be a concomitant of their action, the "teleology" of the new point of view re-

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turns to that of Greece and becomes a mere tendency toward a result of conditions inherent in the nature of matter, and not an intentional movement transcendentally toward an end, at least in so far as the evidence is concerned. Such a "teleology" excludes a foreign intelligence, and all intelligence, unless this can be made a function of matter itself. To exclude intelligence from matter would be to use the term "teleology" to mean nothing more than the relation between conditions and result. All use of it to imply "means and end" would be a mere surreptitious appropriation of ideas not true in fact, and would only deceive the reader with associations and implications of a doctrine that is no longer held. It does not matter whether we call our "teleology" transcendent or immanent, it can mean only one of two things, namely, either intelligent aiming at an end or appropriate adjustment of complex conditions to the production of a result. The former is definitely theistic and the latter is agnostic, though it purloins interest and respectability by using the orthodox term "teleology," reserving the right to explain it away if orthodoxy claims the victory.

But what is this new "teleology"? I repeat that it does not matter whether it be called "immanent" or not. That is immaterial to the question, except as a means of excluding the *deus ex machina* conception, which after all is a bugbear only because it does not appear to be true, and not because it is intrinsically irrational. But it is certain that the assumptions of modern science favor an immanent "teleology" whether this be intelligent or blind, and I shall assume that this is the only defensible position, and simply press the question whether it implies a "rational" process, as the term ought to do if we are not equivocating or trying to curry favor with religious conceptions which the premises will not admit. I must insist upon keeping our conceptions clear at this point. I must know when the term "teleology" is used, whether it is to imply concomitant intelligence directing a movement or the resultant of complex conditions not naturally associated and in which intelligence is not clearly apparent, even if possibly present.

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But what is it that supplies evidence of intelligence in the relation between causes and effect? The answer to this question is not so easy as it may seem. It would be easy to give a formula for detecting intelligence, but it would be liable to error in its application, unless it were truistic. Hence I shall not indulge in laying down rules that are dubious. I can only indicate one negative consideration which will serve as a precaution against hasty judgment. It is that a mere combination of unexpected causes is not a sufficient evidence of intelligent action. They must be accompanied by a result which is also "rational." Let me illustrate. Suppose the case of a boy throwing a stone against a wall. If I see the boy actually throw the stone I regard the phenomenon as purposive. That is, I suppose the throwing to have been intentional, directed by consciousness. The intelligence is inferred from the previously made assumptions that the boy is a conscious being, and that I am not accustomed to seeing inanimate objects thus start to move through the air. It is not the large combination of independent causes that influences my mind in such a case, but the primary knowledge of the nature of the initiating agent and my experience in such acts myself where I know the part played by consciousness. But if I saw the stone moving through the air in its course and did not see its initial motion, the intelligence of the act is not so apparent. I must know more than its motion to decide the case. The stone might have been impelled in various ways, such as the result of an explosion, glancing from a fall down a mountain, or even thrown by an automaton prearranged to throw objects. In this last case intelligence is assumed as causing the prearrangement, but not as directly causing the specific act as an immediate consequent of volition. I must know more than the mere motion to infer intelligence. The case of falling meteors illustrates the whole phenomenon, and no one suspects immediate intelligence there. The instance of the watch is only a little more complex one than the stone. It is our personal familiarity with man's mechanical inventions and the absence of such artificial conditions in natural creations that

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lead us to suppose the watch a designed object. The watch is associated with known human intelligence, or it resembles such productions sufficiently to exclude any other interpretation of its nature, though this view would not be so certain if we knew that "nature" produced similar combinations of conditions for a single result, as it certainly does apparently in the organic world. But the primary fact in evidence of intelligence, when we do not previously know the nature of the agent most naturally associated with the phenomenon adjudged, is that we see the event initiated, that is, know its origin, and if this origin is an intelligent being we can be assured of some specific purpose, whether we know exactly what the purpose is or not. In all other cases the question of intelligence will be a more or less open one.

This brings us to the demarcation of the fields in which "teleological" action is possible or real and those fields in which it is either absent or indeterminate. The first of these is conscious human action. Here we have indubitable evidence of "teleology." None will dispute this fact. I do not care what theory of the will we adopt. I am not concerned in this supposition of human "teleology" with either free will or determinism. I shall make a present of his theory to the determinist, and yet insist upon the purposive nature of human actions, and hence a field in which "teleology" is indisputable. Neither do I care whether this "teleology" is immanent or transcendent. From the point of view of modern thought it would probably be regarded as immanent. But that is indifferent to the view here taken, which depends upon the introspective deliverance of consciousness that we actually intend certain ends or results. To that extent we must admit "teleological" action in the world. This conclusion can probably be extended to the whole of organic life. But it must be remarked that assured "teleological" action may not extend further, and will be doubtful in all inorganic phenomena in proportion to the strength of the assumption that matter is uncreated and is capable of initiating action under certain conditions.

Now the crux of the whole problem appears at this point

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where we wish to know if "teleological" phenomena are evident outside of the actions of man and of organic beings. This problem is to know whether the actions and movements in the inorganic world are accompanied by purpose or not, whether that purpose be immanent or transcendent, whether it be consciously initiated by the subject of the action or the medium for its expression and realisation, as in the case of a machine. The old cosmology had no difficulty in making an intelligible claim at this point, because it assumed a creator and governor of things to account for all physical action. But the new point of view cannot claim this with the same impunity. Its whole philosophy is not only immanental, but assumes agencies to which it does not attribute intelligence of any kind in their actions and combinations. This position once admitted, there appears to be no limit to its application, and the laws of chemical action sustain its extension to almost anything.

Evolution apparently offers a difficulty to the materialistic opponent of "teleology" in that combination of causes which produces and maintains the various species of organic life and the definite complex order of inorganic phenomena. There are certainly appearances of design here. But these appearances have to meet with a twofold objection. The first is the fact of natural selection and the survival of the fittest. The force of this objection lies in the circumstances that the failures have disappeared so that the function of chance in the order is not superficially apparent. It seems intelligent because the evidence that it is not is absent. The "teleologist" will struggle in vain with that fact, unless he obtains evidence in some other consideration than the mere conjunction of causes to produce the results which appear to him so purposive.

One need not deny to the evolutionist the view that events are combined in a remarkable way to bring about a single result, but it is another thing to suppose the process purposive or intelligent, as has already been indicated in the definition of true "teleology." But grant that it is actually purposive, what is that specific purpose? It is all very fine

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to admit that nature shows purpose, but what is that purpose? The "old teleology" had a very clear idea of it and in its doctrine of immortality had an end in view which recommended itself to rational beings, even when it represented that end in a somewhat materialistic light. But what is the "telos" of evolution? Is it anything that appeals effectively to men of high intelligence? We have only to look at the process and the outcome to see that it gives no scientific evidence of any other purpose, if purpose be admitted at all, than that of producing and sustaining for a period of time the forms of organic life. The chief thing for which organic life interests rational beings, namely, the development of consciousness and its ideals, seems to have no permanent place in the system. All that is apparent is the preservation of the race or type, and even this only on conditions. Moreover this is accomplished only at the expense of half, or more than half, of the individuals created. The survival of the fittest shows that nature fails to accomplish any clear purpose for the individual apart from the lucky strong. We express the purpose as the maintenance of the race, but as the race is nothing but a number of individuals the proper way to express it is to say that its purpose is the preservation of the strong and the destruction of the weak. This is the true statement of the facts, and it takes the whole ethical character out of the process, unless we either abandon out charity morals and imitate nature in the destruction of the weak, or obtain evidence of the continuance of life beyond death, in which the whole aspect of natural selection and the survival of the fittest would be wholly changed. But the spectacle of the struggle for existence as we see it and the assumption that we have no other possible view of it to take than the preservation of the strong and the destruction of the weak, only show us that the "teleology" so naïvely ascribed to the process conceals an ugly moral situation that men of high intelligence and morality cannot tolerate. Our moral nature does not idealise the preservation of any species unless the best characteristics of that species can have as much valuation placed on them

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as on mere organisation. I think no intelligent person would value the production and maintenance even of the human race, unless he felt that mental and moral qualities and their enjoyment could also be equally sustained.

The theistic theory which affirms the immortality of the soul has a basis upon which to rest its "teleology." It may not be true, but it is certainly "rational," because its view of a future life only sets up as an end the continuance of conditions that are uniformly assumed to be rational in the present order. The survival of personality, the realisation of perfection and happiness, are only another expression for the ideals of pursuit in the present existence, and admitted by every school of ethics, and most of all by the utilitarian. Consciousness is valued in that system as above matter, whether organised or unorganised, and our estimate of reality measured by the extent to which it protects and aids the development of consciousness in all its higher forms of art, science, religion and society. But eliminate the consideration of a future life and you have nothing but the survival of the race or type before you as the "telos" of the cosmos, and however much design you may ascribe to that, it is not a very high result for intelligent and noble men to consider. It may be all that there is, but it is not very ethical, while what merits it may be supposed to have are terribly marred by the failure exhibited in the process of natural selection. But, as I have said, the spectacle of this struggle and selection would be greatly modified, if we could feel that it made no difference to the development of the consciousness which we estimate as the factor that gives existence its primary moral value. It would remove the disparity we must all feel between the estimate which nature places on matter in comparison with consciousness, and the estimate which moral ideals must place upon them. In our moral ideals we must evaluate consciousness more highly than mere matter, but the indestructibility of matter and the conservation of energy, without the survival of personality, mean that nature places a higher value on matter, at least from the standpoint of permanence, than it does on con-

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sciousness, and if nature is to be our guide and example in this, we must reverse the ethics which evaluates the "rational" life the more highly. Materialism takes the true position in this, and unless you can show that nature is as careful of consciousness as it is of matter and its organisation, you are without a criterion for any other end than material organisation.

I am not claiming that the belief in a future life has any right to recognition as a fact. It may be neither a fact nor a possibility. It may be absurd to even think about it after what physical and physiological science have shown us. Besides, I think it true that the belief in it has been associated with so much "other worldliness" and false ideals that the moralist may well shrink from reinstating the illusions that have haunted its path. There can be no doubt that our duties lie right in our present environment and that nature seems to have done well, either to have hidden the destiny of man from him, or to have left it doubtful enough to force him to pay attention to his terrestrial duties instead of running after speculations that are fit only for the idle. Our concrete morals belong to the physical conditions in which we live. But all this has nothing to do with the problem of "teleology," which must consider the meaning of the cosmos, whether our ethics be limited to the incarnate life or extensible to an assumed discarnate existence. It is all very fine to talk stoically about the sacrifice of immortality when you think you cannot get it in any way, and to insist upon the Christian view of life without the Christian view of its meaning, but you cannot discuss any "teleology" in the system, beyond the creation of organic forms and their final absorption in a dead universe of matter, with all the real ethical values of it in terms of consciousness permanently lost. You must frankly face the fact that your "ideal" is a sheer mental abstraction, and that no intelligent man will prize it even as highly as stock-breeding. There is no use to give the cosmos any better character than it actually possesses, and if you leave out the belief that it cares less for personality and its opportunities to develop

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than it does for inanimate matter, you have a sorry spectacle with which to move the average man to anything higher than a sensuous life. The survival of the fittest and the struggle for existence, as we see them egoisically carried out, are no models for our imitation. All our ethical progress has been made by putting limits to their operation, and trying to do something for the weak and unsuccessful. If the cosmos does not have a policy for the care of this class, so much the worse for it in our ethical systems. The successful may very naturally think well of the cosmos for their happiness and development, but the unsuccessful are within their rights and only apply the other side of the logic in the case when they complain that nature is not just; for their ideals are the same as those of the successful and it was only the gambler's luck that kept them out of their winnings. But any philosophy which does not provide for a rational solution of the accidents of life is not likely to find a very acceptable "teleology." All our altruistic ethics insist upon respect for the unsuccessful, pity for misfortune, and help for the downfallen, a course the direct opposite of what is palpable in the survival of the fittest, and if nature's only object is the preservation of the species in an organic form, our morality is against the law of nature, as it appears in its most obtrusive aspects. We can well understand failure and accident, and can tolerate the discrimination of nature against the weak in favor of the strong, if there is hope that the change for personal consciousness is only a change of environment and not annihilation. But the want of such an outcome leaves us no high purpose in the cosmos that is appreciable by any but stock-breeders. Hence a philosophy which does not have a definite word to say on survival of death is not one with any very rational "teleology." It may be right, and it may be the best that we should have no such belief, but we should not shuffle and prevaricate with terms that convey theistic impressions when examination shows us naked of their meaning. If we recognise that survival is a part of the system, let us give the evidence for our belief, and if we have no evidence, let us cling firmly and courage-

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ously to agnosticism, and admit that we have no adequate grounds for supposing any result that will make things reasonable to us.

Kant saw the whole force of this in his moral argument, though I think he stated it wrongly. I do not think the morality of the system depends as much upon the proper articulation of virtue and happiness as it does upon the consistency of its course in the estimation of values in life. Kant had complicated his doctrine with the existing ideas of ethico-legal responsibility, and practically implied that duty and virtue had less reward in the present life than is probably the fact, and hence, like the theologian of the time, postponed the rectification of an imperfect order until another life. Now it is not so much the rectification of the present that is wanted, though any belief in survival is likely to take that expression of its meaning, but it is the necessity that nature shall be consistent with herself if it is to be regarded as rational. If we are to have any morality at all in our present life we have to estimate consciousness above a material order pure and simple. We have to reverence personality above impersonal force. Now unless nature gives the same permanence to personality that it gives to dead matter, in spite of all its changes, we can hardly accept any purpose in it as embodying the rationality which our ethics assigns to the preference for consciousness over a material order. Nature will appear rational if it provides for the conservation of consciousness as well as that of energy and matter, and it will not appear adequately rational until we are convinced that it does make this provision, and if we can rationally hope or believe it, we can well modify our feelings about the ugly spectacle of natural selection. Without it we only use abstractions about the race that are only euphemisms for the destruction of one individual for the benefit of another.

Another problem would also be on the way to solution if this survival could be rationally believed. It would be the existence of a personal Absolute. The survival of personality after death would suggest a unity in the system that

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would make a larger personal ground of existence much easier of belief and proof, and in my opinion we can obtain no logical leverage for such a belief short of some conviction in favor of a soul and its survival. Our "teleology" would thus reach all the meaning that it has in its theistic conceptions, and it can have no range beyond what is perfectly compatible with materialism under any other way of looking at the problem. We could then talk freely enough of "the whole of nature shimmering in the radiance of the ethical ideal," but such a view is defenceless unless we can point to a result in nature that is more rational than the multiplication of organic forms. The rationality of the system depends, not merely upon the discovery of a purpose, but upon the discovery of a *rational* purpose. I agree that the process of evolution is at least superficially "teleological," but this appearance has two limitations which very much modify the right to lay any emphasis upon it. The first is the one that has already been mentioned, namely, the absence of the evidence for the amount of chance in the process. The second is the fact that the process is not always progress, but may be one of regress, or degress, if I may coin a term to indicate deterioration. Evolution is mainly a name for certain kinds of change, and instead of describing it in terms implying its ethical character, we have satisfied its demands when we have expressed it as increase or decrease of complexity, and not progress. But on the whole I agree that there has been progress of a kind, but that does not help a "teleological" theory in any respect, unless this progress conforms to the highest ideal which the ethical consciousness forms for itself in estimating the relative importance of the realities with which it has to deal. It may be that we cannot make good the claims of any such order in nature, but we cannot make our "teleology" either clear or very rational until we can sustain this point of view.

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NEW YORK.

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THE GOVERNMENT PRISON SETTLEMENT AT WAIOTAPU, NEW ZEALAND.

AN EXPERIMENT IN THE UTILISATION OF PRISON LABOR.

On the main coach-road through the North Island of New Zealand, between Taupo, on the great lake of that name, and Rotorua, of Hot Springs fame, and about twenty miles from the latter place, the coaches stop at a lonely hotel, a homely, one-story, wooden building, little like a hotel in the English acceptation of that term. From the hotel there is one of those almost boundless views of which there are so many in New Zealand,—over trackless volcanic plains, covered with manuka scrub and tall fern, and occasionally broken with a plantation of firs, away to ranges upon ranges of blue and purple mountains. The plains are part of the immense tract devastated in 1886 by the terrific, utterly unexpected eruption of Mt. Tarawera, full fifteen miles away.

In the vast expanse of scrub-covered land, white as snow in spring with the blossoms of the aromatic manuka, and in which steam is constantly rising in all directions from the numberless hot springs, one cluster of plain, unadorned, white buildings at once strikes the eye. There is hardly another human habitation in sight. These unpretentious looking buildings are the scene of an experiment in the utilisation of what has hitherto been largely a waste product—prison labor. It is an experiment, call it philanthropic, social, or what you will, which from its novelty alone, quite apart from its great success, is of unique interest.

A similar experiment has already been tried in New South Wales, and failed utterly, the cost of management having been so enormous as to make its continuance out of the question.

The prison settlement is a collection of some dozen or fifteen little square box-like houses, arranged in the form of an oblong with one end open, and a large space in the middle, built upon a bank, in all fifteen buildings, including the Forester's room, store-house (with the gaoler's room off it), and kitchen. It is approached by about a mile of winding paths made by the

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prisoners through the scrub, which is full of wonderful and not half explored volcanic sights, some of the very best in the whole vast thermal district of the North Island—boiling mud-holes, "porridge pots" (fine mud bubbling like porridge), steam jets, little geysers, sulphur terraces and caves, excellent black sulphur baths, and an immense variety of hot springs and streams mostly with remarkable curative and medicinal properties. The land belongs to the Government, and the part that is too volcanic, too much riddled with steam holes and hot streams and springs to be of any use for planting, besides being most unsafe and treacherous, is now handed over to the Government Tourist Department, although the prisoners may and do constantly use the different natural hot baths. The remainder of the area is gazetted as State Forest Land, and it is on this that the prisoners are now engaged. I cannot forbear to describe the situation, for, should prison settlements become common as blackberries, it is not likely that there would ever be another so remarkably situated as this.

The writer visited the prison camp with the gaoler on January 31st, 1903, two years all but a day since its opening with only four prisoners. On February 22d, 1901, twenty-one more men arrived from Auckland, all being employed until March in putting the camp in order and erecting the huts. Then began the real work of tree planting. The area to begin with was 1280 acres, the country in that part being very little settled and most sparsely populated. The soil is entirely volcanic, and, it must be admitted, very unpromising looking at first sight—a kind of pumiceous, sandy deposit, mixed with much volcanic ash thrown out by Mt. Tarawera, to the depth on an average of four inches to two feet, and of course quite unsuitable for many trees. For about three years beforehand experiments had been going on, to find out what kinds of trees, both ornamental and timber, would thrive in such soil. There was at first hardly a tree, except a few scattered pines, no native bush whatever. If there ever had been any, Tarawera must have destroyed it long ago.

At first a good many ornamental trees were planted, especially about the camp itself to give it a less unhomelike appearance;

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but the main object of the Government in starting the settlement was to plant trees that would yield useful timber for building purposes, and to keep their prisoners employed in reproductive labor. It was found that larches grew excellently, as much as four feet six inches in a year, to the immense surprise, almost incredulity of English visitors; Californian and other pines also thrive, and are admirable for timber. The oak, ash, and beech have been tried, but the soil is unsuitable, not being deep enough. On the tops of the brown, bare hills, where timber-trees would not grow, rowans (mountain ash) have been planted, and are thriving well, and already the hillsides are dotted with patches of the fresh green of young larches.

To an English eye even now the place must look very dreary —acres and acres of land covered with bracken fern and manuka scrub, all of which has to be laboriously grubbed up by the roots. What is useless is burnt, which manures the ground well, while anything large enough for firewood is preserved. Nothing can be wasted in a land like this.

The planting season is from May till September, and by the time they were ready, the first year, very little time remained to do any planting, so that only about seventy thousand trees were put in. The ground has first to be sweetened by digging pits for the trees and leaving them open to the air, the average number of pits dug by one man in a day being about four hundred and eighty to five hundred. Clearing the scrub and grubbing out the fern is most laborious work, especially for men who, like many of the Waiotapu prisoners, have never been accustomed to toil like laborers. During the first year the twenty-five men erected about ten miles of wire-fencing, at the cost of about £10 a mile, fencing that had to be strong enough to stand the charge of the wild horses which are plentiful there. Around the line of fencing, barbary, Lawsoniana and other pines, Spanish broom and laburnum were planted to make breakwinds for the young forest trees. All the existing paths were thoroughly repaired and many new ones made. A road eighty-five chains long was formed from a colossal mud volcano, so big that to look down it one must climb up a ladder to a kerosene creek—such is this strange

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country. A paddock for sheep was fenced, drained and sown with grass, for meat (chiefly mutton) is at present supplied locally by the Maoris, and is a heavy item of expenditure, which the authorities hope to reduce in time by having their own meat killed. A small swamp on the river bank near the camp has been drained, and fenced with hare-proof wire netting —a necessary precaution, the hares being most troublesome, as they eat the young trees. So hopeless looking was this swamp that the gaoler told me he was positively assured that it was wasting time and money to touch it. However, he persevered, had good black soil brought from a near gully, bought a few seeds himself, so that if he did fail it could not be cast in his teeth that he had squandered the public money, and he has now realised the project of supplying the whole prison with vegetables. Indeed, he told me he had not paid a shilling for the past year for vegetables, except for potatoes, which have still to be brought overland at the cost of £10 a ton, so out of the way is the settlement and so little opened up the country. There is no railway nearer than twenty miles on the Rotorua side, and one hundred and eighty on the south side.

Everything is done by prison labor. When the writer visited the camp forty-one prisoners were living there, with the gaoler and four warders in charge. Four prisoners were employed about the camp itself. One, who had been a bank manager and was obviously, even in his prison dress, a man of education and refinement, acted as cook; another attended to the flourishing kitchen garden full of cabbages of enormous size, turnips, carrots, onions, and herbs, the selection of vegetables allowed to the prisoners being limited. The beds were bordered with pretty pansies, and the prisoner in charge had spent his spare time in cultivating a beautiful hedge of choice sweet peas.

More than two hundred acres are already cleared and in cultivation. When these are planted, there are thousands more adjoining, not yet fenced or cleared. They have, besides, a piece of land one hundred miles long by twenty-five broad, which they can use when all this is under cultivation—all Government land and all pumiceous, the result of former volcanic devastations. Last year (1902) they had planted nearly

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three hundred thousand trees, chiefly larches and Oregon pines. Very few of these had died, indeed they had shot up wonderfully well in the few months they had been planted. Pines, which have latitudinal roots, are peculiarly suitable for the shallow, volcanic soil. It is trees with deep roots that will not thrive.

The men work in parties of about twelve, eight being the regulation number, with one warder to each party. None of the warders are armed. Owing to the treacherous and rotten nature of the ground in parts, great care has to be taken by the warders, but there have been few accidents, although one man has been scalded in one of the hot springs. The men's health is usually excellent, however, scarcely any medical attendance having been needed. The climate is very healthful, Waiotapu being one thousand three hundred and fifty feet above sea level. In summer it is rarely over 90° Fahrenheit, though in winter there are sometimes 16° to 18° of frost.

Of course with such heavy work only fairly robust prisoners can be utilised. Hitherto, also, it has been the rule that only first offenders shall be taken at Waiotapu. The prisoners there are almost all men convicted of felonies, mostly on charges of forgery, embezzlement, and similar crimes, and many of them are professional men, gentlemen by birth and education, with no appearance of the criminal about them. On Sunday, with two or three other outsiders, I attended a service held out of doors by the local schoolmaster, who drove five miles every fine Sunday for this purpose. He had to be at once curate, clergyman, organist (a small harmonium was produced from somewhere), and choirmaster. Very reverently and well did he conduct the simple service. Some of the prisoners were certainly rough-looking, but many of them are really nice-looking men, and it seemed inconceivable that they should be sitting there in that dress—a dress which some of them would have to wear for six and eight years to come, and that one should not be allowed even to speak to them.

There has never been any trouble with attempts at escape, idleness, or misconduct. The prisoners are mostly men only too anxious to earn all the good marks possible in order to

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shorten to the uttermost their term of imprisonment. As Colonel Hume, Inspector of Prisons for New Zealand, says in his report (1902):—

"The ordinary criminal is, under present conditions, not available, for the reason that his first impulse would be to escape. Some men are safe only under lock and key and behind a fourteen-foot boundary wall. The class of prisoner required for tree-planting or similar work in the country is the man who is determined to shorten his term of imprisonment by good conduct and industry, whose last thought is to escape, and who therefore needs little supervision. This class is, however, limited in number, and for that reason the scheme referred to cannot be extended as far as one could wish."

The gaoler said that he had never once during two years administered any punishment, unless the occasional forfeiting of a few good marks could be so called. In making his report on Forestry Operations for 1902 Mr. Matthews, the Chief Forester, writing about the tree-planting at Waiotapu, remarks: "From frequent personal observation, as well as by estimating certain defined works such as digging holes for trees, it can be said that there has been an entire absence of loitering by prisoners, and, although perhaps hardly equal to free labor in point of speed, the works undertaken have been carried out in a thorough and workmanlike manner."

The slight inferiority in point of speed is doubtless due to a cause already mentioned—that the men are mostly not of the laboring class. They are, as a rule, young or middle-aged men; an old man would be unable to do such work as clearing scrub or grubbing up fern. The average age would be between thirty and forty.

The men are called every morning, Sundays excepted, at 5.30 in summer, and breakfast (a pannikin of tea without milk, sixteen ounces of bread, and occasionally porridge) is about 6.15, the time varying according to how far they have to tramp to their work to be there by 7. From 7 till 12 o'clock they work without an interval—on bread and tea only, and this in a land where the working-classes hardly think they have had a meal unless they have had meat. This, indeed, seems the one weak

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point in the arrangements, the men, it was admitted, sometimes getting exhausted before the 12 o'clock dinner. At 12, however, they have a meal of a pint of soup, a pound of meat, a pound of potatoes, and as much vegetables as they want. At 1 o'clock the men are again at work, and continue till five, when they have again a pint of tea and twelve ounces of bread. For tea, however, they are allowed to warm anything saved from dinner or make stews on the little stoves in each of the huts. They are also allowed an ounce of tobacco a week. Nothing may be given to them, except periodicals and books. The other regulations as to seeing friends, receiving and sending letters, etc., are what is usual in English prisons. But they work, be it noted, nine hours a day in a country where the regulation day is eight hours.

Every Saturday afternoon after dinner they thoroughly clean their rooms (which four prisoners share together), air their bedding, and bathe in the lukewarm stream or one of the natural hot baths in the prison grounds. On Sunday they sometimes go out for walks, with one of the warders.

It will naturally be asked how does the cost of management at Waiotapu compare with that of other New Zealand prisons? The answer is very favorable, and the more so when it is considered that the isolated situation necessarily puts up the cost of everything that cannot be produced locally. Of course the land is rent free. Fuel also can be obtained fairly near. But each of the little box-like huts, built, of course, of wood and roofed with corrugated iron, fitted with four bunks, two on each side, four wooden stools, and two tables that let up and down like those in a railway carriage, costs fully £60 by the time it is brought to Waiotapu, and the nature of the country makes it extremely hard on all clothing, especially boots, which have to be very thick and good, and even then quickly rot away if they come in contact with any of the numerous mineral waters about. Sulphur, of which there is so much, is ruinous to clothes.

The labor of women prisoners in the large towns is utilised in making the men's shirts and stockings. The total cost of keeping the Waiotapu prisoners, including the salaries of warders and everything, for 1902, was £1,249 8s. 1d., or, per

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head, £52 1s. 2d. It must be remembered that this sum includes heavy items for necessary initial expenditure. That for extra huts, for instance, would not be incurred after the first year or two. Allowing for the value of work done for the Forestry Department, which is reckoned at only 2s. 6d. a day, the Department having to pay Maoris about 7s. 6d. a day for similar work, the net cost works out at £13 3s. 5d. per annum per prisoner. The figures for 1902 for the four largest centres may be cited. They clearly show how admirable in every way, both for the prisoners themselves and for the Government, has been the experiment at Waiotapu.

	Gross cost per prisoner per annum.	Net cost per prisoner per annum.
Auckland, ...	£36 14s. 10d.	£9 4s. 1d.
Dunedin, ...	£53 14s. 0d.	£36 8s. 3d.
Lyttleton, ...	£41 6s. 9d.	£18 18s. 1d.
Wellington, ...	£48 6s. 5d.	£24 15s. 2d.

The lowest gross cost is that of Auckland, and the highest that of New Plymouth, which is £82 11s. 9d., while the lowest net cost is again Auckland, £9 4s. 1d., and the highest Wanganui, £72 12s. 8d., and New Plymouth, £68 16s. 3d., while Hokitika comes third with £55 10s. 2d. Auckland, it may be observed, largely utilises prison labor for supplying broken metal.

So successful has been the experiment at Waiotapu, that the Government are proposing to send twenty-five more prisoners to Hanmer, a tiny place on the Canterbury Plains (South Island), where there are some remarkable hot medicinal springs, and to Somes Island in Wellington Harbor. It is hoped only to send first offenders, but should it be impossible to get enough of them, then men will be sent who by their good conduct and industry have shown themselves worthy of some indulgence during their imprisonment; but no men, not even first offenders, convicted of "immoral" crimes. It was hoped to make a start in June last year, the work to be tree-planting, and the trees selected as suitable to the soil are

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English larches, spruce firs, Austrian pines, English oaks, and Oregon pines.

Convict labor, it may be noted, has long been utilised in New Zealand, chiefly for such public works as road-making. All the roads in and around Rotorua, for instance, the chief centre of the tourist traffic in the Hot Springs district, were made by convicts.

In forming prison settlements, however, the Government in no way intends to supersede convict labor, but rather to discriminate between the different classes of prisoners, to humanise, as far as possible, the conditions of life for those who, though convicted of crimes, cannot be classed as criminals in disposition, thus preventing the herding together of hardened criminals and first offenders. Secondly, prison settlements such as those of Waiotapu and Hanmer in no way interfere with free labor, as no Government could afford to carry out such a scheme of clearing waste land and tree-planting except by means of prison labor. With labor costing at least 8s. a day per man (which is low as labor in New Zealand is now paid) it could not be thought of.

Such a prison settlement as Waiotapu is not a depressing sight like, for instance, an English workhouse, pitiful though it be to see some forty fine, strong men in the prime of life, such as the Waiotapu prisoners, when it is remembered how they come to be there. If we must have prisoners always with us, and it seems as if we must, what can be better than that at all events the young and strong among them should lead a healthy, invigorating outdoor life of productive labor?

CONSTANCE A. BARNICOAT.

LONDON.

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THE MORAL TRAINING OF THE YOUNG IN CHINA.*

This paper refers exclusively to the moral training of boys and young men. In another paper I have explained the peculiar instruction given to Chinese girls and young women.

There is no distinction or difference, of any material character, between ancient and modern times in the line of my topic. What was done or neglected in China ten, twenty, or thirty centuries ago, is done or neglected to-day, and what is true to-day was true then.

As a nation the Chinese are peculiarly given to acts of indirection. That is to say, they are fond of accomplishing results which they do not appear to seek, and of guiding and controlling affairs in which neither guidance nor control is manifest. Thus with their educational system, which in its origin runs back to a point which history fails to record and where even tradition fades into myth, the Imperial Government has apparently no concern and ventures upon no interference. There are no laws or ordinances, either national or local, governing the schools. Superintendents, inspectors, and trustees are unknown. There are no legally prescribed courses of study, no required qualifications for teachers, and no school taxes. Any one may teach what, when, and as he pleases, and collect his own compensation therefor. And yet, as will be seen later, by a system of ultimate examinations, not of the schools but of such individual pupils as desire to submit to them, the Government controls every detail of school life and school work far more easily and effectually than it could by the most elaborate and complicated system of laws and regulations. In education, as in many other matters, it insists upon and exacts certain results, leaving each individual free to determine for

*A lecture given in a course on "The Moral Training of the Young in Ancient and Modern Times," under the auspices of the Society for Ethical Culture of Philadelphia.

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himself the ways and means by which they shall be accomplished.

Thus both the moral and intellectual training of the youth of China are controlled by the Imperial authorities. It becomes desirable then to have some understanding of the form and characteristics of the government of this most ancient and populous of all nations. This is the more important since, in so doing, we shall reach the center of our subject by the most direct path, and learn most easily the nature and extent of the moral training given to Chinese youth, and the methods and forces by which it is taught and put into practice.

The definition readiest to hand by which to describe the Chinese political system is to call it an absolute despotism, and such is the course commonly taken in our political geographies. But any careful study and observation of the practical operation of the system will make it plain that such characterization is at once uncharitable and inexact. The most enlightened of the Chinese, including those who have studied other political forms and systems, will admit of no such definition. The idea that there is any feature of despotism in the Imperial rule is absolutely foreign to their conception of it. An Englishman of authority says: "China is, in many senses, one vast republic, in which personal restraints have no existence." Another English writer says: "There is really no country in which the administrative functions are more completely decentralized than is the case in China. The people are accustomed to manage their own affairs, and exercise a measure of local self-government which is unparalleled elsewhere." Dr. G. Wells Williams, an eminent American authority, speaks more cautiously, and perhaps with greater correctness, in saying: "The Chinese may be regarded as the only pagan nation which has maintained democratic habits under a purely despotic theory of government." If by the phrase "democratic habits" this learned writer intended to include the actual methods and exercise of political control, then he has correctly described the Chinese governmental system. It furnishes one of those

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sharp, startling contrasts which are not uncommon, viz., a vigorously democratic and self-governing nation provided with a nominally despotic head.

Like all potentates not chosen by the voice of the people the Emperor claims to rule by the will of heaven. There is no limit to his authority, no appeal from his commands. There is no legislative body. The laws of the Empire are simply the collected and collated expressions of the personal will and judgment of many Emperors. His word is final and unchangeable. He is the owner in fee simple of every foot of land within the limit of the Empire, of all other property of every sort, and of the muscle, brain and lives of every Chinaman. He has but to nod his head, and the head of any of his subjects may fall—no matter how high in rank or authority—unaccused, untried, and, perhaps, innocent of any wrong. This is the theory of Chinese Imperialism.

In point of fact, however, land tenure is substantially as secure there as in the United States. Real estate is bought and sold, held by recorded title deeds, mortgaged to secure loans, and otherwise dealt with in all respects there as here. The law of entail is unknown. There are no "lords of the soil" holding vast estates and grinding the faces of the tenant poor. The land is divided up into holdings probably smaller than are found in any other country in the world. A land tax, small and graded carefuly in each locality according to the fertility of the soil and ease of cultivation, is levied by the government, and, this being paid, the Emperor concerns himself in no way with the ownership of the soil.

There is neither form nor trace of feudalism within the Empire. And there is no titled class or rank of nobility in which the accident of birth affords the right of domination or control over the masses of the people. The few existing titles are purely empty honors carrying with them no authority and no power. They do not entitle a person to hold office. Sons and relatives of the Emperor are not permitted to hold civil or territorial office outside of Peking, the capital; nor, with the exception of the Family Council of State, are they

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frequently found in any of the various departments of the Imperial Government. Like the law of entail, the law of primogeniture finds no recognition in China. With one exception, which is a burden rather than an advantage, the eldest son stands upon the same plain of equality with his brothers. This rule applies to the sons of the Emperor and peasant alike.

There is no large standing army, bound by fear or favor to a ruthless enforcement of the Imperial will. Nor is there any great hierarchy, or body of ecclesiastics, to coerce and frighten the populace, by threats of real or imaginary pains or terrors, into subservience to despotic authority. Chinese priests cut no figure in governmental affairs, and possess but a meager influence in matters of religion. There exists, then, no intermediary coercive force between the Emperor and his subjects. His only agents for the enforcement of the Imperial Decrees, the preservation of loyalty and order throughout the Empire, and the general administration of the affairs of State, are the people themselves. From those early days of which myth and tradition form the only source of information, down to the present moment, the successive Emperors of China have always depended directly upon the entire body of their subjects for the practical conduct of government. And this dependence has proved itself to be safe and wise. Since the earliest dawn of time no rebellion against the established order of government has been heard of in China. To-day it is the pride and boast of the entire nation, and no respectable following could be secured for any proposition looking to even a moderate change. In the long centuries of her history there have been a number of uprisings against maladministration of public affairs, and many bloody struggles between rivals for the throne, but not one against the system of control. To the Chinese it represents the perfect governmental type.

The high authority and sacred character of the head of the State comes not from his title of Emperor, but from another—the Son of Heaven. As Heaven is the source of all things, he, as its son, is the father of the nation. He is

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not a despot but a parent. And as he is vested with the ancient type of parental authority, so he is responsible to Heaven for the wise control and the health, prosperity, and order of all his theoretical children. This idea of Paternal or Family Government runs like a thread through and fully explains the entire Chinese system. As the Emperor is the father of the nation, Viceroys or Governors, appointed by him, are the fathers of the provinces, over which they are delegated to have authority. The same holds true regarding the heads of smaller political subdivisions until finally the village and the family are reached.

The family, and not the individual, is the unit and model of government in China. The head of each is vested, both by custom and the laws of the Empire, with the same almost unlimited authority which the Emperor is supposed to have received from Heaven. He is vice-regent of his own household, and is held in turn strictly accountable for the peace, order, good conduct and moral instruction of all members of it. Innumerable instances might be cited in which parents and grandparents have been subjected to punishment, and even to the penalty of death, for the crimes of their descendants. The entire Chinese theory of government is based upon the divine right and duty of a father to control and instruct his children, and his responsibility to the nation for them.

Next to the family comes the village community. And here is seen the living center of the Chinese political system. Here is the democratic, self-governing body, over which the Emperor is the nominal head. Each has what may be termed an unofficial board of control composed of the old men, who choose a leader or "headman" from their number. All municipal affairs are controlled by them. They are expected to provide a public school, suitable police, good roads and bridges, and any needed public buildings. They are responsible to the authorities for the payment of the taxes due by members of the community, and for the maintenance of order and good government. They settle disputes among the villager, act as mediators or arbitrators in many private

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quarrels, and see to it that the young people of both sexes are properly behaved and disciplined. What funds they may need for public use are raised by voluntary subscription. They are permitted to inflict penalties for petty offences, and are held accountable and punished for turbulence or other misconduct of members of their community. So long as taxes are paid and a reasonable degree of order maintained they are never interfered with by the Imperial authorities.

In these tiny communes or municipalities, existing everywhere through the Empire, rest the actual authority and control of the nation. Local self-government is the keynote of Chinese administration. In a thousand and one ways by which the peoples of America and Europe are hedged in, protected, limited, restrained, regulated, directed, and ruled by the State, the people of China are untrammeled and free, at least so far as the law, authority, or interference of the Emperor or his deputies are concerned. At the same time the administration of government over such an enormous population requires a very large number of officials. How, and upon what basis of fitness and proficiency, are these deputy fathers of the people, in all the varying grades from a petty magistrate to a Prime Minister of State, chosen? The answer is easy. Education among the Chinese forms the essential and only condition to official life and honor. The public school has, for an unrecorded number of centuries, been the sole gateway to public office. It may not be said to have been established for that exclusive purpose, but it has been shaped mainly to that end. In the minds of the people, its chief object from the beginning has been to provide suitable candidates for the public service. And, with their fondness for terse sayings, the Chinese have condensed this governmental practice, and the national motive and object of study, into four words, *Nien shu, tso Kuan*, "Acquire an education, and thus become a ruler of the people."

The Government has done much to foster and encourage this ambition. While it has nothing to do with the school system, it exercises most rigid control of the literary exam-

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inations, both regarding the subjects upon which students are tested, and the methods under which they are conducted. The schools are absolutely free, but the examinations are under the closest Governmental supervision. They are conducted with great pomp and display. Officials of high rank and distinguished scholarship are appointed by the Emperor to preside over them. Special honors, and assurance of rapid promotion in the public service, await those who pass with distinction. Financial assistance is given to poor students to enable them to attend the examinations; those who fail once, or even many times, are at liberty and are urged to continue their studies and efforts to pass; and all who succeed are granted certain privileges and exemptions which place them in a distinguished and honored class, separate from and above the common people.

With ignorance as the only bar to admission to and preferment in the Governmental service; with this one path—through the village school-house—open and unobstructed to poor and rich alike, and leading to the highest honors in the gift of the throne, is it any wonder that the people are satisfied with their Government; that they seek not to destroy but to enter it, and that the chief ambition of every Chinese boy, no matter how poor, ragged, and beggarly his condition may be, is to go to school? Is it any wonder that the phrase just mentioned—*Nien shu tso Kuan*—is in the mouths of all parents as an incentive to their children, and that they strive and, if need be, starve, quite like many American parents, to give their sons an education? Is it any wonder that the youngster who has gained his first degree at the Government examinations is the pride and admiration of his family and the envy of his village, and that others who have tried and failed are cheered and encouraged to make further efforts? And is it any wonder that—as in America so in China—the great men of the nation, the actual rulers of the Empire, have with few exceptions come from among the very poor—have been those whose brains and bodies alike were exercised, stiffened, and developed by hardship and compulsory effort when young?

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It is impossible to determine with accuracy the time when these official examinations were established. It is known that they were in force about 200 A. D., and that they were revised and shaped into their present form by the celebrated Emperor Tai Tsung about 600 A. D. They have therefore been conducted along present lines for some thirteen centuries. It is equally impossible to discover the date in the remote past when an educational system was founded. The *Li Chi*, or "Book of Rites," which dates back, as is well known, to 1200 B. C., declares that, "For the purpose of education among the ancients, villages had their schools, districts their academies, departments their colleges, and provinces their universities." If a record, written thirty-one centuries ago, speaks of such institutions as having existed in times even then ancient, the attention of the Chinese must have been turned toward learning at a very early period indeed. And the character of the learning acquired in the very dawn of time may be inferred from an extract translated from the *Shu Ching*, or "Book of History," which antedated the "Book of Rites" by a number of centuries. Only some eleven chapters of this most ancient work are now known, and they are entirely occupied with the relative duties of Prince and people, pointing out that the welfare of all is dependent upon mutual faithfulness. One passage reads as follows:

"Order your affairs by righteousness, order your heart by propriety, so shall you transmit a great example to posterity. I have heard the saying, He who finds instructors for himself comes to the supreme dominion; he who says that others are not equal to himself comes to ruin. He who likes to ask becomes enlarged; he who uses only himself becomes small. He who would take care for his end, must be attentive to his beginning. There is establishment for those who observe propriety, and overthrow for the blinded and wantonly indifferent. To revere and honor the way of Heaven is the way ever to preserve the favoring regard of Heaven."

If more is needed to demonstrate the fact that China had a system of education and a literature of high quality in the very beginning of history, it is only necessary to refer to the fact that there was an immense mass of ancient literature in the time of Confucius, and that this profound thinker and

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insatiable student confessedly drew all of his inspiration and knowledge from ancient books and writings. Of the entire list of text-books with which the Chinese student is required to make himself familiar, not one was written less than seven hundred years ago, while those which are regarded as of highest importance were prepared long before the birth of Christ.

Coming now to an examination of the text-books invariably and universally used in Chinese schools, the first, or primer of the list, is known as the *San Tz Ching*, or "Trimetrical Classic." It was prepared by a teacher for use in his private school, in A. D. 1050, and may be bought in any village in the Empire for about two cents. It is in poetry, or doggerel, as the name implies, and contains 1,068 words. It has been translated into Latin, French, German, Russian, and Portuguese, and a paraphrase of it is used by the Protestant, Roman, and Greek Catholic missionaries in their schools in China. It has been much commended by distinguished native writers, one of whom calls it "a ford which the youthful enquirer may readily pass, and thereby reach the fountain head—the higher courses of learning." It opens with a widely disputed assertion of the nature of man, and the importance and value of education. Carefully translated quotations will best show the character of the little book. The first twelve lines run as follows:

"Men at their birth are by nature radically good;
Though alike in this, in practice they widely diverge.
If not educated, the natural character grows worse;
A course of education is made valuable by close attention.
Of old, Mencius' mother selected a residence,
And when her son did not learn, cut the half-woven web.
To nurture and not educate is a father's error;
To educate without rigor shows a teacher's indolence.
That boys should not learn is an unjust thing;
For if they do not learn in youth, what will they do when old?
As gems unwrought serve no useful end,
So men untaught will never know what right conduct is."

Following this introduction, filial and fraternal duties are taught by precept and example. Then succeeds an arrangement, of which the Chinese are very fond, of the various

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branches of learning in an ascending numerical scale; the three great powers; four seasons and four cardinal points; five elements and five constant virtues—humanity, justice, propriety, wisdom, and truth; then the six kinds of grain and six domestic animals; the seven passions; eight materials for music; nine grades of kindred, and ten social duties. The verse which recites the last may well be given as an example of the whole:

"Mutual affection of father and son, concord of man and wife;
The elder brothers—kindness, the younger ones—respect;
Order between seniors and juniors, friendship among associates;
On the Prince's part regard, on the Minister's true loyalty;
These ten moral duties are ever binding among men."

The volume concludes with incentives to study, drawn from the conduct and lives of ancient sages and statesmen and from motives of interest and ambition. The name of the author of this ancient text-book—which has been studied by hundreds of millions of children—has been, solely on account of it, a household word for many centuries. The last four lines of his book are as follows:

"Some for their offspring, leave coffers filled with gold,
While I, to teach children, leave this one little book.
Diligence has merit! Play yields no profit.
Be ever on your guard! Rouse all your energies!"

While there are manifest imperfections in this primary volume of instruction, it is pure and elevated in morals, and the counsel which it gives is sound and good. It has exerted an immense influence upon the Chinese nation.

When the school boy has committed the contents of this primer to memory and learned to read and write each character, or word, in it, the *Po Chia Hsing*, or "Book of One Hundred Family Names," is placed in his hands. It is written in verse, and, as the name implies, contains nothing more than a list of the one hundred surnames recognized in the Empire, with four hundred and fifty additional characters which may also be employed as names. It conveys neither moral instruction nor connected sense, yet must be thor-

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oughly memorized, and each word in it must be studied until it can be correctly pronounced and written.

Following this comes the *Chien Tz Wen*, or "Book of a Thousand Words." It is a most remarkable volume and could be produced in no other language than the Chinese since it contains exactly one thousand characters, none being repeated, no two being alike in meaning, yet the whole forming connected sentences and embodying sound instruction. The history of this book is interesting. It was written about A. D. 550, by a Minister of State who had been requested by the Emperor to select this number of characters which he, the Emperor, would form into a poem. The thousand characters were accordingly furnished in the shape in which they appear in this little volume. The delighted monarch did not undertake to construct his poem and rewarded the Minister with many valuable presents. And business men in China, always practical, make use of the characters contained in the book to list and identify boxes and parcels, instead of using numerals, which would require more room. Those who may have puzzled over the hieroglyphics found upon a Chinese laundry ticket will find the duplicate of it in this "Book of a Thousand Words." Since no character occurs twice, there is no possibility of confusion.

The contents of this volume resemble closely the text-book first studied, though having a wider range. The productions of nature, virtues of the early monarchs, the power and capacities of man, his social duties and mode of conduct, with many instructions as to the proper manner of life, all these are concisely dealt with. A short extract will give a fair idea of the whole.

"Now this our human body is endowed with four great powers and five cardinal virtues. Preserve with reverence what your parents nourished. How dare you destroy or injure it!

"Observe and imitate the conduct of the virtuous, and command your thoughts that you may be wise. Your virtue once fixed, your reputation will be established; your habits once rectified, your example will be correct. Sounds are reverberated in the deep valleys, and the empty hall re-echoes all it hears. So misery is the penalty of accumulated vice, and happiness the reward of illustrious virtue.

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'A cubit of jade stone is not to be valued, but an inch of time you should contend for."

Next comes "Odes to Children," a poetical work of thirty-four verses, containing four lines each. It is a description and praise of a literary life, alluding incidentally to the beauties of nature and changes of the seasons. Here is a translation of two verses:

"It is of the utmost importance to educate children; do not say that your families are poor, for those who can handle well the pencil (or pen), go where they will, need never ask for favors."

"A passage for the sea has been cut through mountains, and stones have been melted to repair the heavens. In all the world there is nothing impossible. It is the heart of man alone that lacks resolution."

When the short task furnished by this little volume is accomplished, the student takes up the *Hsaio Ching*, or "Classic of Filial Piety." This is accounted to be the root of all virtues among the Chinese. The book purports to be a record of conversations between Confucius and one of his followers. Many commentaries upon it have been written, one notably by the Emperor Yuan Tsung in A. D. 733, containing one hundred chapters, and another written some two and a half centuries ago which filled no less than thirty-two volumes. The work, containing less than 2,000 words, has had a great and lasting influence upon the Chinese people. It is divided into sections, and a sentence or two from the first and fifth sections will serve as fair specimens of the work:

"*On the Origin and Nature of Filial Duty:* Filial duty is the root of virtue, and the stem from which instruction in the moral principle springs. Sit down and I will explain this to you. The first thing which filial duty requires of us is, that we should carefully preserve from all injury and in a perfect state, the bodies which we have received from our parents.

"*On the Attention of Scholars to Filial Duty:* With the same love that they serve their fathers, they should serve their mothers; and with the same respect that they serve their fathers, they should serve their Prince. Unmixed love, then, will be the offering that they make to their mothers; unfeigned respect, the tribute they bring to their Prince; while toward their fathers both these will be combined."

The last volume to be mastered by the Chinese pupil in what may be termed primary instruction, that is, before

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entering upon the study of the Confucian Classics, is called the "Juvenile Instructor," and was prepared by one of the most distinguished authors of any age or time within the Empire. There have been more than fifty commentaries written upon it, each, if possible, being more eulogistic than the other. One writer says, "We confide in the 'Juvenile Instructor' as we do in the gods, and revere it as we do our parents." It is divided into two books, the first being called "The Fountain of Learning" and the second "The Stream Flowing from It." The first treats of the principles of education; of the duties we owe our ruler, kindred, and fellowmen; of those which we owe to ourselves in regard to study, demeanor, food, and dress; and gives many examples, from early times down to two and a half centuries before Christ, of the observance of the lessons taught in the book, and the good effects which have resulted therefrom. The second book contains a collection of the wise sayings of eminent men who lived subsequent to 200 B. C., and a series of examples of distinguished persons which are intended to show the effects of sound principles.

Such is the matter and course of primary instruction in Chinese schools. Aside from the purely mechanical drill of the memory, and learning to read and write, it contains little which is found in western systems of education. No mathematics and no science, however rudimentary, are taught, no language aside from the native tongue. Such stray bits of history and geography as are found in the various textbooks examined are there quite incidentally, and only because they serve to illustrate or enforce some point of far higher importance to the student. This preliminary system of education is wholly ethical—is intended to be and is moral in its entire scope and application to the young. Not to communicate knowledge or learning, but to mold character, to instil right principles of action and conduct, is evidently the object of the Chinese common school. The boy who has completed the course taught there will, of necessity, be possessed of far less general information than the pupils in any similar western institution, but he is likely to know better

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how to behave and carry himself. The ethical training given is sound, pure, and good.

Our path has now brought us to the goal of all paths in China, no matter what the line or object of their course, to the most conspicuous figure in the history and affairs of that Empire, to the sage and statesman, Confucius. He was the embodiment of a force which more than any other, perhaps more than all others combined, has shaped the institutions of China, controlled the policy of the Government, and determined the character and destiny of the people. It is a fact beyond dispute that the Chinese sage has influenced the conduct and guided the lives of a larger number of human beings than any other man known in the world's history. For more than two thousand years he has been final authority in all matters, public and private, to a race which to-day numbers more than four hundred millions. Let any one interested in the problem determine the aggregate population of China in that long stretch of time, and he will realize to what an enormous mass of humanity Confucius has been leader, guide, and master.

Nor is there any sufficient indication of the decadence of his authority. He is still the moving and steadying spirit which dominates the Chinese nation. It is idle to ignore this fact, and extremely indiscreet on the part of any person who seeks to know the Chinese in order to influence them for their good. To understand the framework and system of government or the social organization and moral character of the nation, it is necessary to study Confucius. To come into touch with the mental attitude and modes of thought of the ignorant and the scholarly alike, to discover the secret of the power of the leaders, and the confirmed, not to say obstinate, conservatism of those who follow, one must study Confucius. For an explanation of the fact that the average Chinaman looks backward instead of forward, and finds his golden ideals in the dead past rather than in a future glowing with life, study Confucius. To gain the secret of the quietness and patience of the nation under vicious rule, examine the teachings of Confucius. To quiet a mob or gain a Chi-

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nese friend quote the ancient sage, and assume familiarity with his teachings. In short, Confucius and his instructions form what may be termed a "universal solvent" of all Chinese mysteries; a pass-key to every hidden nook and secret closet in the mind and life of the nation which recognizes him as lord and paramount leader.

Confucius was a poor boy of obscure parentage—born 550 B. C. His father died when he was three years old, and he was brought up by his mother. In his youth he did what all poor boys in any land may do, sought any work, however menial, by which he might aid his mother, and secure an education. As a student the subjects which interested him most appear to have been music, poetry, and the history, rites, and rules of government in ancient times. Throughout his life he strongly repudiated the idea that he sought to inaugurate any new theory or system, and to quote his own words, persistently declared himself to be "a transmitter and not a maker."

When twenty-two years of age Confucius opened a school, not of boys, but of men, young like himself, who wished to be taught the principles of right conduct and government. It was, in fact, an institution for the study of social and political ethics. And this was maintained, with varying fortunes, throughout his life. It was not always held in the city of his birth, for Confucius spent many weary years wandering from one capital to another, accompanied by his disciples. The feudal system, suppressed about 220 B. C. by the famous Emperor under whose orders the great wall was built, was at its height in the time of Confucius. Princes ruled different sections of the Empire, and the authority of the Emperor was only nominal. It was the ambition of the sage that some one of these feudal chiefs should accept him as master, or teacher, for a term of years, and follow his instructions in the management of public affairs. Once he said: "If any ruler would submit to me as his director for twelve months, I should accomplish much. In three years I should attain the realization of my hopes." But rulers were no readier then to submit to be controlled by wise men than their suc-

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cessors are to-day. No one made use of his services. He was discredited, treated with contempt and persecuted, and more than once his life was in danger.

As a teacher Confucius can hardly be described as either patient or helpful. While he rejected no student who could pay even the smallest fee, he retained none who were stupid or slow. He said once: "When I have presented one corner of a subject, and the pupil, of himself, cannot make out the other three, I do not repeat my lesson." He was fond of speaking in enigmas or riddles, and appears often to have furnished his disciples with far less than "one corner of the subject." Some of his dark sayings have remained without interpretation into intelligible language down to the present day. His method of instruction appears to have been entirely conversational. And while he constantly appealed to and quoted ancient authorities, any occurrence, no matter how trivial, might form the subject of a lesson. Once he said: "I never meet two men upon the highway but I find one teacher." From a remark made by a woman weeping by the roadside he taught the dangers to be feared from a violent and oppressive government. From the churlish answer of a recluse, Confucius taught the absurdity of withdrawal from the world because of the evils found therein. "With whom shall I associate," said he, "but with suffering men. The disorder that prevails is what requires my efforts." An example of the peculiarly terse and sententious methods of his instruction may be given. Upon one occasion, being asked what he would consider the first thing to be done if entrusted with the government of a state, he replied: "The rectification of names." Being told that such an answer was wide of the mark, he insisted upon it, but made no explanation. However, upon another occasion, he told a feudal prince that good government obtained when the ruler was ruler, and the minister was minister; when the father was father, and the son was son. Society, he explained, was made of five relationships: ruler and subject, husband and wife, father and son, elder brother and younger, and friends. Hence when each person in all his conduct was true to his

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place in each of these relationships, then good government obtained, and "the rectification of names" was complete. The entire political and social system of Confucius was wrapped up in that phrase.

It is necessary to call attention to, and to emphasize, the fact that the theories and teachings of the great Chinese sage were entirely secular. They deal exclusively with the relations and duties of man to man in this life, and neither bore reference to or made account of a higher Being, or Beings, or a future state of existence. Yet the idea has spread widely that he sought to establish a cult or religious system, which is far from the fact, and "three great Chinese religions" are spoken of, namely, Buddhism, Taoism, and Confucianism. Buddhism and Taoism are exotic forms of belief, neither being indigenous to the Empire, and there is no such thing as a Confucian faith, or system of religious belief. Confucius himself could not be called a religious man; he was a moralist. His disciples have left upon record four subjects upon which he seldom spoke. One of these was spiritual beings and a future state. In answer to a question from a Minister of State as to what constituted wisdom, the sage replied: "To give oneself earnestly to the duties due to men, and while respecting spiritual beings, if there are such, to keep aloof from them—this may be called wisdom." Being asked by a disciple concerning ancestral worship which then, as now, was universal in China, he answered: "While you cannot serve men, how can you serve spirits?" Asked by the same disciple concerning a future state, he replied with the counter question: "While you do not know life, what can you know about death?" In order then to gain any just conception of the Confucian system as a whole, and to determine the position to which the founder of it is entitled in the list of the world's great leaders, it is essential to eliminate the idea that it was, in any sense of the phrase, a cult, superstition, or form of religious, or idolatrous, worship. It was no nearer akin to these than are the theories of John Stuart Mill or Herbert Spencer.

The "Confucian Classics," as they are called, are composed

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of nine books, divided by the Chinese themselves by a familiar name, into "Five Classics and Four Books." Confucius himself wrote but very little. Aside from the classic called the "Annals of Spring and Autumn," he is not certainly known to have written anything. He left no detailed statement of the principles upon which his moral and social system is based. He did not claim any divine revelation which should be placed upon record as a guide to future ages of men. He declared that he was not born with knowledge, but was fond of antiquity and earnest in seeking knowledge there. He insisted that the rule of life for men, in all their relations, existed within themselves, but the right development of it was to be found in the teachings and institutions of the ancient sages. Hence, rather than elaborate theories of his own, he rescued from oblivion and arranged the earlier records.

Of the Five Classics already mentioned, the first in the order of antiquity is the "Classic of History." It covers the history of China from the twenty-fourth to the eighth century before Christ, and was collated by Confucius from more than one hundred different records. It is not history in our meaning of the word. The second is the "Classic of Poetry." It contains three hundred and five Chinese poems, selected by the sage from some three thousand then in existence, and which had been written between the twenty-fourth and sixth centuries B. C. The third in order is the "Classic of Changes." It was prepared in 1185 B. C. by a feudal prince while in prison, and Confucius had no part in the preservation of it. It is geomantic in character and utterly unintelligible to native and foreign scholars alike. The fourth is the "Book of Rites," collated more than a century after the death of the sage, from materials prepared by him and his immediate disciples. The fifth, and last, the "Annals of Spring and Autumn," was prepared by Confucius, as has been said, and is a continuation of the "Classic of History."

The "Four Books," included in the Confucian Classics, which have played a most important part in forming the Chinese mind and character, and in extending the influence

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of the sage, were none of them prepared by him or during his lifetime. They are, to speak concisely, interpretations of the master, prepared by his disciples. The first is called "The Great Learning," and is divided under four heads, which treat, respectively, of "the improvement of one's self, the regulation of a family, the government of a State, and the rule of an Empire." The title of the second is almost or quite untranslatable into English. It has been variously called "The Invariable Mean," "The Doctrine of the Mean," and "The Just Medium." Literally rendered the title reads "The Middle Course or Way," and this, perhaps, is as satisfactory a translation as any. The virtue which is especially illustrated and enforced in the volume is that of "unswerving moderation." It was written by a grandson of Confucius, about ninety years after the death of the latter. The third of the Four Books, and by far the most important in the information which it gives of the life and teachings of the master, is entitled the "Analects of Confucius." It was prepared by his disciples shortly after his death. The fourth, last, and largest, is composed entirely of the teachings of Mencius, the great interpreter and apostle of his greater master.

These nine works constitute what may be termed the academic or advanced course in the Chinese educational scheme. The system of instruction followed with them is identical with that pursued during the primary course. Each character, or word, must be thoroughly memorized—there are at least half a million of them—and each student must learn to read and write them, and to expound their meaning. This work completed, his student days are finished. He is the polished and educated gentleman, ready for the Governmental examinations, and the highest service and honor within the gift of the Emperor. Such, for many centuries, has been the scholastic itinerary of the Chinese youth, and they have labored through its clouds, and fogs, and mazes, up to the glittering stars which have crowned their ambition.

The object and scope of the training given during this advanced portion of the educational course, differ in no important measure from that of the primary school. The

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most careful instruction is given in composition and probably the most finished masters of style to be found anywhere in the world must be looked for among the Chinese. Much attention is also given to versification. China is emphatically the land of hand labor, and the only machine-made product found there is poetry. Still the empire possesses a very considerable list of genuine poets whose work would be an honor to any language or nation. With these additions, the methods and purpose of study remain the same in the academic as in the primary department.

The difficulties attendant upon the transference of ideas of one race, time, and language to another, extend far beyond the mere question of exact verbal equivalents, though even these are frequently not to be found. Much misconception and unjust criticism of what Confucius intended to teach, much narrowing and distortion of his ethical system, have resulted from these difficulties. As has been said, the sage was sententious, terse, and often enigmatic in his instructions. He was fond of packing an entire department of moral philosophy into a single word or phrase, which was not infrequently left unexplained. As was the case with another and greater teacher, his disciples seldom understood him. There are three characters, or words, which occur so frequently in the ethical system of this great master, and upon which he laid so much stress and significance, that, together they may be safely be said to furnish the foundation and framework of the entire fabric. Understand them as he understood them, and you know Confucianism as the master knew it.

The first and most important of these words is "*li*." It may be termed the bed-rock upon which rests the entire system of social and political ethics, as taught by the Chinese sage. It is constantly in the mouth of every Chinaman today, as it has been for many centuries, as the final criterion and authority discriminating between right and wrong. It furnishes the distinctive title of one of the Confucian Classics already mentioned. There is no single word or sentence in our tongue competent to fully embody the meaning of it.

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It is generally translated as "ceremony" or "rites"; and out of this mistranslation has grown a sweeping condemnation of the entire teachings of the sage. It has been inferred that, with him, everything depended upon form, that if the external appearance and conduct were decorous and correct, it mattered not what the internal conditions might be. Nothing could be further from the fact. This Chinese character, thus belittled and robbed of all but form in the process of transference into English, means far more than ceremony or ritual, more than the appearance of courtesy, good breeding, and correct deportment. Probably the nearest equivalent phrase in our language is "the principles of correct living." *Li* means the primary and the ultimate law of right action, and implies doing the right thing at the right time, in the right way, and from the right motive. No moral training based upon this word, and enforcing the constant practice of it, can be far wrong.

The second word was given by the master in conversation. He was asked if there was any one word which would serve as a rule of practice in all the relations of life. To which he replied: "Is not "*shu*" such a word? Then, fortunately, he explained his meaning by giving that famous Golden Rule: "What you do not wish that others should do unto you, do not unto them." The word "*shu*" is translated by the English word "reciprocity"; it needs no argument to show that "reciprocity," as commonly understood, is not equivalent to the Golden Rule of either Christ or Confucius. The Chinese character, "*shu*," includes consideration, charity, forbearance, thoughtfulness for others, mutuality of rights and interests. It covers the entire principles of the brotherhood of man put into practice. The English equivalent, as used among us, involves only the commercial idea of "give and take."

The third word which played a most prominent part in the conversations between Confucius and his disciples, and which, correctly interpreted and understood, will furnish the key to much of his teaching, is "*Chün tz.*" There is a wide divergence among sinologues as to a suitable translation.

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It has been interpreted as "the princely man," "the superior man," "the mean or moderate man," and by a variety of other phrases. It is quite evident from his many descriptive remarks concerning the "*Chün tz*," that by this expression Confucius meant the ideal man, the perfected type of manhood. While hunting far afield, and finding only a misfit phrase, these translators have overlooked one close at home which does fully embody and convey the idea of the sage. "The gentleman," in the highest, truest, broadest meaning of the word, is the modern type of the Confucian *Chün tz*. A short quotation from the description of such a person, given by Confucius himself, will make this plain:

"The gentleman, in dealing with others, does not descend to anything low or improper. The gentleman enters into no situation where he is not himself. If he holds a high station, he does not treat with contempt those below him; if he occupies an inferior position, he uses no mean arts to gain the favor of his superiors. He corrects himself and blames not others; he feels no dissatisfaction. On the one hand, he murmurs not at Heaven; nor on the other, does he harbor resentment towards man. Hence the gentleman dwells at ease, entirely waiting the Heavenly will."

Thus far the course of moral training as given in Chinese schools to the practical exclusion of all other education, has been followed and explained. Before summing up and concluding this paper, a brief reference must be made to another effort, only less influential than the ethics of Confucius, in shaping and controlling the lives of the young. The Emperor Kang Hsi, who ruled China for some sixty years, than whom no wiser, more faithful, and patriotic monarch has occupied any throne in either ancient or modern times, prepared during his reign a series of sixteen essays of a politico-moral character for the guidance of his subjects. They were called "The Sacred Edicts." They were not to be used as text-books in schools, but, upon the first and fifteenth of each month, the old men of each hamlet, village, and ward or other division of cities throughout the Empire, were commanded to summon all the young men within their jurisdiction, and to read and expound portions of these essays in course. This has been done for more than two hundred years to the great advantage of the people and the quiet and order of the

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nation. The topics treated are placed at the head of the essays and the list runs as follows:

1. Pay just regard to filial and fraternal duties, in order to give due importance to the relations of life.
2. Respect kindred, in order to display the excellence of harmony.
3. Let concord abound among those dwelling in the same neighborhood, thereby preventing litigation.
4. Give the chief place to husbandry and culture of the mulberry, that adequate supplies of food and raiment be secured.
5. Esteem economy, that money be not lavishly wasted.
6. Magnify academic learning, in order to direct the scholar's progress.
7. Degrade strange religions, in order to exalt orthodox doctrines.
8. Explain the laws, in order to warn the ignorant and obtuse.
9. Illustrate the principles of a polite and conciliatory bearing, in order to improve manners.
10. Attend to necessary duties, in order to give determination to the will of the people.
11. Instruct the youth, in order to restrain them from evil.
12. Suppress false accusations, in order to protect the innocent.
13. Warn those who hide deserters from the army, that they may not be involved in punishment.
14. Make full payment of taxes, in order to avoid frequent urging.
15. Let constabulary and people unite to extirpate robbery and theft.
16. Settle all quarrels, that lives may be properly valued.

After all that has been said, there is neither time nor occasion to add much regarding the details or quality of the moral training of the Chinese youth. It is, in form and substance, the Confucian system of ethics taught to the exclusion of all other education. It is based upon the five relationships already named. The Chinese sage had found in the ancient records the following declaration made by a king and hero twelve hundred years before he was born: "The great God has confered upon the people a moral sense, compliance with which would show their nature to be invariably right. To give them tranquillity in which to pursue the course indicated by it, is the task of the Sovereign." Confucius accepted this statement as entirely correct and upon it, as a corner-stone, erected his system. His teachings were elevated and pure, free from word or idea which might possibly corrupt the thoughts of men. He claimed that uprightness and harmony were the basis of all things good, and that, when they were everywhere operative, mankind

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would reach perfection. He was strongly opposed to war and to standing armies, and taught the rulers of China to conquer their enemies by showing the excellence of good government. And the Chinese to-day, whether taken *en masse* or as individuals, are the most peace-loving race in the world. Nowhere is that beatitude, "Blessed are the peacemakers," held so highly in honor and obedience.

In the elaboration of his theories, he took the family as the unit of humanity, and regarded all men as grouped into one vast household. He gave the most minute and varied instructions for the nurture and education of children, laid great stress upon filial duty, and prescribed detailed rules of courtesy and conduct for the government of all ranks and classes. The principal figure in all of his instructions was the "*Chün tz*," or gentleman, and no higher type may be produced by any code or system of ethical training. Dignity, moderation, self-restraint, fortitude, and sincerity were to be his characteristics, and the *golden rule* the law of his intercourse with his fellows.

With few exceptions, every peculiarity and every virtue in the social or political forms, customs, and usages of the Chinese, may be traced back to Confucius, their hero, master, and sage. It is a wonderful and pathetic sight, this vision of a vast empire, the oldest and by far the largest in the world, with one impulse modeling itself, generation after generation, and century upon century, upon the pattern framed by one man, dead so long ago. Claiming to be only a man, ranked by his followers as only the wisest of men, Confucius has held the obedience and loving devotion of his entire race for more than twenty centuries. The counterpart to it has not been, and is not, seen elsewhere upon earth.

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THE PRACTICAL REASON IN ARISTOTLE.

"In Auslegen seyd frisch und munter;
Legt ihr nicht aus, so legt was unter!"
—Goethe. "Zahme Xenien."

"Arisotle's quarrel was not merely with the ideal theory of Plato but with his whole attempt to connect ethics with metaphysics and to base the regulation of conduct upon the conception of the Absolute Good." (Caird, "Gifford Lectures." Vol. I, p. 300.)

"Aristotle with his *ὁ τὸν σκοπὸν ἔχων ὀρθόν* ('the man whose aim is right'), and Plato with his *ὁ τὴν ἰδέαν ἀυτην τεθεαμένος* ('the man who has looked upon the Absolute Idea') are at one in making *amor intellectualis Dei,* the ultimate spring and co-ordinating principle of all man's varied activities, scientific, moral, and artistic." [1] (Stewart, "Notes on the Nicomachean Ethics," Vol. I, p. 89.)

Such disagreement between such interpreters gives reason, perhaps, for attempting once more to set out in detail the relation Aristotle conceived to maintain between the Theoretic and the Practical Reason.

Now if Stewart's interpretation is right—as I believe it is—and if Aristotle is not confused—and I believe he is not—this relation ought to form the centre and the never-forgotten centre of his entire ethical system.

But is Aristotle confused? This is held by many who would otherwise agree. And there is much cause for the opinion. The Nicomachean Ethics, as we have it, is obviously a rough draft, disfigured by repetitions and omissions, alternately prolix and brief to obscurity. But further, the very plan of the great building is not easy to grasp. Statement after statement, each inadequate and insufficient, though each less so than the last, is presented for our consideration and only at the end does the full view emerge to justify and explain the whole. But this method, this passing from what is true but indefinite to what is both definite and true, from what is "better known to us" to "what is better known in itself" is not only Aristotelian, it is Platonic, even Socratic, and it ought not to surprise us. For half the book Aristotle gives us only a provisional definition of

[1] I have ventured to insert in brackets translations from the Greek.

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the end of action, viz., "The mean between two vices." How is that "mean" to be fixed? By the prudent man. But who is the prudent man? We are never told, scarcely a hint is given even of the difficulty until the opening of the Sixth Book, but then we have pregnant matter. Then it appears that there is a faculty in man, Reason, (νοῦς), which can see the ultimate principles (the ἀρχάι), the Absolutely Real, and the Absolutely Good. And finally at the very close we are told what that Absolute is. But just so in Plato's great work, successive definitions of Justice are given, advancing from trivial to profound. And just so it is not until we reach the very centre of the Republic that we realise that it is not enough to say Justice is a harmony of the soul where each part performs its *proper* work. We must know what the proper work is, and for this we need a standard, and no standard can finally be satisfactory but that of the Absolutely Real and the Absolutely Good. It is for this reason that the philosophers who rule the state must look at the sun in his glory.

Why, then, does Aristotle in the very forefront of his work ("Ethica Nicomachæa," Bk. I, c. 6)[2] gird at Plato for his search after the Absolute Good? We answer that it is not the "search after" a standard to which Aristotle objects but the nature of the standard offered. Aristotle indeed takes pains to make this clear. Apart from the logical puzzles involved in that peculiar conception of the Absolute Good (as a "goodness" existing apart from all good things), he shows that it remains in Plato's hands a blank formula unconnected with all we want to do. That this is Aristotle's "ostensible" reason for rejecting it is, indeed, admitted by Dr. Caird himself (p. 300 op. cit.), and surely we have a right to take Aristotle at his word. No doubt he has been led to disguise his fundamental sympathy with Plato's search by his passion for the delightful game of nailing a fallacy to the page, but Plato's failure he did well to recognise. All eager readers of the Republic must have felt the same sense of the ladder they trusted to turning to cobwebs in their hands. If we could reach the Ideal Good, if we could

[2] The references throughout are to the chapters as in Peters' translation and the pages of Bakker.

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even see it, all would be well with us, we feel, but we are left with hardly a dream of what it is.

That Aristotle means to climb to an ultimate principle of his own is, I think, expressly indicated in a passage a little before (Bk. I, c. 4 fin.). Plato was right, Aristotle says, in pointing out the difference between those studies which started from ultimate principles and those which worked up to them. Now in Ethics we must take our start from what is best known to us, i. e., not from ultimate principles. but from the moral dicta of the average good man in the street, e. g., from the conviction, gained by habit, that such and such an act is brave, and that it is right to do what is brave. The passage is admittedly somewhat obscure because of the play on the word ἀρχή, which may mean either an ultimate principle or any starting point whatever, but the paraphrase here given is in accord with the opinions of most commentators. The point, however, to which I wish to call attention is that to introduce it by this express distinction between the studies that work up and those that work down, has significance only if we suppose that Aristotle meant to work up. Meditating upon these unauthorised dicta the philosopher will discover their authorisation. This implies, we may note, a profound respect for the opinion of the plain man, not in itself, but for what it will yield under criticism. This respect, always present in Socrates and nowise absent in Plato, is pre-eminently characteristic of Aristotle, as Dr. Sidgwick has pointed out.

It has been said that Aristotle could not have dreamt of a metaphysical basis because he asserts again and again that it is not possible to reach precision in ethical matters, and that we must be content with as much accuracy as the subject-matter will allow (e. g., E. N. Bk. I. c. 7). But why need we suppose Aristotle meant more than to point out that an ethical philosopher cannot possibly go into the details of all situations, that he must be content with laying down general rules which require to be interpreted, and therefore modified, according as circumstances alter cases? This has now become a commonplace in ethical treatises, but it was not so in Aristotle's time. It, of course, in no way implies any doubt that the principle

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underlying the rough general law can be based on the surest of foundations, e. g., the motive of truth-telling—to ensure confidence between man and man—may be rooted in the Absolute Good, and yet the moralist can only advise people not to tell lies *as a rule.* The best commentary on Aristotle's works in the First Book of the "Ethics" is, it seems to me, to be found in his own admirable distinction between equity and justice in the Fifth (c. 10):

"The reason of this is that every law is laid down in general terms, while there are matters about which it is impossible to speak correctly in general terms. Where, then, it is necessary to speak in general terms, but impossible to do so correctly, the legislator lays down that which holds good for the majority of cases, being quite aware that it does not hold good for all; the law, indeed, is none the less correctly laid down because of this defect, for the defect lies not in the law, nor in the lawgiver, but in the nature of the subject-matter, *being necessarily involved in the very conditions of human action.* When, therefore, the law lays down a general rule, but a particular case occurs, which is an exception to this rule, it is right to make good this deficiency, just as the lawgiver himself would do if he were present." (Peters' translation.)

Again it is almost universally held that when Aristotle says the sphere of human action is that of "things which can be different," (*τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα ἀλλως ἐχειν*), he means to say that events contain an element which being "contingent" is irrational and can give us no sure foothold. Now I am not concerned to deny that Aristotle leans elsewhere to the belief in an irrational element in the world, but I see no reason to introduce that conception here. The writer of the "Magna Moralia" no doubt is full of it, but we need not saddle the master with his confusions. What Aristotle has in his mind is rather a conception of those future events that are due to the action of man, events which he can shape as he chooses and which, therefore, so Aristotle holds, are not to be taken as settled beforehand. The phrase "what can be different" is a general one, and here it refers to what can be made or done: cf. "De Anima," "what is to be done is what can be different," (Bk. III. c. 10, 432 a), and E. N. (Bk. VI. c. 4), "those things which can neither be or not be, and the cause of whose production lies in the producer not in the thing itself which is produced." (Peters' translation.) "No one

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deliberates about the past, but about the future and about that which can either be or not be, and the past cannot *not* be." (Ibid. c. 2.)

It is true, then, that for Aristotle uncertainty hangs over the future actions of men, and it is true, we may add, that he did not solve the fundamental questions as to the nature of this uncertainty. But this is only to say that he accepted Free Will as a reality and yet did not explain its action, and until this old riddle is really solved, or a satisfactory Ethics based on Determinism, no one can throw stones at him for that. But that he did not identify choice with chance, or with anything unintelligible in particular events as such, is, I think, clear from his express statement in Bk. III., which should be read in close connection with Bk. VI. Deliberation, Choice, and Free-will,—the genuine initiative of man,—are all linked together. And what is it, Aristotle asks (c. 3) that we deliberate about? "Not about eternal realities, such as the universe or the incommeasurability of the diagonal. Nor yet about what changes, but always changes in the same way, like the risings of the sun,—nor yet about what *happens sometimes in one way and sometimes in another, like droughts and showers, —nor yet about what comes by chance,* like the finding of a treasure,—nor even about all human actions,—(no Spartan, for instance, would deliberate about a constitution for the Scythians). *For none of these things can be effected by our action. We deliberate about the things that we can do.* The causes of things seem to be Nature, Necessity, Chance, *and moreover Reason and Human Agency.*" This seems. it may be added, entirely in accord with the view expressed in the Eudemian Ethics, always a valuable commentary on the Nicomachean. Aristotle goes on, no doubt, to say that there is a futher element of doubt in deliberation. We do not *deliberate* when we know exactly what means will reach a given end—but this is another point, and ought to be kept quite distinct from the preceding. We cannot in the strict sense "deliberate" about writing, for we have no need to enquire how we ought to form the letters, but it would still be in a man's power to saw whether he would or would not write at all.

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There is another matter that requires careful consideration. Why, it might be asked, does Aristotle insist again and again that the moral actions of everyday life, brave deeds, for example, should be done for their own sake, if, as we suppose, he had a further end in view? But this is to overlook his peculiar doctrine of the "mean." Let us run over his argument up to this point. Happiness is the end of action; happiness lies in the performance of function, and the better the function the richer the happiness. (I c. 7.) Man's function is to act acording to reason. (II c. 2, init.) Reason bids us in action, choose the "mean" for its own sake. And this is not an arithmetical "mean," but the amount of any quality that serves the right "plan." (I use the word "plan" as a rendering for λόγος, to express the double sense of "proportion" and "reasoning" involved in the Greek.) Thus the truly brave man is he who stands his ground, not on every occasion, nor yet for a fixed quantity of danger, but on the right occasion and in the right cause. It is glorious to die for the right cause. But what is the right cause? The "mean" must be chosen for its own sake, true; and because it is "noble" (καλόν) to do so, but how is the mean constituted? Such questions still press, and it is hard to think that Aristotle really put them aside with the mere *ipse dixit* of the "sensible man," (ὀφρόνιμος), or with conceptions, which take us but little further, of human nature as a "whole." It is as though we said we valued the Greek philosophers for their own sake and were not allowed to explain that their value lay in their service to the truth, but could only repeat that we did value them, or remark that they formed a unity. And indeed it is only on the supposition that Aristotle had some definite standard in his mind by which the mean could be tested, that we can understand his speaking of these moral virtues later on as *not* chosen for their own sake after all, (Bk. X c. 7).

We have, therefore, it would seem, every right to attach full weight to the hints he gives in earlier books of a fuller explanation to follow. At the close, for instance, of the argument just summarised, he says in so many words of our actions: "That they should be 'according to the right plan'; we

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must take for granted here, and later on we will discuss the matter and say *what the right plan is.*" (Bk. II c. 2.)

This seems to lead directly to the trenchant criticism of his own as yet inadequate result which makes so impressive an opening to Book VI. "To say," he remarks quietly, "that the mean lies between excess and defect and must be according to the right plan is true enough, but hardly to be called precise." To put us off with this is as unsatisfactory as to teach a man the art of healing by bidding him do as the doctor did. The doubts and questions which the preceding chapters have,—of set purpose as I think,—aroused in the reader's mind, could not be more pithily expressed. But the answer is less clear. Aristotle seems to turn aside and, as some think, lose himself in a minute account of the different powers of the mind. This is partly due, no doubt, to his love for such fine mosaic work, partly to the incomplete state of the treatise, but the chief reason is, I believe, that, desiring an absolute standard, he wants to indicate first the power in man which can reach it, and the relation of that power to his other faculties, especially to the workaday intelligence of the ordinary "sensible man." The content of the standard itself is not given till Book X.

We find then, first (c. 1), the distinction, all important for our purpose, between the Theoretic (Speculative and Contemplative) and the Practical Intelligence, or, as Aristotle says here, between the Knowing (*ἐπιστημονικόν*) and the Planning (*λογιστικόν*) powers of the mind. Every "plan" has to do with *what can be different* in the sense (explained before, and re-emphasised in the next chapter), of voluntary actions in the future. The essential difference between the two powers lies exactly here, viz., in their relation to action,—and we can, perhaps, best see this by comparing Aristotle's account of desire in the "De Anima" (Bk. III c. 10 init.), where he speaks of the "Practical Reason" as "that which makes a plan for the sake of something" and which differs from the Contemplative in having an *aim* (*νοῦς δὲ ὁ ἑνέκα του λογιζόμενος καὶ ὁ πρακτικὸς-διαφερει δε τοῦ θεωρητικοῦ τῷ τέλει*), "distinguished from the speculative by its end." (Wallace.) In how subtle a way this vital distinction is conceived by Aristotle may be seen from Bk. III c. 9 of the

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"De Anima" (fin.). The theoretic Reason can contemplate good and bad, knows, e. g., what is terrible and what is sweet, but does not take the all-decisive step of saying *this is to be done.* When it does this it becomes the planning, the purposive, Reason. Thus we can understand how Aristotle can say as he does there ("De Anima," 432 b), and, indeed, again here, (E. N. Bk. VI c. 12), that the speculative Reason thinks of nothing practical, nothing *that has got to be done,* οὐδὲν νοεῖ πρακτὸν, and at another time, that contemplative wisdom (which is theoretic intelligence at its best) knows why each thing *ought* to be done, τίνος ἕνεκέν ἐστι πρακτέον ἕκαστον, (Met. I c. 2, 982 b). The intimate nature of the union between the two Reasons must be stressed, for it is only in its light that we can understand how the "*plan*" of the practical Reason has a claim to be called "true" (Bk. VI c. 2); and in virtue of it, we must remember, where one Reason goes the other can follow at its side.

But the Practical Reason is, as a matter of fact, inoperative, unless desire is linked with it. Aristotle spends a great deal of time working this out. It is really a digression, though an important one. The gist of it is that Moral Virtue in the full sense, (κυρία ἀρέτη,) cannot be developed unless we have on the one hand *the right means chosen with a view of the right thing to attain, viz., the "mean,"*—and this implies Prudence,—the excellence of the planning faculty in its strict sense,—and on the other, the desire for right action itself, the disinterested love of the "mean,"—and this is Moral Virtue in the narrow sense, Natural Virtue. The desire alone might produce the well-intentioned atrocities of a Mary Tudor, and we should only have Natural Virtue left (φυσίκη ἀρετή); the right thing, the true "mean" will, as a matter of fact, never present itself to a man's mind at all unless his nature is tuned aright; the poltroon, for all his quickness of wit, will soon learn to say the right end is to save his own skin; his Prudence will sink into mere "cleverness" (δεινότης) (E. N. Bk. VI c. 1 cc. 12, 13).

This digression brings us back to our main theme, What is the right end? Where is the test of the mean? And to our immediate question, How far do our powers reach in the

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search? Nothing has been said so far about the efficiency of mind. But here (Bk. VI c. 3) begins a new division on this principle, and it is a cross division. It has been admitted that we can reach truth in varying degrees both on the theoretic and the practical side. Taking the first, we have, on a low level, Scientific Knowledge. This works from premises uncritically accepted. It has no sight of the ultimate principles. But (c. 6) there is a higher function of intelligence than this, and that is Reason in the great sense (νοῦς). This does see the ultimate principles of all things, and therefore we have in us *Wisdom:* "the union of Reason and Science, Knowledge at its full height, Knowledge of the most precious things." "Thus a wise man can see not only what follows from first principles, but can speak the truth about the first principles themselves." This is in entire accordance with the passage referred to in the Metaphysics where Wisdom is said "to know the good in each particular and universally the best in the whole of nature." (982 b.)

Now let us turn back to the practical side. We have Art (Production), which need not concern us here, and we have Prudence. It seems to me of vital importance to recognise that Aristotle is here dealing with Practical Intelligence on *a low level.* He does not say this in so many words, (hence the trouble), but everything points to it. The conception is drawn, he says, from the everyday men he sees around him. It involves deliberation, and deliberation, we have been told (in Bk. III) implies doubt. It deals with *what is good for man* and, therefore, never, like Wisdom, which sees the ultimate principles, with what is good in itself. This is emphasised in c. 7, where we are told that there may be different kinds of Prudence, but only one Wisdom. Different animals may know the different things which are good for each, (good that is, relatively to them); only Wisdom can know the Absolute Good. A "prudent" man can only know what is good for him, and this can only coincide with the Absolute Good if man is the best thing in the world. It is, moreover, in accordance with the parallel between the theoretic and the practical that we should have something to balance the merely scientific

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knowledge which is subordinate to Wisdom. But it will be said, if this is so, why does Aristotle not complete the parallel? Why does he not give us a really supreme Prudence (a true ἀρχιτεκτόνικη φρόνησις), which could see the ultimate end and take her measures accordingly? The answer is probably two-fold. Such a height of Practical Reason is, as a matter of fact, plainly indicated in the life of the wise man on earth as described in Book X. In the second place, Aristotle, as we saw, has set himself throughout the whole work to analyse the content of the ordinary sensible man's moral consciousness, and the ordinary sensible man troubles little about the ultimate heaven. He is quite ready to wait till he gets there. He accepts the end set before him as the physician accepts health, as the mathematician the assumptions of the problem he has to solve. It is really Wisdom which sets the end and proposes the problem, justifies the acceptance and the solution, but he leaves all that to the wise man, whom he regards with a curious mixture of reverence and piety. Aristotle, with his eye on fact, is full of this actual difference between men (cf. VI c. 7 § 5). Moreover in the ultimate heaven the Practical Intelligence would be so transformed we should hardly know it. Doubt would have passed away, and with doubt deliberation; and it is hard to think that we should not even be above choice.

But now comes the further question, What is the nature of the standard? What is the supreme end in which we could find rest? This is not disclosed, as we said, till the Tenth Book, but even in the First it has been hinted at, and spoken of as Contemplation (θεωρία). As such it now appears. In the enjoyment of this lies the highest happiness: the true mean is what serves this. Aristotle has left the reader to work out in detail the relation between service and fulfillment, but the task is not difficult. The truly brave man, say, is he who faces death for the safety of a free city where Contemplation is possible. Many have fallen foul of the ideal itself as an arid intellectual exercise, but that Aristotle thought of more than this is, I think, plain from his preliminary treatment of what he calls Friendship and we should call Love. He devotes two entire Books to the subject, and the final result of his

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analysis is every way remarkable. The essence of Friendship, it appears, (Bk. IX, c. 9), is bound up with a heightening of the consciousness of life and the power of contemplation. A friend is another self; and further, "We can contemplate our friends better than ourselves, their actions better than our own." Therefore, the good man, however self-sufficient in other respects, must always have with him for his full happiness those whom he can love. The man who wrote this knew something about affection, and had no dusty goal in view. The life of his ultimate heaven, if it was intellectual, was yet an intellectual love, *amor intellectualis Dei,* as we quoted at the outset, and we might, perhaps, now add *et hominum* to the *Dei.* This is the ultimate ideal, but it cannot be attained in its fullness under our hampering conditions of mortality. The life of heaven, a Christian would have said, must necessarily be different from the life on earth. This and this only, seems to me what Aristotle means to stress at the end of Book X (c. 7, 8). He has been accused, quite unfairly, I think, of making here a radical divorce between the life of action and the life of contemplation. But everyone who believes in any kind of heaven at all must surely hold that certain manifestations of Reason are temporary and secondary. We do not try to keep men sober for the mere sake of not drinking wine, we look forward to a time when temperance crusades will have finished their work and the reward of a richer life been won and assured. We make war for the sake of peace, not peace for the sake of war, to quote Aristotle's own most noble phrase. His words are strong, but no stronger than Paul's,—"when that which is perfect is come, that which is in part shall be done away." Paul, no less than Aristotle, would have felt it blasphemy to speak of God as chaste and honest. The work of Prudence, even we may suppose of the highest Prudence, would be over in that free kingdom of unimpeded life; for there would be no more actions, only activity (E. N. Bk. X c. 8, 1178 b). None the less her work, so long as it lasted, would have been in the service of Reason, the work, as the author of the Magna Moralia puts it, of controlling the passions and winning leisure for her superior (M. M.

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I 34, cf. E. N. Bk. VI fin.). Unfair, too, is the charge, so far as Book X is concerned, of a fundamental chasm set between the human and divine. This can only be maintained if we take Prudence in c. 8 as that highest unnamed Prudence which would be granted sight of the ultimate principles, and shut our eyes at the same time to the transitory character of many virtues; and I have tried to show that we have no warrant for doing either. No doubt there is much many of us would demand for our ultimate heaven that Aristotle leaves out as belonging to the merely mortal sphere, but none the less he makes the express statement (Bk. X c. 7) that the happiness of our true self is the happiness of what is Godlike. Reason tells us not only that Contemplation is *our* greatest good, but that it is the greatest good in the world. So do we find in Bk. III c. 3,—thrown out modestly after Aristotle's fashion—the pregnant suggestion that we ought to say that while all men wish for what seems good, the virtuous man wishes for the true good, the true object of desire. Such a line of thought points straight to the union of the human and the divine; but that opens another vista: ἄλλης ἐστι σκέψεως.

I am aware, I may say in conclusion, that the interpretation I am defending may be traversed, and that others are possible, but I would submit that, while it in no way strains the Greek, it has the advantage of presenting Aristotle's system as a coherent whole. On any other theory that system is at the best "dispersive and incomplete" (Sidgwick), at the worst a tissue of confusions. In dealing with a stupenduous intellect such as Aristotle's it is surely safer to try the first course.

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STUDENT HONOR: A STUDY IN CHEATING.

Not long since there was a flagrant case of cheating discovered in one of our large universities. An examination paper had been stolen from a printing office and several students had used it to secure superior standing. An attempt was made to arouse public sentiment in the institution; and the student body appointed a committee from its numbers which was to receive reports and try future offenders.

While the matter was still under discussion, three professors in different and representative departments asked their students to answer the following questions:

1. Suppose a member of a class gets from the printing office a copy of a set of examination questions, prepared for use the next day, and takes some of the other members of the class into confidence and they meet and prepare for the examination. Would one who had prepared honestly for the examination be justified in reporting the dishonesty to the professor, provided the punishment be to lose the credits in that subject for that semester? Why? or Why not? Would your answer be, Yes or No, if the punishment were expulsion?

2. Under the present arrangement, if you were sure you saw a student cheating in examination, would you report it to the committee, provided the punishment were to lose the credits in that subject for that semester? Why? Why not? Would your answer be, Yes or No, if the penalty were expulsion?

The students who wrote were to hand in their papers unsigned and simply marked "man" or "woman." Many of the students did not write, but in all one hundred and twenty-five papers were returned, sixty-six written by men and fifty-nine written by women.

The data were carefully classified with the following results:

Would the student be justified in reporting if the penalty were loss of credit for the course?

Yes: Men, 70%; women, 71%.

No: Men, 30%; women, 29%.

If the penalty were expulsion?

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Yes: Men, 57%; women, 57%.

No: Men, 43%; women, 43%.

Would you report a student to the committee if the penalty were loss of credit for the course?

Yes: Men, 36%; women, 33%.

No: Men, 64%; women, 67%.

If the penalty were expulsion?

Yes: Men, 25%; women, 33%.

No: Men, 75%; women, 67%.

A study of these figures shows that the returns from the men and those from the women are almost identical in each of the four cases. Where the returns are so similar one cannot doubt that he has succeeded in reaching the general student sentiment. If we compare first the cases where the penalty is loss of credits we find that while 70% of the men and 71% of the women think it would be justifiable to report the culprit to the professor, only 36% of the men and 33% of the women would actually report the case to a student committee. An examination of the papers shows that this is not because the writers object to reporting to a committee of students, hardly one who writes raising that aspect of the question, but they object to doing themselves what they think it would be right for a student in the abstract to do. Only about one half of the students who consider that it would be right to turn informer would themselves do so.

In the second place, the penalty of expulsion makes a great difference, the men who would report dropping from 70% to 57% in the impersonal case and from 36% to 25% in the personal one. The women drop from 71% to 59% in the impersonal case and remain the same in the second, where, however, only 33% had originally stood for reporting. Evidently a penalty that is felt to be extreme leads even university students to shield wrongdoers.

Comparatively few of the students gave definite reasons for their decision; those given appear in the following table:

Reasons for reporting:

Cheating wrongs honest students: Men, 30%; women, 35%.

Cheating harms the institution: Men, 18%; women, 11%.

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Not reporting makes one an accessory: Men, 5%; women, 1%.

It is a duty to society: Men, 19%; women, 8%.

It is best for the culprit: Men, 9%; women, 15%.

Right, but I would not do it: Men, 18%; women, 17%.

Reasons for not reporting:

It is the professor's business: Men, 9%; women, 8%.

Not the honest student's business: Men, 4%; women, 5%.

Tale bearing is contemptible: Men, 21%; women, 17%.

It affects only the culprit: Men, 4%; women, 5%.

It is useless: Men, 3%; women, 12%.

Would make enemies: Men, 3%; women, 5%.

Private remonstrance better: Men, 4%; women, 2%.

Cheating carries its own punishment: Men, 25%; women, 10%.

It will be seen that the reasons are mainly selfish; the university's interests are far less important than self-protection; while general social responsibility is comparatively little felt.

Those who say that cheating wrongs students, 30% of the men and 35% of the women, base their reasons on the fact that the cheat establishes a standard which honest effort cannot reach.

"If we did not report it," writes a man, "the dishonest members would raise the standard of the examinations so that the one who had prepared honestly would not be given a fair chance to show that he was doing faithful work."

"Yes, he would be justified," says a woman. "Such dishonesty makes false standards by which the work of the class is judged. The standard is raised above that which the honest student can reach and he becomes discouraged, feeling the injustice. The successful cheater wins approval without any work, which is of no real benefit to him in the end. The professor does not have a true basis to work upon and cannot give the fair, helpful instruction which most of us want."

Closely related to this group of reasons are the groups that say "it is not my business," and "it is the professor's business." "No in both cases," says a woman. "It is my duty to

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see that I do what is right. It is not my duty to see that another does right."

"The professor could and should keep the questions in his own hands," says a man, "until the time of examination and then write them on the board; he has no right to subject weak students to temptation."

The most extreme form of this self-protection is expressed by those few, 3% of the men and 5% of the women, who say it would bring them enmity. They say frankly, "I don't think I should. I would not care to incur the enmity of that person or his friends." "No, I do not wish to incur enmity."

The motive of self-interest is certainly not the highest to which we can appeal; but judging from this study it is the one on which we must mainly rely in bringing culprits to justice, even with such an intelligent body of public opinion as is represented in a university student body.

Those who rise to the higher social responsibility represented by their connection with the university, 18% of men and 11% of women, generally say that the credit of the university would be impaired if cheating became general and so the value of its diplomas would be depreciated. This is again a form of self-interest; and there is hardly a trace in the papers of that loyal devotion to Alma Mater of which we hear so much. Were their own mother's good name involved these same writers would certainly not work out their reactions in terms of immediate self-interest.

Those who recognise the higher responsibility to the social body around them, 19% of the men and 8% of the women, base their reasons on general considerations:

"He would be justified in reporting," says a man; "society must have some means of eliminating its parasites. And it is desirable that the adjusters be people of honest temperament."

"Yes, in either case. The student body has the same right as any other community to make the laws that it will abide by and enforce, if publicly promulgated. Honesty in examinations has been so declared as the will of the student body and publicly announced. Recalcitrant minorities, existing in every

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community, must be forced to adopt the will of the majority in matters affecting public welfare as this does."

Nearly allied to this group are those students, 9% of men and 15% of women, who would report the case because it would be best for the culprit himself. They say, "Cheating would harm the dishonest student even more than the honest ones. If not reported the cheater would lose his power of acquiring knowledge and his character would be weakened."

The groups so far discussed seem to represent a developing sense of social obligation; and it is interesting to note that the highest point of recognition of abstract social obligation is much stronger with men, 19%, than with women, 8%. The remaining reasons are largely doctrinaire, as when the writers say that not reporting would make them accessory to the crime, 5% of men and 1% of women; or, when they say that cheating carries its own punishment with it, 25% of men and 10% of women. There is also a considerable number who apply the doctrine of *laissez faire* and declare reporting useless. "So long as the dishonest man is injuring himself vastly more than he is anyone else," writes a woman, "I think honest people would be fulfilling all their obligations in tending strictly to their own concerns."

It is true that the case has features which make the fulfillment of social obligations difficult. Among all young people there is a deeply grounded feeling against tattling. Tale bearing the students declare to be mean and cowardly, and most adults agree with them. "No," they say, "I despise the spirit that actuates a tale bearer. How can a person respect himself and be a tale bearer?" "The prejudice of my early training against tattling is too strong to be overcome." "Students have an instinctive feeling that they would be doing something sneaking, even when they try to reason themselves into another attitude. Instinct in such a case is usually safe." "The whole world hates a tattler even though he tells the truth." "I have been taught that tattling is a cowardly act and I cannot get the prejudice out of my mind. I admire any one who has the courage to report, but I would not do it."

Some of the students go further. They say that even the

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professors to whom they reported would secretly despise them and the public would consider them contemptible informers. "I could not be sure," writes a woman, "that I was not taking a faint satisfaction in my power and in seeing a fellow-student fall, particularily if I happened to think him arrogant." Another declares that were a system of reporting to become general it would develop a moral condition worse than widespread cheating. "No," says a man, "the whole system is despicable. For the doubtful chance of proving one man guilty of cheating (himself), a hundred people must be willful spies. When suspicion is in the heart how can honor rest there? Instead of profound sorrow for sin, this practice would tend to produce egotistical exultation against the sinner."

"Our first duty is to ourselves," says a woman, "and public consciousness is not yet educated up to the point where this can be done without loss of respect to the person giving information. A very few times in my life, actuated only by an intense interest in the person suffering from the conduct of another, I have given information bearing upon it; in each instance, I have felt myself drop in the estimation of my friend. I lost by it and have no reason to think my friend gained."

The most dangerous element in these answers is represented by those writers who know the right, but frankly say they lack the moral courage to do it. Eighteen per cent. of the men and 17% of the women say without reserve that they would not do what they believe to be right; many others who wrote doubtless felt it; and among those who did not write were certainly many more. "No," says a man, "theory is one thing, practice is another. I should not enjoy the part." Another student says, "No, although I should think it quite justifiable I would not have the moral courage to report upon a fellow-student, especially if it happened to be one I had associated with." "It may be due to cowardice," writes a woman, "to 'chicken heartedness,' to training received at home and at former schools against tattling, or to a slight amount of indifference or a mixture of all, for I could not tell, though I think I should be justified in so doing." "No," writes still another, "because I do not like to stand in the attitude of prosecutor; in

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other words, I haven't the strength to carry out my ideas of what is right. It is not only necessary for the good of the university that dishonest students should be weeded out, but also for my own good. I realize the necessity, yet I would not report even though it is my duty and I feel it."

Had the case in point been concerned with the stealing of money or books the student's answers would probably have represented a higher plane of social and personal responsibility than is brought out by the theft of credits. Even the freshman in college knows how unfair a test of effort any written examination must be. Preliminary training, retentive memory, facility in words, luck in having questions that fit the information on hand, all these things help to determine examination results after the conscientious student has done his best. Hence, there is injected into all set examinations a certain amount of fatalism and favoritism which makes the young person who still believes in fair play and an even chance less willing to complain of theft than he would be if the commodity were a watch or a five-dollar bill.

The application of this study does not seem far to seek. It shows us that even among university students the sense of the larger social self is only partially developed. Self-interest is the strongest single motive that appeals to them, and even that is the interest of the smaller personal self. Social responsibility in matters that immediately affect them is obscured by a sense of honor grounded in sympathy, a sense of personal unworthiness, love of open fight, and a personal loyalty to their fellows.

The greatest problem of our present democracy is how to make the intelligent citizens take up arms against municipal and national abuses. Our unwillingness to do our part is largely due to the same reasons that actuated the students in this study. Part of these reasons are good in themselves, but out of place. The lack of moral courage, the laziness and willingness to let things drift can be attacked directly. But the positive elements must grow. Through loyalty to a boss the ignorant foreigner or native may climb up to loyalty to party, and through this to loyalty to government. But climbing is

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hard work and those who lead must ever call back and urge upward. Meantime, the "affairs of life are neither to be wept over nor laughed at, but they are to be understood"; and those who understand can steadily help forward.

It is this disgust that we feel for the spy and the informer, partly due to our own sense of imperfection, partly due to our sympathy for anyone in trouble, and mainly to those deeper and more primitive feelings of fair play and personal loyalty which stand most in the way of good democratic government. Just as a man cannot be a good cosmopolitan and humanitarian until he has first been a good nationalist, so he cannot be devoted to abstract social ethics until he has served his apprenticeship in personal ethics. To prematurely act on general ethical grounds is to destroy the very foundations of the moral nature. And so we must be patient with children, and university students, and with ourselves until we grow up to social manhood and womanhood.

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AN EXAMINATION OF THE RATIONALISTIC ATTITUDE.

The fact that a person is specially interested in one object tends generally to prevent him from having an interest in any other object; or one might put it that the lines along which we customarily recollect or think tend to exclude other lines of recollection or thought. A man, in this condition, unaware as he is usually of the factors which determine his line of thought, and unsuspicious of the peculiarities of the psychic mechanism, feels convinced that he cannot possibly be mistaken, because, as it seems to him, all the evidence points to his being right. Yet if he would only consider that many of his neighbors who differ from him in opinion are as certain of their beliefs as he is, he might begin to suspect that there is something at fault with his psychic mechanism which, although he means to be impartial, causes him to recollect only evidence which favors his theory. His universe of thought, in other words, is not so

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complete and connected as the universe itself, but is rather a tiny planet replete with peculiarities which divide him from other similar planets.

Take, for instance, the average Rationalist. He is so impressed with the evils of superstition; he has thought so much about the growth and history of religions; he has so often observed the danger of relying on authority; he has become so convinced of the perniciousness of priestcraft—that to him human salvation appears vitally connected with mankind's abandonment of superstition. Abolish superstition, abolish supernatural sanctions and explanations, and men, having become worshipers of reason, will, he argues, live rational lives. The triumph of Rationalism would, accordingly, mean the triumph of the humanities and the graces. Men, being guided solely by reason, would be rational, and rationality, it is contended, is the distinctive mark of a human being.

Consistently with this the Rationalist eloquently and enthusiastically presses the claims of reason. An appeal to the emotions is to him an outrage on reason, an introduction to superstition, and a reliance on an incompetent tribunal. Only reason has a right, he holds, to decide any issue, and only the reason, therefore, may be appealed to. To appeal to the emotions is to appeal to prejudice. The Rationalist deals similarly with the "practical" reformer. To act appears to him a dangerous thing, unless the actions follow from the demands of reason, and as the thraldom of superstition is said to be the root of all evil, the reformer's task is chiefly to help men to throw off that thraldom. The emotions, then, are not to be trusted, nor is the will or the impulse to action.

Such an attitude is plausible rather than reasonable. Those eloquent panegyrics and impassioned glorifications of reason are surely emotional in character. The lover of reason manifestly loves reason, and is not love an emotion? We have only to listen to the praise of reason and to the scorn poured on the emotions and the will, to learn how strongly moved by emotion the Rationalist is. Besides, it is not only that he strongly feels what he utters; but his chief aim is to produce similar emotions in his hearers. The enthusiasm he raises, the rounds

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of applause he receives, and the converts he makes, clearly show that he excites the emotions of his audience, and as he also desires to stir them to action, he appeals to their will, too. A wholly "reasonable" Rationalist is an inconceivable being. His state of mind would argue that he is not interested in reason; that to him it is indifferent whether men reason or not; and that he does not care whether reason triumphs or is trampled in the dust. He himself would have no recourse to reason, except accidentally.

This criticism will seem less paradoxical and more obvious when we inquire into the nature and purport of reason. It is, briefly, this: there exist within us certain needs or functional tendencies, innate and acquired, and these, owing to opposing obstacles, can seldom be satisfied directly. Consequently the end is attained by a more or less prolonged and circuitous process or search or turning over of memories, and this process we term the process of reasoning. To put it differently, we must know what to do if we are to act effectively, and hence we seek to know. This primitive process of knowing for the sake of acting is only modified in two ways. A more or less strong desire to acquire knowledge independently of action may grow up, or the passion for knowledge may be such that it obscures every other need. These modifications, however, by no means challenge the fundamental proposition that needs are the explanation of our having recourse to reasoning. for if the psychic mechanism were perfect, answers to questions would be immediate and reason would consequently not even be suspected of existing; besides which there is the fact to be noted that no one would reason if there were no desire to reason.

The preceding remarks do not prove the unimportance of the rationalistic attitude. It may still be true, and is true, that unreasoning action plays great havoc with human welfare. Wherever an issue is complicated, and issues are frequently in that condition, and wherever the desires of men conflict, and they often do conflict, the consistent Rationalist will plead the imperative necessity of not rushing to conclusions, since such a method defeats the object aimed at. When

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a question of the correctness of a statement or of a line of reasoning arises, he will insist that no emotion but that of the love of truth should be appealed to. And, generally speaking, it will be his mission to point out how necessary it is that the demands of reason should be respected.

The Rationalist, then, has no sufficient case against what is not reason, for the Moralist as naturally appeals to man's love of goodness, the Artist to our reverence for the beautiful, and the Statesman to the necessity for following up sentiment and reason by action. The only limitation we may make is to say that nothing within us should be encouraged or appealed to which has a tendency to lower or to deteriorate vitality or the fullest individual and social life. Consequently, the appeals to self-interest, to prudence, to the love of justice and kindness, to the love of nature and art, are each in their way, no more and no less, as reasonable as the appeal to the love of reason. Let it only be remembered that the appeal to reason is an appeal to the love of reason, and the inconsequence will be evident of making an appeal to the love of reason when it is a question of the love of goodness or the love of the beautiful.

We have thus far silently assumed that the Rationalist of whom we are speaking, is thoroughly consistent in his rationalism. As a matter of fact, his love of reason is far from being a love of reason as such. To the student of mind it is clear that he hates falsehood less than he hates some particular theological or philosophical systems. The triumph of reason means for this typical Rationalist, the annihilation of certain supernaturalistic systems. He does not often have in view a religion which will be true to reason, nor does he generally think of how to prevent the development of a new supernaturalistic system. His attitude is chiefly negative, though it must be admitted that a negative attitude is not without its value. He seems to think that the death of supernaturalism means the coming of reason into its birthright.

This question is too important to be disposed of in a sentence. It is the old story of the common belief that the killing of one falsehood implies the killing of all falsehood. Naturalism being triumphant, the Rationalist is inclined to reason that

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with its triumph justice, beauty and truth have triumphed. He does not see that the supernaturalism he attacks is but a kind of crude naturalism, and that, therefore, the exclusion of the gods and spirits he objects to may make little difference to human welfare. Savages have their medicine men and popular supernaturalism has its mediating priests and its prayers. Are we much nearer the reign of reason when these are done away with, and quacks innumerable, with no supernaturalistic pretensions, take their place? It is appalling when one considers the vast amount of neglect of health and encouragement of illness which is due to the industriously and effectively advertised stories of quick and safe cures for any and every ill. Prayer to a non-existent power could surely not do more harm. On the side of prevention of ills there are similar changes observable to-day. It is no more the gods who are believed to protect us; it is an endless number of systems of diet, exercise and what not. Here is one man who offers to supply us with iron nerves; another recommends a brain food which is to make all fear of overwork or need of prudence superfluous; and still another tempts us with a beverage which makes it needless to have higher wages or decent workshops and homes. Then there are extreme Anarchists, Individualists, Single-Taxers, and Socialists, who are ready to save mankind at once and for ever. Lastly, granting laudable exceptions, we have a Press, fickle as a child, shallow as a puddle, narrow as a bigoted sect, created by wealth and serving wealth, aping impartiality and wisdom, and doing its best to crush out or ignore everything which is profound or is not sensational. Under these circumstances Naturalism as such is of little assistance to human progress. Our case is that men should not only believe in law; but that they should be deeply impressed with the truth that the general facts of outward and of human nature only become evident after exhaustive research. Such a belief would cut off with one movement of the blade the many hundred heads of modern quackery. It would make obvious that the universal panaceas of to-day, religious and other, are to be ranked with the beliefs in witches and demons, and we should learn that human nature is organic and com-

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plex, consists of many parts, and that no single remedy could put everything in order once for all. Moreover, the belief we have spoken of would convince men that we are yet far from having reached the degree of culture which would enable us to discover universal remedies or preventatives. A mere triumph over supernaturalism, therefore, supposing supernaturalism to be indefensible, may be of small importance for human progress, and lovers of their kind have no grounds for hoping that the overthrow of the popular supernaturalism will kill that uninformed and inert spirit which gave birth to it.

There is also another sense in which the average Rationalist is not a true Rationalist. If he were interested in reason as such, he would urge its claims in every direction—in the sciences generally, in the realms of ethics, æsthetics, psychology, in personal and business matters, and in economics and politics. He would impartially press the demands of truth everywhere. Loyal to his ideal, he would learn that not only in matters supernatural, but in all matters, the claims of reason are treated with scant respect. He would become a consistent Rationalist, in touch with every live issue, one who would point out that conclusions, no matter what the subject, should have reasoned foundations. He would take interest in politics, in ethics, and the other great departments of life.

The search for truth is, in its essential features, wholly guided by practical considerations. That is, instead of piling up colossal mountains of facts, we seek for generalisations which make the piling up superfluous; and instead of observing and noting interminable changes, we endeavor to find the general facts which sum up these changes. Except for this practical aspect, we should be collecting a vast mass of detail which would neither illumine our ideas of the world we live in nor assist us in our practical life. Science, on the contrary, as we know, achieves what an impartial method would fail to accomplish—it makes man wiser and more powerful.

For this reason the consistent Rationalist will more especially urge the claims of reason in those subjects in which the neglect of reason is most conspicuous, and it is most likely in accordance with this that the typical Rationalist wars against super-

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stition until he fails to see any other enemy of the human race and until everything is swallowed up in reason and reason itself is swallowed up in hatred of superstition.

There is still another aspect to be considered. It is said that faith forms the support of reason, because, it is argued, there comes a point when we cannot pursue a question any further. The alternative to this, of ever-receding answers to questions, is one which destroys the value of reason itself, since it robs it of permanent foundations. If we do not consider such extremes, the problem meets us yet in another form. Except in pure mathematics and the exactest portions of the physical sciences, we never know all the conditions of an intricate problem and must, therefore go beyond the limits of exact reason, and take refuge in incompletely verified conclusions. In ordinary life the more intimate connections of facts are certainly hidden from us, and we are compelled to direct ourselves almost altogether by probabilities or, more often, by the rule of thumb which social experience has suggested. A reason for our action, at least so far as the satisfied reason is concerned, is almost invariably not only absent, but extremely difficult to discover, since our whole conduct is closely related and is not yet understood as a totality, there being as yet no science of conduct. All these considerations should teach us not to press the claims of reason with too great vehemence, though the Rationalist cannot too strongly emphasize the fact that scientific research into matters of conduct is one of the most crying needs of our time.

Lastly, there is the fact that the needs of our nature create their truths, in the sense that only certain facts are by us selected and formed into a suitable system. There is no ethics except for the ethical man; no hygiene except for the prudent man; no beauty except for him who appreciates the beautiful; and no reason in any definite sense except for him who loves consistency and general facts. The world as given to the senses is a chaos, and it is only judicious pondering which enables us to see an order behind the chaos, or rather to view things in such an arbitrary manner that we read order where there is chaos. As I look out of the window, everything ap-

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pears as in a dream; the leafless boughs are shaking—I know not why; there are curious noises which I regard as due to carts passing and children shouting in a neighboring playground; upright things are moving along (things which I call human beings), coming I know not whence and going I know not whither. Everything in connection with the senses happens haphazard. Nay more, the very individual objects we see—the objects about which we reason—are themselves the result of a psychological selective process, independently of which they do not exist; that is, we build up objects as we build up truths.

Specialisation is necessary; but it too frequently ends in over-specialisation. However, while it is bad that people should regard their particular opinions as being of matchless importance, it would be worse if they would not specialise at all and tried to be equally interested in everything. If all men were Jacks of all trades, not only would they be masters of none, but there would be no occupations whatever. The narrow interest which over-emphasizes itself is not to be abolished in favor of a quite general interest; but men must be taught to reconcile their interests with the interests of others. That is to say, to make a special application, the true Rationalist has his place. It is important at the present day to urge the claims of reason, especially in religious affairs, and it is well that those who feel strongly about this matter should devote themselves more particularly to this object. The Rationalist can but gain in influence and in respect if he admits that not only the popular supernaturalism, but a light-hearted naturalism, threatens to dethrone reason; that reason is to be honored in every department of life and knowledge, and not only in matters of religion; and that the business of reason is not to supplant or domineer over feeling and will, but to insist that it should have its rightful and honorable place at their side.

We may agree consequently that the Pragmatist and the defender of Faith are justified in so far as they insist that one may reasonably revere other things than knowledge and that a critical attitude and the pursuit of truth do not sum up the aim of life, and the Rationalist will be justified in so far as he

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contends that life's complexity and the diversity of men's wants make it imperative that the reason shall be called in to investigate and to decide upon the many diverging claims put forward. Pragmatism thus ceases to be a wild man's country where all opinions are regarded as equally well-grounded, and Rationalism no more makes war on legitimate feelings and impulses. The fullest harmonious development of the individual and of society becomes accordingly the aim of the Pragmatist as of the Rationalist.

GUSTAV SPILLER.

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THE HEART OF MR. SPENCER'S ETHICS.

Many readers of Mr. Spencer's "Autobiography," already familiar with his philosophical writings, must have found themselves asking this question: Was Mr. Spencer's mind supremely interested in that process of universal evolution which he devoted his life to explaining, or in the mystery of that Creative Power which the human intellect fails to comprehend, or in the problem of human conduct conceived as man's conscious adaptation to the conditions of his existence? One must have studied Mr. Spencer's works and his life with more than usual diligence to answer this question with assurance.

It can, however, be answered. Numerous expressions throughout the "Synthetic Philosophy" indicate that Mr. Spencer regarded the formulation of a system of scientific ethics as the crowning achievement of intellectual effort, while the "Autobiography" and the personal recollections of his friends afford convincing evidence that from his earliest manhood until his death Mr. Spencer was ready under all circumstances to endure any hardship or to make any sacrifice that might be necessary to square his acts with the principles that he professed. If further proof were desired that Mr. Spencer regarded conduct as the supreme concern of mankind, it might be found in the unconcealed pain with which, in old age, he viewed the revival of militarism throughout the civilized world.

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I had long been convinced that the most direct avenue to the heart of Mr. Spencer's philosophy of life lay through his ideas upon the subject of militarism, and in a conversation with him in the summer of 1896 this opinion was confirmed. Almost the first thing that he said after greeting me was: "You have come on a day that is in some respects the most interesting of my life. This morning I wrote the last paragraph of the last chapter of the last volume of the 'Synthetic Philosophy.'" I asked him if his satisfaction was as profound as he had anticipated that it would be, if he should live to complete so vast an undertaking. He answered that it was sadly diminished by a regret and by a disappointment.

The regret, as he went on to say, was that he had misled many readers by his phrase, "The Unknowable." In writing the "First Principles" he had tried to make clear his view that "knowledge" is a word that is properly used only as a name for the products of intellectual processes, and that its meaning is not broad enough to include all that lies back of them, but the reality of which we are compelled to accept as absolute verity. Realizing now how inattentive even intelligent readers are, he was sorry that he had not, by fuller explanations or by a different phrasing, compelled the most careless of readers to understand that "The Unknowable" is such only in the sense that the Creative Power baffles every attempt of the intellect to formulate it in conceptual terms.

Keener, however, than this regret that the aged philosopher felt in having failed to make himself perfectly understood, was his disappointment in the world's progress. It seemed to him that human society, having developed through all the stages of militarism and of industrialism, until it was on the point of becoming a complex of voluntary activities and relations subject to that law of equal freedom which was set forth in "Social Statics," was apparently about to be put back, perhaps for a thousand years, by war and "regimentation."

The conversation following this confession revealed clearly that Mr. Spencer, abhorring theology and sure that neither he nor any other could "by searching find out God or know the Almighty," was yet a man of deep religious feeling, which

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found practical expression through a process of conversion into intense ethical interest. It was obvious, too, that in old age, as when in early life he wrote those most suggestive concluding chapters of the "Social Statics," Mr. Spencer was convinced that the problem of human character is inseparable from the problem of the habitual activities of socially organized groups.

Events have moved rapidly since 1896, and in reflecting upon them I have many times recalled Mr. Spencer's words, and have wondered why I did not think then, when I had so good an opportunity, to ask him to explain to me how he could reconcile his disappointment with his own explanation of the causes of militarism, whenever and wherever prevailing. I am now satisfied that there was a certain conflict between Mr. Spencer's philosophy and his feeling about the modern situation, and that it revealed better than any other one fact in his life or in his teaching the true nature of the man. There was a point beyond which he was unable to adapt his moral emotions to the logical requirements of his philosophical scheme.

The postulate of evolution, according to Mr. Spencer, is the equilibration of energy. Wherever a body highly charged with energy is in contact or communication with a body undercharged there must be a discharge from one to the other. Among organic species and in human populations equilibration becomes a conquest, an exploitation, or a transformation of the weak by the strong. So long as races, nations, political and economic classes remain widely unequal in any kind of strength, the process must continue. Or, if having for a time subsided because natural or artificial barriers to further contact have been reached, it must again begin whenever the barriers are broken through.

Mr. Spencer must have seen that the attainment of a relatively perfect form of liberal social organization in England, France and the United States in the first half of the nineteenth century was the result of prolonged military struggles and of class antagonisms, that had terminated, for the time being, in a balance of power among the nations, and in an approximate equality of economic and political opportunity within the state.

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He must have seen also that the extension of communication throughout the world would bring strong and weak races, western and eastern civilizations hitherto kept safely apart, into close contact, and would precipitate a transformation of the weak by the strong on a scale unprecedented; and that the exploitation of natural resources with the aid of scientific discovery and invention must revive the struggle between economic classes. And finally, he must have seen that only when these gigantic equilibrations shall be substantially completed can there be world-wide peace and a final disappearance of militarism with its correlated type of character.

Seeing and understanding all these things, as I am sure he must have done, Mr. Spencer's inability to look upon the process with equanimity and to reconcile himself to it without bitterness, was a crowning proof of the intensity of his abhorrence of all aggression. Believing that only through the widest possible liberty of the individual and through the maintenance of impartial justice can human happiness be attained, he could not look calmly upon the long and cruel struggle that the human race has yet to sustain, before universal equality of liberty and opportunity are established.

Nevertheless, the ideal that Mr. Spencer cherished is no vain dream. By his own showing all the forces of the universe make for its ultimate realization. Moreover, all that has been attained thus far of sympathy, of idealism, of liberty, will ameliorate the warfare that is yet before us. The equilibration of energy throughout the human population of the world will not, as in the past, inevitably take the form of an extermination, or even a ruthless exploitation, of the weak. More and more the energies of the strong will transform the weak in humane ways, above all by economic stimulation and educational uplifting. In this amelioration, that enlightenment of the human mind, and that wholesome bracing of moral purpose, to which Mr. Spencer's teaching, and still more his blameless life, were a noble contribution, will be no insignificant factors.

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

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BOOK REVIEWS.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF EUROPEAN POLITY. By Henry Sidgwick. London: Macmillan & Co., 1903, pp. xxvi, 454.

This book makes the third of the posthumous works of the late Professor Sidgwick, and of the three it is perhaps the most considerable. It has had the advantage of being most ably edited by his widow, and although in the matter of arrangement much seems to have been left to the editorial discretion, there can be few to whom the present book will not appear to do the utmost justice to the methodical and analytic thinking of the author. The experiment, it must be said, was at the best a trifle dangerous. To write so very serious a sketch of the political development of Greece and Rome and modern Western Europe, and to do so in the midst of constant application to other subjects in which a wide influence and a very rare distinction had been won, to give it to a public—from the nature of the subject more than usually mixed—who could not possibly be persuaded but that here it would of necessity find Cambridge history, in the broad sense, at its best,—this was, for one who was not a professional historian, confessed and marked by an innocence of speculative thought, to give many hostages to fortune. But for the fact that the attempt was first made in the form of lectures, and that Sidgwick never "stereotyped" his lectures, one might be inclined to doubt whether it would have been carried through. It is therefore with a peculiar interest that one reads Mrs. Sidgwick's explanation in the preface, that it had of late years been the author's view that a threefold treatment of politics is desirable for completeness, "first, an exposition analytical and deductive, such as he attempted in his work on the 'Elements of Politics'; secondly, an evolutionary study of the development of polity within the historic period in Europe . . . ; thirdly, a comparative study of the constitutions of Europe and its colonies in connection with the history of what may be called the constitution-making century which has just ended." And if the second of these three tasks seems too stupendous for the mere student of what is called Political Philosophy, the work before us is not the only reminder of the sterling and unexampled thoroughness of the late author. "With regard to the third point of view . . .

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it was a favorite idea of his, when he was making plans for the future, that he might reside abroad for some time in different countries successively, in order to learn on the spot not only what their constitutions were on paper, but what they were in fact—how they actually worked and what tendencies to development were operating. The scheme was perhaps too ambitious to have had, at Mr. Sidgwick's age, much chance of being carried out by him, but it is a scheme which, if adequately performed, ought to afford much interest and instruction." A critic of the work before us might well sum up with just such a reflection. It also, though in another way, is "perhaps too ambitious." As regards "an evolutionary study of the development of polity within the historic period in Europe, beginning with the earliest known Græco-Roman and Teutonic polity, and carried down to the modern state of Europe and its colonies as the last result of political evolution," there can, of course, be no talk of adequacy, But anyone who knows how broad and general are the only results yielded by Inductive Politics, how attractive and how popular are the generalisations which Freeman and Maine and Seeley have made current, how much in need of new analysis, how likely to be overlaid by reservations or to go to waste without them, may well consider that the substantial purpose of the book has been achieved. It is sometimes formal rather than "morphological" and cramped as well as severe. History on the large scale has not usually been quite so unrelenting. It might have been more viewy and no less true. But within the limits of its purpose and of its binding it is still Sidgwick at his best, the familiar analysis, the accustomed caution, the old, untiring effort of intellectual honesty dæmonically sustained. These things have not yet become a fetish in Political Philosophy. If ever they become so, then perhaps, if it was no bad criticism of Arnold upon Shakspeare that the sonnet was "almost adequate," it may be thought no bad criticism of Sidgwick on the development of polity that he was "perhaps too ambitious."

Meanwhile, one of the most conspicuous features of the book is its utility. A book has for some time been greatly needed which should bring together in a balanced and corrected form what the student has had to extract piecemeal out of the well-known works of Freeman or Seeley or Maine, out of histories written with no view to broad comparisons, and out of special essays in comparative politics such as those by Mr. Warde

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Fowler and Mr. Jenks. The relation between political history and political theory is, moreover, not forgotten. The value of such a survey as Professor Sidgwick attempted is specially enhanced by the fact that he expended much industry in placing the conclusions of previous writers not only in their most considered form, but also in the light of their mutual corrections, as well as of his own criticism. To illustrate this may bring out some important features of the book.

First, then, and as regards the starting point, we have a careful criticism of the way in which Freeman represents the earliest data of comparative politics—the "primitive Indo-Germanic polity" consisting of a king, a council, and an assembly. It is pointed out that affinities of language are a very imperfect guide to affinities of race, and that in speaking of an Indo-Germanic family of nations it is not implied that they are all derived from one stock, but only that they are connected with one ancient social group by a continuous social life evidenced by continuity of language and at least partly due to continuity of race. In Sidgwick's view, the polity of which Freeman speaks is not to be regarded as in any way peculiar to the Aryan race. Moreover, it is not primitive. The account of Tacitus does, that of Cæsar does not, show us the institution of kingship among the German tribes. Our earliest data show us here a movement *towards* kingship, and in any case the supreme authority appears to reside in an assembly of free warriors. The threefold institution would, therefore, seem *not* to be an "inheritance from the time when Greeks, Romans, and Teutons lived together."

As regards the Patriarchal Theory, it is not unnatural that this part of the work should take the form of a criticism of Maine. Readers of Morgan and McLennan must often have desired such a critical summary as is here given. Morgan's work, in many respects one of the most important books ever written in English on primitive society, suffers so badly from his peculiar use of the term "gens" that it can hardly be utilised to bring Maine's theories to the test of fact. McLennan's well-directed learning has much more unmistakable results. The facts of polyandry and the tracing of kinship through females are regarded in the later form of Maine's conclusions as aberrations, though possibly frequent aberrations, from the larger course of development. In truth, they tell much more heavily against the Patriarchal Theory than Maine admits. Sidgwick does not regard it as even

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decidedly most probable that any political society which we know historically was actually developed by the expansion of a single family. Not only is the "Cyclopean" family, based on sexual jealousy and physical force, very different from the Patriarchal, with its oldest living male ascendant bearing despotic sway, but there is no reason to suppose that the latter developed immediately out of the former, and the former may well not be primitive. Even where the Patriarchal family becomes established and has developed into the clan, the idea of "son representing father" hardly accounts for hereditary chieftainship.

Two other criticisms of "Ancient Law" may be added. The first has reference to Maine's account of Rousseau. Sidgwick shows that it adds quite a new paradox to the Contrat Social to suggest that for Rousseau the perfect social order could be and must be evolved from a consideration of the original or savage state. Admirer of the "noble savage" Rousseau certainly was, but he did not regard *droit naturel* as realised in the original state of man. He does not endow "original man" with the passions and conflict of an intolerable and exaggerated Civil War, making life "nasty, brutish, and short," but he is at one with Hobbes in holding that in this state man has no notion of *jus* or *droit* at all. "The original state of nature, though it is, if not perhaps the happiest, at any rate the freest from inequality, is certainly not a state in which *jus naturæ* is realised."

Again, Maine regards Montesquieu's influence as opposed to and overborne by Rousseau's. Sidgwick sides with Janet in holding that the "Esprit des Lois" may be classed with the "Contrat Social" as forming part of the literary source and spring of the Revolution. The doctrine of the relativity of forms of government does not do any very vigorous battle against republicanism. The principle of a republic, for Montesquieu, is political virtue; and this idea "may be called the main historical element of French Revolutionary thought; and perhaps it did as much even as the idea of natural liberty and equality and the idea of the inalienable and indivisible sovereignty of the people to rouse the fire of revolutionary ardour."

Generalisations are indeed part of the author's program. Examples are: a comparison of the parts played by monarchical despotism in Greece and Rome (p. 65); by town and country in ancient and modern Europe (p. 67); the influence of religion on the history of the Greek city-states (p. 219); the "most general

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statement" of the type of political organisation in the feudal period (p. 213).

George Claus Rankin.

London.

Morals: a Treatise on the Psycho-Sociological Bases of Ethics. By Professor G. L. Duprat. Translated by W. J. Greenstreet, M. A., F. R. A. S. London: The Walter Scott Publishing Co., Ltd., 1903, pp. xv, 382.

This is by no means a striking or remarkable book, but it is very sensible, and both interesting and suggestive, and not least so as illustrating some of the perplexities of ethical thought at the present day.

It is to be regretted that the translation is not more satisfactory. A long list of passages—awkwardly rendered or wrongly rendered—might be drawn up, and also many cases of carelessness in statement of references in the footnotes might be noticed. Our limits, however, will only permit of a general indication of Professor Duprat's main problem, and of the principles underlying his attempted solution.

Stated briefly, his problem is as follows: What can guarantee stability in Morals? The ideas of good and evil, of justice and injustice, of what is lawful and what is forbidden, seem more and more to be granted a merely conventional or even provisional worth; and the "social conscience," the moral ideas and sentiments of the community as such, seem to be in a state of hesitation, wavering, and uncertainty. Religion and Philosophy are powerless to afford to the age the moral stability which it needs. Substitutes like Utilitarianism and the Religion of Humanity have been proved failures.

In the main, these statements may be accepted. The failure of what has been called, in the English-speaking world, "Moral Philosophy" is almost impressive. And in the interesting but singularly ineffective development of "Idealism" in the last quarter of the nineteenth century we have a mode of thought whose accredited exponents usually define "Ethical Theory" in such a way as to make it devoid of all practical significance.*

* This is implied in the constant contention that it is not the business of Ethical Theory to lay down *any* "rule of conduct." Professor Bosanquet goes so far as to stigmatise as "Casuistry" any attempt to derive guiding principles from "Ethical Science."

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What, then, does M. Duprat propose? His hope is that moral unity will be realized if Ethics can be based on Science in general or on one of the Sciences in particular. He does in fact bring himself face to face with the question that presses hardly on every reformer of moral theory who talks of finding a "scientific" basis. Go beneath phrases to meanings: have you really found a "scientific" basis, in the true sense of the words, which can be put in the place of the foundation said to be crumbling away? Great carelessness both of thought and expression prevails among writers on this subject at the present time; and Sidgwick's reiterated criticism of Spencer might be given a wider range. M. Duprat does well to point out the abuse of terms involved in qualifying as "scientific" an ethic which is connected with a scientific theory of doubtful value. Of Spencer he observes: "Mr. Spencer has neglected to show that to obey the law of evolution is a duty; hence he has failed in one of the first obligations which are imposed on a moralist—that of laying down the obligation" (p. 47). Knowledge of Nature is not sufficient for a basis; "it cannot enable us to evolve new types; it cannot lead to important modifications; it cannot show us the necessity of innovation and invention" (p. 24). And "invention" is as indispensable in Morality as in Science or Industry. This striking admission is not of any importance for the further development of the author's position. In the end we find him minimising to the utmost the value of individual invention in morality. He refuses to ascribe any importance to the work of the prophet. He makes moral ideas a function of the social life, and nothing more.

It is when the last-mentioned statement is made into an "exclusive proposition," as here, that (in the opinion of the present writer, and possibly of many others) it ceases to be an important ethical principle and becomes a source of serious fallacies. It becomes, in fact, equivalent to the doctrine, which Mr. G. E. Moore has recently criticised most effectively, that in the moral unity "the part has no significance or meaning apart from its whole" (*Principia Ethica*, p. 34). All that Professor Duprat says in support of it is to repeat the stale metaphor of the "health of the organism" being necessarily connected with the "health of the element"; and to proceed to show what no one denies, that the higher human faculties are social faculties. Nevertheless, on other grounds, the whole treatment here given to the "socio-

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logical" aspects of Ethics may be heartily welcomed, as showing the utter insufficiency of what Spencer called "the Biological view" either for a basis for Ethics or for an explanation of the moral characteristics of humanity. This last conclusion is indirectly involved in the author's discussion.

Professor Duprat's fundamental principle is stated as follows: "As long as we confine ourselves to representing Nature as inevitably obeying certain laws, then we are at liberty to consider ourselves as outside that blind Nature which is the sport of fatality; no obligation is imposed on us. But as soon as human thought is exhibited to us as in its turn obeying certain laws, conceiving a principle as necessary and therefore as obligatory (the principle of seeking everywhere for causes, or that of establishing out of every diversity a system), from that moment a duty is laid down. . . . The idea of rational activity is imposed on us, because, owing to our mental constitution, we cannot form any other conception; the idea of that rational activity embraces the idea of system, and involves as *duty in general* the obligation of realising in the whole domain of human life a system of systems, a perfect co-ordination of all the individual and social functions" (p. 48). In the light of this general definition of moral action, he proceeds to study the psychological and the sociological conditions of morality. We cannot admit that the desired scientific basis has been found. M. Duprat in effect takes "systematic action" as the essence (in the Aristotelian sense) of man, and he has not succeeded in showing the connection between this abstract idea and the discussion of particular moral problems which follows.

It would be quite unjust to conclude without saying that the discussion of the details of social life is the most interesting part of the book. There is hardly any social question in the air at the present day which is not touched on in a suggestive way, and some of these questions are really illuminated.

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Bushido, The Soul of Japan. An Exposition of Japanese Thought. By Inazo Nitobé, A. M., Ph. D. The Leeds & Biddle Co., Philadelphia, 1900. Pp. ix, 127.

At a time when the world is watching the sad spectacle of two civilized nations engaged in a bloody fight, bent on crippling and

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humiliating each other by the destruction of human life and valuable property, the reading of this little book dealing with the knighthood of one of them has a peculiar interest. It is at once disturbing and reassuring. "Scratch a Japanese of the most advanced ideas," says the author, "and he will show a Samurai." But he adds, "If you would plant a new seed in his heart, stir deep the sediment which has accumulated there for ages." Bushido means "the ways of the knight." It is the term for chivalry; it designates the code of honor of the Samurai or warrior class. Dr. Nitobé speaks with the authority of a man intimately acquainted with the institution he describes. Though manifestly influenced by his occidental environment, the non-feudal type of social life, democracy, and Christianity in the form of Quakerism, he has preserved a deep sympathy with the ancient system of the Mikado's empire and its chief support, the warrior class with its peculiar training. He looks upon Buddhism and Shintoism as the sources of Bushido. The former contributed "a calm trust in fate, quiet submission to the inevitable, stoic composure in sight of danger or calamity, disdain of life and friendliness with death." The latter furnished "loyalty to the sovereign, reverence for ancestral memory and filial piety." Moral reflection was also encouraged by Shintoism. In the Shinto shrines, which are devoid of all objects or instruments of worship, there always is a mirror in which the visitor may behold his face as an aid to serious introspection. Dr. Nitobé presents the moral principles which the knights were required or instructed to observe. Among them are rectitude or justice, courage, benevolence, politeness, veracity, self-control, and loyalty. Their code of honor prescribed self-inflicted death as a penalty for certain delinquencies and made revenge a duty. The author gives a gruesome description of the ceremony by which a knight would publicly disembowel himself. The system caused suicide to flourish. Dr. Nitobé rightly compares the attitude of the Stoics on this question. He freely admits that under the continued influence of Bushido, woman's life has been made a perpetual self-sacrifice. "It is sometimes laid to the charge of our sex," he says, "that we enslaved womankind." His defense is: "I have once heard Socrates called the slave of conscience; if slavery means simply obedience or surrender of one's will, there is an honorable slavery in life; woman's surrender of herself to the good of the home and family was as willing and

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honorable as the man's self-surrender to the good of his lord and country." How voluntary this self-surrender was may be judged from the statement that "from earliest youth she was taught to deny herself." He fears that if woman should be granted rights of her own, it would be at "a loss of that sweetness of disposition, that gentleness of manner which are her present heritage," and criticises "the individualism of the Anglo-Saxon" which "cannot let go of the idea that husband and wife are two persons" and have "separate rights" that should be recognized. Though the feudal system was broken up, the spirit of the Precepts of Knighthood continued to be felt, according to the author, not less in the universal politeness of the people than in the physical endurance, fortitude and bravery of the soldiers and the universal loyalty to the throne and patriotism. To the same source he also traces the great transformation whose strongest motive was "the sense of honor which cannot bear being looked upon as an inferior power." Some defects, such as the distaste for philosophical speculation, "the exaggerated sensitiveness and touchiness," and possibly a tendency to conceit, are also referred to the same cause. The author believes that "Christian missions have done and will do great things for Japan—in the domain of education, and especially of moral education," but thinks that "Christianity, in its American and English form—with more of Anglo-Saxon freaks and fancies than grace and purity of the founder—is a poor scion to graft on Bushido stock." A new ethics he deems unavoidable. Like its symbolic flower, the cherry blossom, Bushido may die "at the first gust of the morning breeze," but after it is blown to the four winds, it will still bless mankind with its perfume. The volume is dedicated to an uncle who taught the author "to revere the past and to admire the deeds of the Samurai." The characteristic Japanese design that graces the cover was made by Miss Anna C. Hartshorne.

NATHANIEL SCHMIDT.

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THE PHILOSOPHY OF AUGUSTE COMTE. By L. Lévy-Bruhl. Authorized translation, to which is prefixed an Introduction by Frederic Harrison, M. A. London: Swan Sonnenschein. 1903, pp. xiv, 363.

A translation of M. Lévy-Bruhl's masterly exposition of the philosophy of Comte ought to be heartily welcomed by English

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readers. According to Mr. Harrison "no one abroad or at home, certainly neither Mill, nor Lewes, nor Spencer, nor Caird, has so truly grasped and assimilated Comte's ideas as M. Lévy-Bruhl has done." And, apart from any such comparisons, there can certainly be no difference of opinion as to the extraordinary merits of the work. It unites in a remarkable degree breadth of treatment with definiteness and lucidity. And as the author not only possesses this gift for exposition, but has the fullest sympathy with his subject, he is able to present a view of Comte's philosophy as a whole which will be something like a revelation to any who are accustomed to take Comte's name as standing either for a superficial generalisation as to the three stages of thought or for the preposterous invention of a new religion.

With the religious side of Comte's system M. Lévy-Bruhl does not concern himself. Not that he accepts the criticism which would sever the religion from the philosophy. On the contrary, he upholds the unity of Comte's doctrine as a whole. But he exercises his right as a historian to distinguish in the light of the subsequent movement of thought between what is of more, and what is of less, enduring philosophical interest.

"The object of the present work," he explains, "is to study Comte's philosophy properly so called, leaving aside the transformation of this philosophy into religion. The choice which we thus make is not an arbitrary one, since, in order to justify it, we have the distinction formally established by Comte himself, when he admits that his philosophy and his religion might have been the work of two different persons.

"It will perhaps be asked in what our position differs from that of Littré, and of the 'incomplete positivists.' By the difference, we shall answer, which separates the historical from the dogmatic point of view. It is from the latter point of view that Littré and his friends reject the 'systematisation of the feelings,' the subjective method, and the religion of Humanity. It is as positivists that they connect themselves with the first half of the doctrine, and that they exclude the second half. But we are here working from the historical point of view, and the historian, while using his right to define the limits of his work, has nothing to exclude from the doctrine which he sets forth. As a matter of fact, far from claiming with Littré that the second part of Comte's work weakens and contradicts the first, we have recog-

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nised that they both form a whole of which he had drawn out the plan in his early writings. . . .

"But then, why only study the first of the two careers, why not respect the integrity of that whole which, according to us, Littré ought not to have disregarded? We do respect it, for we do not arbitrarily exclude from the doctrine any of the parts which Comte included in it. If we make the philosophy proper the sole object of this study, in it we shall ever have before our minds the idea of the greater whole in which Comte placed it. On this condition alone, our study will be accurate. But once this condition is fulfilled we do not consider that we exceed our right in concentrating our effort upon the philosophy" (pp. 14, 15).

As an exposition M. Lévy-Bruhl's work must be allowed to be masterly. And since he confines himself almost wholly to sympathetic exposition there is little more to be said. Those who come to the study of the Positive Philosophy from other points of view are hardly likely to accept all the claims which M. Lévy-Bruhl, speaking as its expositor, makes on its behalf. And when they compare the very exalted philosophical rank which he is apparently prepared to assign to Comte as the founder of sociology, and therefore of Positive Philosophy, with the admissions later on that Comte "believed this new science to be far more advanced by his own labors than it was in reality" and that "Sociologists at present believe that almost everything remains to be done," they will probably feel that his estimate of Comte's historic importance is exaggerated or, to say the least, premature. He compares Comte's relation to sociology with that of Descartes to physical science. Just as Descartes conceived a mathematical ideal of physical science, so Comte, he would say, conceived a positive ideal of social science. But perhaps it will be time enough to make the comparison when sociology has got beyond the stage of being merely an ideal. It will then be easier to know exactly what is meant by a "theoretical science of the individual and social nature of man, constituted by means of a purely positive method" to which "pædagogy, rational economy, politics, and in general all the social arts in the future will be subordinated"; and easier also to estimate the philosophical value of the conception of such a science.

The translation is very readable, and, so far as may be con-

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jectured without comparison with the original, appears to be almost always well and carefully done. There are slips here and there which it does not need comparison to detect, but the only thing one cares to mention is the use, irritating because it recurs so incessantly, of "to" instead of "for" after the verb "substitute," *e. g.*, "substitute the relative *to* the absolute point of view. Mr. Harrison's Introduction [or Note, as it is afterwards more appropriately called] is, he explains, a notice of the book, written on the appearance of the French original and now reprinted nearly as written.

HENRY BARKER.

EDINBURGH.

THE CRITICS OF HERBARTIANISM AND OTHER MATTERS CONTRIBUTORY TO THE STUDY OF THE HERBARTIAN QUESTION. By F. H. Hayward, D. Lit., M. A., B. Sc. (Lond.), B. A. (Cantab), assisted by M. E. Thomas, Battersea Polytechnic. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1903.

HERBART AND THE HERBARTIAN THEORY OF EDUCATION, A CRITICISM. By Alexander Darroch, M. A. London and New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1903.

There is a certain amount of similarity in the contents of these two volumes, but they differ essentially in purpose and in method of treatment. Dr. Hayward writes as a professed and enthusiastic Herbartian, and in reproducing the criticisms of others he does so with the object of showing that "as the system is grounded upon many a deep moral and psychological truth, though its outworks may fall to ruin, its main walls will surely stand" (p. 17). Professor Darroch, on the contrary, is a firm opponent of the doctrines he regards as fundamental to Herbartianism, and he writes with a conviction which derives its strength from a definite philosophical position of his own—a position which it is the positive aim of his book to enforce and recommend. Equally marked with this difference in aim is a difference in method of treatment. Professor Darroch gives us a continuous and sustained argument, Dr. Hayward a series of disconnected, and not entirely consistent, summaries. Fourteen sets of criticisms are summarized, and the one principle of arrangement is that of authors' names. It seems to us that a systematic treatment under topics would have been more helpful to the reader.

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Dr. Hayward precedes these summaries by an Introduction of some thirty-five pages, a Historical Survey of about forty pages, and an account of Herbartian Literature in English of some eleven pages. In the introduction we have some enthusiastic advocacy of Herbartianism, but no definite setting forth of the doctrines against which the criticisms reproduced in Part IV are directed, still less any systematic attempt to justify them. "To the writer, the system founded by Herbart is a moral gospel for men perishing through stupidity and absence of ideas" (p. 6). "Extinguish Herbartianism and you extinguish for a century the hopes of Education" (p. vi). It is true that "to claim Herbartianism as a remedy for all the evils which afflict mankind would be veritable folly" (p. 13), but evidently Dr. Hayward believes they will never be cured without Herbartianism.

When such large claims are made we are justified in asking what exactly is meant by Herbartianism. And this is not very easy to answer from Dr. Hayward. As Professor Darroch points out, there are two main divisions in the Herbartian camp—those who accept Herbart's philosophical position and regard his ethics and psychology as the bases of the pedagogical system, and those "who prefer to follow the spirit of their master rather than *definitely* pin their faith to his doctrines with their metaphysical and psychological foundations" (pp. 4, 5). In spite of the passage quoted above, Dr. Hayward belongs to the latter of these classes. But it is not apparent how far he rejects Herbart's doctrines, or what he would substitute in their place. Thus in one place we read, "Herbartianism, with all its faults, is a *system*, apparently the only educational system in existence which has at the same time a definite psychology, a vast and fairly coherent mass of literature . . . above all, the power of raising enthusiasm" (p. 52). And on p. 39, in an "Outline of Herbart's Doctrines," we are told that "teachers must know psychology. . . . But *which* psychology? Herbart's." Yet on p. 31 "be it remembered, the Herbartian principles of education were, after all, never *deduced* from the doctrine of the presentation-mechanism. Critics who forget this merely tilt at windmills." And on p. 209 Professor Darroch's criticism is said to be marked by "persistent irrelevancy," because he regards the psychology as "the foundation of the pedagogy." This charge Dr. Hayward thinks is established by pointing out that "Herbart's psychology was elaborated years

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after his chief educational works were written" (p. 209). It is of course true that, with the important exception of the "Lectures on Pedagogy," Herbart published his educational writings before his books on psychology. But surely it will not be urged that Herbart had no general psychological position before he published works on the subject. It may be true, as Dr. Hayward quotes from Professor James, that "the pedagogics and the psychology ran side by side, and the former was not derived in any sense from the latter" (p. 209). But is it not equally true that, as Professor James goes on to say, "everywhere the teaching must *agree* with the psychology"? And if the psychology is not an integral part of Herbartianism, what is meant by saying that "the Herbartians are . . . fully alive to the dangers of their presentational psychology" (p. 21)? Dr. Hayward's position seems to be that "Herbart's psychology may be incorrectly based, yet for the teacher it may be the best psychology in existence" (p. 31), for "the educator must, in large measure, view his pupil as a presentation-mechanism and nothing else" (p. 28). This seems to us to mean that a teacher will do better work if he holds a false view of child nature—or even pretends to hold it, knowing it to be false—than if he holds a true view. If it does not mean this, we are at a loss to see what it does mean. In short, we cannot grant that the psychology is a detachable adjunct to Herbartianism. As Professor Darroch says, "It needs to be emphasised at the present day that educational practice is explicitly, but more often implicitly, based on educational theory, and that every educational theory is founded not merely on a psychology of mental development, but on some philosophical theory as to the meaning and value of human life" (pp. vi, vii). This indeed is the teaching of Herbart himself, for he says in the *Lectures*, "Education as a science is based on practical philosophy and psychology" (*Felkin's Trans.*, p. 102). To suppose with Dr. Hayward that "the student can, if he choose, supply the supposed deficiencies of Herbartianism by adding correlative spiritual factors . . . and he can, with a clear conscience, call himself a reformed Herbartian" (p. 33) seems to us to show either confusion of thought or a remarkable disregard of the necessity for consistency. Between the conceptions of the mental life as teleological and as built up from the outside by presentations there is, as Vogel shows, a definite opposition (*Hayward*, p. 140), and the only sense in which the one conception can be added on to the other is when

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presentationism is degraded from the position it claims in Herbart and is given the lower place of a metaphorical description of one aspect of mental life, and that not the most important aspect. Unless "Herbartian" is to connote some definite view of the nature of life, we cannot see what is gained by using the term to designate a school of educational thought and practice. That much in Herbartian practice is good and suggestive no competent observer would deny. That Herbartians do well in insisting on the value of interest and systematic knowledge may be granted, with the reservation that "interest" is not used in a sense which accords with Herbart's psychology, and that knowledge is not the sole, or even the chief, deciding factor in conduct. But to say that all who hold such doctrines as these are Herbartians seems to us to be playing with terms. Yet this is what Dr. Hayward apparently claims on p. 53 of his "Student's Herbart." That the German critics of Herbartianism have regarded the pedagogy as essentially connected with the ethics and the psychology is abundantly evident from Dr. Hayward's summary of their objections. At any rate, when Herbartianism is offered us as a "gospel," it would be well to explain definitely and explicitly what view of life it sets forth. If it is the practical identification of knowledge with virtue and the derivation of feeling and will from the "circle of thought," then the essence of the Herbartian psychology is implicitly there; if it is not this, we ask what is to replace it. And to this question we can find no answer in Dr. Hayward.

We have confined our remarks to this one question because it seems to us to be the one essential point at issue between the Herbartians and their opponents. It follows that we do not agree with Dr. Hayward in thinking Professor Darroch's line of criticism "irrelevant." Nor does it seem to us that the charge of plagiarism is proved by a series of such points of resemblance as are shown to exist between Professor Darroch's book and "The Student's Herbart." Anyhow, we find nothing in the latter book corresponding to the sustained and incisive criticism Professor Darroch gives us. In Dr. Hayward's opinion, "Mr. Darroch has nothing fresh, original, or stimulating to present to the teachers of Britain" (p. 213). We can only say that we do not agree with Dr. Hayward. Professor Darroch's criticisms are not "fresh" in the sense of never having been made before, but then neither are many of those Dr. Hayward summarises for us. But they are

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urged clearly and incisively, and above all they are set forth in the light of a very positive theory—that human life is purposive and that its unity is fundamentally a unity of purpose, not of presentations. This we hold to be stimulating doctrine for the teachers of Britain, or any others who care for the meaning of life.

J. WELTON.

UNIVERSITY OF LEEDS.

SOME ETHICAL PHASES OF THE LABOR QUESTION. By Hon. Carroll D. Wright. Boston: American Unitarian Association, 1903, pp. 207.

Under the above title, Mr. Wright discusses "Religion in Relation to Sociology," "The Relation of Political Economy to the Labor Question," "The Factory as an Element in Civilization," and "The Ethics of Prison Labor." In the treatment of these questions there is evinced a high ethical ideal, a rational and well-balanced sympathy with the laboring class, and a strong conviction that the labor problem will never be solved until ethical principles dominate alike the employers and the employed. Mr. Wright forcibly maintains that in all dealings of man with man the ethical factor is of prime importance; that, therefore, in dealing with sociological problems, and so also in economics—a branch of sociology—the ethical aspect of the question in hand must ever be brought to the front. Indeed, no truth is more important to the student of social and economic problems, to the practical business man, and to the laborer and labor organizations, than that *all* relations between man and man are fundamentally relations between spiritual, and thereby ethical, beings. As such each man should be treated as an end in himself and not as a mere means or commodity. Until this view is taken a permanent solution of sociological problems must remain an unrealized dream.

In discussing the relation between religion and sociology the sphere of each is kept quite distinct, while at the same time they are recognized to be correlated forces acting upon human life and destiny (p. 7). Both are considered to be concerned with the ideal of life, which is taken to be the greatest happiness of all—a principle, by the way, which can be accepted as an ethical ideal only with important qualifications. But not only are religion and sociology correlated, though distinct, they are also inseparable. For while sociology gives us a scientific study of facts, it is the province of religion to act as a guiding norm to the conduct in

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and through which the facts are expressed. By religion it is evident that we are not to understand any dogmatic religion, but that type of practical Christianity which is synonymous with practical ethics and which says, "Bear ye one another's burdens"; put yourself in the place of others in all your dealings, in every relation which you sustain in social life.

In the chapter on "The Relation of Political Economy to the Labor Question," the inseparableness of economics and ethics is clearly and strongly emphasized, not only in the practical relations of economic life, but also in economic theory. The school of thinkers and writers represented by the classical English economists, who would wholly separate economics from ethics, is criticised as representing only a half truth, while the school represented by Sismondi, Chalmers, and Ruskin, who would make economics a branch of practical ethics, is warmly and strongly commended. Indeed, with the latter school, represented at the beginning of the nineteenth century by Dr. Chalmers, and to-day by a growing number of European and American economists, Mr. Wright finds himself in hearty accord. "I am proud," he says, "to sit at the feet of these new teachers, and to declare my allegiance to such doctrines, which are the need of the world to-day so far as economic questions are concerned. They recognise as fundamental elements of political economy the humanity of the world and its moral conditions, becaue the best humanity is to be found where the best morality prevails" (p. 35). And, so we are told, only as economics abandons heathen *laissez-faire* for the new economics of moral considerations, will it escape the just censure of a Carlyle and command the respect of mankind.

In the relations of labor, particularly in the conditions of labor contracts, the new economics is to find its most fruitful field for application. Especially will it insist upon a distinction between labor and commodities, between contracts for the service of persons and contracts for the use of material things. "In the recent past, social philosophy has become more and more cognizant of the distinctions between the exchange of commodities and the contract for services; and mildew will strike that political economy which denies the validity of the distinction" (p. 65). Again, "Political economy needs new life, a warmer blood, and a more thorough appreciation of the sinews of production; and, when this appreciation comes to it, or is forced upon it, the science will become a moral philosophy as well, and many of the dark places

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in the life of labor will be bright and luminous with the light of prosperity" (p. 66).

In other words, the new economics concerns itself with something more than with mere wealth relations. Its subject-matter embraces all that is vital in the relations of men. Its eye is ever towards the beacon light of justice. Not satisfied with asking, "Does it pay?" it insists upon the question, "Is it right?" (p. 37). Still further, it shifts the place of emphasis in the study of economic questions. Instead of regarding production as the most important branch of economics, as was taught by the early economists, or distribution, as taught by the socialists, the new school of economics will find its most important field of study in the use, or consumption, of wealth; since it is the consumption of wealth that tells most vitally upon the moral, social, and intellectual progress of a people.

That economic doctrine guided by ethical ideals is not an impracticable utopia, but capable of successful application in the business world, the author shows by citing the experience of Owen at New Lanark, in Scotland, the Briggs Brothers in England, the Cheney Brothers in Connecticut, the Lowell Mills in Massachusetts, the Fairbanks Company in Vermont, and says hundreds of others might be mentioned.

We have space to say but a word respecting the chapters on the Factory and on Prison Labor. Mr. Wright gives a fresh statement of his well-known position that the factory, instead of having a degrading influence, pressing its workers down to a lower social stratum, as many have supposed, is upon the whole a powerful agency of civilization with a constantly uplifting influence, economic, moral, and intellectual. In fact, he considers it to be one of the great agencies of modern society whereby the lowest and poorest classes of the population have been lifted to higher standards of life—to better conditions of culture and comfort. It is pointed out that the conditions of employment in the modern factory, and the general economic welfare of the factory hands, are far superior to the conditions of the hand workers before the introduction of the factory system—a fact well understood by students of economic history, but little understood by the general public.

In his study of the Ethics of Prison Labor, Mr. Wright considers the question from the point of view of the general public, the convict, and the laborer. While strongly advocating the

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reform methods of treating the convict, inaugurated by Howard, we are told that "there is not so much reformable material in prisons as philanthropists and others would have us believe" (p. 206); that many who are sent to prison should instead be sent to asylums for the insane and feeble-minded; that those sent to prison should be treated with a view to curing a moral and a physical disease; and that the employment of convicts should be so directed as to produce the best effects upon the prisoner, and at the same time interfere as little as possible with prices and wages.

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ORGANIZED LABOR: Its Problems, Purposes, and Ideals, and The Present and Future of American Wage Earners. By John Mitchell. Philadelphia: American Book and Bible House, 1903, pp. 436.

Almost the chief characteristic of this volume is its conservatism. There is scarcely a line in its 436 pages to indicate any reckless disregard for society as now organised. This quality of the book can best be shown by extracts that may be found in nearly every chapter. "The world does not owe a man a living but the man owes it to himself." . . . "I wish to see the interests and ideals of labor and capital fairly reconciled, not by surrender but by mutual understanding, and to see the rights of all parties—the workman, the employer, and the public—clearly, completely, and unmistakably recognised."

Few economists recognise more fully the immense progress made by labor since Colonial days, or give more fairly the reasons for this progress. "In the amount of his wages, in the length of his working day, in the things he can buy and the leisure he can enjoy, in his legal rights and political privileges, in his skill, intelligence, enlightenment, and self direction, and finally in the esteem in which he is held and the humanity with which he is treated, the workingman of America to-day is infinitely better off than was his remote ancestor before the Revolution."

There is full recognition, moreover, of the other causes which have led to this result besides the influence of trade unions. "These advances have not been due wholly to trade unionism. The greater skill and effectiveness of workmen, the invention of machinery, the improvement and increased productions of manufacturing, have all contributed to this result."

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It is because of the wastefulness and stupidity of strikes that Mr. Mitchell lays much stress on the Educational value of the joint-agreement.

It is a pity that every employer could not be led—one might almost say forced—to read this book. Such chapters as the tenth, on "The Constitution of the American Trade Union," would show to most men who can be taught anything what the educational value of the trade union must be, in spite of every weakness and vice that can be charged against it.

It is true that the author deals with the best features of these organizations. He touches very lightly the most serious evils in the movement for which he stands. The critics of trade unions have, however, no lack of knowledge as to these evils, while the positive service, the disciplinary, educational value are as a sealed book to most outside persons.

If one would like to enforce all employers to read the book, not less would one like to force all trade unionists to read it. The author is perhaps intellectually closer to the most intelligent employers than he is to his own average followers. To the extent that these are led to read his book and to be influenced by it, the result will be altogether good.

The grosser "labor-illusions" are met without any flinching. For example, no one of them casts a heavier shadow than the illusion that there is only a certain quantum of work; that if any member of the unions does more than a given amount he is therefore "hogging it" and depriving others of their due measure of work. Note how the author meets this. "This belief in a definite amount of work to be distributed occasionally tends to make a workman go slow with the job in order to make it last longer. . . . For the whole of society, however, this theory is not true. The man who earns large wages in a blacksmith's shop creates a demand for labor when he spends his wages in shoes, clothes, furniture, or in books, and a large production tends to make his product cheaper. . . . To render work more expensive merely for the sake of restricting output is to lessen the amount of work that will be done, and it is only by doing a fair day's work that a fair day's wages can be permanently maintained."

This illustrates the competence and the admirable spirit of this excellent volume.

JOHN GRAHAM BROOKS.

CAMBRIDGE, MASS.

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HUMANISM. Philosophical Essays. By F. C. S. Schiller, Fellow and Tutor of Corpus Christi College, Oxford. London: Macmillan & Co., 1903, xxv, 297.

The fifteen more or less disconnected essays which form this book are intended to advocate the latest philosophy, Pragmatism, which Mr. Schiller has renamed Humanism. Most of them are critical; and some of the criticisms—e. g., of Lotze's Monism (Essay IV) and some in the Essay on Preserving Appearances—are sound. But the truth of these is quite independent of the Humanism element, which, judging from the preface, is the most important part of the book. But what that element is and means it is indeed difficult to understand; and Mr. Schiller, by the wantonness and vulgarity of much of his writing, has prevented any sympathetic attempt to do so. Mr. Schiller is no doubt right in protesting against the absolutist philosophies; but he should have adopted a better tone.

But Humanism, the philosophy which he recommends, is something far worse. "There are not really any eternal and non-human truths to prohibit us from adopting the belief we need to live by" (xvii). "With common sense Humanism will ever keep in touch, by dint of refusing to value or validate the products of merely speculative analyses, void of purpose and of use." But Mr. Schiller elsewhere asserts that all cognition is teleological (10). The first essay is an attempt to prove that there is a supremacy of "good" over "true" and "real." Reality is a response to a will to know. All our thought is purposive. "The response to our questions is always affected by their character, and that is in our power." "Reality is not determinate but determinable." "The eternal 'truths' are postulates, and theoretical principles, like practical, get their meaning from their use; they are called true, if they prove useful." The main proposition of Humanism seems to be that "what is useful is true, and what is true is useful." But on p. 147 we read that "there is everywhere in the sciences a tendency to forget that methodological assumptions are not necessarily true because they are useful." Mr. Schiller would have us believe that usefulness is the only criterion of truth. The fifth essay, upon Non-Euclidean geometry and the Kantian *a priori* shows that the validity of Euclidean geometry is empirical. Mr. Schiller says it is true because it is useful when applied. The sixth essay, on the Metaphysics of the Time

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Process, criticises the philosophies which deny the reality of time. "The defects of our thought symbols for reality should stimulate us to improve them," not to reject as unreal what they symbolise, because they are self-contradictory. "Scientific 'laws' are methodological devices for practical purposes. Ethics as a science of ends conditions metaphysics." The seventh essay, on Reality and Idealism, asserts the same doctrine. The criteria of reality have only a practical value. But Mr. Schiller elsewhere (p. 10) says that "real" means real for certain purposes. And he gives no means of determining what purposes should be our purposes. The next essay, on Darwinism and Design, contains some obvious cautions against the idea that the theory of Natural Selection has completely destroyed the argument from design. There is one false assertion (on p. 134) that "on the Darwinian assumption only those qualities can be developed which have a value for survival." The twelfth essay, on Activity and Substance, recommends the Aristotelian *ἐνεργεία* as the true substance. *Ἐνεργεία ἀκινησιας* is a scientific conception of heaven and eternity. But Mr. Schiller does not see that interaction is possible only in time (p. 218). And perhaps this is a suitable place for pointing out that Mr. Schiller is not justified in using the word interaction (and many others), unless he admits the truth of the law of causality. For the truth of that law can alone justify any assertion about cause and effect or interaction. If its truth is a postulate, it is a postulate for a certain purpose. Mr. Schiller should explain exactly what purpose.

The essay on the Desire for Immortality suggests causes for the indifference of men to the question of immortality. The fourteenth essay attempts to shew that immortality is an ethical postulate. Mr. Schiller does not see that morality is the adaptation of means to known ends. The last essay contains some general remarks upon the investigation of the questions whether we are immortal.

The main theme of "Humanism" would seem to be the assertion that all truths are postulates, and that we can postulate anything which is necessary to enable us to live. (This seems to be the meaning of "usefulness.") But Mr. Schiller's theory does not explain how it is possible to know what is useful. Evolution, it seems, will tell. But evolution is itself a postulate. And so we are driven round with never an answer as to the end of it all. The law of causality is only true because it is useful to explain

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reality; because that explanation is useful. That is, that the usefulness of the explanation is the ground of the "truth" of the law of causality. But Mr. Schiller can only assert that the explanation is useful if he admits the validity of the law of causality. For useful means productive of some good, being the cause of some good effect; and Mr. Schiller can only assert that anything is the cause of anything else if he admits the validity of the law of causality.

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THE CHRIST IDEAL: A STUDY OF THE SPIRITUAL TEACHINGS OF JESUS. By Horatio W. Dresser. New York and London: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1901. Pp. 150.

This little volume seeks to present the ideal for which "the Christ" stands. There are three ways of approaching such a task. One may attempt, by literary and historical criticism of the gospel records, to find out what Jesus actually said and did, in order to gain a knowledge of his aims and ideals, his spirit and his character. If this way is entered and resolutely followed, the conclusion is almost inevitably reached that the term "Messiah" or "Christ," applied, in its historical sense, to Jesus of Nazareth is a misnomer. He never claimed to be the Messiah, never accepted for himself any Messianic title, never allowed his disciples to say that he was the Messiah, never uttered a word that justifies the assumption that he cherished in secret any ambition to become a Messiah. The whole trend of his teaching and life as a prophet ran contrary to the Messianic ideal. His words and deeds suggest ideals of a nobler social order, conceived of as the coming kingdom of heaven on earth, and of a worthier moral and religious attitude in view of that great hope, ideals at once dimmed and perverted when a personal ambition for kingship is falsely ascribed to Jesus. When this is understood, the very love and reverence that Jesus inspires will make it appear like an injustice to him to obscure his own ideal by applying to him titles which he did not covet, but virtually repudiated, and which indicate an entirely different ideal.

Another avenue of approach is to inquire what the term has meant to the Christian Church and what ideal it has suggested. The Christ-conception crystalized in the ecumenic creeds has not exercised a less powerful influence for good and evil in the

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world, because it is, on the whole, so distant from the historic character of Jesus and presents a purely fictitious personality. Men are influenced by their gods and heroes through what they conceive them to be. Isis may never have existed, but during millenniums she helped to shape human life in the valley of the Nile. When the ecclesiastical Christ-idea is considered in its historical character, its power to lift, inspire and bless is not likely to be denied, but neither can its unwholesome nature, its lack of real human virtue, its remoteness from the actual needs and aspirations and objects of man's life upon the earth, be concealed. This ideal has not roots deep enough in the soil of humanity to be an example and an inspiration.

Still another way is to borrow from history nothing but the term and to fill it with a new content. This is in reality done even where an allegorical exegesis reads its own meaning into Biblical texts and creedal expressions. "The Christ" is then only a symbolic name, signifying anything that may seem most ideal in life. There is a strong tendency among the representatives of what has been somewhat loosely called "The New Thought" to use the term thus vaguely. The time-honored name is gently severed from its historic connection and can be applied to the "overman," the "master," the "prophet," anywhere.

Mr. Dresser does not realize the full importance of critical study of the records. His attitude is by no means one of hostility, but rather one of genteel indifference. He does not deem it necessary to examine the genuineness of the Fourth Gospel before he draws from its texts conclusions as to the spirit of the teaching of Jesus, and the synoptic material is used without discrimination. It is of no avail to insist that the object is only to find the spirit. The spirit of Jesus proceeds from his own words, and his words are found only by him who earnestly seeks for them and knows how to disentangle them from later accretions. If the work of criticism is neglected, it is in the end "der Herren eigner Geist" that comes out of the process of reading and meditation. But as the Jesus of history has left his impress upon the synoptic records and has helped to shape the spirit of each leading type of Christian faith revealed in the New Testament, so this modern reader has not failed to feel the glow and inspiration of one who has been with Jesus. His Christ-ideal is far removed from the ecclesiastical conception. Yet it is mystical, and postulates philosophical speculation behind the ethical teach-

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ing of Jesus that reminds both of ancient and modern gnosticism. in interpreting the ethics of Jesus, Mr. Dresser is inclined to break the edge of his injunctions by making them "reasonable." It is better to give them their full force and natural meaning, and to differ from Jesus, if one's own convictions make it necessary. For this new and sympathetically drawn ideal the reader cannot but be grateful. But it must not be forgotten that one man can never be the ideal of any other man. He can render his best service by helping another to form his own ideal for himself and human society.

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